Emotions in International Politics

Beyond Mainstream International Relations

Edited by Yohan Ariffin, Jean-Marc Coicaud and Vesselin Popovski
EMOTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

In recent years, social scientists have increasingly recognized the interconnectedness of thought and emotions. Nowhere is the role of passions more evident than international politics, where pride, anger, guilt, fear, empathy, and other feelings are routinely on display. But in the absence of an overarching theory of emotions, how can we understand their role at the international level?

*Emotions in International Politics* fills the need for theoretical tools in the new and rapidly growing subfield of international relations. Eminent scholars from a range of disciplines consider how emotions can be investigated from an international perspective involving collective players, drawing evidence from such emotionally fraught events as the Rwandan genocide, World War II, the 9/11 attacks, and the Iranian nuclear standoff. The pathbreaking research collected in this volume will be a valuable theoretical guide to understanding conflict and cooperation in international relations.

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This book is an important challenge and corrective to rationalist approaches that assume that politics is a rational activity or can be best described and predicted by rational models. This assumption flies in the face of several millennia of evidence to the contrary. Rationalist approaches further assume that reason is some objective process independent of the motives of actors. However, it can readily be shown that reason, especially when it applies to risk, generates different logics depending on whether actors are motivated by fear, interest or honor.¹ Strangest of all is the application of rationalist models to foreign policy, a subject in which emotions and passions are routinely on display and often the driving forces for leaders, elites and peoples.

All mammals display emotions, but only humans are thought to have sophisticated cognitive capabilities. Many philosophers have valued reason over emotions and considered the former a means of taming the latter and enabling us to rise above animals in our behavior and accomplishments. For Aquinas, most emotions were related to capital sins. In his 1649 Passions de l’Âme [Passions of the Soul], Descartes equated emotions with “uproar,” “social unrest,” vehemence and rowdiness. For Kant, they were illnesses of the mind (Krankheiten des Gemüts), although he touted the therapeutic value of the emotions associated with the sublime. Social science is steeped in this tradition.

Psychologists associate reason with complex cognitive processes that entail logical inference. Political scientists frame reason in terms of means-ends relationships. They have long considered emotional arousal damaging to both inference and goal seeking. Only recently, and thanks in part to neuroscience, have a minority within both disciplines began to consider the beneficial consequences of emotions for

social and political behavior. The present book is among the first studies to explore this relationship in the domain of international relations.

International relations scholars have borrowed extensively from cognitive psychology. They use cognitive biases, heuristics and prospect theory to study foreign policy decision making. Some – myself included – have used motivational models of decision making, drawing on Irving Janis and Leon Mann. Psychobiography, rooted in Freudian concepts, has illuminated the careers and policy decisions of such well-known figures as Martin Luther, Mahatma Gandhi, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. Again, with few exceptions, these scholars turn to emotions to explain deviance from what they consider rational behavior and generally attribute bad outcomes to emotional arousal or the personality structure responsible for it.

Research in neuroscience indicates that emotions are involved in all stages of decision making, and generally in a positive way. They help us to decide what information deserves our attention and how it should be evaluated and acted upon. Reason and affect are so closely entwined in formulating goals and decisions that it is almost impossible to separate them. People who succeed in doing so do not become highly rational and effective actors, but pathological ones. Instrumental reason divorced from emotional commitments reinforces people’s conceptions of themselves as autonomous and egoistic. It leads them to act in selfish, if sometimes efficient, ways and to frame relationships with others in purely strategic ways. They treat others as means, not ends in themselves, to use Kant’s famous distinction. In these circumstances, the pursuit of self-interest is likely to intensify conflict and undermine or prevent the emergence of communities that enable actors to advance

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2 An important exception is George Marcus, W. Russell Neuman and Michael Mackuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).


their interests and satisfy their spirit more effectively by means of cooperative behavior. Modern social science, which welcomes, even propagandizes, the conception of human beings as autonomous, rational actors is thus part of the problem, not a solution to it.

Such a framing appeals to many scholars as scientific and helpful in promoting peace and cooperation. But rationalist models cannot explain these phenomena. The most that realist, liberal institutionalist, social capital and “thin” constructivist theories and models can do is identify conditions likely to facilitate cooperation (e.g., coordination, leadership, institutions, trust), in situations where actors are already predisposed to cooperate. They tell us nothing about how this commitment comes about or how it can be encouraged in an otherwise hostile environment. The more interesting and fundamental question, and one addressed by several chapters in this book, is accounting for an underlying propensity and willingness to cooperate with a given set of actors. In its absence, order is impossible, and cooperation, if possible at all, is unlikely to extend beyond the most obvious, important and self-enforcing issues.8

Conflict and war also require analysis of the ways in which reason and affect interact. Elsewhere, I explore the role of anger arising from sleights to one’s standing as an important cause of war. Several chapters in this volume also explore the role of emotional arousal in war and terrorism.

There is much to be done in elaborating the relationship between reason and affect, and emotions and passions, at the individual, group, national and international levels. The essays in this volume offer insight into these questions and will prove a valuable inspiration and resource for other like-minded scholars.

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Introduction

*How Emotions Can Explain Outcomes in International Relations*

*Yohan Ariffin*

This book is about how emotions can help explain outcomes in international relations. It is now widely recognized that emotions play an important role in world politics as they do in face-to-face relations or in domestic politics. With the exception of a few scholars to whom we shall revert shortly, however, little attention has been paid to examining what this role actually is and how it can be studied. Crawford (2000) and Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) have argued that such neglect arises from the assumption — shared by realists, liberals and neomarxists alike — that foreign policy is pursued on the basis of rational expectations reflecting the “interests” of the actors that partake in international agency. Long regarded as irrational or as interfering with rationality, emotions were not deemed worthy of scientific attention. This perception has changed substantially over recent years. In the life sciences and in the philosophy of mind, the folk dichotomy between “heart” and “mind”, or emotions and thoughts, has now been debunked. Affective and cognitive processes are increasingly seen as integrated. Evidence demonstrates that emotions often play a crucial role in judgement and decision making. By acting as tie-breakers when subjects have to choose among various options, of which none appear to be superior, they are now seen as “a prerequisite for good decision making in many situations” (Damasio, 1994; Västfjäll and Slovic, 2013: 266).

Crawford (2000: 116) points out rightly that emotions have been the subject of denial rather than indifference in the study of international relations. She argues that realists have held tacit, unproblematized assumptions on two emotions, fear and hate, which are in fact “implicit and ubiquitous, but undertheorized” in their theoretical framework. Crawford’s argument can be taken further as there is reason to believe that the other major paradigms in international relations have proceeded along the same lines as realism. It might even be said that each paradigm has in fact *overrationalized* — rather than undertheorized — a select number of emotions, while dismissing other emotions altogether. We know that realists consider states to be motivated primarily by the pursuit of relative power.
Translated into the language of emotions, this amounts to believing that an overriding desire – man’s “lust for power”, for example – is the main driver in the conduct of foreign affairs. This desire elicits envy (or the coveting of others’ possessions) and entails aggrandizement as its purposeful behaviour, but it is tamed by fear, particularly the fear of failure. In classical realism, lust for power is rationalized into “interest defined as power” (Morgenthau, 1956 [1948]: 5), and fear of failure into “risk assessment”, which converts uncertainty into probability. Similarly, classical liberalism is grounded in the premise that human action is motivated by the “desire for bettering our condition” (Smith, 1776: II.3). The purposive behaviour thus prompted is a “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” (Smith, 1776: II.3). Following the “doux commerce” thesis, this propensity is deemed capable of containing excessive power plays in international politics by creating interdependency regarded as an absolute gain for all. In this regard, the distinctive feature of the institution of the marketplace is to tame jealousy (or the fear of losing a possession) and envy (or the resentment caused by another enjoying a possession that one does not have) by turning these emotions into emulation (or the desire to attain economic equality with, or superiority over others). It is therefore apparent that liberalism rationalizes a number of emotions into various kinds of utilitarian self-interests. Similar considerations can be made with regard to Marxism, which considers that lust for wealth and power are the mutually supporting drives in international politics at the capitalist stage, and that this has resulted in the exploitation of the subject classes by the dominant classes. By point of fact, Marxism similarly overrationalizes the emotions involved in this dynamic. Couched in rational terms, greed (or the desire for excess) of the dominant classes becomes “appropriation of surplus value”, and wrath of the expropriated classes becomes “class consciousness”. In view of the foregoing examples, it is apparent that rationality in the main paradigms of international relations theory comprises some form of rationalized emotion. To engage with the role of emotions simply amounts to recognizing what is currently denied despite overwhelming evidence.

The fact remains that emotions differ from thoughts in many ways. They involve specific elements of consciousness referred to as feelings – of pleasure or displeasure. They are personal, internal and usually short-lived. As such, they pose serious methodological challenges to scholars of international relations. Before passing to the question of why this is the case, it is necessary to secure our ground by a brief digression on the notions of desire, emotion, sentiment, attitude and affect, which are often confused:

- **Desire**, following Locke’s classic definition, is an “uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good” (1690: II.xxi.31). The satisfaction of a desire produces pleasure, its frustration results in pain.
• *Emotion* can be defined generally as a feeling associated with the perception, the idea or the judgment that a particular desire is satisfied or not, thereby motivating subjects to take various sorts of action. As a result, emotions are either pleasurable or painful. Such a definition concurs closely with the findings of appraisal theories of emotion. Theorists in this tradition argue that “most, but not all, emotions are elicited and differentiated by people’s evaluation of the significance of events for their well-being” (Moors and Scherer, 2013: 135; Lazarus, 1994). Emotions are bound to cognized feelings or felt cognitions relevant to the well-being of the person who experiences them. Thus, fear or anger is elicited when one cognizes an object or subject as either harmful (with the attendant desire to regain a sense of security) or injurious (with the desire to retaliate); pity or empathy when one cognizes a subject as suffering misfortune (with the desire that his misfortune ceases); envy or jealousy when one cognizes a subject as either enjoying a good that one lacks (with the desire to obtain it) or as seeking to take possession of a good that one enjoys (with the desire to preserve it). From this perspective, the significance of emotions also lies in the particular sorts of action that they motivate people to take or, to put it another way, in the purposive behaviour that they are amenable to prompt. To jump when one is startled by a bear in the woods expresses (1) the action of avoiding (2) an object perceived as threatening harm which (3) initiates certain organic activities. Purposeful behaviour allows us to appreciate the specific role that desire – which brings together cognition and feeling – plays in emotions (in this instance, the desire to avoid harm and to restore the “absent good” which would be a feeling of security). As John Dewey (1895: 20) noted, it is especially important when dealing with emotions to address “the “feel”, the “idea” and the “mode of behavior” in relation to one another”. Following his definition, “emotion in its entirety is a mode of behavior which is purposive, or has an intellectual content, and which also reflects itself into feeling or Affects, as the subjective valuation of that which is objectively expressed in the idea or purpose” (1895: 15).

• *Sentiment* – following Nico Frijda et al. (1991: 207), who build on a long-standing literature in moral philosophy – refers to a “disposition to respond emotionally to a certain object”. This disposition is “not warranted by an eliciting event *per se*” and lasts longer than simply a mood. As Frijda argues, “affections and aversions towards individuals or groups are sentiments”. We hold sentiments about ourselves, our families, our countries and others.

• Sentiments result in *attitudes*, which are positive, negative or indifferent reactions to situations.\(^1\) Reactions of this kind arise from “global evaluations

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\(^1\) I am using the definition of attitude proposed by Read Bain (1928: 951).
of any object such as oneself, other people, issues, and so forth” (Petty et al., 2003: 59).

- Attitude in the foregoing sense is merely a behaviouristic synonym for affect, which entails “positive and negative evaluations (liking/disliking) of an object” (indifference being habitually designated by the term “flat affect”).

Now that we have defined the main notions underlying the study of emotions, we get a better picture of the specific issues and challenges facing scholars of international relations. To begin with, we need to bear in mind that the actors of world politics are collective players who (as such) do not experience feelings, emotions, sentiments or affects, although they can display attitudes. To simply reduce states to governmental decision makers does not in itself solve the problem as scholars of international politics are unable to observe key players in salient situations where emotions may play a role in decision making. Nor can they rely on data, such as memoirs or other retrospective accounts of events, owing to the problems associated with selective memory or post hoc justifications. These are important barriers that need to be overcome in order to ascribe decisions made by heads of states or governments partly or wholly to emotional reactions rather than rational assessments. As long as this ground is left unploughed, emotions cannot be studied as an independent variable capable of effecting decision making in international politics.

Scholars of international relations have therefore sought to highlight the role of emotions from angles other than decision making. A growing body of research has begun to address how a variety of emotional states such as anger, humiliation or revenge function in specific international circumstances. However, space limitations require that focus be put here on scholarship that attempts to develop general theories of how emotions matter in world politics. Studies of this kind have been undertaken from the perspectives of constructivism (Neta Crawford and Jonathan Mercer), cultural theory (Ned Lebow), political philosophy (Pierre Hassner) and psychoanalysis (Pierre de Senarclens). As mentioned earlier, Crawford (2000) argues in her essay that emotions are central to international relations, and that realists hold implicit assumptions about them, in particular fear and anger, which accordingly should deserve more attention. At the time of finalizing this volume, she has turned to studying how fear has been institutionalized or “translated and embodied into practices and procedures” that articulate ideas, organize knowledge, particularly military doctrines, routinize decision-making operations and eventually lead to building physical structures and adopting technologies – such as biometrics – to protect borders (Crawford, 2014: 547). The purpose of her reflections is partly normative by aiming to provide the opportunity to think of how empathy that makes

3 Cf. Coicaud’s review of literature in Chapter 1.
friendship possible, rather than fear, can be promoted and institutionalized in international politics.

Mercer (2010: 2) proposes to conflate emotions and beliefs into a single entity that he calls “emotional belief” defined as “one where emotion constitutes and strengthens a belief and which makes possible a generalization about an actor that involves certainty beyond evidence”. This would allow the study of emotions through the cognitive component of the beliefs of which they are a feature. More recently, Mercer (2014) suggests building on the work conducted earlier by intergroup emotions theorists. Intergroup emotions are group-level emotions shared across members that motivate people to take action specifically related to implications for the in-group, such as confronting an out-group perceived as threatening (Smith and Mackie, 2008).

Lebow (2008) has been developing a motivational theory of international relations. Basing his beliefs on classical Greek philosophy, he contends that political communities, because they are made up of men and women, are driven by three fundamental components of the human psyche, namely reason (nomos), appetite (epithumia, which encompasses our biological and more sophisticated urges) and spirit (thumos, or the desire to be esteemed and respected by others, which manifests itself first and most simply as anger at slights or injustices, but which can provide the motivational force for much political action aiming at securing honour and victory). Adding fear to these three components, and applying them to the study of ancient, medieval, early modern, modern and contemporary polities, Lebow traces various world orders built around combinations of spirit, appetite, reason and fear. A similar concern with the role of emotions in international relations is expressed in the works of Hassner (2005), who has explored – from the perspective of political philosophy – the avenues by which fear, honour and greed shape what he calls the “geopolitics of emotions” in contemporary international relations.

Both Lebow’s and Hassner’s works, however, focus on conscious social emotions. Pierre de Senarclens (2010), for his part, stresses the importance of unconscious mental processes in intercommunal behaviour. Basing himself on a psychoanalytic reading of the emotional weight that group identities carry, de Senarclens argues that Freud’s cultural texts remain an important source of insight despite the critiques voiced by sociologists who fear being dragged back into “psychological reductionism”. He points out that the nation-state is

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4 In the Phaedrus (253c–254e), Plato compares the human psyche to the dynamic relation between a charioteer and his pair of horses, one of them “noble and good” and the other of an “opposite stock”. The charioteer personifies the reasoning part of the soul (nomos), the “good” horse is its spirited part (thumos) in charge of the elevated, self-conscious emotions, while the “bad” horse embodies its appetitive part (epithumia). The role of nomos is to direct the path of the chariot, which requires that he trains the bad horse to obey his direction.
not merely a geopolitical or sociological entity, but is infused with unconscious emotional feelings at the root of all communal groups. As object relations theorists have underlined, the nation can provide “good narcissistic images” to subjects prone to anxiety and fragmentation (Kristeva, 1983; Volkan, 1988); but it can also exacerbate their aggressive drives with destructive consequences in times of crises.

Our brief look at the state of recent research that offers generalizable propositions on emotions in international relations reveals that, despite the fact that few specialists have so far engaged with this topic, their contributions are very engaging. These inquiries basically fall into two groups. Some are highly original essays, which by virtue of their idiosyncrasy are not particularly amenable to further developments by other than their authors who are all experienced scholars. This applies to the studies undertaken by de Senarclens, Hassner and Lebow. The second group of inquiries is made up of seminal articles formulating programmatic calls for future research, which – while intuitively appealing – are not yet based on substantiated research and still lack practical methodological propositions as to how such research may be carried out. I only touch here on a few aspects of the latter works.

The notion of “emotional belief” proposed by Mercer has its appeal, but its study poses a number of challenges. While ideas may simply be expressed, beliefs need to be experienced. In other words, beliefs differ from ideas in that they take the form of representations deemed true in people’s minds. This brings us back to the nagging problem of how the analyst can get inside the heads of actors, in this instance to determine whether they actually share beliefs that have a particular emotion as a property. Moreover, not all emotional beliefs are social, fixed or dispositional; they may well be individual, transient or occurrent, with limited impact on collective behaviour. Finally, there remains the problem of determining how and to what extent these beliefs actually influence group behaviour.

A similar difficulty arises with respect to the study of intergroup emotions. As the social-psychological pioneers of the concept noted, “intergroup emotions are experienced by individuals (when they identify as members of a group), not by some kind of group mind” (Smith and Mackie, 2008: 429). Establishing how group memberships that extend beyond face-to-face contacts – such as in the case of a “nation” – may take on such emotional importance for a large number of individuals as to issue in collective behaviour is by no means a straightforward matter. Stereotypes may possibly provide relevant content for investigating the effects of intergroup emotions. Their study however would require appropriate methods capable of revealing how in-group or out-group prejudices actually influence collective behaviour. Until then, the study of intergroup emotions in world politics will remain a matter of programmatic formulation.
Institutionalization of emotions may be an avenue for future research less riddled with obstacles. The role of social institutions in shaping emotions has been an ongoing subject of study in history and macrosociology. It seems obvious that at least some intersocietal regimes have been designed to ensure, among other things, the management of specific emotions such as fear or trust. The challenge here is to combine the study of discursive and non-discursive practices, of emotional speech acts produced by leaders, which are eventually embedded in institutions that seek to achieve specific functions by, inter alia, regulating emotions. This may be done by using analytical tools developed in the field of the history of emotions. We have only to mention here the concept of “emotional communities” devised by Barbara Rosenwein (2006) to study social groups as systems of feeling. Contemporary “security communities” rest on a “we-sentiment”, which in turn is based on trust defined by Barbalet (1996) as the emotional foundation of cooperation by way of involving the perception that another’s will corresponds to one’s own expectations. Building “security communities” can be viewed as a process which seeks to institutionalize an overall attitude of trust through various cognitive practices that gradually shape a larger, mutually valued identity, and through diplomatic policies aiming at socializing state elites to become motivationally aligned with the “cognitive region” in the making (Adler, 2005) or with the “nonterritorial functional space” (Ruggie, 1993). Conversely, distrust, which can be defined following Worchel (1979) as “a sense of readiness for danger and an anticipation of discomfort”, cognizes relationships with out-groups as taking place within a dysfunctional space of conflicting interests. This results in institutionalized practices of confinement and control that take the form of various walls of separation, real or metaphoric, the apparent purpose of which is to provide sanctuary (the Great Wall of China, Hadrian’s Wall, the Iron Curtain, the Berlin Wall, the Israeli West Bank Wall). International relations are made up of a great number of “emotional communities”, some larger and some smaller than the “imagined community” that is the nation-state. As Barbara Rosenwein (2002: 35) points out, the concept of “emotional community” allows the researcher to look at various social and political entities from the perspective of what they “define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations that they make about others’ emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore”. By focusing our attention on these points, new light can be shed on patterns of conflict and cooperation in world politics relating to topics as diverse as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that emerged from the Marshall Plan, or the ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict. Such subjects are clearly ones of burning topicality: emotional communities have fostered cooperation with in-groups, crystallized adversarial relationships with out-groups, or done both simultaneously. It would certainly be possible to study the emotional
speech acts (or performatives) made by leaders prior to the institutionalization of such communities, just as it appears largely feasible to analyse how the latter, once established, have attempted to manage emotions. Lack of primary sources should not be a cause of concern as many contemporary emotional communities produce an abundance of texts.

Our quick glance at the state of research on emotions in international relations shows that, while innovative studies have been undertaken on this topic, there is still need to develop, explore and especially test theories and methods. It may be welcomed that there is no grand paradigm or “universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners” (Kuhn, 1970: viii). Current research, however, is overly fragmented. Each scholar appears to have an incommensurable idea about emotions and what kind of questions should be asked. Under these conditions, tentative theories and methods requiring testing, improving and extending are unlikely to reach maturity.

The purpose of this volume is to pause and reflect on how to begin remediating some of these problems. We started from the premise that humility should be exercised by looking at the body of knowledge developed in other disciplines. Scholars of emotions coming from various fields of study were asked how emotions could be investigated from an international perspective involving collective players. International relations specialists contributing to this volume were committed to interdisciplinary approaches, and many have a track record of research in a range of other fields. The intent of the editors was to address existing gaps in knowledge by providing cross-disciplinary theoretical and empirical inquiries.

The book is presented in two parts. The first part features essays from political science, psychoanalysis, philosophy, history, sociology, economics and law. The second part focuses on emotions in foreign policy decision making, and examines emotions in war and in peace.

Part I of the book explores the role of emotions in international politics from a plurality of disciplines and methodologies. Jean-Marc Coicaud’s first essay serves as an anchor for the debate. He highlights tendencies to which we have briefly alluded to explain why, despite progress in recent years, emotions remain overlooked in the discipline of international relations. Coicaud calls into question realism’s denial of the role that emotions play in world politics, a denial that appears entirely inconsistent with a theoretical framework infused with fearful assessments about the capabilities and intentions of U.S. opponents. He likewise queries rationalism’s dry conception of collective actors as rational, self-interested utility-maximizers. Coicaud concludes, in his second essay, that emotions and passions matter all the more so in international politics as they can generate in crowds feelings about whether or not rights are respected, motivate collective international or transnational action to assert denied rights, and thereby contribute to social and political change.
While Coicaud focuses on how emotions may be crucial to reasoning and behaving well, Pierre de Senarclens in his chapter on “Psychoanalysis and the Study of Emotions in International Politics” is concerned with how emotions can also interfere with good reasoning and lead subjects to behave destructively. De Senarclens suggests that it is worth rereading Freud as a social theorist. Deeply concerned by the destructiveness of war, Freud was led to address questions as to what mental processes lead men to bind into social structures, how these structures are established, at what cost for their members, and why they so often fail. Organized groups are entities with which members identify, and the psychological source of their identification is to be found within their original family relations. Fundamental to Freud’s concept of the human psyche is the notion of primordial ambivalence, namely the presence of conflicting drives, in particular love and hate. Cultural identification is a response to such ambivalence rooted in images of loved parental figures, in hostile impulses directed towards them and in concomitant feelings of guilt.

Although based on his clinical findings and representing no less than a third of his work – which indicates the importance that he ascribed to the study of social phenomena – Freud’s cultural texts remain speculative. How do such conjectures fare now that emotion has become a hot topic in cognitive science in general and in neuroscience in particular? Jean-Michel Roy’s chapter reflects on the emotive turn in cognitive science. Considerable understanding has been recently achieved on how brain circuits process emotion. Back in the 1990s, a team of neuroscientists at the University of Parma discovered a general neural mechanism – ascribed to a specific class of brain cells called “mirror neurons” – that enables subjects to understand the meaning of other people’s actions, intentions and emotions. These neurons fire when an individual performs a familiar action and – this is perhaps the most important point – when he/she thinks of or observes others performing the action. By contributing to make what others do and feel as part of the individual’s own experience, mirror neurons are thought to grant humans the ability to empathise with others. However tantalizing this discovery may be, it still leaves open the question of how these neurons actually acquire their mirror properties. Recent research tends to conclude that the latter can be exaggerated, reversed or even nullified through learning experiences. In other words, mirror properties are neither innate nor fixed once acquired (Catmur, Walsh and Heyes, 2007). This would imply that to experience empathy humanity is not “hard-wired”, but rather “soft-wired” through various cultural processes. Clearly the most spectacular breakthroughs in neuroscience have not settled the longstanding “nature-nurture” debate, as those responsible for the mirror neurons discovery readily admit themselves:

The data reviewed in this essay show that the intuition of Adam Smith—individuals are endowed with an altruistic mechanism that makes them share the “fortunes” of others—is strongly supported by neurophysiological data. When we observe others, we enact their actions inside ourselves and we share their emotions. Can we deduce from this that the mirror mechanism is the mechanism from which altruistic behavior evolved? This is obviously a very hard question to answer. Yet, it is very plausible that the mirror mechanism played a fundamental role in the evolution of altruism. The mirror mechanism transforms what others do and feel in the observer’s own experience. The disappearance of unhappiness in others means the disappearance of unhappiness in us and, conversely, the observation of happiness in others provides a similar feeling in ourselves. Thus, acting to render others happy—an altruistic behavior—is transformed into an egoistic behavior—we are happy. Adam Smith postulated that the presence of this sharing mechanism renders the happiness of others “necessary” for human beings, “though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.” This, however, appears to be a very optimistic view. In fact, an empathic relationship between others and ourselves does not necessarily bring positive consequences to the others. The presence of an unhappy person may compel another individual to eliminate the unpleasant feeling determined by that presence, acting in a way that is not necessary the most pleasant for the unhappy person. To use the mirror mechanism—a biological mechanism—strictly in a positive way, a further—cultural—addition is necessary. It can be summarized in the prescription: “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets” (Matthew 7, 12). This “golden rule,” which is present in many cultures besides ours (see Changeux and Ricoeur 1998), uses the positive aspects of a basic biological mechanism inherent in all individuals to give ethical norms that eliminate the negative aspects that are also present in the same biological mechanism (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2005: 119–120).

Lacking innate and fixed properties, mirror neurons are unlikely to help us understand more fully particular outcomes in diplomatic negotiations. Sociology appears in this regard better suited to analyse the emotions that may be aroused under certain social structural conditions to produce particular effects on behaviour, such as giving in to, rather than disregarding totally, an unhappy party to a negotiation in order to do away with the unpleasant feeling created by his/her distress. “The Sociology of Face-to-Face Emotions” by James Jasper, a leading practitioner of the sociology of emotions applied to the study of social movements (Jasper 1998), raises a series of questions and methodological challenges that scholars of international relations need to address in order to study adequately the role of emotions in world politics. Firstly, anthropomorphisms should be diligently avoided on the obvious though often ignored grounds that collective players cannot have emotions. Secondly, strategic dilemmas in diplomatic negotiations involving
emotional tradeoffs – such as the “band of brothers dilemma” or the “naughty or nice dilemma” – may be worth investigating alongside more classical quandaries such as the “security dilemma”. Thirdly, one must recognize that “even in a globalized world, many crucial interactions remain face to face” and can therefore be analysed with sociological tools: “global civil society” in fact amounts to no more than a series of face-to-face encounters in various forums, venues or meetings, as do diplomatic negotiations. Finally, leaders carry out – as do INGO activists – rhetorical work to transform “emotional raw materials” into specific ideas motivating action, a process to which greater attention should be paid. Needless to say, there are many challenges involved in evaluating the rhetorical and performative work carried out by activists or elected officials who appeal to emotions in their quest for support; however, the game is worth the candle, considering the wide range of theories and methods that have been applied in the sociology of emotions (cf. Stets and Turner, 2006).

History of emotions is another burgeoning field from which scholars of international relations can take inspiration. In his chapter, Peter Stearns, the distinguished pioneer in this field of studies, explores whether “emotionology” – defined as “attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, maintain toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression” and “ways that institutions reflect and encourage these attitudes in human conduct” (Stearns and Stearns, 1985: 813) – has to some degree transcended cultural boundaries and the role of media in triggering and guiding global emotional responses. Timely research questions emerge from Stearns’ essay. To what extent are we witnessing the emergence of a new emotional standard in the form of global empathy towards victims of certain kinds of injustice or international disasters? Have global social processes such as demographic transition brought about similar adjustments in emotionology, in particular grief management, or separate adjustments following various cultural traditions? What conclusions can be drawn from the loosening abroad of national emotional constraints (for example, the conduct of U.S. foreign policy has often been marked by strong expressions of choler despite the fact that anger standards in domestic politics require that efforts be made to hold it in check)? Is this a demonstration of the “hydraulic theory” of emotion, which propounds that suppression of a primary emotion will cause it to emerge in other forms? Last but not least, the emotional culture of a superpower may have global implications worth studying. For example, shifts during the Vietnam War in American public sensitivity to military casualties has obviously had an impact on U.S. foreign engagements since then. Wars have had to be fought taking into account low public tolerance for mounting casualties and high public sensitivity towards war weariness.

It is however in the field of economic behaviour that the influence of emotions is most obvious. Keynes – it should be remembered – believed that, in the face of fundamental uncertainty, rational quantitative calculation may in fact stand in the
way of making crucial decisions. He used the term “animal spirits” to refer to the gut feelings, or the “constructive impulses”, that enable some entrepreneurs to make investment decisions, which they would not have, had they thought “too precisely”, in particular of possible loss:

A large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits – a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities … We are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions affecting the future, whether personal or political or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation since the basis for making such calculations does not exist (Keynes, 1964: 161–163).

Animal spirits are a kind of positive “somatic marker” avant la lettre. Formulated by the neurologist Antonio Damasio, the “somatic marker hypothesis” suggests that emotional processes can be crucial in assisting decision making, especially when subjects face conflicting choices. “When a negative somatic marker [such as fear] is juxtaposed to a particular future outcome the combination functions as an alarm bell. When a positive somatic marker [such as elation] is juxtaposed instead, it becomes a beacon of incentive” (Damasio, 1994: 174). Keynes viewed the idea of animal spirits favourably, as a positive somatic marker, in that it contributed to maintain investment at adequate levels.

In her chapter on the international financial sector, Jocelyn Pixley similarly argues that “future-oriented emotions, the anticipatory emotions (Kemper 1978) of trust, distrust into the future … play by far the major role in the actions of this sector than rational calculation”. However when applied to financial capital as opposed to productive capital, animal spirits may in fact take the form – as in the subprime crisis – of overconfidence in sophisticated statistical models of risk. Regulations, based on political distrust towards banks, are generally perceived by the latter as hurting profits, which in turn leads them to take more risks insofar as these are considered low by usually untested mathematical models. Pixley’s analysis encourages additional research on whether distrust displayed by states tends to result in defiance on the part of banks, thereby trapping the two parties in a vicious circle of mistrust whereby regulatory action taken by governments to mitigate risks that arise from financial operations are promptly undermined by the banking sector, which reintroduces risk in ever more sophisticated (albeit disguised or even hidden) forms.

The issue of regulation brings us to the central question of emotions and the law. In the closing chapter of Part I, Vesselin Popovski explores the multifarious
functions performed by law in relation to emotions. Law can express emotions; more often, it channels them. We know that fear of and anger at others are regulated by fear of the penal system, which embodies legitimate anger at perpetrators of harmful behaviour. In this regard, law serves to satisfy particular passions, such as the desire of vengeance. The judicial process may also elevate these passions to more complex forms of emotional phenomena, for example by leading the victim to forgive the offender, or by exposing the latter to sincere remorse. If law shapes emotions, the reverse also occurs when the latter are led to play a role in making the law or in bringing justice. Popovski notes that at the very heart of international humanitarian law lies an emotional phenomenon: empathy towards victims. As for the role emotion may play in the work of the judge, he argues that the issue is rightly regarded as problematic for fear that emotionalism jeopardizes the impartial administration of justice. In any event, our understanding of the makings and workings of international legal institutions – such as Military Tribunals or more recently the International Criminal Court – can no doubt benefit from taking into account changes in emotional standards that eventually allowed advanced societies to respond through law to acts hitherto rarely punished because the perpetrators acted with the authority and protection of governments.

Focusing first on emotions in foreign-policy decision making, Part II of the volume moves into largely uncharted territory. It has long been recognized that decision making can be guided by cognitions. Although approaches vary significantly, research has aimed at demonstrating that cognitive contents and/or processes have a direct effect on policymakers. Operational code framework (Leites, 1951), cognitive mapping (Robert Axelrod, 1976), image theory (Jervis, 1976; Cottam, 1986) and conceptual complexity (Driver, 1977) all hypothesize that perceptions, ideas or beliefs significantly influence foreign policy decision making (for a review, see Young and Schafer, 1998). By and large, however, emotions have been a blind spot in these research programmes.

The central theme of the first three essays in Part II is that our understanding of decision making may in some instances be impoverished were one to embrace blindly the rationalist ideal and take no heed of any possibly significant influence of the emotions on policymakers. Moving on from there, the chapters present differences of views over the approach to be taken.

My chapter aims at taking up the challenge put forth by Bleiker and Hutchison (2008: 125), who contended that the problems we face in our attempts to render emotions intelligible can only “result in research that is speculative or tenuous at best”. I argue that empirical research is feasible and that the study of emotions can open exciting avenues insofar as the inquiry is confined to their discursive expressions by significant subjects. This implies studying the role of emotives rather than emotions per se. By which I mean cognitions whose distinctive nature is to
excite an emotion for political purposes. When mobilized by state actors, emotives represent a resource liable to support power policies. They can, however, be used by non-state actors to achieve political change in the international system. When successfully brought into play they impart stimuli for purposeful behaviour and can—as a result—be implemented in policies and eventually embedded in institutions.

Ainius Lašas’s chapter explores the extent to which American leniency towards the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Paul Kagame, particularly as regards the role played by the United States in the failure to indict RPF officers suspected of having committed war crimes in Rwanda in 1994, can be attributed to feelings of guilt about failed responsibility to stop the genocide. Lašas concludes that in the absence of substantive geopolitical stakes, the reluctance on the part of U.S. authorities to criticize the RPF can only be ascribed to their seeking in this way psychological exoneration for past inaction.

Asia Alexieva proposes a method termed “affective mapping” to portray the Kennedy administration’s emotional state during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The method is applied in three stages: “(1) data construction, including textual analysis, sequencing, and grounded coding of mostly primary material; (2) data analysis, involving drawing snapshot emotional maps and zooming into some of their structures, and (3) hypothesis generation and testing, consisting of clustering, labelling and macro mapping”. She hypothesizes that U.S. policymakers experienced embarrassment as a result of the Bay of Pigs botched invasion. This emotion is inferred from content analyses of written and spoken words by significant subjects, combined with an inquiry into the diplomatic behaviour of the Kennedy administration, which displayed attempts to conceal, excuse and repress the incident while adopting a policy of restraint in its immediate aftermath; these are all elements that are congruent with the experience of embarrassment.

The following four essays explore the role of emotions in war. A common thread running through all contributions is the question: What role does culture play in the production of emotions conducive to collective violence? Culture is understood here holistically as the “code of conduct embedded in or constitutive of social life” (Peterson 1990: 498).

Following Freud’s insights, Pierre de Senarclens reminds us that the psychological source of cultural identification is to be found within family relations. As a result, culture is—as mentioned earlier—emotionally ambivalent by way of being rooted in images of loved parental figures, but also in hostile impulses towards them, and in ensuing feelings of guilt. Freud’s cultural texts span twenty years (Freud 1955, 1957 and 1961), from his first essay, “‘Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness” (1908), to his major work, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930). As a result, there are obviously discontinuities in his thought. However, continuity manifests
Introduction

itself in his central concern, namely to study the source of the intense emotions of loyalty and/or rebelliousness which institutionalized groups arouse in their members. Continuity is also apparent in Freud’s belief that social bonds are by-products of our shared filial sense of guilt, whether the latter be rooted in the inherited memory of a “primal crime”, in the Oedipal fantasy of parricide, or in feelings of hatred caused by the wounding of infantile narcissism by admonitions from parental figures. Overall, Freud stressed that the psychological motive underlying social identifications is mainly ego defensive by helping the ego ward off all at once threatening id impulses (that channel libido impulses) and harsh or punitive superego injunctions (forming the evaluative codes in a society’s culture). He argued that culture allows for repressed id impulses to be displaced onto aim-inhibited libidinal relations among the group of peers, and for repressed superego injunctions to be displaced onto identifications with a leader or an institution personifying the fantasized image of the all-powerful, all-knowing, all-giving, all-loving parent with which subjects crave to (re)connect. Another means used by society to inhibit aggressive id drives, besides allowing for displacements and cultivating feelings of guilt, is to project hostility outside the group through the cultivation of a “narcissism of minor differences”. However, this balance of power, so to say, which social identifications allow subjects to establish between their id impulses and their superego injunctions – by conjoining in socially useful ways their instincts of aggression and submission, their feelings of love and hate, and their no less conflicting needs for individuation and union – is highly delicate and unstable. Hence, the vicissitudes of social order constantly stressed by Freud. If the demands exerted by society from its members involve too high a quantity of renunciation of their id impulses, this can prove pathogenic, as subjects are led to obey outwardly to social injunctions while inwardly rebelling against them through their neuroses. Conversely, if superego identifications lack or fail, this can lead to anomie and eventually to the dissolution of the social bond in an orgy of mass violence. Finally, war can be a tragic means by which “the organism preserves its own life, so to say, by destroying an extraneous one”, as Freud stated in his 1932 response to Einstein’s letter “Why war?”.

In his essay, “The Dialectic of Rage”, Pierre Hassner invites us to consider culture as polarized at the global level between “bourgeois powers inspired by possessive individualism and groups or cultures inspired by more traditional, warlike or manly passions, based on pride or honour, or on religious fanaticism and sacrifice”. These opposing values, however, should not be conflated with a particular region or “civilization” (as Huntington believes). Epithumia, or the kind of appetite evinced in possessive individualism, and thumos have proponents in both Northern and Southern hemisphere countries. Within and between nations, this cultural conflict appears to be at the core of contemporary passionate
politics, engendering disruptive emotions, such as anger, which in turn elicit their restorative counterpart: fear.

Jean-Marc Coicaud’s third essay is a study in the emotions that played a part in the outbreak of World War II. A key factor, he argues, in stirring up aggressive drives among the population in Germany and Japan was a political culture that heightened feelings of insecurity and bred negative emotions, such as frustration and resentment, on the grounds that the nation was not being dealt with on an equal footing with the great Western powers.

Andrew A. G. Ross, writing about post-9/11 U.S. policies, similarly focuses on affective processes sustained in this case by a cultural context marked by acute fear of terrorism. These processes have given a veneer of legitimacy to various violations of human rights, which were translated into legal exceptions deemed necessary to contain an enemy who was labelled stereotypically as unpredictable, dangerous and savage.

The final chapters of the section explore the role of emotions in peace. Naomi Head begins her chapter by arguing that dialogue, empathy and trust are endowed with reflexive capacities allowing parties to transition from a conflictual situation to conciliatory outcomes. The continuing standoff with Iran over its nuclear programme illustrates this point. Four resolutions imposing sanctions against Iran have been adopted by the Security Council since 2006, which represents an unprecedented application of the Council’s enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Head notes that “Iran can only achieve the Security Council’s trust in its peaceful nuclear intentions if it satisfies a series of conditions (including the indefinite suspension of enrichment activities)”. Iranian refusal to continue suspension only raised levels of mistrust over its intentions. Surely a dose of perspective taking – imagining oneself in another’s place – would have led Security Council members to interpret the government’s refusal not necessarily as an intention to develop a nuclear weapon but as preserving a sense of pride. Empathy, together with dialogue, would enable the parties to build sufficient trust to break the deadlock in high conflict situations.

The question that I am concerned with in my chapter is why there is a regime complex for “plant genetic resources”. I argue that the appeal to emotions can largely account for this enigma. The dynamic purpose of each regime is assisted by emotive meanings associated with the world views and the normative and causal ideas conveyed by the regime. In other words, each regime is based on particular ways not only of thinking but perhaps more importantly of emoting.

The two central themes of this volume are that reason cannot be totally detached from emotion and that emotions are a good heuristic for understanding conflict and cooperation in international relations. We hope that new lines of argument are opened, and fruitful differences of opinion are introduced.
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PART I

Towards an Interdisciplinary Analysis of Emotions in International Politics
Emotion and Change: Where History Comes In

Peter N. Stearns

The scenario is intriguing. At the Tehran conference, an ebullient President Roosevelt tries repeatedly to get the dour Josef Stalin to break out a smile. At least that is what Roosevelt later claimed in a personal account, asserting that he attempted a charm offensive with the Soviet leader by telling jokes at Churchill’s expense. Stalin, FDR went on, smiled vaguely, which convinced the American that he was on the right track in establishing a personal rapport that would alter Soviet intransigence. It did not, and whether Roosevelt’s effort to use cheer to win Stalin’s trust affected the conduct of the conference in any serious way remains unclear; but it certainly provided relevant context. What was happening was a revealing disparity between historical trajectories in two emotional cultures, both the role and importance of cheerfulness. And, the American assumption that cheerful, superficial friendliness was a key diplomatic tactic has cropped up recurrently since that point, even in dealing with more recent Russian leaders.¹

Roosevelt was a smiler, probably the first American president regularly to make sure that most of his photographed public appearances involved a broad smile. FDR’s public cheerfulness was quite possibly a function of personality in part, but it also responded to increasing imperatives in American culture to put on a happy demeanor.

An initial move toward encouraging greater cheerfulness took shape in Western culture generally in the eighteenth century,² following a period in which dominant emphasis, if only for religious reasons, had been on a certain level of melancholy. New thinking about the possibility and importance of happiness, associated with the


My thanks to my colleague Eric Shiraev for his insights on this subject.
Enlightenment, and prosaic changes such as better dentistry (which made people more comfortable with smiling), seem responsible for the initial changes in tone. This new culture spread gradually over ensuing decades. Foreign travelers by the early nineteenth century were commenting on Americans’ particular proclivity for wishing to appear happy. Then in the 1920s, associated with a new surge in consumer culture and changes in management styles, both pointing to the need to overcome “negative” emotions and project cheerfulness, the whole culture escalated, again with the United States seemingly in the lead. Trainers like Dale Carnegie showed how salesmen could woo customers by continuing to smile, whatever the provocation; a truly amazing series of popular how-to book titles emerged, from the 1920s onward, including *Sunshine in Thought, Cheerfulness as a Life Power, The Influence of Joy*, and simply *I’m So Happy*. This was a setting in which American leaders such as Roosevelt decided that public cheerfulness was an important political attribute and in which many Americans became visibly uncomfortable when they were not surrounded by apparently cheerful people.

Soviet Russia also emphasized the importance of happiness—the goal was listed in the *Soviet Encyclopedia* of the 1930s—but this did not include the need to keep smiling. Soviet consumer outlets, like the GUM department stores, catered to employees more than customers, and therefore did not impose emotional requirements like public happiness. And communist leaders, focused on the serious stuff of revolution, visibly did not generally adopt a smiling visage in public appearances—although Stalin was capable of loud laughter on occasion. (Revealingly, when McDonalds came to Russia in 1991, well after Stalin, it faced a major task in training employees to put on a smile.) So Stalin, again in addition to personality, was the product of a different emotional culture, involved in a different historical trajectory. The result: an interesting diplomatic moment in the early stages of what became the cold war.

The principal contribution of historians to the study of emotion involves a focus on changing emotional standards and experiences—as in the Western shift toward greater cheerfulness during the Enlightenment, and through this the opportunity to explore both the causes and the consequences of innovation. Through assessing the dimensions of change, historians can also contribute to the challenging task of comparing emotional cultures from one society or group to the next—an analytical area that is just beginning to emerge. Potentially as well, historians can help relate the phenomenon of emotional change to areas like international relations.

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Change is a challenging analytical assignment, and many researchers on emotions have, understandably, ignored the complexity entirely, assuming a constant human experience. Emotions historians themselves struggle with change. In this still-new field, a typical configuration involves initial claims of massive shifts, followed by revisionist protests, followed by more tempered but still significant statement. Thus at one early point, historians of the premodern European family, impressed with the lack of modern-style emotional emphases both in marriages and in parent-child relations, argued that traditional families sponsored no more emotion than one would expect in a bird’s nest. Medievalists loudly protested, claiming that extensive emotional commitments existed earlier (as one would expect from what is, after all, a single human species). Some even argued that there was no modern change at all.7 More recent attempts have distinguished between premodern parental reactions, for example, and what has developed in more recent times without claiming that the earlier parents were devoid of emotional attachments.8 Similar discussions are now underway concerning anger control. The goal is to recognize change, but at the same time not oversimplify the earlier past.

More than passing reference to a real history of emotion remains a relative newcomer in the history discipline, and the field has yet to be fully established. French social historians in the famous Annales School began calling for work on emotion in the 1930s, as part of exploring all aspects of the human experience in the past, but explicit follow-up began to emerge only about a half-century later.9 Several centers for study in emotions history have arisen, for example, at Queen Mary University in London, the University of Western Australia, and also in Berlin.10 While most historical research continues to focus on European and United States settings, and most theoretical consideration – for example, the exploration of Norbert Elias’s “civilizing process” – also has a Western orientation, a bit of interest begins to emerge for other geographical settings such as China. Most historical work on emotion has focused on collective standards and group response – whether the “group” is a social class, a gender, a religious sect – with explicit or implicit links to similar interests in fields like anthropology and sociology.11 An earlier approach, strongly linked to Freudianism and centered more on biography, often called psychohistory, proved less fruitful and has largely been abandoned.12

Historical work on emotion depends heavily on attention to the interaction between emotional standards or culture – what has been variously referred to as “feeling rules” or “emotionology” – and actual emotional experience. Attention to change moves historians toward the constructionist camp, in arguing that key aspects of emotion – not, necessarily, the whole phenomenon – are determined by cultural setting or by factors for which culture serves as a vital intermediary. And because cultures can and do change, historians comfortably argue that emotions do as well. But the relationships are admittedly complex.

Emotional rules clearly vary from one society to the next and change over time. The changes normally leave clear records – in sermons, prescriptive literature such as childrearing or marriage manuals, or other kinds of advice and guidance. It is always interesting, and often significant, to figure out why such changes occur, what kinds of new cultural influences or material experiences are involved, for this inquiry probes what societies seek to accomplish through emotions and emotional constraints. Shifts in emotional standards often generate new words. In the eighteenth century, the word “tantrum” was introduced to designate now-unacceptable, presumably childish outbursts of anger. In the later nineteenth century, the word “sissy” moved from its original meaning of sister, to denote a boy or man who was too easily overcome by fear and too slow to generate righteous anger at an affront. Neologisms chart an intriguing path to navigate some of the key changes in emotional culture.

Emotional standards usually shape public arrangements, including laws and, often, rituals. To this extent, they are significant even aside from actual emotional impact. They also affect how people evaluate others’ emotions, and even their own; and they help explain the extent to which societies may seek to conceal certain emotional realities. Changes in emotional standards also help shape childhood socialization. Data in these final categories may be harder to come by, compared to impacts in law or public ritual, but evidence from diaries and letters is increasingly being used to help explore impact. But emotions historians seek to go beyond these first- and second-level results, to see if emotional experience itself changes. It is assumed that, because part of “real” emotion depends on cognitive judgments in which basic stimuli are assessed and channeled, many people will try to adapt their emotions to prevailing standards, which means that emotion itself alters, although not necessarily completely. But obviously, historically, and even in the present, evidence of “real” emotion is the hardest element to identify reliably.

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A specific case illustrates and clarifies the issues involved in the most characteristic historical analysis, along with the gains that come from historical inquiry: American culture toward grief was transformed in the span of a few decades, between the 1880s and the 1920s, with ramifications still visible today. In the late nineteenth century, middle-class, Protestant emotional reactions to death were clearly scripted in the United States. Individuals might spontaneously share in the recommendations or merely prudently trim their sails, but the standards were pretty definite. Great emphasis was placed on the importance of grief. The author of one family manual argued that grief at the death of a loved one was really the consummation of familial love, uniting the family around a bittersweet sadness. Etiquette manuals specified elaborate procedures for conveying grief to a family or individual suffering loss. Mourning symbols (such as black armbands and draperies on a home), stylized funerals and increasingly elaborate cemeteries all showed how expected emotion was translated into both ceremony and monument. Revealingly, doll kits were available for girls, complete with mourning paraphernalia and coffins, to help prepare a womanly role as grief leaders for a respectable family.\(^{15}\)

Significant and surprisingly abrupt change set in by the second decade of the twentieth century. A new set of advice givers, writing particularly in American popular magazines, explicitly noted their aversion to practices of the past, urging a modern approach that would dispense with the emotionally excessive and wasteful indulgences in grief that had marked the Victorian era. Grief should be downplayed, as it dissipated time and energy and additionally posed an unacceptable burden for others. Children should be kept away from grief altogether, as it was too powerful an emotion for them to handle and was in any event unnecessary. In this new approach, people who could not recover from grief quickly were urged to seek professional help, and “grief work” among therapists largely focused (as it still does for the most part today) in helping people eliminate the emotion as quickly as possible. Correspondingly, etiquette books changed, at least by 1950, to focus not on what others owed to a grieving family, but on how individuals must avoid inflicting emotional pain on others through pronounced or prolonged signs of distress.\(^{16}\) This was a dramatically new approach.

So there is no question about sweeping changes in standards over just a few decades. What consequences did this upheaval in standards have? Can people really shift gears on grief so quickly, just because cultural authorities tell them to (aside of course from the troublesome minority who had to get counseling, an indication


already that the formula did not always work smoothly but also that is was widely accepted).

Consequences, as already noted, need to be divided into two categories: public responses (shading over into personal evaluations) and actual emotional reactions. For grief, there is no question that public responses shifted. Signs of mourning began to decline, and the time spent (or allowed by employers) on mourning also dropped off. Americans increasingly turned to professional funeral directors to organize a viewing as well as the funeral itself, so while ritual did not disappear, the opportunities to show and receive grief were normally fairly confined. Terminal illness was itself increasingly turned over to medical personnel, as deaths began occurring predominantly in hospitals rather than homes; and doctors were notoriously eager to concentrate on saving lives rather than dealing (in themselves, in patients, or in attending families) with strong displays of grief. As a result, energies that once were devoted to grief surrounding an imminent death were now poured into efforts to keep people alive – a pattern that, today, often includes ignoring the previous wishes of a patient and applying heroic measures to the prolongation of life.

We know less, in this case, about changes in evaluation, but popularizers and experts alike were urging people to be rather hardnosed in reacting to other people’s grief, ready to brand it excessive and to urge professional help. Evidence that Americans increasingly mistook sadness for psychological depression, although going beyond the grief area alone, suggests a similar linkage with changing emotional evaluations, at least of others and possibly of self. A current discussion among psychologists about whether grief is an illness shows the ongoing power of the new standards.

As to actual grief, the case is more complex. The new patterns may have been a relief to some emotional personalities who would have been uncomfortable in conforming to Victorian norms – again, each emotional culture doubtless appeals to some participants more than others. Grief therapy did indeed develop and doubtless helped many people conform to the new demands for emotional control even if some extra efforts were required. And we can assume, as the social psychologists suggest, that new rules normally generate attempts to measure up, so that actual emotional experience changes once the standards are enunciated and assimilated. As would also be expected, there are a number of intriguing signs that the new culture did not entirely prevail and that it has had some unexpected side effects. Additional cultural changes in the 1960s opened new opportunities to reevaluate grief, and while the modern standards were not set aside, some modifications were possible. The rise of the hospice movement, although not American in origin and only gradually utilized in the United States, was another sign that more allowance

for grief was essential, again without entirely redefining modern cultural aversion. By 2000, modern grief culture persisted (to the regret of many culture critics), but it has been softened a bit with the impact of several ensuing decades.

What causes emotional standards to change, and through them emotional experience at least to some degree? This is the first of two key analytical questions in linking emotions history to larger social processes.

Not surprisingly, there is no single formula in response. This not only reflects the newness of the field, (grand theories are for the most part lacking), but also quite probably the variety of empirical situations. The one constant seems to be an effort, by various cultural leaders and ordinary folk alike, to use emotions to react to or shape alterations in the larger social and intellectual environment.

The changes in American reactions to grief, for example, accompanied the huge transformation in mortality patterns that developed, throughout the Western world, between 1880 and 1920. With infant deaths dropping to a historically unprecedented 5 to 8 percent by 1920, and with attention focused increasing on saving lives rather than resigning (with whatever accompanying sorrow) to the inevitable, emotional requirements clearly began to change. The concomitant transitions – rapidly declining maternal mortality in childbirth and the clear movement of death from home to hospital – had similar implications, and – without question – leadership in dealing with imminent death was passing from priest to physician, with radically different cultural assumptions to match. Emotional change, here, fit a larger revolution in death incidence.

Explanations for other changes in emotional standards may be more challenging, although shifts in economic structures may play a key role. The new surge in cheerfulness, in the 1920s, clearly followed from alterations in American management practices and the growing (although not brand new) emphasis on consumerism. Emotional styles were sought that would help people in management hierarchies get along smoothly and would encourage the sale of goods. Similar economic shifts, along with reactions to labor protest, helped fuel efforts to redefine anger, and particularly to insist that anger in the workplace was misplaced and childish. A new breed of industrial psychologist arose to help devise methods to restrain workplace anger; by the 1920s and 1930s, foremen were being re-taught to become less production bosses, more human relations experts, holding their own anger in check and becoming skilled in methods – such as insistence on repetition of angry grievances to the point where a worker would become embarrassed – to accomplish the same with employees.18

18 Stearns, American Cool.
Again, there’s no grand theory involved in all of this. Each major change can be linked to some mix of demographic, economic, and broader cultural factors, although the precise combination varies with the point of time and the particular emotion or emotions alike. What is a constant, and what returns us to the significance of emotional change, is the extent to which shifts in emotional standards help translate into personal life – into the family, into individual roles at work or in recreation – larger changes in social and cultural structure.

Historians have not yet tackled more global causation in the emotional arena, as this might come into play at least by the later twentieth century. There are however some “straws in the wind.” A few scholars have talked about applying Western formulas, such as the civilizing process, to societies elsewhere, such as China. This may not be the most constructive way to proceed, for it risks neglecting ways in which Chinese emotional standards, concerning personal restraint, may have long preceded roughly comparable developments in the West. The possibility of examining emotional results of demonstrably similar basic changes – for example, emotional outcomes of reducing family size or accelerating consumer activities – may be a more fruitful basis for comparative work, but again little has thus far been ventured. More (literally) global connections might include the emergence of signs of global empathy, in response to certain kinds of injustice or international disasters. Although the detailed comparisons have yet to emerge, superficially similar responses, from various cultural regions, to tragedies like the Indian Ocean tsunami deserve exploration as signs of emotional sensitivities to some degree transcending cultural boundaries.

A similar global interest might well apply to the growing role of media in triggering and guiding emotional responses. Mass demonstrations of emotion, again to some degree across cultural lines, on the occasion of deaths such as Princess Diana or more recently Michael Jackson, suggest some similar responsiveness to media cues and a willingness to use media-enhanced deaths of strangers to express in groups certain emotions that are more tentative in private contexts. Again, this is a field that awaits more systematic work, but it could play a significant role in understanding some of the emotional consequences and underpinnings of globalization. We do know, after all, that emotional changes respond to a number of stimuli, and the globalization of some of these stimuli could produce some limited convergences in emotional standards and experience alike.

THE RANGE OF THE FIELD

Several recent summaries of the state of the field provide additional reference on the topical coverage thus far achieved, but a brief synopsis is appropriate.

Emotions historians, working primarily on topics within a West European/North American orbit, have at least partially explored a variety of specific emotions: love, happiness/cheerfulness, sadness, anger, fear, jealousy, grief, disgust, envy, empathy, embarrassment, nostalgia, guilt, and shame. They have probed several time periods. Interesting research has recently emerged on emotions in the Middle Ages, and there are largely cultural accounts of some emotions standards in the classical world. Most historians, whether oriented toward social history or the recently more fashionable cultural field, have been interested in collective emotional standards and responses, which links them, explicitly or implicitly, to often-similar work in sociology, anthropology, and – to a degree – social psychology. Indeed, direct historical contributions by sociologists and some social psychologists have helped advance the field. It remains true that the range of topics, settings, and approach applied to the history of emotions is considerable, which the importance of the topic both explains and justifies. But there are many time periods, specific emotions, and emotional connections that have yet to be explored, quite apart from the huge imperative to widen the geographic base of this historical specialty.

To date, historical work has identified two particular points of sweeping cultural change, where larger intellectual and social developments combined to produce significant shifts in the overall emotional context. The eighteenth century involves one such point, the twentieth century the other. Neither example erases the importance of looking at specific emotions and their particular historical timetables. But both suggest that societies, periodically, alter a larger approach to emotional expression in reaction to broader developments and in ways that spur additional change.

Emotional change in the eighteenth century, in Western Europe and to some extent Colonial America, has focused on developments in and around the family. By this point, some of the implications of the Protestant Reformation, in centering new attention on marriage, and possibly also the trickling down of Elias’s civilizing process to the middling classes, helped set the stage for more systematic shifts. Growing commercialization also encouraged new attention to the family as an emotional alternative to an increasingly competitive economic environment. At the

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same time, new economic opportunities like the spread of domestic manufacturing produced new emotional expressions and needs, partly because of the growing impact of urban standards even on rural populations.

The next big shift in emotional culture in the Western world – for developments of this magnitude are neither consistent or regular – seems to have occurred in the middle decades of the twentieth century, first perhaps in the United States and then with greater echoes in Western Europe. Not surprisingly, given the recency and importance of these developments, there has been a good bit of disagreement over what the core elements of this new configuration are. Most historians (and related sociologists) would agree that one component involves greater informality, a loosening of formal manners in favor of unwritten rules about codes of emotional conduct. Included in this movement as well was a greater turn to democratization, with more social groups expected to live up to common emotional standards and to incorporate these in childrearing. Growing aversion to emotional intensity, in favor of more uniform efforts at self-control and greater use of spectator activities to play-act more vigorous emotions, seems to have been widespread as well. This was supplemented, and sometimes complicated, by a growing role for the media in triggering public and personal emotional respects. While the formulas of twentieth-century change are not entirely agreed on, there is considerable belief that they spilled over into a number of discrete emotional areas, but with particular focus on emotions now defined as negative, such as grief and anger.

CONSEQUENCES AND COMPLEXITIES

A fair amount of emotions research starts and ends with emotions themselves, with perhaps some nod to emotional standards. A key advantage of a historical approach – although the gains are not unique to the discipline – is an almost unavoidable push not only to connect emotional change to prior or concomitant causes, but also to talk about the consequences of change – extending out from the emotions themselves. Even more than with causation, it is difficult to generalize about results of emotional change, beyond the basic point, already offered, that one should look both for public (institutional and legal) consequences of new standards, and also for shifts in evaluations and actual emotional behavior.

Thus a clear change in standards involving far more explicit disapproval of jealousy in the early twentieth century, showed up fairly quickly in American law and in personal evaluations alike. Legal arguments that might justify a homicide – in cases in which a man killed a wife’s lover or an unfaithful wife herself – on grounds of uncontrollable but justifiable jealous rage, that won several acquittals in some landmark trials in the later nineteenth century, were disallowed by American courts by the 1930s: now, jealousy was never an excuse for crime, it should always be subject to restraint. Polls suggested that growing
numbers of Americans were eager to claim that they had overcome jealousy as a childish emotion, and a comparative study later in the twentieth century showed that Americans – unlike Europeans, who reacted to jealousy with sadness or anger – were eager to check with friends and acquaintances to make sure they had not let any jealousy show through; and they were eager as well to conceal the emotion, compared to people in most other cultures. Changes in attitudes about jealousy, as well as a desire to restrain intense emotion generally, contributed to the rise of no-fault divorce provisions by the 1960s, first in California and then across most of the nation. Finally, new concerns about jealousy helped generate a shift in school procedures: new rules forbid the public posting of student grades, lest the results stimulate an unfavorable emotional dynamic (although students in fact continued to compare grades on their own). Law and personal outlook alike changed considerably thanks to the basic cultural shift on this interesting emotion, although there were some complexities involved – as with communal student culture – and many variations by personality.

At the same time, consequences can have some unexpected twists, and contemporary American sports serves as an intriguing example. New concerns about anger, earlier in the twentieth century, helped phase out an earlier (late-nineteenth-century) middle-class interest in boxing. It had been believed that boxing was a great way to teach boys to retain but channel anger, in ways that would later help in campaigns against social injustice or in business competition. The approach fit Victorian culture admirably. But with the new idea that anger should be not just channeled, but systematically restrained, the boxing option became unnecessary and unduly aggressive and violent. (It was revealing that, in the same mid-century period, childrearing manuals stopped using the word anger, substituting aggression.) However, popular spectator interest in sports as expressions of anger not only persisted but increased. Baseball continued – and still continues – to feature ritualistic fury between a manager and a referee, after a disputed call; boxing retains spectator interest; football is an extreme example of symbolic aggression. Almost certainly, the growing popularity of sports owed something to their use as an anger surrogate, allowing spectators to enjoy expressions of anger that they knew they could not themselves legitimately indulge, but for which sports provided an indirect outlet and some real emotional relief. Here, too, is a consequence of an altered emotional culture, simply not a straightforward one.

**POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY**

Emotions history has not yet widely applied to politics, and the connections are not easy; examples are thus far quite scattered. We know that Mao Zedong realized the need to address peasant emotional deference as part of building a revolutionary
movement in China, deliberately encouraging more open expression of anger.\textsuperscript{23} Civil rights and feminist leaders in the United States have carefully discussed how to utilize or manage anger, in a culture that was officially hostile to the emotion: feminists, for example, by the 1970s were often trying to distinguish between anger (bad, because it called a protest movement into disrepute given the prevailing standards) and assertiveness (good, as against more traditional female passivity). On a more global scale, we have noted the importance of charting the development and evolution of empathy and its relationship to new humanitarian sensitivities that can be traced from the later eighteenth century abolitionist crusades onward. Expressions of what is called world opinion demand a combination of empathy and anger-fueled outrage, whether the target is nuclear testing, sweatshop labor, women’s rights abuses, or American imperialism.\textsuperscript{24} Figuring out the emotions involved in manifestations of world opinion, and how both media and international NGOs have learned to evoke and manipulate these emotions, deserves more scholarly attention.

A major exception to the general tentativeness about dealing with emotions in politics involves the recent book by V. Shlapentokh, who probes the role of fear in maintaining social order in authoritarian societies such as Soviet Russia and more generally explores the extent to which societies are held together not just by patterns of constructive socialization but also by fears. Shlapentokh proposes a major revision in contemporary social science, away from undue emphasis on positive allegiance plus self-regulation, and more toward the recognition of coercion, punishments, and ensuing emotional reactions.

An obvious opportunity to examine the impact of emotional culture and cultural changes on politics, at least in contemporary democracies with extensive media links, involves the emotional behavior expected of political candidates. We know from a famous American example that having a male candidate for public office cry in public is frowned on as a sign of character inadequacy (although it might have been fine around 1800, when male tears were briefly fashionable). We have noted the importance of seeming to be cheerful, most of the time, from FDR onward. More generally – and in contrast to the much wilder political behaviors of the nineteenth century – American political figures are expected to demonstrate clear restraint of anger. An official in the Clinton administration was told, on arrival in Washington, that the most important emotional goal must be to avoid signs of anger, which would be regarded as immature and unacceptable. Rituals have developed, most obviously in presidential debate settings, in which candidates are goaded by

\textsuperscript{23} Solomon, R. H. Mao’s Revolution and Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

\textsuperscript{24} Stearns, Peter N. Global Outrage: The Impact of World Opinion on Contemporary History (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005).
pointed questions which might legitimately inspire an angry response, with their capacity to maintain cheery acting as an important character test. Too much lack of emotion, on the other hand, can also be a drawback. This is a charge now being levied against the cool, calm Obama, who apparently should learn to become a bit more passionate. The need for balance is considerable. How much these tests matter in the actual conduct of politics deserves more attention: we know that some very angry politicians get elected, so long as they mask themselves in public. But the symbolic test of character through public conveyance of emotion is a not insignificant part of at least the modern political process.

Links between emotional change and the conduct of international relations are even more venturesome, particularly when one gets beyond the emotional components of world opinion. At this point, it is far more realistic to suggest a need for concerted research than to venture hypotheses. But a few issues and connections may be useful even at this stage.

A first issue, doubtless varying from one regional culture to the next, involves the extent to which emotional standards applicable within one’s own society are seen as less relevant in contacts with the world as a whole. The twentieth-century trajectory of American anger standards forms a case in point. Efforts to control anger in domestic politics and in personal and workplace settings are not consistently seen as applicable in foreign policy. The capacity to express, and sometimes act on, deep anger concerning real or perceived foreign misdeeds is a vital political capacity. The rules governing foreign response have – in other words – a different calculus, and at times the capacity to direct anger abroad may serve as a compensatory outlet for domestic emotional constraints, much as certain kinds of spectator involvements do. Demonstrating emotional backbone in international relations thus jostles with the imperative to project a cheerful, conciliatory approach on the domestic front, but there may be an explicit linkage here and not just a surface contradiction.

Two other emotional areas, both involved in extensive contemporary change, warrant more concerted exploration, at least from an American cultural vantage point, but both cases have global implications as well. The first involves the ongoing saga of American grief culture. The modernist redefinitions of appropriate grief, from the early twentieth century onward, have never been entirely redone, but they have clearly frustrated some emotional needs and also have generated implications, applied to wider areas that were not initially understood. Even in the nineteenth century it was becoming clear that grief needs, as the emotional culture was beginning to be reshaped, required some adjustments in the military arena. It was after the Civil War that a new American quest for salvaging the remains of fallen soldiers first emerged, and this would only strengthen amid the conflicts of the twentieth century, with fascinating diplomatic implications particularly after the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts. Beyond this, the initial contact between grief and the modern
military involved the patriotic injunctions to keep a stiff upper lip and not let grief seem to undermine the war effort – an approach applied to both world wars. During the Korean War, this rational formula began to break down. The American press began to inquire more deeply into military casualties and to present life histories of some of the fallen, including the families left behind, with an eye toward eliciting more public emotional response. Public sensitivity to military casualties was greatly enhanced, and this tension was intensified still further as a result of television footage during the Vietnam War. From these experiences the military derived some clear lessons. First, be careful (to the extent politicians allowed) of foreign engagements that might rouse the public grief response, for the response could endanger public support for the military more generally. Second, take every step possible (and the American military already had extensive commitments here) to limit American casualties (the American public was not particularly emotionally engaged where foreign casualties were concerned). And third, at least by the time of the Iraq war in 2003, take steps to conceal emotion-stirring evidence of those soldiers who did die, most notably by bringing the emotion-laden caskets back without publicity or family involvement. Modern grief culture and the military were locked into a complex relationship, with clear implications for American policy more generally.  

By the 1990s, grief was also spilling over into a more novel public arena. Publics in the United States, but also several other countries including the United Kingdom, were beginning to display strong emotional reactions to unexpected deaths of celebrities or to the victims of terrorism, showing emotional absorption, attending public displays of grief, and insisting on memorialization and monuments. Emotional reactions of this sort responded to deaths like those of Princess Diana or Michael Jackson, and to victims not only of the 9/11 terrorist attack but also to some of the mass school shootings like those at Virginia Tech in 2007. People who remained fairly restrained in grief reactions in personal settings, who seemed to accept the modern grief culture, were displaying a new need to vent emotion almost ritually, in media-guided responses to certain kinds of public or celebrity tragedies. In some cases, at least, the venting crossed national lines or had wider international policy implications (as in responses to terrorism). Grief, apparently, along with a wider media dominance of certain emotions, was seeking a new if somewhat indirect outlet.

Finally, there is the interesting example of fear, an emotion relevant to international responses both at the public and at the policy levels. Fear was one of several emotions, in the United States, that began to be reconsidered at least by the 1920s, initially in childhood socialization. The new breed of psychological expert began to argue that fear was an inevitable part of a child’s life but that it should be

25 Stearns, Revolutions in Sorrow.
minimized as much as possible. Victorian emotional standards had urged that fear was an emotion boys should experience, directly or through sports or reading, and learn to surmount through courage; this was a vital aspect of emotional manliness. Now, however, the new authorities began to argue that courage was too risky to urge on children, who might be overwhelmed by fear in the process. Instead, parents should seek to avoid as many fear-provoking situations as possible and surround children by distractions and reassurance should fear emerge nevertheless. The result, obviously varying by individual parental personality, was a new effort to control risk and to provide emotional comfort. Over time, elements of these new attitudes spread to other venues, for example to the military where new counseling resources began to replace older intolerance of displays of lack of courage.

Not immediately, but by the 1960s and 1970s advertising began to pick up on the new attitudes toward fear. During much of the twentieth century advertisers had stayed away from fear tactics, on grounds that public reactions were unpredictable and might not help sell goods. Now, however, both product and political advertising began to play up fear messages, urging people to buy various kinds of protections or vote for particular candidates on grounds of this kind of emotional response. Initial innovation in American scare advertising has been traced to a Lyndon Johnson campaign venture in 1964, showing a menacing atomic cloud behind a girl playing with flowers and conveying the notion that a vote for his opponent might encourage nuclear war; but the tactic has proliferated since, with commercial ventures joining the parade by the 1980s.

The change in cultural signals was both fascinating and complex, but equally important is the likelihood that it began to affect larger political reactions as well. Thus American responses to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, fueled by the government, emphasized widespread fear, even remote from the sites of the attack, and of course an urgent desire to retaliate strongly. (Interestingly, response included a surge in sales both of handguns and burglar alarms, reflecting advertising emphases that had been encouraging home protection even though these were hardly relevant to the tactics of al Qaeda.) The reactions measurably differed from those that had earlier greeted the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, particularly in the emphasis on fears for one’s family. Arguably, this in turn expressed the greater resentment of fear that the shift in emotional standards had encouraged. American reactions also seemed stronger and measurably more fearful than responses in Spain or Britain to (admittedly more modest) attacks a few years later. And the American government both reflected and encouraged this public mood by measures such as the colored terrorist threat codes, designed largely to promote public anxiety; and at least a segment of the voting public, in the 2004 presidential elections, responded

26 Stearns, American Fear.
positively to the Bush campaign on the basis of a fearful desire for government protection and reassertion.27

Yet the American focus is not the final word. Over the past decade a host of scholars in various countries have claimed the importance of fear in their society; one historian termed fear the dominant modern emotion. While there may be some specifically American cultural features to fear, there may be wider modern features as well that affect France, Palestine, or the United Kingdom in some comparable patterns of change. Here is one of the many large historical assignments yet to be seriously undertaken, to determine the role of fear in international relations in earlier times, to analyze more specifically modern dimensions (including the capacity of omnipresent, visual media to stimulate and convey fear across wide space, and also including widespread fears of globalization itself), and to determine more particular regional variants, such as that in the United States.28

Historical research over the past two decades has generated impressive findings about the nature and variety of emotional change and emotional-cultural changes, in many chronological and several regional settings. It has traced relationships between emotional change and wider development in society, from demography to the sources of relevant expertise. It has demonstrated substantial consequences from emotional change, at both personal and societal levels: shifts in emotional standards help mediate between social contexts and arenas like policy and law, as well as affecting personal and political evaluations.

Crucial tasks remain. The historical enterprise itself needs extension, particularly in terms of regional coverage. The emergence of global patterns needs more seriously to be included in explorations of the causes of emotional change, with media involvement prominently placed. The need for comparative work is urgent: in a global environment, having a better sense of how patterns of emotional change have led to some interregional convergence or how they have promoted new differentiations is a crucial step that has only barely been addressed. Modern societies are almost all involved in some common experiences, such as the change in birth and death rates associated with the demographic transition. Has this sharing led to some overlapping redefinitions of emotions like grief or fear, or do separate cultural traditions make separate adjustments? Finally, the extension of the analysis of the consequences of emotional change, into the political and international relations arena, must move from plausible speculations to larger and more fully substantiated conclusions. Without denying the huge challenges the field faces,

historical work on emotion has arguably generated sufficient understanding to make additional steps highly desirable and ultimately feasible as well.

Admittedly, historical research adds complexity to the study of emotions and their social role. Having to account for changes in standards deepens the challenge of comparing different regional emotional responses. But the historical component also adds realism: as societies adjust to some of the basic changes of the modern world, including globalization, emotional formulas will shift. Understanding the trajectories of change, from past to present, is vital to understand emotional reactions and characteristic issues, whether the topic is personal evaluations of jealousy or social and political uses of fear.
The Question of Emotions and Passions in Mainstream International Relations, and Beyond

Jean-Marc Coicaud

Emotions and passions, and the psychology associated with them, play a significant role in international politics. For this reason, if we want our understanding of international life to be as accurate and comprehensive as possible, this role has to be described and analyzed. However, in mainstream international relations, all too often the tendency has been to overlook, if not ignore, this aspect of the nature and dynamics of international affairs. Indeed, despite the fact that in the past fifteen years a growing number of publications has been dedicated to exploring the emotive nature of international politics, and the place and function of emotions and passions in it, the study of emotions and passions in international relations continues to be a rather underdeveloped field, and a field that is not at the center of international affairs specialists’ preoccupations.

The objective of this chapter is therefore to explain why this is the case. In the process, it will also be alluded to how this state of affairs can be overcome. The chapter is comprised of two main sections and a brief conclusion. The first section, building in particular on the recent neuroscientific findings concerning emotions and passions, examines emotions and passions in general. The second reviews the state of emotions and passions studies in the area of international relations. In this regard, it shows that as a discipline, international relations has been prone to either disregard or give a biased account of psychology, emotions, and passions in international life. It indicates as well that although significant progress has been made since the early 2000s to remedy this situation, there is still much work to be done to develop the social science study of emotions and passions in international relations. Finally, there is a brief conclusion referring to a few suggestions for the

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way forward, which are taken up in greater detail in the overall Conclusion of this volume.

GENERAL REFLECTIONS ON EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS

Recent publications on the question of emotions in international affairs tend to dedicate a section to the nature of emotions. This is not surprising considering that emotions not only have been prone to be ignored or have a bad reputation in the field of international relations (if not in general); they are also a complex reality that is not easy to pin down intellectually. Consequently, introducing them to the reader appears as a natural first step. It is how we begin this chapter as well, by touching upon two points: first, we look into the nature of emotions themselves; second, we indicate that although emotions and passions are related and even overlap to some extent, they are also significantly different.

Interdisciplinary Modes of Understanding Emotions

Emotions are an important part of human psychology. In this perspective, because psychology – or the analysis of mental phenomena – did not exist as a distinct field of science before it emerged in Germany in the late nineteenth century, when Wilhelm Wundt began conducting experiments to understand the ways in which the mind works, for a long time exploring emotions was essentially the monopoly of the discipline of philosophy. Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, and Smith are, for instance, some of the philosophers who, in the Western tradition of philosophy, have discussed at length the nature and role of emotions. Although philosophy prior

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to the nineteenth century was not in a position to benefit from the scientific support and breakthroughs that modern psychology has enjoyed in the past century, and could only speculate on how the brain functions, one has to recognize that many of its intuitions concerning emotions and passions have provided critical insights into the human nature, which, interestingly enough, scientific psychology has often still not superseded. After all, as Jon Elster puts it, “Although the pages of psychological journals testify to a great deal of concern with methodology, even the most sophisticated statistical analysis cannot compensate for the intrinsic limitations of laboratory studies on humans.”

This is all the more the case considering that in the development of modern psychology, the combination of the influential conception of emotions put forward by the Harvard University philosopher and psychologist William James (presenting emotions as bodily sensations responding to particular environmental stimuli) and of the fact that cognitive science and its various disciplines, such as philosophy of the mind, linguistics, neuroscience, psychology, biology, computer science, and anthropology for a long time excluded emotions as a significant influence on the exercise of reason, has contributed to the importance of emotions in the psychology and cognition of human beings being overlooked. Fortunately, in recent years, this state of affairs has changed and scientists have come to increasingly recognize the relevance and centrality of emotions.

More specifically, this evolution has been encouraged by work in neuroscience that is empirically confirming that emotions are a central part of what it is to be human. This work shows that emotions contribute to the fundamental definition of how we feel and therefore, among other things, who we are in our own mind’s eye as well as in the eyes of others. As Joseph Ledoux puts it, “[C]apacity to have feelings is directly tied to the capacity to be consciously aware of one’s self and the relations of oneself to the rest of the world.” And if there is a domain in which this contribution of emotions

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3 This does not mean that we now understand everything concerning the brain and its functions. Far from it. Despite the scientific progress made, modern psychology and the relevant fields of research, such as neuroscience, are still trying to figure out how the brain works, and there is a long way to go toward full understanding.

4 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thoughts: The Intelligence of Emotions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).


8 Ledoux, The Emotional Brain, p. 125.
to our humanity is at work, it is in the context of the mind, of how it works and relates individuals to themselves, others, and the environment in general.

As such, emotions are hybrids that incorporate three elements: bodily reactions, feelings, and cognitive elements. In emotions, there is not one of these elements without the others. They unfold and work hand in hand. First, concerning bodily reactions, emotions are physiological and even behavioral responses to stimuli coming from the environment – stimuli themselves wired or made meaningful, that is, eliciting a response, by how the human body is made and designed to interact with the environment. Second, these bodily reactions are accompanied by feelings, by an experiential awareness that has certain tonality or color, that of the specific emotion that is experienced (sadness, joy, etc.) in the context of various situations.

Third, connected with the intrinsic biological functions of the nervous system that are rooted in an underlying mechanism that works, for the most part, unconsciously, emotions have a cognitive dimension in two ways: they are associated with – at times even triggered by – beliefs and values, themselves contributing, in part in relation with human biological needs and functions, to the interpretation of events and situations; and they are conscious experiences in the sense that it is not only that human beings are feeling but also that they are feeling the feeling. In this context, there are emotions, or states of emotions, that can be more susceptible to reflexivity or reflection than are others. For instance, sadness, as an emotion or emotional state that tends to be inward-oriented, can be more reflexive and reflective than happiness, an emotion or emotional state that is prone to be more outward-oriented.

Against this background, exploring how the underlying mechanism in which the biological functions of the nervous system are rooted contributes to the production

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9 “Feelings of fear . . . occur as part of the overall reaction to danger and are no more or less central to the reaction than the behavioral and physiological responses that also occur, such as trembling, running away, sweating, and heart palpitations.” See Ledoux, *The Emotional Brain*, p. 18.

10 Regarding emotions and feelings, Antonio Damasio presents the distinction in the following terms: “While emotions are actions accompanied by ideas and certain modes of thinking, emotional feelings are mostly perceptions of what our bodies do during the emoting, along with perceptions of our state of mind during that same period of time.” See Antonio Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), p. 110.

11 A number of authors argue that certain primal emotions, such as fear, are capable of arising without any cognitive processing, but that most emotional reactions have an immediate cognitive antecedent. See Antonio Damasio, *Descartes’s Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Penguin, 1994), pp. 130–139. Jon Elster, in turn, asserts that, “First, we form the belief that the world is such and such; and then we react emotionally to that belief.” See Elster, *Alchemies of the Mind*, p. 408, as well as pp. 246–271. I am less inclined than these two authors to believe in the idea of cognitive antecedent, or even of “antecedent” altogether. That said, while I am more prone to give to biology and its interactions with the environment a causality role in the production of emotions, I do not see this causality as unique and fixed. It comes with other historical factors and evolves, in part under the influence of the interactions with the environment and its changes, over time (see discussion that follows).

of emotions amounts to and entails trying to understand how the human mind’s operating system (which generates emotions) is made of various levels of evolutionary history – including, to some extent, evolutionary biology.

The most basic and fundamental of these levels is the need for human beings to satisfy certain conditions in order to survive. At a minimum, this includes obtaining food and shelter, protecting oneself from bodily harm, and, arguably, procreating. Coming as a complement to and an influence on this are the accumulated layers of history (different over time and across cultures) and the changes that come with them, to which individuals respond and, at times, adapt, both biologically and emotionally. \(^{13}\)

Now, once emotions occur, they become powerful motivators of future behavior – for example, acting to experience them again if they are pleasant or to avoid experiencing them again if they are unpleasant. Ultimately, much of maintaining emotional hygiene – and mental health – is about balancing negative and positive emotions in order to facilitate functional interactions among the various selves that cohabit in the self (a functional self is one in which the various selves are by and large balanced and integrated), as well as interactions between the self, others, and the environment.

Much discussion has taken place regarding the proper listing of various emotions. This discussion has entailed, for instance, disagreements over which emotions can be considered basic – that is, biologically produced and fairly constant in all people. \(^{14}\) It has also involved debates on whether there can be differences in the ways basic emotions are labeled and expressed between cultures, or even between individuals within the same culture. Given the disparities among the lists of emotions that have been published, it is challenging to come up with a consistent list, even if “many if not most of the lists include some version of fear, anger, disgust and joy.” \(^{15}\)

Moreover, it can be difficult to determine where to draw the line between the basic or fundamental emotions and nonbasic emotions. Often there is a mixing of basic emotions to construct “higher-order emotions” (e.g., anticipation + fear = anxiety) that are more uniquely human. \(^{16}\) The fact that the social dimension enters into play as well is another source of complexity. \(^{17}\)

\(^{13}\) Jon Elster argues that the influence of culture on emotions is shown in three main ways: “in the labeling of emotions, in the evaluation of emotions, and in the determination of the behaviors that tend to trigger specific emotions”; Elster, *Alchemies of the Mind*, p. 412.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 117. For more on basic emotions theory, see, for example, Nico Frijda, *The Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

\(^{15}\) Damasio, *Descartes’s Error*, pp. 149–150.

\(^{16}\) Ledoux, *The Emotional Brain*, p. 114.

\(^{17}\) Elster, *Alchemies of the Mind*, pp. 144–145. Daniel M. Gross is critical of the distinction between emotions (and passions) that are socially constituted and the basic ones that are not. In his view, all
As far as they express how the individual reacts to and handles the environment, emotions contribute to revealing a significant aspect of an actor’s personality. This is to say that, while the biological makeup of human beings gives to emotions a rather objective dimension, and history provides a contextual dimension, emotions are in part subjective as well; because of their specific life experience, individuals do not address a given situation emotionally exactly the same way each time it occurs. In this perspective, emotions are personal feelings indicating how the inner world of people and the outside environment interact and, by extension, to some extent, shape one another. As such, in addition to being at the same time objective, contextual, and subjective, emotions are social. They are an inextricable aspect of the texture and flavor of all social relations, including the interactions among individual human beings, and are at least partially caused by how actors relate to themselves and to one another in their social environment. This is destined to be of particular importance in the area of international relations.

**Distinctions and Relations of Emotions and Passions**

There is clearly a strong link between emotions and passions, to the point that for a long time, Western philosophy has not distinguished much between them when it sought to address and explain human affects. Although the notion of passion was more commonly used than the notion of emotion, by and large they were treated interchangeably. In the process, in contrast with reason, viewed as stable and pure, and heralded as an ideal way of thinking and behaving, emotions/passions were more often than not described in negative terms. In this perspective, the fact that they were seen as subject to change and difficult to control led emotions/passions to be considered as sources and expressions of individual and social ills, and, therefore, to be fought and overcome. It would take the emergence of romanticism in nineteenth-century Europe for emotions/passions to acquire a more positive connotation and be somewhat rehabilitated.
In any case, if emotions and passions are connected, it is because emotions give passions their emotive content. In other words, passions are built and developed on the basis of emotions. They are an important part of emotions. In a general sense, this makes emotions more fundamental than passions, and makes passions a subcategory of emotions.²¹ That said, the overlap between emotions and passions is not so complete as to cause the latter to be entirely absorbed in the former. There is more than a simple difference of language between them. Passions are a distinct form of emotions. Furthermore, what makes passions different from emotions is what also makes them important, especially in the social and political contexts.

From our standpoint, as distinct forms of emotions, passions are different from regular emotions in six ways:

- First, passions, rather than being principally reactions, tend to have a willful character. We could say that they constitute an enthusiasm or desire for something or someone. Take, for instance, the expression “having a passion for justice.” It conveys the idea that a person is taking seriously the notion of justice and is dedicated to trying to make it, as much as possible, part of reality. This is distinct from simply feeling or experiencing emotionally a situation as just or unjust. As such, passions are a type of investment and engagement. In extreme situations, actors experiencing them can be so invested and engaged in passions as to be more accurately described as invested and engaged by passions. In this regard, when someone is passionate about something or someone to the point of being more possessed than in control, this can undermine the willful aspect of passions and contribute to giving them a bad reputation.

- Second, the willful character of passions carries the idea that they have an active and purposeful dimension. To be sure, certain emotions entail this characteristic as well. Revenge is a good example, amounting to a real commitment to harm the person who has harmed the one seeking revenge. But this active pursuit of an effect is not a specific aspect of most emotions. On the other hand, it is a constant feature of passions the way we understand them here. As such, more than being a mere state of mind, passions are animated by the desire and intention to act and achieve an objective in the outside world.

- Third, the commitment to action that passions have must be understood in connection with what is valued and thus desirable. The essential drive behind passions is to realize valuable goals, themselves identified in these terms on the basis of values that are seen as essential. Indeed, the fact that some values are

²¹ Not everybody agrees with this. Robert C. Solomon argues that emotions are one of the forms of passions: “There are three fundamental species of passions: (1) emotions, (2) moods, and (3) desires.” See Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 70.
perceived as fundamental, or more fundamental than others, is what makes them engines and objects of passions, as well as generates passions for certain objects, people, beliefs, and so on. By the same token, key values are placed in a commanding position for the production of emotions and passions. They have this power because they give meaning to aspects of human and social reality and motivate their pursuit. This is especially the case for key values reflecting basic and fundamental needs, such as the ones associated with survival. But it applies also to values geared more toward reflecting ideals of life. This is, for instance, the case for the values of justice and love. Because they bring about a qualitative meaning to life and are difficult to attain, these values tend to be sought after by actors and are the source of positive emotions and passions when realized reasonably, and of much emotional misery when constantly eluding the quest of an individual.

- Fourth, as elements eager to produce effects in the world in connection with highly valued ends, passions are prone to call for and introduce change. When this is the case, the pursuit of change that drives passions has the tendency not to be for the sake of change itself. The purpose is to produce what is viewed as a more satisfactory situation, which can concern the world or the relationship between people and reality. Yet, ultimately, the pursuit of change is always about people finding greater comfort in how they relate to themselves, one another, and their environment.

Importantly, the emotional adjustment that is aimed at by the passions pursuing change does not necessarily imply a commitment to a positive agenda, a positive outcome, or progress. Surely, if this mechanism is at work in the context of positive or inclusive emotions/passions, genuine improvement can happen. But when this mechanism takes place in the context of negative or exclusionary emotions/passions, rather than moving the world and people forward and upward or generating a healthy overcoming of the tensions that previously existed and reconciliation, the contrary happens. As we allude elsewhere, the dynamics of emotional resentment at the heart of Nazism is, among others, a case in point. 22

- Fifth, the call for change and the emotional adjustment sought (which the dynamics of passions entails) show that passions, while deriving from emotions, are not necessarily in a “one-way street” or strict relationship of dependence

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vis-à-vis emotions. Passions can nourish and shape emotions. It is in this perspective that, for example, fulfilling a passion can make an individual happy, while failing to do so can create unhappiness. This is part of the interactive relationship and mutual influence that brings together emotions and passions.

- Sixth, passions are prone to go public and wind up on public display. The process of how they are seen, if not shared with others, is a significant element of the nature and dynamics of passions. As a matter of fact, the tendency of passions to have a public character (i.e., among other things, to be visible if not loud and dramatic) has led to the perception of them being particularly intense. Moreover, it has led to the perception that they have a higher level of emotional intensity than emotions that do not have a passion character. Of course, this is not always the case. After all, the deepest emotions can be ones about which people, for better or for worse, are the most private and quiet, such as the emotions generated by traumatic experiences.

THE HANDLING OF EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS IN THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Now that we have a better idea of what emotions and passions are in general (including in how they relate), it is time to focus on the state of the literature on emotions and passions in the discipline of international relations. This section makes two main points on this issue. First, it is argued that, traditionally, in the mainstream discipline of international relations, emotions and passions have not been handled or accounted for very well. Second, it is indicated that in recent years the role of emotions and passions in international politics has been taken more seriously, including by some of the international relations scholars of the new generation.

Emotions and Passions in Mainstream International Relations

International relations have long been a topic of study, especially in the context of diplomatic history. But international relations as a discipline of the social sciences is one of the youngest topics in the field, and it is perhaps one of the least intellectually established topics as well. It emerged relatively late, although not all scholars agree on when this precisely happened. One view, conceivably the most conventional one, is that the study started in the early part of the twentieth century, with the formation of the first department devoted to the discipline at the University of Wales
at Aberystwyth in 1919. Another view contends that the study appeared in the United States, in the aftermath of World War II.

It is clear, however, that the discipline of international relations has developed the most in the United States, to the point that it is frequently seen as, first and foremost, a U.S. social science. And indeed, compared to international relations in other countries, its large size, role in producing theory and overall influence internationally make American international relations a global force with which it is difficult to compete. In this regard, while some believe that U.S. scholarship in international relations is quite diverse, others argue that it is less pluralistic than in other parts of the world, such as in the United Kingdom.

In any case, it cannot be contested that in the United States, more than anywhere else, the desire to be taken seriously led the discipline of international relations, echoing in this a major trend in social sciences, to give much importance to the model of analysis of reality pioneered in the natural sciences. The adoption of this model, and of the positivist methodological and epistemological assumptions that come with it, has certainly helped international relations produce good analyses of international reality. However, it has also come at a price. It has played a significant role in having the discipline of international relations unable to acknowledge properly the role of emotions and passions, and – more generally – psychology in international life. As a result, dominant paradigms of international relations like the neorealist approach and rational choice have had the tendency – when referring to psychological considerations, emotions, passions, and their place in international politics – both to be misled and misleading.

Positivism and the Marginalization of the Study of Emotions and Passions in International Relations. Epistemological and methodological assumptions are at

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the core of the positivist approach and its variants, which are part of the natural science model. Considering these assumptions, it is not surprising that they have encouraged political science and, subsequently, international relations to ignore explanatory factors linked with psychology, emotions, and passions because they tend not to fit the natural science criteria. Steve Smith offers a good summary of these assumptions:

The main epistemological assumptions (of the mainstream definition of international relations) are those of positivism, by which I mean: a belief in naturalism in the social world (that is to say that the social world is amenable to the same kind of analysis to those applicable to the natural world); . . . a commitment to uncovering patterns and regularities in the social world, patterns and regularities that exist apart from the methods used to uncover them; and, finally, a commitment to empiricism as the arbiter of what counts as knowledge . . . (These) theoretical assumptions are contained implicitly in (the) methodological (usually quantitative) and epistemological (nearly always empiricist) commitments . . . Together these define “proper” social science and thereby serve as the gatekeepers for what counts as legitimate scholarship.29

Over time, even the most committed scholars to this agenda came to recognize that it is extremely challenging to identify scientific laws – that is, to assert that, given certain initial conditions, an event of a given type (the cause) will always produce an event of another type (the effect) in the social world, including in international life. As a result, they did not give up altogether the quest for causal inferences30 and their predictive aim, but they were forced to acknowledge that, by and large, what can be realized in the natural world31 is much more problematic in a social environment.32

30 Causal inference can be defined as “learning about causal effects from the data observed.” See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Knowledge in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 8. See also: “Inference . . . is the ultimate goal of all good social science” (ibid., p. 34).
31 “There may be no true universal theories, owing to conditions differing markedly through time and space; this is a possibility we cannot overlook. But even if this were so, science could still fulfil . . . many of its aims in giving us knowledge and true predictions about conditions in and around our spatio-temporal niche.” Anthony O’Hear, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 43.
32 As Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba put it in their influential book Designing Social Inquiry: “The scholar who searches for additional implications of a hypothesis is pursuing one of the most important achievements of all social science: explaining as much as possible with as little as possible. Good social science seeks to increase the significance of what is explained relative to the information used in the explanation. If we can accurately explain what at first appears to be a complicated effect with a single causal variable or a few variables, the leverage we have over a problem is very high. Conversely, if we can explain many effects on the basis of one or a few variables we also
This is the case because no matter how perfect the research design is, and no matter how much data is collected, it is not possible in social science to know a causal inference for certain. In the social world, owing to the importance of the context and the impossibility of experimentally manipulating the explanatory variables or rerunning history to thoroughly test the nature of an event as a systematic cause for what happens, the bounds of applicability of social science theories are limited. Indeterminacy of explanation is high.

Nevertheless, the realization that in social science the ambitions concerning causal inference had to be limited has not eliminated the positivist bent of mainstream international relations. This means that for the supporters of the natural science model and positivism that continue to dominate the discipline, certain aspects of social reality (and of international life) do not entirely fit the standards of scientific observation, measurement, verification, and falsification (among other things in terms of concreteness) and therefore have little or no value. The disregard unfolds at three connected and mutually reinforcing levels. First, certain aspects of social reality (and of international relations), emotions and passions to begin with, are not taken seriously as part of reality, or they are not seen as part of serious reality, so to speak. Second, these aspects are not considered as a source of valid knowledge. Third, they are not perceived as a legitimate object of study.

The illustration and consequence of this state of affairs is how psychology, emotions, and passions are dealt with negatively. The fact that, compared to physical nature, emotions and passions are hard to define, hard to operationalize, hard to measure, and hard to isolate from other factors, makes it all the more tempting. This attitude is at work at three levels. First, the identification with the natural science model renders it easy to embrace the traditional labelling of emotions and passions as irrational, and consequently as an invalid element and factor on which to rely for understanding and analyzing (social) international reality. Second, because material structures, such as the distribution of power, are viewed as the predominant

have high leverage. Leverage is low in the social sciences in general and even more so in particular subject areas . . . Explanation of anything seems to require a host of explanatory variables: we use a lot to explain a little.” Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 29.


34 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, pp. 185–186. They argue that political science and, therefore, international relations research are rarely experimental.

35 Ibid., p. 83.

36 These difficulties have led Jon Elster to view the ideal of law-like explanation in the social sciences as implausible and fragile, instead preferring the idea of a mechanism as intermediate between laws and descriptions. He describes mechanisms as “frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences.” Alchemies of the Mind, p. 1.

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origin of state behavior and are a major observable fact, there is no room in the positivist scientific agenda of international relations for the incorporation of rather immaterial-seeming phenomena like emotions and passions. Finally, the belief that international politics is anarchical and therefore somewhat asocial plays a role in facilitating the rejection of the social features that emotions and passions embody.\(^3\)

**Neorealist and Rational Choice Views of Emotions and Passions in International Relations** – The pervasiveness of this negative evaluation of emotions and passions throughout mainstream international relations is shown by how neorealism and rational choice, two paradigms that, in more ways than one, continue to be of great influence in contemporary international relations, consider emotions and passions in international affairs. Although neorealism de facto mobilizes a psychological dimension that includes emotions and passions in its conception and analysis of international politics, it tends to be in denial about it. As for rational choice, by draining emotions and passions from the psychology of the rational actor at the center of its approach, it puts forward a cognitive and instrumental model that, in the end, has little to do with reality.

**The Neorealist Denial of Emotions and Passions** – It is rather ironic that neorealism, also called structural realism, in international relations is unwilling to acknowledge or properly take into account the measure of the role that emotions and passions play in international politics. After all, as part of the intellectual family of realism, neorealism shares with classical realism many of its basic premises, such as the ideas that power is the most important factor in international relations and that world politics is driven by competition among self-interested states fighting for their survival. Unlike neorealism, however, classical realism does not fail to see the dimensions of emotions and passions that come with this thinking and assessment of the reality of international politics: it gives pride of place to emotions and passions. Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, and Hans Morgenthau are among the most notable examples. A brief review of these three authors’ ideas helps illustrate this state of affairs.

While arguing in the *History of the Peloponnesian War* that concerns for self-interest make actors sensitive to their power standing (especially military power, vis-à-vis other actors), Thucydides\(^3\) recognizes that the nature and understanding of interest cannot be disassociated from that of emotions and passions. This leads


\(^{39}\) For a discussion on the extent to which Thucydides is a realist, and what kind of realist he is, see Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger, *International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 20; Richard Ned Lebow, *Coercion, Cooperation and Ethics in International Relations* (New York:
him to present the emotion of fear as a key motive, to the point that it is even evoked as a crucial reason for the war between Athens and Sparta: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”  

Likewise, this leads Thucydides to stress the significance of the value of honor both as a source and an object of emotion and passion. In the words of the Athenians: “We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from doing so – security, honor and self-interest.” This is to say that, for Thucydides, emotions and passions cannot be minimized as motivations and explanations for how inter-state relations take place.

In his own way, Thomas Hobbes also gives much significance to emotions and passions in international politics. Influenced by the scientific ideas that were gaining ground in his day, Hobbes set out to create a science of politics, but he did so in the context of a theory of man and society that put psychology, emotions, and passions front and center. For example, the value and passion of glory, which Hobbes views as one of the three principal causes of conflict, constitutes an “exultation of the mind” – that is part of the larger system of “Appetites, Aversions, Hopes, and Fears” that defines human nature. In this perspective, what stands in the foreground of his conception of politics, society, and the state, is an account of men and women as the sum of emotions and passions, and of human reason as a calculating machine driven by the alternate pursuit and avoidance of appetites and aversions. In this context, his focus on actors’ needs for self-preservation produces a theory that goes far beyond material considerations revolving around power and interest. It incorporates a psychological approach of social relations in which emotions and passions are essential. Furthermore, although the emotions most frequently flagged in Hobbes’s philosophy are the ones referring to the sense of insecurity that prevails when it


Honor generates self-esteem when an individual, or a country, abides by it; honor generates shame when this is not the case. For self-esteem and shame in the Greek context, see Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 63.

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book I, 76, p. 80.


“So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation.” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Chapter XIII, p. 185.

Ibid., Part I, Chapter VI, p. 125.

Ibid., Part I, Chapter VI, p. 127.

is not mitigated by the benefits generated by political institutions (like fear), his psychology is not entirely pessimistic. Some degree of fellow-feeling exists among men, if only because, according to him, men respect others’ intentions to protect their body and will not blame anybody who does so.\(^4\)

Hans J. Morgenthau, a key scholar for the development of realism in international relations (if not of the entire discipline of international relations\(^4\)) in the United States in the aftermath of World War II, sees the psychology of human nature, and the emotions and passions it entails, as a basic cause of the dynamics of international affairs. Believing that “[i]nternational politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power”\(^5\) and that “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature,”\(^6\) he thought that human nature contains a will to power that is without limit. This effectively meant that, for Morgenthau, the answer to one simple but important question – why do states want power? – resides in the never-ending lust for power, particularly that of leaders in commanding positions who are moved by deep psychological forces and who are eager to dominate rivals.

In contrast, neorealists decided that the realist approach was better off without emotions and passions considered. In this perspective, for Kenneth N. Waltz, who first outlined this paradigm in 1979 in *Theory of International Politics*,\(^7\) the question of why states want power has nothing to do with human beings and the various aspects of their psychology. Rejecting classical realism’s use of essentialist concepts such as “human nature” and the human emotional dimension to explain international politics, Waltz neorealism argues that it is the structure or architecture of the international system, treated as a material and by and large objective reality, that determines behavior in international relations and forces states to pursue power. As John J. Mearsheimer, another neo- or structural realist, puts it:

In a system in which there is no higher authority that sits above the great powers, and where there is no guarantee that one will not attack another, it makes eminently

\(^{4}\) Richard Tuck argues that “this universal recognition by all men of the blamelessness of self-preservation is the practical foundation for Hobbes’s moral theory: his confidence that his theory was of general applicability rested on his confidence that all men displayed this fundamental moral agreement.” *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 152.


\(^{7}\) Ibid., p. 4.

good sense for each state to be powerful enough to protect itself in the event that it is attacked. In essence, great powers are trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive.\textsuperscript{53}

That said, the rejection by the neorealist paradigm of a meaningful role for emotions and passions in international politics would be more convincing if this rejection itself was consistent, that is if itself did not have an ambiguous relationship with emotions and passions. This ambiguity is revealed by the fact that while considering emotions and passions and the psychology associated with them as irrelevant, the neorealist paradigm cannot help but presuppose their existence.\textsuperscript{54} More than anything else, this can be seen in what is revealed by the centrality that it assigns to survival and security of state-actors (as is seen also in classical realism). Far from being empty of emotions and passions, this centrality (which is totally understandable) presupposes and projects emotions and passions associated with the sense of insecurity and the fears that the centrality given to security implies; and it presupposes and projects passions, such as the quest for security elevated to an absolute priority and addressed and conducted in ways that can be obsessive.\textsuperscript{55}

The Flawed Psychology of Rational Choice Theory and International Relations. Rational choice theory is the other most influential paradigm in the discipline of international relations, and – like the neorealist approach – also tends to be dismissive of emotions and passions. Yet, although it is prone to dispute their validity and relevance, rational choice, also like neorealism but in its own way, assumes and needs the existence of emotions and passions. The characteristics at the core of the rational choice theory and their limitations concerning human psychology help understand this.

Building on key aspects of modern economics, which is seen as the discipline to emulate,\textsuperscript{56} rational choice argues that the actor – either individual or collective – is essential. It constitutes an atomistic and stand-alone agent prior to and independent from the social environment, including social structures.\textsuperscript{57} In this regard, while the environment can influence the strategic choices of the actor (i.e., how it deliberates and acts concerning the pursuit and achievement of its goals), it does not shape its


\textsuperscript{54} For a detailed discussion of this issue, especially in the context of Kenneth N. Waltz’s work and its views on human nature, refer to Neta C. Crawford, “Human Nature and World Politics: rethinking ‘Man,’” \textit{International Relations} (Volume 23, Number 2, 2009), pp. 271–288.

\textsuperscript{55} U.S. foreign policy is not foreign to this mindset. Over time, America’s feeling of vulnerability, which seems to have increased along with the growth of its power, has come to feed a passion for total security that is probably as illusory as illustrative of a tendency to paranoia. September 11, 2001, has only intensified this psychology.


ontology, including the key aspects of its identity or interest. More specifically, rational choice conceives of the actor as a utility maximizer who mobilizes its cognitive power to identify the right means, based on cost-benefit calculations, to realize tangible and material results satisfying self-centered purposes. The concentration on oneself and self-interest is all the more required considering that, according to rational choice theory, competition never truly ceases among actors. Even if they learn to cooperate, they do not come to identify with each other and, therefore, lowering one’s guard and being less focused on one’s interest is not a sound option. Ultimately, rational choice seeks to generate a series of well-grounded predictions regarding behavior on the basis of observed outcomes.

The predictive powers ambitioned by rational choice theory are nevertheless far from being achievable; and its vision of psychology, in addition to not being fully assumed as such, is far from being coherent and convincing.

To be sure, the rational choice model has some validity. Concerns for self-interest and cost-benefit matters are facts of life. This is partly why rational choice theory has been successful at becoming hegemonic in (American) social sciences, including in international relations as a subfield of political science. But its pretension to serve as a universal model undermines its credibility because it simply does not embrace the whole of human and social reality. In this perspective, rational choice’s disqualification of psychology, emotions, and passions is an obstacle to a satisfactory description of human and social reality and the production of the type of causal explanation to which it aspires. More specifically, its belief that psychology and emotions are only useful to explain mistakes or deviations from rationality and, consequently, that psychology is unable to account for accurate judgments, is problematic. In conclusion, combined with pride of place given to cognition, instrumental reason, and material considerations, this leads to the idea that rationality can and must be free of psychology. However, a brief analysis of reality and rationality shows that this position is incorrect for at least four reasons.

First, recent research in the field of neuroscience indicates that emotions are a constitutive part of cognition and rationality as well as of a socially functional behavior. For instance, Antonio Damasio’s work shows cases for which people without emotion may know what they should do in a particular circumstance, but that this knowledge is abstract and inert and does not impact their decisions. As a
result, they make mistakes, are not able to avoid making mistakes, and do not learn from the mistakes they have made.\textsuperscript{61} In the words of Jonathan Mercer, writing on rationality and psychology in international politics:

Emotion is necessary to rationality and intrinsic to choice. Emotion precedes choice (by ranking one’s preferences), emotion influences choice (because it directs one’s attention and is the source of action), and emotion follows choice (which determines how one feels about one’s choice and influences one’s preferences).\textsuperscript{62}

This discovery is in contrast with the rational choice concept of decision-making, which sees the cognitive process of deliberation and decision as void of emotions – emotions that are deemed to have all the more a negative influence in that, in addition to being viewed as irrational, they are (because they are viewed as irrational) open to manipulation.

Second, rational choice postulates psychology and emotions despite the fact that it claims to dismiss them in the name of rationality. This can be illustrated in four ways. To begin with, the preferences and goals associated with the optimization of self-interest are based on ranked emotions and values and their interactive relations. For example, it can be that an actor prefers A to B because A better suits its values’ order and therefore ranks higher from an emotional standpoint, or because A is more emotionally fulfilling than B and consequently more valued, or because of a combination of both. In addition, valuing so much self-interest is a form of psychology, one of self-centeredness. Furthermore, this is a type of psychology that can be viewed as \textit{asocial}, if not \textit{antisocial}, because human bonding is minimal and always driven by a conception of self-interest that underlines, even in the context of cooperation, the existence of a basic gap between actors. Finally, the psychology of separation and isolation conveyed by rational choice is one in which actors experience emotions, and – that is – emotions of a specific kind; one amounting to limited trust in others, if not mistrust toward others and, more than anything else, to a sense of insecurity.

Third, the implicit – but never fully acknowledged – psychology of rational choice is only a partial and one-sided account of the various ways in which, in reality, actors think and interact with others and the environment. In particular, the notion of stand-alone individual self-interest, accompanying a conception of the self not relationally defined\textsuperscript{63} that rational choice puts forward, is not universal but primarily

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{61} Antonio Damasio, \textit{Descartes’s Error}, for example, chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{62} Jonathan Mercer, “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics,” p. 94. See also Janice Gross Stein: “(t)he evidence from psychological studies is now robust that people are not ‘rational actors’, except in the most trivial and uninteresting situations.” “Psychological Explanations of International Conflicts,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), \textit{Handbook of International Relations} (London, Sage Publications, 2009), p. 302.
\end{footnotesize}
Emotions and Passions in Mainstream IR

Moreover, it ignores the motivations, emotions, and passions that, at the individual and collective levels, are not necessarily shaped by instrumental and self-serving considerations. For instance, emotions of connectedness, such as empathy and compassion, love and friendship, generosity, altruism, and justice – to name a few – are by and large absent from the rationalist approach. In addition, when these emotions are mentioned by rational choice theorists, they tend to be reduced to the demands of cost-benefits and self-interest analyses. Love of parents for children, for example, will be prone to be viewed as fulfilling the parents’ needs to have their genes and name continue beyond their death. In this perspective, the fact that love of parents can also be non-interested, inhabited by the loving desire to see children experience the fact of being alive and happy, regardless of the by-product benefits they may derive from it, will not be front and center. Take another example from the context of international affairs: while the pursuit of the national interest is a central element of states’ foreign policy, occasionally they act on the basis of a sense of solidarity toward strangers, and the fact that a sense of solidarity can enhance the reputation and, consequently, the interest of states, should not lead to eliminate the significance of its non-interested dimension.

Fourth, rational choice is contradictory because, even though it is a philosophy and psychology of interest-maximization, it is not necessarily the best way to achieve, on the individual and collective plans, the optimization it seeks to obtain and with which it identifies. Three considerations help to make this point. First, from the qualities historically attributed to the notion of interest, one cannot infer that rational choice always generates a productive, let alone the most productive, activity that brings together the individual and collective interest. The 2008 financial crisis, largely created by the self-serving practices of powerful market operators, is a case in point. Second, focusing essentially on self-interest can backfire. In international politics, stable relations among countries require the ability to conceive of and implement one’s interests in such a fashion that they are aware and respectful of others’ interests. In other words, give-and-take is a key aspect. Short of this, trust is likely to be missing, with the interests of each and every one ending up at risk. Third, selflessness,

64 Richard Ned Lebow, Coercion, Cooperation and Ethics in International Relations, p. 307.
generosity, kindness, and openness sometimes trigger more virtuous circles and benefits individually and collectively than mere self-interested actions could.

The Challenge of Descriptive and Explanatory Limitations. The positivist limitations at work in neorealism and rational choice theory, like in most other analytical frameworks of schools\textsuperscript{69} and subfields\textsuperscript{70} in mainstream international relations, take a significant descriptive and explanatory toll. As we have seen, important aspects of international affairs are not factored in and accounted for.

Incidentally, in addition to these aspects, it is also extreme political phenomena and their projection in the international realm that cannot be addressed and analyzed properly. This is the case for Nazism, fascism, other totalitarian regimes, and terrorism. For these cases, mainstream paradigms of international relations have little to say, except perhaps, and not surprisingly, that they are more or less historical exceptions and exceptional situations, aberrations at odds with normal reality and the type of categories and knowledge required for studying it. From this standpoint, it is therefore best to use psychology as the science of (irrational) emotions and passions to deal with those cases.\textsuperscript{71} Nevertheless, considering the significance of these phenomena in international politics, both modern and less modern, it is difficult not to see them and the fact that they tend to be beyond the analytical reach of mainstream international relations as a serious epistemological and methodological challenge for positivist international relations.

Recent Scholarship on Emotions and Passions in International Relations: A Step Forward

In recent years, a number of scholars have tried to address the shortcomings of mainstream international relations and factor in emotions and passions in the study of international affairs.\textsuperscript{72} In an intellectual production that is steadily

\textsuperscript{69} For liberalism, for example, consult Diana Panke and Thomas Risse, “Liberalism,” p. 99.

\textsuperscript{70} In the subfield of decision-making studies, refer – for instance – to Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 225: “The analysis so far has focused exclusively on what psychologists call ‘cold’ cognitive processes … Little reference has been made to the role of ‘hot cognitions’ such as affect, emotions, anxieties, and ego needs, nor have these ‘hot’ factors been incorporated into my explanations. Although these ‘hot’ factors are not unimportant for analogical reasoning … they have been omitted for two reasons. First, the role of affects or emotions in information-processing approaches is only beginning to be systematically explored by psychologists … The second reason for focusing on ‘cold’ cognitive processes is theoretical parsimony. Insofar as ‘cold’ factors are sufficient to explain most of our inferential failures and successes, there is only a residual need to resort to ‘hot’ cognitive explanations.”

\textsuperscript{71} Incidentally, this commitment to the preservation of theoretical orthodoxy, even if it is at the expense of a better understanding of the world, illustrates how at times the professionalization of ideas can contribute to the impoverishment of the life of ideas.

\textsuperscript{72} The references mentioned in this section do not pretend to be exhaustive. It is simply a selection of recent publications.
growing, especially the Anglo-Saxon literature, which is principally the one we refer to in this chapter, it is possible to identify at least four areas, at times overlapping, in which the research is developing: methodology and epistemology of the study of emotions and passions; analysis of situations and issues in relation with emotions and passions; the study of the role of one or several emotions in international affairs; and the attempt to provide a general theory of emotions and passions in international politics.

a) At least four authors recently have done significant work concerning the methodology and epistemology of the study of emotions and passions in international relations. Janice Gross Stein is a veteran expert of international relations, principally interested in conflict management and negotiation, who – in her more recent work – has been exploring the impact of the progress of neuroscience in connection with the role of emotions, away from rational choice theory, on the analysis of international conflict and decision-making. Neta C. Crawford is one of the first scholars to highlight the fact that international relations theory in the discipline of international relations has had the tendency to ignore explicit considerations of emotions and passions; she continues to examine the importance of emotions and passions in international relations, including from methodological and epistemological standpoints. In a succession of articles, Jonathan Mercer has done much to unveil the implicit assumptions of rational theory vis-à-vis emotions and psychology, and their weaknesses and contradictions.

73 A similar phenomenon is happening in other fields of the social sciences. For instance sociology is also paying more attention to emotions (see the bibliography mentioned in Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchinson, “Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics,” Review of International Studies (Volume 34, Supplement S1, January 2008), p. 123, note 40. Even criminal law is getting more interested in the question, for example with Suzanne Karstedt, Ian Loader, and Heather Strang (eds.), Emotions, Crime and Justice (Oxford: Hart, 2011).


75 Neta C. Crawford, “The Passions of World Politics.”


Finally, Rose McDermott’s work in political science mobilizes the findings of neuroscience concerning emotions in order to improve the conceptualization of rationality and decision-making in international relations.78

b) Regarding the analysis of situations and issues in relation with emotions and passions, much work has been done on logic of deterrence,79 cooperation and the solution of collective action problems,80 nuclear proliferation,81 terrorism,82 the “War on Terror,”83 global justice,84 and the financial crisis.85

c) As for the study of one or several emotions and passions, in a list to which we could add more references, the scholarship produced includes work on revenge, anger, humiliation, and hatred as motives of war;86 patterns

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of ethnic and civil conflict; and conflict resolution and post-conflict reconciliation.

d) Finally, efforts have been made to put forward what we could call a general theory of emotions and passions in international politics. In France, the work of Pierre Hassner on the geopolitics of passions is especially notable. For Hassner, there is no possible understanding of international relations without making sense of the key trilogy constituted by interests, ideas, and passions. But the author who has done the most in this area is Richard Ned Lebow. After having highlighted the limits of mainstream international relations in multiple articles and books, in recent years Lebow has been engaged in the construction of a theory of international politics that accords prime of place to psychology, emotions, and passions.

That said, despite the quality of this growing scholarship on emotions and passions in international relations, and the intellectual progress that it renders possible, there are two reason that there is still much more work to be done.

First, the research needs remain considerable and call for further development. Even a body of work as ambitious and impressive as that of Richard Ned Lebow in the area of emotions and passions in international politics is probably prone to introducing more questions than to bringing definitive answers. For instance, the


typology of emotions and passions that he offers in *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* and how they are said to contribute to shape inter-state actions is somewhat problematic. What appears to be the universal use of Greek historical categories is not fully compelling.

The second reason why the scholarship produced on emotions and passions in international relations in the past fifteen years or so is no more than a first step is institutional: these intellectual efforts have not changed dramatically the landscape of mainstream international relations. Indeed, the bulk of international relations, especially in the academic departments of the most prestigious U.S. universities, remain by and large under the influence of positivism, realism (in one form or another), and rational choice, and of the methodological and epistemological assumptions at their heart. These assumptions are all the more difficult to dislodge because they tend to be implicit, as alluded to earlier in the quote by Steve Smith, because they are not systematically theorized, and because they are in line with some of the key aspects of U.S. ideological formulations of social relations (regarding, among others, competition, interest, and self-help). This leads these assumptions to be taken for granted and create an illusion of science, while often being no more than intellectual ideology.

CONCLUSION

Mainstream scholarship on international relations has many strengths. But it also has limitations especially in that it overlooks emotions and passions. This is why, later on, the overall conclusion of this volume puts forward suggestions toward improving the study of international relations in relation to the politics of emotions and passions. These suggestions deal with four sets of issues: the mainstreaming of emotions and passions in international relations; developing a more systematic and
systemic analysis of emotions and passions in international relations; encouraging institutional change in the ways of doing research and teaching international relations; and improving international political theory in connection with a better understanding and integration of emotions and passions in the study of international relations.96

96 See, in this volume, Jean-Marc Coicaud, “Conclusion: A Few Suggestions for a Future Research Program on Emotions and Passions in International Politics.”
Over the past thirty years, emotions and globalization have both become fashionable topics in sociology. But they have not been brought together, as one seems to be an extremely microlevel concern, the other is a macro issue. This essay recaps what we have learned from sociological research and theory on emotions in order to see how we might connect the two sets of issues.

The sociology of emotions has focused on face-to-face interactions in which feelings are generated and managed. It places these interactions in the context of broader structures, such as power and status hierarchies, cultural norms and expectations, and employer-employee relations. These encounters remain relevant in a globalizing world, so that the emphasis on face-to-face interactions proves more useful than we might intuitively expect.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS

At its core, the discipline of sociology features a structural intuition about societies: that certain groups dominate other groups, that humans are constrained by social structures such as social networks or bureaucracies, and that each society gives rise to an appropriate culture. Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim – generally portrayed as the founding fathers of sociology – were especially concerned with the Great Transformation to modern capitalism. Although Talcott Parsons (1937) and others tried to incorporate psychology, economics, anthropology, and political science into a grand structural-functional synthesis in the mid-twentieth century, Anthony Giddens (1971) reinforced the original structural impulse in his influential synthesis of the three founding fathers’ theories of capitalism and modernization. Although the main concepts of sociology were tied to the nation-state, this structural approach could be adapted to understand globalization processes as the flow of
ideas, people, capital, and goods through expanded social networks in a stratified world system.¹

Although both Durkheim (enthusiastically) and Weber (dissmissively) wrote about emotions, as did other important early sociologists such as Max Scheler and Norbert Elias (1939/1978), the dominant theories in the discipline mostly ignored them. Yet a minority vision, originating in Pragmatism and symbolic interactionism at the University of Chicago, retained a more central place for emotions. In the work of Charles Cooley and George Herbert Mead, it was possible to locate emotions in the direct interactions among individuals. Cooley (1902) in particular was explicit about their role, finding in shame and pride basic motivations for human interaction as well as mechanisms for social order. Erving Goffman almost single-handedly kept this interactionist tradition alive, through his various books cataloguing face-to-face encounters. This interactionist tradition has only occasionally connected with the structural mainstream.

When a systematic sociology of emotions began to emerge in the late 1970s, it was primarily grounded in the minority Chicago tradition. But the spark for this subfield was that social psychologists managed to make contact with social-structural images, showing various ways that emotions were both cause and consequence of broader social processes.

Affect control theory (ACT; Heise, 1979, 2007) suggests that humans have emotions when events do not match their expectations, which are in turn based on cultural expectations about what people in different social roles do in different interactions. For instance, we expect mothers to nurture their children; we react emotionally when we instead see a mother starve or ignore her child. We try to protect our basic cultural assumptions about mothers (i.e., to control our affects). The main way to do this is to change one of the elements in the subject-act-object triad: perhaps this is not the child’s mother; perhaps we mistook illness for intentional starvation; perhaps the child is sick rather than starved. We try to confirm our underlying sentiments through our interpretations of events around us, and sometimes must take action to do so, for example by gathering more information or by intervening in some way. The greater the gap between our expectations and what we see or learn (the “deflection,” in ACT terms), the stronger the emotion. Through surveys, ACT researchers have established catalogues of the meanings that different cultures have for roles and actions, although this linguistic research is still centered on the United States.

ACT researchers characterize our expectations about roles and actions along three dimensions: evaluation (whether it is good or bad); potency (strong or weak);
and activity level (active or passive) –together known as EPA space (drawn from Osgood et al., 1957). To extend our example, if we see a mother and her starving child on television, how do we make sense of this horror? Normally, we see mothers as very good, somewhat strong, and somewhat active. But in this case, we may conclude that the mother herself has been weakened or made passive by starvation, even though she still has good intentions. Instead of seeing her as a villain (a bad mother), we can see her as a victim (still a good mother, but weak and passive). Presumably we do interpretive work like this not only in face-to-face encounters but also when we receive mediated news or propaganda, even from the other side of the globe.

Identity control theory (ICT) is closely related to ACT, but focuses on a person’s own identity (Burke, 1991). When our sense of ourselves is not confirmed, we act to reassert that identity. Over time, with enough shocks, we may have to revise our sense of who we are, but our immediate response is normally to try to maintain our identities. For example, if we think of ourselves as good and generous, but do something that is apparently not so good or generous, we may both offer rationales as well as try to engage in generous actions for a while to repair our self-image. Although research has only been conducted on individuals, it is possible that our collective identities can operate similarly: we support action to restore our national honor when it has been insulted, for example (Lebow, 2009).

Both ACT and ICT suggest ways that emotions can contribute to political action, and “deflections” have parallels with the anxieties that Marcus et al. (2000) suggest lead to greater surveillance and information gathering. Often, we work to confirm existing cultural views and social structures. But the point of political propaganda can be to shock our expectations in ways that cause us to act (or support government action) to change the world around us. Events trigger emotions depending on our background expectations. If we expect our government to be good, strong, and active, we are shocked when it fails to protect us (from hurricanes, for instance) or acts badly (killing its own citizens). Unfortunately but realistically, not everyone expects their government to be good. Most citizens expect their government to be strong, so that defeats or insults to it can lead to action, such as the overthrow of the government or support for retaliatory war.

Another strand in the sociology of emotions, less directly beholden to symbolic interactionism, relates our emotions to our interactions with those above and below us in hierarchies of status and power. Theodore Kemper (1978, 2001; Kemper and Collins, 1990) developed an elaborate scheme of possible interactions, which explain three types of emotion: structural emotions based on our position in these hierarchies, situational emotions based on changes in our power and status during interactions, and anticipatory emotions based on the power and status that we expect. Positive emotions such as confidence and security result from status and
power (and from increases in these); fears, anxieties, and other negative emotions result from low levels or declines in power and status. There are far more nuances than I can elaborate here.

One interesting twist, relevant to politics, is the attribution of blame. If we believe we have lost status because of our own action, we are ashamed or embarrassed, whereas if we blame someone else, we wax indignant or angry. The former are deflating emotions, the latter move us toward action. The emotional dynamics of blame, I have argued elsewhere (Jasper, 1997:chap. 5; 2006:chap. 2) are helpful for explaining political action.²

A number of social psychologists within sociology, drawing on work like ACT and Kemper’s structural models, have stressed the importance of expectations in explaining our emotional reactions. Robert Thamm (1992) claims that all groups generate expectations about how individuals should behave as well as rewards and sanctions depending on whether they conform. As one appraises how well one’s self and others are living up to expectations, one feels emotions. In all these models, there is room for cultural variation in expectations, as well as motivation for political action.

In 1983, Arlie Hochschild published The Managed Heart, an academic bestseller that eclipsed the other traditions in the sociology of emotions. Her diverse sources included Goffman’s interactionism but also C. Wright Mills’s theories of class structure, specifically the exploitation of white collar workers. Writing about Delta flight attendants, Hochschild described the management of emotional expressions according to culturally informed feeling rules and display rules, including those imposed by employers in a kind of exploitation of the soul. When we simply follow the display rules, she says, we are surface acting; when we follow the rules about what we are actually supposed to be feeling, we are deep acting. By working on our thinking and our bodies, we continually do emotion management, but when corporations force us to do too much of that work we become alienated from our own feelings. Aside from its indignant tone, this book was not directly related to politics, although one of Hochschild’s earliest discussions of emotion (1975), concerning women and anger, appeared in a feminist political volume.

Another strand in the sociology of emotions is Randall Collins’s (2001, 2004) discussion of the emotional energy generated in collective rituals, labeled “collective effervescence” by Durkheim. As part of his “conflict theory,” Collins sees emotions and attention as values for which people compete. The “emotional energy” generated in face-to-face encounters (with their attendant mutual focus of attention and coordinated movement) becomes a mood that people carry with them, often

² Identifying a villain, opponent, or “other” to blame seems a frequent component of collective identity, which depends on “our” sense of difference from “them.”
giving them the enthusiasm for collective political action. Group loyalty also results, although it needs to be recharged periodically with additional interactions. (Following Goffman, Collins emphasizes that almost all interactions are kinds of rituals; they need not be elaborate and formal affairs. He also accepts Durkheim’s claim that participants create meaningful symbols from these emotional engagements.)

The main application of the sociology of emotions to politics has been in the study of social movements, where a variety of emotional processes have been acknowledged after a generation of neglect (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2000; Jasper, 2011). Here the emphasis has been more on the rhetorical production of emotions in various audiences, including the face-to-face rituals studied by Collins. For example “moral shocks,” in which people become outraged when the world does not meet certain expectations, help recruit new participants (Jasper and Poulsen, 1995; Warren, 2010) and energize or radicalize existing participants (Gould, 2009). Moral shocks, a form of deflection to use ACT language, are conveyed through the news media but are also packaged by activists.

With a few exceptions, the sociology of emotions has confined itself to face-to-face interactions. This would seem to be an unpromising approach to explaining global political and economic processes. But in the remainder of this chapter, I would like to draw out several strains of the sociology of emotions that seem promising. In part 2, I step back and suggest some ways that emotions are relevant to strategic choices in a very general way. Then I take a look at aspects of globalization which in fact remain face to face and thus amenable to a sociological analysis. Along the way, I suggest some distinctions in the category of what we label emotions, so that we may avoid some common confusions and conflations. Part 4 examines similar emotional processes that can occur through the media, and part 5 looks at the emotional underpinnings of so-called cosmopolitanism.

EMOTIONS AND STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

In other work, I have tried to develop an approach to strategic interaction that includes emotions and which provides an alternative to the rather sparse and unrealistic approach taken by game theory (Jasper, 2004, 2006). The same tradeoffs (and when the tradeoffs are acknowledged, dilemmas) appear in a number of different institutional arenas, including politics, protest, and international relations. They all have some emotional content in that the long list of costs, benefits, and risks attendant to each choice includes emotional costs and benefits and risks. These tradeoffs are often salient in decision-making, whether or not they are consciously acknowledged.

A few examples should suffice to show that strategic dilemmas involve some emotional management of one’s own team as well as attempts to rhetorically manipulate the emotions of others outside the team (from Jasper, 2006). In the Band
of Brothers Dilemma, a team tries to build emotional loyalty among its members, but those emotional attachments may be to one’s immediate comrades rather than to the entire team (the nation, the army, the social movement). If there is a conflict between protecting your buddies and fighting the broader war, the latter may lose out.

In the Naughty or Nice Dilemma, players decide how aggressive to be: violent or aggressive tactics may scare other players into compliance, but at some cost in disapproval; they are usually worth the risk if they allow a player to make irreversible gains or if public approval is not especially costly. In his chapter, Peter Stearns shows how tastes in tactics help explain how choices are made in the face of the Naughty or Nice Dilemma: Americans value cheerful, friendly displays in and of themselves, and so tend to overestimate their effectiveness as diplomatic expressions.³

The Security Dilemma evolved from international relations, but it fits a number of other interactions: any time a player feels threatened by what another does to strengthen itself. Another example is the Home-Turf Dilemma: you have the advantage of familiarity, but you are also concerned with protecting your home (either your literal or your institutional home). Emotions also often entail Today or Tomorrow?, a tradeoff between immediate goals and long-run goals: it feels good at the moment to express emotions, but we may regret them tomorrow. Urges are the extreme case of immediate impulses crowding out other projects until they are satisfied.

To understand how strategic players make choices, we need to recognize dilemmas like these. Even players who do not acknowledge them explicitly are still affected and constrained by the underlying tradeoffs. Creativity, very often, comes out of a recognition that things can be done differently, that there are choices where it had seemed there were only constraining routines. Both the means and the ends in these choices include emotions.

Formal games cover some of these cases, but others elude simple mathematical formulas. Emotional dynamics are difficult to model mathematically, and normally make rank-ordering of preferences impossible. Dilemmas are just that, unsolvable choices. When they involve emotions, as most of them do, they are that much harder to clarify but that much more important causally.

THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION

If we live in an era of increased worldwide flows of people, information, products, and money, does this “globalization” change anything in our analysis of emotions

³ This might also be viewed as a case of the Sorcerer’s Apprentice Dilemma, in which my available means come to shape my ends, either because I grow fond of them through familiarity or because I lose control over them (as with many technologies and experts): Jasper (2006:97).
and politics? We have seen that most sociologists of emotion place great emphasis on face-to-face interactions. It is copresence that creates possibilities for shame and guilt management (Goffman, 1963, 1967). Interaction rituals require that bodies be brought together to generate emotional energy (Collins, 2004). Jonathan Turner (2002:1) insists that “face-to-face interaction is still primal and primary,” even though it requires a great deal of work and is far from “natural.” What happens to these face-to-face dynamics when interactions are mediated and take place at global distances?

Given my concern with getting down to the microlevel of social processes – this is why I became interested in emotions – I have naturally been skeptical about big structures and big processes. I am not sure they even exist, and I am not sure they explain much. Scholars are too comfortable with metaphors such as a culture, the state, a social movement, social structure, networks, and power. We tend to forget they are metaphors, merely standing in for concrete actions and actors, so when we talk about structures we think we have explained something. Nothing is bigger than globalization, so I was naturally skeptical about globalization: is anything new really going on, or are we simply seeing the continuing extension of the micro-networks, the vocabularies, and the symbols, that have been growing out of Central Asia and Europe for a thousand years? Is this just the continued expansion of the capitalist world system?

My first appreciation of the globalization discourse was to realize that we had common opponents, in the basic categories of western sociology as derived from the nineteenth century: state, society, a culture, and so on. I was trying to nibble away at these ideas from below, while globalization theorists chipped away from above. For instance, states are not monolithic agents, with any assured degree of coherence, or any particular relationship to civil society, in contrast to what you would conclude from both Marxist theories and their liberal critics. States are internally divided arenas for conflict, perhaps even more than they are coherent players, and they open onto broader networks of interaction (Jasper, 1990; Ferguson and Mansbach, 2004).

My second source of appreciation for globalization as an analytic lens was to recognize an opportunity to better specify what is really going on in political, economic, and social life: what is happening at the microlevel that corresponds to globalization? If there is nothing new at the microlevel, then perhaps we are just seeing the latest intellectual fad. And if there is something new, we should be able to see it at the most microlevel, even in the individual.

Emotions are the perfect test of this. Nothing is more micro: only individuals can have emotions, collective players cannot. So do emotional processes and outcomes change under what we call globalization?
MEDIATED INFLUENCES

Of the influences on our emotions that have potentially changed with globalization, the two most obvious are the media and INGOs. Both potentially entail mediated interactions, with “a certain narrowing of the range of symbolic cues which are available to participants,” who as a result “have fewer symbolic devices for the reduction of ambiguity” (Thompson, 1995:83–84).

First, media coverage has extended its global reach. The evidence is clear that extensive infrastructure has been built to carry both people and their messages around the world (Lechner and Boli, 2005:112ff.); less clear is what those messages mean. Does globalization mean cultural imperialism (Schiller, 1976), or does it bring opportunities for resistance (Flew, 2007)? Presumably, it is both: transmissions open new strategic arenas for contestation. They have all sorts of biases, of course, but if nothing else the media bring images and stories of distant suffering to broader audiences than ever before, spurring emotional reactions (Boltanski, 1999). And if they are effective, we react to the people they portray in some of the same ways we react in face-to-face encounters.

If we can feel compassion at long distance, we can also feel hate. As Benjamin Spock (1970:13) wrote: “Man can be the most affectionate and altruistic of creatures, yet he’s potentially more vicious than any other. He is the only one who can be persuaded to hate millions of his own kind whom he has never seen and to kill as many as he can lay his hands on in the name of his tribe or his God.” This suggests another dynamic: we think we already know something about the strangers we encounter, thanks to stereotyped information conveyed by the media. But is this really new? Humans have always used stereotypes to form expectations about others. Global media reach may in fact bring more accurate information than groups used in the past in forming opinions about distant others.

There is a politics to news coverage and to humanitarian intervention. Luc Boltanski (1999) argues that humanitarian intervention aspires to put aside accusations about the past, the search for villains, and policy proposals for the future, preferring an immediacy of action in the present. Compassion, he says, is a more useful emotion than pity: a direct recognition of humanity, not a framing of others as victims. In affect-control terms, victims are seen as weak and passive, whereas we can feel compassion for those who retain the dignity of strength and who try to help themselves. Whatever the politics of the media, a mobilization of attention and of charity is possible as a result of increased coverage. (This is the strategic Dilemma of Powerful Allies: the media can broadcast your message, but inevitably have their own frame and purposes in doing so: Jasper, 2006:29.)

Deterministic theories abound concerning the effect of new communications technologies, but there is little evidence that mediated communication replaces
face-to-face interaction. Geographer Paul Adams (2009:40) cites the case of the invention of the telephone in 1876. Many predicted that the new device would replace personal interactions, but the latter increased alongside telephone use. Comments Adams: “For every trip avoided because of the communication-transportation tradeoff, more trips were generated because people had become more deeply involved in distant affairs, more spatially extensive as agents.” The effects of the internet today are probably similar.

A second channel of global influence is international networks of activism, whose rhetorical dynamic Clifford Bob (2005) describes in *The Marketing of Rebellion*. He examines the remarkable success of the Ogoni in Nigeria and the Zapatistas in Chiapas, both of whom managed to capture the imagination of broad audiences and nongovernmental organizations around the world. By comparing them directly to nearby and similar groups and indirectly to hundreds or thousands of other insurgent efforts around the world, Bob highlights a handful of factors that allowed these two groups to market themselves so effectively. There is a double process of persuasion occurring: oppressed groups around the world must craft their appeals to activist and charitable INGOs, who in turn pick their causes with their own audiences in mind, audiences of donors and networks of similar INGOs.

Bob lists factors that affect a movement’s chances of finding international support. Six are movement characteristics: their standing with various audiences around the world, their personal and professional contacts, their knowledge about donors and supporters, their material resources, their organizational resources, and leadership. Two are opponent characteristics: the identity of opponents, and their reactions.  

Personal and professional contacts are obviously based on face-to-face interactions, but so – to some extent – are standing, knowledge, organizational resources, and leadership.

Although Bob does not quite say this, the key factor to both movements seems to have been the presence of a leader (Ken Saro-Wiwa among the Ogoni and sub-comandante Marcos for the Zapatistas) who embodies the group’s moral aspirations and can speak the languages of the relevant audiences the group wants to reach. Both were prolific writers, and both were articulate not only in the language of their followers but in the English so useful in attracting international audiences. They were able to embody the emotions of the people they represented in order to arouse sympathetic emotions in their INGO audiences.

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4 The list seems reasonable, although the factors on the list do not seem particularly structural, as Bob calls them. Instead, the explanatory factors seem strategic, in that groups make choices about how to change all of them, reshaping them during the course of mobilization and conflict. None have the durability, placing them outside the control of parties to a conflict, that the term structure implies.
Bob’s root metaphor of marketing could be given a structural, a strategic, or a cultural tone. Bob sometimes falls back on more structural terms such as “matching,” which seems to imply a network process by which preexisting entities are either brought together or not. But his empirical presentation shows the many strategic choices made on both sides of the match. Insurgents rethink their identities and images, just as INGOs think hard about the potential risks and benefits of supporting various groups. Both sets of players face innumerable dilemmas in trying to please more than one audience. (The most common, which we saw with the news media, is the Powerful Allies Dilemma: you want strong allies, such as INGOs with money to disburse, but those allies may reshape you as much as they aid you.)

Bob’s marketing metaphor is apt, in that we see a series of interactions among supplicants and supporters, an interaction at least as old as conscience constituencies (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Interestingly, this interaction places the supporter, the donor, in the place of the hero, and the activist in the character of the victim. But the support allows the activist to return to the field and once again assume the role of active hero to fight local villains. Victims in one arena become heroes in another. Affect-control dynamics suggest that we admire heroes for being strong, good, and active – and that these characteristics also make us want to help them or at least associate with them.

“Marketing” can also imply actively selling oneself to an audience, as in advertising. Some ads are aimed at creating a general impression about a group or product: these people are good, they are victims, while the state is a villain oppressing them. Other ads try to inspire a purchase: someone buys a product, or an INGO decides to support a movement. Here, marketing sounds very much like rhetoric, the art of persuasion, and far from the exchange imagery that has dominated political science in recent years. (Epidictic rhetoric was precisely about the creation of general impressions, especially about people, as in funeral orations.)

In this battle of rhetoric and of imagery, insurgents face the Hero or Victim Dilemma. For purposes of recruiting members, they need to project power and agency, a sense that they will not be easily crushed. But to attract outside sympathy and aid, they need to appear more passive, as victims who have suffered a great wrong. To be a victim, you need a villain, and the Ogoni were lucky enough to cast Shell Oil in that role, until the Nigerian government brutally repressed the Ogoni and grabbed the leading villain role. The two villains together allowed the Ogoni to appeal to environmental and human-rights INGOs at the same time.

Even in a globalized world, many crucial interactions remain face to face. Part of globality is the ability for those who can afford it to travel great distances, to meet with donors or applicants. Saro-Wiwa traveled widely; journalists and funders flocked to Chiapas. Face-to-face interactions may make the difference between a failed and a successful effort to raise funds internationally – just as they do locally. Håkan Thörn (2006) makes similar observations about the
anti-apartheid movement, whose thousands of exiles cultivated personal connections with journalists, activists, and government officials in dozens of countries. Collins (2004) shows a number of ways that face-to-face interactions inspire deeper emotions and emotional bonds.

At the same time, mediated interactions have also existed for a long time: remember letters? We compensate for the mediation to some extent, filling in the sights and sounds with our own imagination, envisioning the lives of distant others, going far beyond the skimpy information transmitted through any medium. (On the importance of imagination to emotions, see Nussbaum, 2001). The objects of emotions have changed more than the emotions and the interactions that trigger them.

As with all rhetorical pitches, these are imbued with emotions, especially the moral emotions: who is the right kind of victim, threatened by the right kind of villain, or the right kind of natural disaster, with the greatest urgency, depending on the organization’s mission and audiences? But of course this construction of victims, villains, and heroes (those who intervene to help) is the oldest kind of emotion work that activists and charities do. What has changed is mostly who the victims and villains are. This is one reason that INGOs, like charities, can make us uneasy, like voyeurs, or they can make us feel self-righteous (Boltanski, 1999). After all, if there are victims and villains, we become, or these organizations become, the heroes, while the local activists must be reduced to victims.

But of course in the world of human rights, as I said, it is the victims themselves who must gain the strength and throw off their passivity, so that they themselves become the heroes. It is hard to help someone else do this, because the point is to do it on their own. Mostly we just need to get out of their way. Part of human dignity involves standing up for your rights (Wood, 2003).

So what can we say, theoretically? The basic mechanisms of emotion and persuasion probably have not changed in 2,400 years, since the Greeks started theorizing about rhetoric. Character sketches of villains and victims and heroes are the heart of epidictic rhetoric. But the content both of the basic affects, and of the social and media channels that trigger the affects, have changed. The theoretical point is that, as you work down to the microlevel, you see familiar components of social life, recognizable across arenas, across times and places, but as you work back up, you see that they are put together in different ways, and come through different organizational channels. It is recognizing the interplay of old and new that gives us a certain purchase as social scientists.

THE EMOTIONS OF COSMOPOLITANISM

A number of scholars have seen, in the increasing density of global connections, the basis for a new emotional loyalty to “the worldwide community of human beings” (Nussbaum, 2002). “The cosmopolitan challenge is to develop the intellectual
ability to establish a distance from their cultural pattern of group life and detach themselves from their old selves, their old cultural patterns, in order to understand themselves as human beings in themselves” (Ossewaarde, 2007:384). This will work well for a tiny number of intellectual, political, and economic elites whose “local” community already lives in airports, hotels, and international organizations. For U.N. officials, famous philosophers like Martha Nussbaum (2002), and a few others, this is their community. They are not really giving up on group life, just adding another face-to-face network with whom to interact (and not necessarily a larger group).  

There may be a global civil society developing, but it is largely a series of face-to-face encounters in places like the World Social Forum and hundreds of thousands of other meetings. A global identity is not necessarily a mediated identity. Or at least no more so than other imagined communities, all of which transcend the total sum of personal encounters. But all are based on personal encounters, and their attendant emotions.

Such cultures may not be as cosmopolitan as they first appear, according to Ulf Hannerz (1990:244). “Some transnational cultures are more insulated from local practices than others,” for one thing. Most such cultures, in addition, “are in different ways extensions or transformations of the cultures of western Europe and North America.” Those from these regions easily enter cosmopolitan settings; those from elsewhere experience these settings as more distinctive and unusual, says Hannerz. Anthony Smith (1990:185), historian of ethnic-based nationalism, scoffs at claims of cosmopolitanism: “national cultures inspired by rediscovered ethnohistories continue to divide our world into discrete cultural blocks, which show little sign of harmonization, let alone amalgamation.”

In contrast to small numbers of cosmopolitans who exert considerable control over those with whom they interact, most of our contemporaries experience increased migration as interactions with strangers. One sociologist, citing Giddens and Bauman, with a long lineage of sociologists before them, worries that “the society of strangers might be like a collective experience of powerlessness, manifested in feelings of personal meaninglessness, loneliness, mistrust, insecurity and anxiety” (Ossewaarde, 2007:385). This is, of course, part of the centuries-old fear of cities and modernization. With globalization come greater flows of migrants, and more strangers. The cosmopolitans escape this unsettling encounter, because they engage with people very much like them (other environmentalists, other philosophers), who just happen to hail from other regions.

5 As Michael Mann (1986, 1993) indirectly shows, most of those who have put aside a local geographic identity have done so in favor of a religious identity, which – while it may have some universalizing tendencies – is hardly cosmopolitan.
In either case, these are face-to-face interactions, whether with strangers or acquaintances. Globalization brings with it more encounters with strangers, but what we feel in these interactions may not have changed. Our face-to-face engagements with friends are still warmly satisfying; those with strangers are potentially unsettling.

Similarly, the most ancient form of international interactions, diplomacy, remains face to face. The flow of ambassadors, special envoys, cultural attachés, and others has steadily increased. The ease of international communication has not trumped the ease of international travel. If there are complicated feeling rules for flight attendants, as Hochschild described, how much more extensive and intensive must be the feeling rules for diplomats?6

FUTURE PATHS?

Despite considerable progress, too much confusion exists in discussions of emotions in politics. In addition to the problem that very different feelings fall under the same rubric of “emotions,” different kinds of emotions interact with one another. Our background affective loyalties and moral sensibilities shape our immediate sense of fear or anger, as with moral shocks. We also have emotions about our emotions, especially when we are ashamed of having felt a certain way that we consider inappropriate or proud of ourselves for having an admirable feeling (Elster, 1999). Another complication is that we frequently experience emotions in combinations or sequences. Anger tinged with shame differs from anger tinged with indignation, with different implications for political action.

The lack of communication across disciplines exacerbates all these challenges. Sociology needs to move beyond its focus on face-to-face interactions, to consider performance, media, and rhetoric, and the emotions they convey or stimulate. Scholars of globalization and international relations, in turn, need to recognize that face-to-face interactions continue to play a key role in the appeals, threats, and discussions that they study. It is glib to say, but more dialogue is needed.

Emotions are a core part of human action and decisions, which we analysts ignore at our peril. Actions, whether consciously made as choices or undertaken as unthinking routines, come with long lists of risks, costs, and potential benefits. We need to include the emotional risks, costs, and benefits, because these surely guide actions and choices. These were excluded from rational-choice and game traditions as too hard to reckon with, but at the high cost of abandoning realism. If we are to understand the political actions undertaken, we need to understand the emotions

6 In the preface to The Managed Heart, Hochschild attributes her interest in emotion management to her childhood observations of her parents’ work for the U.S. Foreign Service.
that guide, accompany, and result from them. Pooling the insights of various social sciences can only help.

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The Relevance of the “Emotive Turn” of Cognitive Science

Jean-Michel Roy

THE PROBLEM OF THE RELEVANCE OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE

Is it relevant to turn to cognitive science, understood as the renewed attempt to elaborate a theory of cognition born in the mid-1950s with what psychologist H. Gardner famously popularized as the Cognitive Revolution,\textsuperscript{1} when seeking possible resources in the field of emotion studies for the development of an emotion-oriented approach to international relations? In other words, is it legitimate for such an approach to expect assistance from cognitive science in securing a theoretical understanding of emotional phenomena? Such is the somewhat intriguing issue that this chapter attempts to answer.

Obviously, looking on the side of cognitive science makes sense only under the presupposition that a theory of emotions can be of any importance in investigating international relations. A presupposition which is derivative from the more fundamental supposition which lies at the very heart of the project discussed in this book (as explained in Chapter 1 by Jean-Marc Coicaud), that emotions themselves matter to the study of international relations, to the point of having to be made more central to it. But to what do these two presuppositions really amount? And what is the evidence supporting them?

I start, accordingly, with a number of reflections on these two preliminary questions that sketch out my personal understanding of the nature and legitimacy of an emotion-oriented approach to international relations studies. These preliminary reflections not only show that this approach indeed has good reasons to turn to a theory of emotions, but they also help to delineate more finely the sort of theory of emotions to which it needs to turn. That is, namely, a theory of emotional processes. As a consequence, these reflections also establish that the issue of the relevance of cognitive science to such an approach is to be more precisely reformulated as that

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Gardner 1985.
of determining whether cognitive science does offer such a theory of emotional processes and, if so, to what extent it can be instrumental.

The issue might sound more apparent than real. Given that cognitive science is commonly presented as a scientific theory of mental faculties, and that emotion traditionally counts as one of the major abilities of a mind, it seems indeed that cognitive science must include a theory of emotions. And, consequently, that the difficulty is limited to determining whether what it says about them is sufficiently appropriate as well as correct to be of any use to an emotion-oriented approach to international relations. This view is nevertheless too superficial. The main thrust of the chapter is to emphasize that it is only in virtue of a fairly recent transformation, and one that counts among the most significant evolutions that affected its foundations, that cognitive science can correctly be seen as offering a theory of emotions, and moreover one with in principle relevance to an emotion-oriented approach to international relations. A transformation often described as a switch from a “cold” to a “hot” approach to cognitive explanation – capitalizing on a terminology first introduced by cognitive psychologist Abelson\(^2\) – and that can also be labelled an emotive or affective turn.

My ambition is in fact limited to establishing and specifying this essential point about the relevance of cognitive science, as well as to clarifying its implications for the agenda of an emotion-oriented approach to international relations. It is not to engage in the detailed exploration of this relevance, whose potential and limitations will only be briefly illustrated with one of the most recent and striking, although yet unexplored by international relations studies, developments of the cognitive science investigation of emotional phenomena.

THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF EMOTIONAL PROCESSES

There is apparently a very straightforward justification to the twofold assumption that emotions (as well as emotion theory) matter to the study of international relations. It lies in the simple fact that international relations involve emotions and can be expressed in the form of the following argument:

(a) \textit{premise}: international relations have an emotional dimension;
(b) \textit{conclusion 1}: therefore, international relations studies should investigate this emotional dimension; and
(c) \textit{conclusion 2}: therefore, international studies need to draw on emotion theory to carry out this investigation.

\(^2\) Abelson 1963.
However obvious it might look at first glance, on closer examination, this argument is not without difficulties. In what sense exactly do international relations have an emotional dimension in the first place? And to what extent does the first conclusion really follow from the recognition of this emotional dimension? Finally, how truly legitimate is the inference from the first conclusion to the second conclusion? Let us examine each one of these three difficulties in turn.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERSUBJECTIVE RELATIONS

International relations are relations between nations. Accordingly, they can possess an emotional dimension only to the extent that some capacity for emotions can be legitimately attributed to nations and to the extent also that this emotional capacity is involved in their interactions with other nations. But in what sense can attributing emotions to nations be acceptable? Nations apparently do not fall into the category of entities that can be credited with emotions, except metaphorically. A closer look at this issue reveals, however, a more complex situation.

Nations are in fact human groups, and they are human groups of a certain kind because not every human group counts as a nation. The specificity of the human groups that do count as nations is probably best captured in political terms. Nations can indeed be defined as politically sovereign human groups. Accordingly, international relations studies investigate the relations that politically sovereign groups as such entertain among themselves.

As they are relations between human groups of a certain kind, the relations that two nations establish are necessarily intertwined with what traditional philosophical vocabulary designates as intersubjective relations, that is to say relations between individual subjects. This intertwining of relations between nations with relations between individuals has in fact several different aspects that it is important to differentiate.

Firstly, relations between nations include as components intersubjective relations between the members of these nations. The 1939–1945 war relationship between the French and the German nations was made for instance of innumerable acts of war between subsets of their respective citizens. In addition, a distinction should be made between specific and nonspecific kinds of such intersubjective relational components. The very same relation of murdering of a French individual by a German individual can, for instance, occur in the context of a war between two nations, or be disconnected from any war relation or any other sort of inter-nations relation. For this reason, when it does occur in the context of an international relation, it is a component of this relation, without being a specific component of it. Specific components are intersubjective relations that are, on the contrary, intrinsically and necessarily linked to international relations,
and rely on specific properties that individuals have in virtue of being elements of nations. The imprisoning of a French soldier by a German soldier, for instance, is an intersubjective relation that is intrinsically linked to a war relation between their respective nations and relies entirely on their soldier status.

Secondly, relations between nations depend for their existence on such intersubjective relations. There is no 1939–1945 war between France and Germany without innumerable warring interactions among French and German citizens, from dual interactions to much more complex interactions. It should be noted that this dependence of international relations on intersubjective relations exists whether or not the former are taken to be reducible to the latter. In the first case, relations between nations are, in the spirit of reductionism, nothing other than the sum of the intersubjective relations on which they depend (and of which they eventually are composed); whereas in the second case, they include a qualitatively different relation somehow emerging from these intersubjective relations, an alternative that depends on whether one sees the whole that a nation constitutes as the mere sum of its constituting individuals or as a higher level entity with qualitatively specific properties.

Thirdly, relations between nations not only include and depend on intersubjective relations, but at times also take the form of an intersubjective relation themselves. When, as we ordinarily say, “two nations negotiate” a cease fire, a peace treaty or some kind of trade agreement, the negotiation is in fact an interaction between two or more individuals acting as representatives of their sovereign political communities.

Relations between nations can even be assimilated with intersubjective relations in a more direct way when the wholes that nations constitute are themselves assimilated to sorts of higher level individuals through the notion of a collective subject. As problematic as it may be, such an assimilation is not unheard of – it is even frequent in the history of political thinking, both ancient and modern. Eighteenth-century political theory and practice is, for instance, replete with physiological references (the body of the nation, the organs of the nation) that betray a more or less explicit subject-based analysis of the concept of a nation. The more remote theory of the double body of the king excavated by E. Kantorowicz is an even stronger illustration of an apprehension of a nation as an individual subject, because – in such a theory – the nation is embodied literally in the physical person of the king, who is both a human subject and a nation.

**INTERSUBJECTIVE RELATIONS AND EMOTIONS**

This complex intermingling of international relations with intersubjective relations is key to understanding in what sense the former can possess an emotional

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3 Kantorowicz 1957.
dimension. The crucial point is that intersubjective relations are in large part emotional relations. Even though it is fairly obvious, this point needs to be formally established through a brief analysis of the notion of emotion.

The term “emotion” has traditionally been analysed as referring to the product of a specific faculty, itself understood as one of the several faculties that are characteristic of a mind, next to the intellectual faculty and the perception faculty. The notion of an emotion faculty in fact has two readings. A broad reading, according to which it applies to any capacity that does not qualify as either intellectual or perceptive; and a narrower reading, according to which it designates only a specific aspect of a more general affective capacity. In this second understanding, an emotion is different from a feeling or a passion.

Following the broad acceptance of the term, now prevalent in the theory of mind literature, an entity endowed with a capacity for emotions can be described as one capable of having mental states of mind such as pleasure, pain, fear, greed, desire, hunger, thirst or jealousy, without forgetting aesthetic, moral or religious feelings. And clearly not every entity in the universe has such capacity: stones are undoubtedly deprived of it, and nonhuman animals include many disputable cases. But emotional states are on the contrary pervasive in humans, to the point that we are seldom free of any of them, although we also seldom are in purely emotional states. Happy, tired, anxious or relaxed, we virtually always mentally operate on a background of emotions and constantly apprehend the world from a certain emotional perspective. Being emotionless is a quasi-pathological condition, and the persistence of being so definitely is. In addition, emotional states are key determinants of our behaviour. We most often behave the way we do because we feel a specific emotion (such as fear or anger) or in order to reach certain emotional states (chief of which is the state of pleasure and its many variants).

Given that they are a pervasive element of mental life and that they largely determine its course as well as its behavioural outcomes, emotions naturally play a key role in the relations of one individual with others. As a matter of fact, we constantly relate to others on an emotional note of pleasure, displeasure, liking or irritation (to name a few), and the relations we establish with them are no less constantly determined in a causal or teleological way by emotions. Aristotle said we are rational animals because he saw our intellectual faculties, chief among them reason, as our distinctive features in the animal kingdom. But we also are emotional animals and socially relate as such. In fact, one important way of classifying emotional states is according to their degree of involvement of the other, either as a cause or as an object, resulting in a well-established division between social and non-social emotions. And social emotions so understood outnumber the non-social emotions, showing that emotional intersubjectivity is clearly the prevailing form of intersubjectivity.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS EMOTIONAL RELATIONS

If, on the one hand, intersubjective relations are as permeated with emotions as just suggested, and if, on the other hand, international relations are as intertwined with intersubjective relations as previously analysed, there is more than metaphor in the talk about relations between nations as emotional relations. Such talk must be in some way analysable into talk about one of the intersubjective relations involved in international ones, making the ascriptions of emotional states they contain genuine ascriptions, to be taken in a literal way.

The inference, however, is not as straightforward as it may look, because the intersubjective relations intertwined with international relations could offer the specificity of being exceptionally emotionless, such as purely rational relations. But this theoretical possibility does not stand the test of empirical reality. To take just one clear example: when relations between two nations assume the form of a negotiation between leaders representing their respective political communities, emotions, subtle and subdued or plain and explicit, play a major role. As documented by numerous historians, the Yalta meeting, so determinant for shaping the face of the world over the course of forty-five years, offers a beautiful illustration of this phenomenon. The division into geopolitical zones that it produced is not the result of a purely rational decision, but of a decision process where emotion mingled with reasoning in various ways.

PENETRATING THE MECHANISMS OF EMOTIONAL PROCESSES

By securing the legitimacy of talking about international relations in emotional terms, the soundness of what was identified earlier as the most fundamental assumption of an emotion-oriented approach to international relations – namely, that international relations have an emotion dimension – is also warranted. Moreover, the validity of the immediate conclusion drawn from this assumption, to the effect that international studies must address this dimension, is in turn confirmed, dissipating thereby all suspicions about the first step of the argument under scrutiny.

A difficulty remains, however. Is this conclusion not so squarely confirmed as to make it in fact a perfectly trivial statement, and to deprive the whole idea of an emotion-oriented approach to international relations of any real substance? Indeed, is it after all even thinkable that the study of international relations take any other perspective?

One way to make sense of the vindication of such an approach is to understand it as a claim, based on the implicit reproach that this emotional factor has not been given its full dues so far, for the adoption of a more emotion-oriented approach.
Avoiding the apparently unrealistic supposition that emotions could remain unaddressed in any form of study of international relations, this interpretation makes it a plea for an approach in which both the true complexity of the nature of emotions and the true importance of their role are taken into account. In this perspective, an emotion-oriented approach is to be contrasted with an approach in which only basic and simple emotions are acknowledged, and in which they are also seen as remaining under the main guidance of reason. A good example of this view is offered by the standard reading of the recent Gulf wars in terms of economic interests and especially of oil production control. In this type of explanation, emotions are not denied a contribution to the conflicts, but they are essentially reduced to basic feelings, such as the desire for material well-being, selfishness, greed, power or pleasure. In addition, the protagonists are seen as fundamentally rational actors putting their intellectual faculties at the service of these unsophisticated emotional driving forces.

In an emotion-oriented approach, on the contrary, the analysis of the emotional factors is finer grained, giving full attention to the intricacies and subtleties of emotional states, as well as to the specificity of the way they relate to each other and to non-emotional states. There is for instance a “logic” of jealousy, insecurity or love where one emotional state leads to another in the ignorance of what rationality would dictate (e.g., going from a feeling of national humiliation to a declaration of war that goes against the odds of a possible victory), or where reason is not the cooling instrument that will bring emotional satisfaction, but a fuelling instrument that will always find “good reasons” to further expand jealousy, insecurity or love.

It is not certain, however, that this more acceptable interpretation is still strong enough to fully meet the objection of triviality that has been raised. In this perspective, an emotion-oriented approach to international relations is one that neither downplays the importance of emotional factors nor simplifies them. But if such a neglect and oversimplification can probably be correctly reproached to parts or periods of development of the field, arguing for their repair sounds less like promoting a new orientation of international relations studies than like striving to put it back on the right tracks where it has erred. And it has certainly not always nor everywhere erred, as from time immemorial greed, power vertigo, religious exaltation, xenophobia and so on have been incriminated as key factors in the interactions between nations. Tacitus is already a goldmine of such explanations, and Cleopatra’s nose has been for centuries credited to have moved the face of the earth through its erotic reverberations on Caesar’s emotional system. In more recent times, Willhelm Reich revisited the rise of fascism in several European nations at the light of a sort of logic of collective unconscious desire.

Accordingly, to give full theoretical significance to the idea of an emotion-oriented approach seems to require understanding it in a deeper way, not as a mere reminder
of the attention that is due to the emotional factors crucially at play in international relations, but as a claim for analysing these emotional factors in the light of a solid and detailed knowledge of what emotions are and how they operate. In other words, as a project consisting fundamentally in substituting an emotion-oriented approach based on a proper knowledge of what might be called emotional processes, to an emotion-oriented approach based on a merely intuitive apprehension of them.

THE NEED FOR A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING

Not all knowledge is theoretical, however, and the move from the first to the second conclusion, stating that an emotion-oriented approach needs to draw on a theory of emotion, is not yet secured. It might very well be that an emotion-oriented approach needs to draw on a non-theoretical knowledge of emotional processes. This issue relates to that of the status of the study of international relations: to what extent does it qualify as a scientific discipline? And if it does, what kind of scientific knowledge does it incarnate? It is at least doubtful that it deserves the label of a theory in the traditional epistemological sense of a deductive structure comprising nomological propositions. Perhaps an emotion-oriented approach needs a more practical kind of knowledge of these processes, one that builds up with experience, observation and reading and does not translate into nomological generalizations and principled explanations.

The objection sounds nevertheless unconvincing, as common-sensical accounts of emotional phenomena arguably include generalizations and principled explanations, and an emotion-oriented approach to international relations no less arguably intends to further elaborate the same type of account of their emotional dimension. It is patently governed by the ideal of showing how myriad facts about international relations (beyond the circumstantial factors of time and location to which they owe their peculiarities), obey general mechanisms, whose mastery can – barring problems of complexity – provide a certain predictive leverage. And its specificity lies precisely in the idea that these general mechanisms are importantly emotional, requiring therefore to penetrate the general mechanisms of emotions themselves. If the international relations scientist could avail himself of reliable generalizations to the effect that individual x in emotional state E1 will develop with probability p and emotional state E2 when confronted with conditions C1, and emotional state E2 when confronted with conditions C2, and so on; he would undeniably get closer to the kind of understanding of international phenomena he is really after.

But requiring a theoretical kind of knowledge of emotions does not necessarily mean borrowing that knowledge, and therefore drawing on external theoretical sources. As a matter of fact, the required theoretical knowledge is to be obviously
built, to a certain extent, in the course of investigating the emotional dimension of international relations. For it is very unlikely that independent theories of emotion, whatever they might be, can provide everything such an approach needs to know about emotional processes to adequately capture this dimension. In other words, it is beyond reasonable expectation that capturing this dimension could simply consist of applying to a specific range of emotional phenomena, linked to international relations, generalizations of the type mentioned in the previous paragraph. The specificity of these phenomena is not a question of pure context, leaving them intrinsically identical with emotional phenomena occurring outside of international relations. Specific emotions, on the contrary, are clearly involved in international relations, chief of which is national pride, and more generally the family of nationalist feelings. The conclusion that emerges is therefore that an emotion-oriented approach must secure the theoretical knowledge of emotions it needs both through the integration of theories of emotions developed by other disciplines and their application to its own data, and through the further elaboration of these theories.

Finally, it should be underlined that the integration of external theories of emotions cannot go without some selectivity. For not all aspects of theories of emotional processes can be of interest to an emotion-oriented approach to international relations. The study of some range of emotions, such as aesthetic emotions, is – for instance – likely to be only of peripheral concern. Similarly, some of the levels at which emotional processes are investigated are quite probably at best of very indirect importance. Chances are dim, for example, that the chemical analysis of ionic exchanges going on in the brain areas involved in emotional processing has much to teach to an emotion-oriented approach to international relations. If selectivity seems thus unavoidable, great caution is nevertheless to be exerted in the process of selection and dogmatism must be as much avoided as undisciplined enthusiasm.

THE IDEA OF A THEORY OF EMOTIONAL PROCESSES

If the conclusion imposed by these analyses is that an emotion-oriented approach can and must benefit from the theoretical investigation of emotional processes, the very notion of a theory of emotional processes stands in need of additional clarification. I take it to mean a theory of the elements and operating principles of the human (and animal) capacity to have emotions, which, as such, is to be distinguished from a variety of differently oriented studies of emotions: such as the investigations of their historical development (When did they appear in the course of evolution? Did the Greeks have the same emotions as we do? Was love in the middle ages the feeling we today call love?), of the mechanisms susceptible to manipulate them or to
reproduce them artificially, of their pathologies, and of the ways they are represented in cultural systems. Which is certainly not to deny that such forms of theorising can be of some importance for understanding the emotional dimension of international relations; it is only that they do not constitute its primary theoretical instrument.

So defined, a theory of emotional processes is a theory having as core problems issues such as:

(a) The Nature of Emotional Processes

How are emotional processes triggered? How do they typically unfold? What are their main dimensions (neurobiological, behavioural, subjective)? How do these dimensions relate one with each other? (What level of independence do they enjoy? Can one be reduced to the other?) How do emotional processes differ both from non-affective processes and from affective processes of a different type? To what extent are they internally and externally determined? More specifically, to what extent are their external determinations social and cultural and their internal determinations neurobiological? Can emotions be considered as pure social constructions? Is there an element of universality in them? To what extent can they classified into basic and non-basic types?

(b) The Individual Development of Emotional Processes

Do we experience similar emotions throughout life with similar intensity? Are all emotions in place at birth? If not, what pattern of emergence do they follow? Does the space they occupy in mental life evolve with maturation?

(c) The Communication of Emotional Processes

Are emotions communicable? How do we understand them? Of what does understanding an emotion consist? Is there anything like a specific faculty of empathy? If so, how does it differ from sympathy, or emotional contagion?

(d) The Relations of Emotional Processes with Non-Emotional Processes

To what extent can a distinction be drawn between emotional faculties and cognitive faculties? If so, how do they relate? What degree of respective independence do they entertain? Is emotion specifically involved in perception or in practical reasoning? Why is emotion a non-voluntary phenomenon? Can emotions be unconscious?
A CRITICAL AGENDA

Acknowledging the need for a specific theory of emotional processes of this kind opens three critical lines of investigation on the agenda of an emotion-oriented approach to international relations. The first line of investigation is the examination of the pursuit of such a theory in the course of history, paying specific attention to the philosophical tradition for the obvious reason that philosophy and science were for the longest time (as late as the end of the nineteenth century) taken as synonymous. An examination of the past which does not answer purely historical concerns but rather predominantly theoretical concerns. It is far from clear, indeed, that Antiquity or Classical Age theories of emotions have exhausted their teaching potential regarding the understanding of emotional phenomena. A second line of investigation is the delineation of the present theoretical landscape that results from this historical deployment. This obviously intricate landscape involves a whole array of disciplines and sub-disciplines such as philosophy of mind, cognitive science, psychopathology, sociology, anthropology and psychoanalysis. A third line consists in assessing the present state of the investigation of emotional processes so delineated. What have we really learned, if anything, about their fundamental aspects from this multifarious and secular enterprise? Where do we really stand in this theoretical project?

THE EMOTIVE TURN IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE

The goal of this chapter is to take a preliminary step in the realization of the last two of these three critical tasks of an emotion-oriented approach to international relations. A preliminary step specifically focused on cognitive science and directed at determining whether this new scientific field is part of the landscape of contemporary emotion studies, and if it is, under what title and with what achievements of potential interest for an emotion-oriented approach?

A SHORT DEFINITION OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE

What is cognitive science in the first place? There is no simple theoretical answer to such a question, even less so today when it can be reasonably argued that cognitive science is going through a serious identity crisis not unrelated to a growth crisis. The difficulty can nevertheless be circumvented with the help of a descriptive definition.

Cognitive science can indeed be descriptively characterized as the approach to the theory of cognitive faculties that emerged in the mid-1950s, essentially in the United States, in a spirit of rebellion against the stronghold of behaviourism on cognitive studies. It was born with a well-delineated foundational hypothesis
known as cognitivism. Cognitivism has various interrelated facets. One facet is its commitment to naturalism, understood as the general idea that cognitive faculties should be wholly explained in terms of natural properties, and – accordingly – that cognitive processes are natural processes. Another facet is its assimilation of cognitive processes to computational processes carried out by the brain (or its equivalent in robots), resulting in the famous analogy between the mind/brain and software/hardware differences. A further important distinctive feature of cognitivism is its disregard, in spite of this naturalist perspective of a computational kind, for the investigation of the implementational dimension (that is, the biological dimension in the case of non-artificial cognitive systems) of cognitive processes. For the cognitivist, cognitive processes should be hypothesized on the sole basis of behavioural performances and characterized solely in the abstract vocabulary of computation, even though a computational process is also materially implemented. Many of the other crucial characteristics of cognitivism only came to full light through the process of systematic criticism to which it was subjected, a process that acted as the driving force of the evolution of cognitive science up to its present situation. And among them, the exclusion of emotions from the field of cognitive theory is of central importance for the issue under consideration.

THE INITIAL EXCLUSION OF EMOTION FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE

Indeed, if viewed through its initial founding cognitivist figure, it is only a slight exaggeration to claim that cognitive science has nothing to say about emotions, and can therefore be of no help to an emotion-oriented approach to international relations. This is apparently a surprising situation for a theory of the workings of the mind, but it clearly is acknowledged in the literature. Joseph Ledoux, who later led a rebellion against it, writes for instance in his 1996 *The Emotional Brain*:

“As one thumbs through some attempts to define cognitive science, it is striking how often this field is characterized by saying that it is not about emotion. For example, in *The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution*, Howard Gardner lists the de-emphasis of affective or emotional factors as one of the five defining features of cognitive science. In his seminal 1968 textbook, *Cognitive Psychology*, Ulrich Neisser states that the field is not about the dynamic factors (like emotions) that motivate behaviour. Jerry Fodor, in the *Language of Thought*, a ground-breaking book in the philosophy of cognitive science, describes emotions as “mental states that fall outside the domain of cognitive revolution … These cognitive scientists each pointed out that emotional factors are important aspects of the mind, but also emphasized that emotions are just not part of the cognitive approach to the mind”.

4 LeDoux 1996, p. 35.
A statement confirmed by A. Damasio, another main protagonist of that rebellion, in the preface to the 2005 edition of his 1994 *Descartes’s Error*:

If we were alive around 1900, and were in any way interested in intellectual matters, we probably would have thought that the time had come for science to tackle the understanding of emotion in its many dimensions and answer the public’s growing curiosity about it in a definitive way. In the preceding decades Charles Darwin had shown how some emotional phenomena are present in remarkably comparable ways in nonhuman species; William James and Carl Lange had advanced an innovative proposal to explain the processing of emotions; Sigmund Freud had turned the emotions into the centrepiece of his inquiry on psychopathological states; and Charles Sherrington had begun the neurophysiological investigation of brain circuits involved in emotion. Nonetheless, the all-out attack on the subject of emotion never came to pass. On the contrary, as the sciences of mind and brain flourished in the twentieth century, interests went elsewhere and the specialties which we loosely group today under neuroscience gave a resolute cold shoulder to emotion research. True, the psychoanalysts never forgot about the emotions, and there were noble exceptions – pharmacologists and psychiatrists concerned with disorders of mood, and lone psychologists and neuroscientists who cultivated an interest in affect. These exceptions, however, merely accentuated the neglect of emotion as a research topic. Behaviorism, the cognitive revolution, and computational neuroscience did not reduce this neglect in any appreciable way. By and large this was still the state of affairs when *Descartes’ Error* was first published, although the ground had begun to shift.\(^5\)

Looking at the field on the privileged occasion of the Harvard celebration of his fiftieth anniversary and from the less partisan perspective of a science writer, Jonah Lehrer unambiguously confirms this verdict of initial exclusion:

as Harvard, and the field, celebrate the 50th anniversary of a true paradigm shift, another revolution is underway. Ever since Plato, scholars have drawn a clear distinction between thinking and feeling. Cognitive psychology tended to reinforce this divide: emotions were seen as interfering with cognition; they were the antagonists of reason. Now, building on more than a decade of mounting work, researchers have discovered that it is impossible to understand how we think without understanding how we feel. This new scientific appreciation of emotion is profoundly altering the field. The top journals are now filled with research on the connections between emotion and cognition. New academic stars have emerged, such as Antonio Damasio of USC, Joseph LeDoux of NYU, and Joshua Greene, a rising scholar at Harvard. At the same time, the influx of neuroscientists into the field, armed with powerful brain-scanning technology, has underscored the thinking-feeling connection.\(^6\)

\(^5\) Damasio 1994, p. x.
\(^6\) Lehrer 2009.
As indicated, the exclusion of emotions from cognitive science is an element of the cognitivist answer to the foundational problem of the delineation of the domain of a theory of cognition. But why did the cognitivist version of cognitive science pronounce such exclusion? The reasons are complex, but three reasons are obvious and frequently invoked.

First, cognitivism entertained an intellectualist bent towards the notion of cognition, according to which affective faculties are not instruments of acquisition of knowledge of any kind, nor do they presuppose by themselves any knowledge. In addition, cognitivism did not consider emotions to play any essential auxiliary role in cognitive processing, so that even where emotions were deprived of any cognitive value, they would nevertheless be crucial to the good functioning of cognitive faculties proprio sensu. In other words, cognitivism subscribed to what might be termed “emotion inessentialism”, and which is closely linked with what some philosophers have dubbed “consciousness inessentialism”. That is to say, the view that the consciousness accompanying some aspects of cognitive processing, as well as the resulting conscious contents or manifestations (the way cognitive processing is apprehended through consciousness) play no role in this process, and can therefore be left out of the picture. For emotions definitely qualify, in part, as conscious manifestations. Even if fear, for instance, can be characterized as a kind of behaviour, it is undeniably also, if not first and foremost, a way of feeling, and thus a content of consciousness of a certain type.

The belief in the inessentiality of emotion for cognition, motivating its exclusion from the domain of cognitive science, is itself an answer to a different issue – that might in turn be labelled the problem of the independence of cognition and emotion, and offers a dual aspect: one aspect concerns the independence of cognition from emotion, and another aspect concerns the independence of emotion from cognition. These two aspects are themselves independent from each other: it is possible to claim cognition to be independent from emotion while claiming emotion to be dependent on cognition, and vice versa.

It is important to emphasize that one can, in principle, incorporate both cognition and emotion into a single disciplinary domain even though they are considered independent from each other, and vice versa. In other words, the two problems are in principle largely autonomous, even though the decision to include cognition and emotion into a single domain of investigation is usually based on considerations about their respective degree of independence, as shown in the case of cognitivism. This point must be kept in mind in order to reach a full appreciation of the relation of cognitive science with the study of emotions in the cognitivist paradigm.

Indeed, the cognitivist exclusion of emotions that presided over the cognitive revolution of the 1950s, in the name of the independence of cognitive phenomena

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from emotional phenomena, does not mean that emotions did not benefit from a parallel revival of theoretical interest. Emotions did, in fact, benefit from renewed theoretical attention, although this other face of the rebellion against behaviourism, for which emotion epitomized the illusory nature of subjective phenomena, is certainly less known, in spite of deserving no less perhaps the title of revolution. In a survey article about contemporary theories of emotion, philosopher Paul Griffiths writes revealingly that “despite [its] neglect by cognitive scientists, other investigators have been actively studying emotions and developing theoretical perspectives on them”.8 On his side, psychologist G. Kirouac underlines that the rehabilitation of mental properties at the heart of the cognitive side of the anti-behaviourist revolt paved the way for its extension towards emotion. And, as a result, that the situation of emotions study, which “had long constituted a marginal sector for fundamental psychology”9 despite being an essential element of the traditional division of mental faculties, “dramatically changed since the 70’s, with a multiplication of both empirical investigations and theoretical developments”.10

At least three disciplines were involved in this parallel revival: psychology, philosophy and neuroscience. Views diverge about the revival’s unfolding in each of these fields and its story remains by and large one to be told beyond valuable attempts at Surveying it, such as the two attempts just mentioned or those offered by K. Scherer,11 N. Fridja,12 William Lyons,13 Ronald de Sousa,14 Gregory Johnson15 or Richard Davidson.16 There is no reason to examine the issue here, as this contemporary area of emotion theorizing precisely lies outside of cognitive science. It is important, however, to emphasize its existence for three motives. First, this revival reveals that the emotive turn that cognitive science took at a later stage did not happen in a void in terms of emotion studies, and thus raises the issue of the relations that this emotive turn entertains with it. It also represents an element of the contemporary landscape of the investigation of emotional phenomena that should neither be confused with cognitive science nor neglected in the critical task to be carried out by an emotion-oriented approach to international relations, as it is in fact a priori of higher relevance to it. Finally, this revival deserves all the more consideration because its distinction from cognitive science seems, on closer examination, to be open to controversy.

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9 Kirouac 1994, p. 3.
10 Idem.
11 Scherer 2009.
12 Scherer and Fridja 2009.
13 Lyons 2009.
14 De Sousa 2010.
15 Johnson 2009.
16 Davidson 1995.
Indeed, in spite of its internal diversity, one point of substantial convergence among many of its protagonists is the idea that emotion is dependent on cognition, despite the fact that cognition is not dependent on emotion. A dependence mainly localized in the notion of appraisal, developed particularly by S. Shacter and J. E. Singer, as well as R. S. Lazarus and M. B. Arnold. Appraisal essentially consists in claiming that an emotion is not elicited directly by a stimulus, but by an evaluation of that stimulus, which itself results from a process of an essentially cognitive nature. This appraisal hypothesis, so central as to be seen as a “new orthodoxy,” even if it came to be highly disputed by a number of opponents (such as R. Zajonc), was consequently also a “cognitive” theory of emotional phenomena. This is a qualification that can only be adequately understood, however, if one carefully distinguishes the problem of the delineation of the domain of a theory of cognition from that of the dependency between emotion and cognition. The appraisal theory was seen as cognitive only in the sense of making emotion dependent on a cognitive process of appraising, and not in the sense of including the investigation of emotion in the investigation of cognition.

This distinction is nevertheless disputable, adding to the complexity of the real situation of the relations between cognitivism and the parallel revival of emotion theory. If emotion is so intimately dependent on a cognitive process of appraisal, there is a point in claiming that emotion falls in the purview of a theory of cognition, as such a theory must investigate the process of appraisal in order to be exhaustive and can hardly do so without also fully taking into account the other elements with which it is associated. The issue is very similar to the one raised by neo-externalism regarding the cognitive status of environmental elements embedded in brain-based cognitive processes, such as a pen in arithmetical calculation. And just as the mind can reasonably be seen in this case as extending over such environmental elements, the cognitive part of the mind can reasonably be seen as extending beyond the operation of appraisal in an emotive process, and hence cognitivist cognitive science as covering the cognitive theorizing of emotional phenomena that it apparently excludes. This is a perspective with significant consequences for the relevance of cognitive science to an emotion-based approach to international relations, because it implies that cognitivist cognitive science can be of much more theoretical assistance to this approach than it looks at first sight.

17 Schacter and Singer 1962.
18 Lazarus 1968.
19 Arnold 1960.
20 Lyons 2009.
21 Zajonc 1980.
THE COMEBACK OF EMOTION

Whether or not it is correct, however, this is not the perspective that the cognitive science movement holds about its cognitivist roots. As already indicated, if cognitive science came to the world with the features of cognitivism, it nevertheless quickly entered a process of revision of its most fundamental tenets, which has not yet led to any consensual alternative hypothesis of the same breadth. And one of these revisions consisted precisely in advocating the reintegration of emotions into its field of study, a claim that only makes sense against a background assumption of exclusion. This claim was voiced in the mid-1990s, and the ensuing reintegration was hailed as an epoch-making reorientation that introduced an emotive or affective “turn” in the contemporary cognitive enterprise, or – as mentioned earlier – a switch from a “cold” to a “hot” approach to cognitive science.

This switch is described by Damasio with the following words in the Preface of *Descartes’ Error* (2005): “A decade later the situation is radically different. Not long after *Descartes’ Error*, two of the neuroscientists who had been studying emotions in animals published their own books: *The emotional Brain* (1996) by Joseph Ledoux and *Affective Neuroscience* (1998) by Jaak Panskepp. Others followed and soon neuroscience laboratories in America and in Europe had turned their attention to emotion research. Philosophers cultivating the subject were heard with a new attention (Mathas Nusbaum was a particularly good example of this), and books capitalizing on the science of emotion became widely popular (Daniel Coleman’s *Emotional Intelligence*, for example). “Emotion is finally being given the due that our illustrious fore-runners would have wished it to receive, albeit a century late”.¹² “The artificial separation of cognitive science from the rest of the mind”, Ledoux himself argues, “was very useful in the early days of cognitive science and helped establish a new approach to the mind. But now it is time to put cognition back into its mental context – to reunite cognition and emotion in the mind. Minds have thoughts as well as emotions and the study of either without the other will never be fully satisfying … ‘Mind science’ is the natural heir to the united kingdom of cognition and emotion. To call the study of cognition and emotion cognitive science is to do it a disservice”.¹³

Assuming this perspective is historically correct, such an emotive turn raises two main issues: To what motives did it obey? And in what theory of emotional processes did it result? Neither of these questions admits a straightforward – nor unique – answer, because the motives invoked and the theoretical views of emotions offered show a fair deal of variety.

¹² Damasio 1994, p. x.
Regarding motives, one can usefully distinguish between negative and positive reasons for rejecting the exclusion of emotions from the domain of cognitive science. Negative reasons are arguments to the effect that this exclusion rested on shaky grounds and should consequently be abandoned. Such is, for instance, the position defended by Ledoux, who explicitly raises the question: “Why was emotion banned from the rehabilitation of the mind that took place in psychology’s cognitive revolution?” His answer is that emotion was discarded in the first place because the core principles of the cognitivist explanation of cognition only fit the rational side of cognition, which was seen as including its intellectual dimension but excluding its affective dimension. He objects, however, that both the assumption of the rationality of cognition and that of the irrationality of emotion have been challenged by research and that, as a result, “the rational/irrational distinction is not a very sharp one when it comes to separating emotion and cognition”. The other main reason supporting the exclusion of emotion, according to his analyses, was the belief that an emotion is essentially a conscious phenomenon and that consciousness should lie outside the scope of a theory of cognition. But here again, these principles have proved to be erroneous in the opinion of Ledoux, who accepts – on the one hand – that a correct theory of cognition must address the conscious dimension of cognitive processing, and – on the other hand – that this conscious dimension both is limited and, for most mental phenomena and including emotional phenomena, not intrinsic. In his eyes, for instance, a good number of organisms should be considered to be endowed with fear, even though they do not have the capacity of experiencing fear, which is to say, in contemporary philosophical parlance, of having a phenomenal consciousness of fear.

To these negative reasons against exclusion, establishing simply that “emotion could have fit the cognitive framework”, Ledoux further adds that, in virtue of being an attribute of the mind of equal importance with cognition, emotion should be included with it in the “united kingdom” of a discipline more appropriately labelled “mind science”. This positive reason for inclusion might however sound insufficient for justifying a re-delineation of the borders of cognitive science. The claim for integrating emotion is more frequently based on the deeper consideration that cognitive processes have turned out to be dependent on emotive processes, as emblematically illustrated by Damasio’s analyses. The central claim of Descartes’s Error is that certain pathologies affecting practical reason, such as the ability to make self-preserving decisions, are in fact the consequences of specific emotional deficits. According to the somatic markers hypothesis developed in the book,

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24 Idem., p. 35.
26 Idem., p. 38.
patients suffering from those pathologies cannot attach any emotional values to the possible outcomes of their choices in the process of deliberation, and as a result become indifferent to the negative implications of their decisions and choose indiscriminately. Emotions are accordingly part and parcel of practical reasoning to the point that a dysfunctional decision-making process is not one disturbed by emotion, but one disturbed by the lack of emotion. Moreover, somatic marking and practical reasoning are rooted in the same brain areas.

The emotive turn of cognitive science can thus largely – and logically – be read as the result of a reversal of attitudes about the dependency of cognition on emotion. Just as the cognitivist exclusion of emotions from the domain of cognitive science was deeply motivated by the belief in the inessentiality of emotion to cognition, their reintegration into its domain was deeply driven by the opposite conviction.

This last remark about the source of the emotive turn is also the first remark about its content. At the very least, the theory of emotions emerging from it also is a theory largely committed to the idea that cognition is highly dependent on emotion, and consequently is hardly dissociable from it, to the point that even the legitimacy of their very distinction became a matter of debate. However, there is all the less consensus on this additional point since the emotive turn is paradoxically associated at times with a rejection of the reverse dependence of emotion on cognition that, as already indicated, was defended not by cognitivist cognitive science, but in a predominant way by the revival of emotion investigation that paralleled its development. And indeed, that cognition is hardly dissociable from emotion does not necessarily imply, as claimed for instance by the “orthodox” appraisal theories, that emotion is indissociable from cognition. In the vein of Zajonc’s criticism, Ledoux in particular has emphasized the necessity for emotion to be purified from the cognitive contamination introduced by such theories and to regain some autonomy. His belief is that “emotion and cognition are best thought of as separate but interacting mental functions mediated by separate but interacting brain systems”. Therefore, in spite of its decisive and widespread insistence on the inadequacy of a perspective that radically separates cognition from emotion, the emotive turn is not homogeneous on the overall issue of dependency relations between cognition and emotion.

This internal tension relates in fact to the broader problem of the continuity between the emotive turn of cognitive science and the antecedent and independent revival of emotion studies. The decision to integrate the investigation of emotion into the investigation of cognition could have indeed followed in principle two main different courses. One course would consist of somehow merging the product of the cognitive revolution with the product of that revival and therefore in capitalizing

directly on the latter without challenging its founding principles. The integration would then take the form of an inclusion of one piece of theoretical development into another. The other course would consist – on the contrary – in rejecting this antecedent revival as ill-founded and in starting afresh the attempt to build a theory of emotion in the context of the continuing but redefined cognitive enterprise. The integration would then take the different form of an inclusion of a mere theoretical project into an on-going theoretical development. Which branch of this alternative did the emotive turn actually take?

If, as regards the issue of the dependency of emotion on cognition, the emotive turn has arguably explored both, there is nevertheless one important point of discontinuity with the antecedent revival of emotion investigation that nearly all of its protagonists seem to share. It is a point aptly summarized with the following statement: the emotive turn is conceived as a neuroemotive turn. Which is to say that the theory of emotion claimed to be developed within the borders of cognitive science aims fundamentally at explaining emotions in neurobiological terms. What is to be fundamentally understood, from the perspective of the emotive turn, is how the various characteristics of emotions emerge from brain structure and brain activity. Ledoux’s *The Emotional Brain* is without ambiguity in this respect. Moreover, Ledoux interestingly underlines the specificity of a neuroemotive approach in terse but very accurate terms: “this book”, he writes, “is not about mapping one area of knowledge (the psychology of emotion) onto another (brain function). It is instead about how studies of brain function allow us to understand emotion as a psychological process in new ways”. Similarly, in *Descartes’ Error*, Damasio explicitly claims his book to be “about the neural underpinnings of reason” that ended up to be a “book about the brain science of emotion”.

By embracing such a “neuro” perspective on the problem of emotion, the emotive turn is taking an additional and crucial step away from cognitivism, as it sides with the alternative neurocognitive approach to cognition itself that emerged within cognitive science in the 1990s, and whose key tenet is the rejection of the cognitivist idea that hypotheses about the psychological dimension of cognitive processes can be devised without consideration for the constraints imposed by their neurobiological dimension. The emotive turn extends therefore this major transformation, known as the neurocognitive turn, in the very movement of adding emotion to the objects of cognitive science. It gives birth to a cognitive neuroscience whose domain encompasses emotions – that is to say, a cognitive neuroscience that

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28 And even on the issue of the dependency of cognition on emotion if one takes into account Ledoux’s moderate stand on it.
29 Ledoux 1996, p. 23.
30 Damasio 1994, p. x.
includes what is now frequently called a cognitive neuroscience of emotion.\textsuperscript{32} An expression that, for lack of a better one, should rather be taken to designate the whole discipline itself. That is to say, a neurocognitive science that integrates the study of emotion with that of cognition, essentially in the name of the dependence of the latter on the former.

It is important to emphasize that, as such, the emotive turn is not necessarily linked to a reductionist approach, as most of cognitive neuroscience remains committed, contrary to what is frequently assumed, to non-reductionist naturalism – that is to say to the notion that cognitive explanation is an irreducibly multi-level one. Neither is the emotive turn intrinsically related to an embodied approach to cognitive science, or to an approach reinstating the rights of phenomenal consciousness, although the neurocognitive turn entertains close ties with both ideas (present in Damasio and Ledoux for instance). Finally, this emotive turn should not be confused with the affective turn that arguably took place in the same years in the humanities and social sciences where various aspects of emotions, from their history to their social determinants, have undeniably received a strong revival of attention.\textsuperscript{33} Although it is probably not entirely accidental that the two turns coincide, even if the emotive turn obeys primarily a logic internal to cognitive science.

The notion of cognitive neuroscience of emotion should not be understood too narrowly, however. On the one hand, it should, in my opinion, encompass the field of evolutionary psychology of emotion, even though this field tends to be presented as a discipline distinct from it. Indeed, in virtue of its general principles, evolutionary psychology clearly adopts the core idea of the neurocognitive turn that psychological level hypotheses about cognitive processes should be constrained by considerations of implementation. Its main specificity lies instead in its complementary insistence on giving full weight to evolutionary considerations.

On the other hand, one might even be tempted with Richard Lane and Lyn Nadel\textsuperscript{34} to understand it so broadly as to cover what is now called, after Jaak Panskepp,\textsuperscript{35} “affective neuroscience”. Panskepp coined this expression as the name of an attempt to develop “a neurological understanding of the basic emotional operating systems of the mammalian brain and the various conscious and unconscious internal states they generate”.\textsuperscript{36} A definition that corresponds quite precisely to the main thrust of the emotive turn. Panskepp, however, insisted in distinguishing his project from that emerging from this emotive turn and, accordingly, from the cognitive neuroscience

\textsuperscript{32} Lane et al. 2000.
\textsuperscript{34} See “The Study of Emotion from the Perspective of Cognitive Neuroscience” in Lane et al. 2000.
\textsuperscript{35} Panskepp 2003.
\textsuperscript{36} Idem., p. 5.
of emotion in the broadened sense. A distinction aimed at preserving what he sees as the strong independence of emotional processes from cognitive processes. However, as previously indicated and as illustrated by Ledoux’s position, the notion of cognitive neuroscience is by itself more neutral than Panskepp seems to think on the issue of the dependence of emotion from cognition, if not on the reverse issue.  

**EXPLORING THE RELEVANCE OF THE EMOTIVE TURN**

**A Research Agenda**

As announced, the problem of the relevance of cognitive science to an emotion-based approach to international relations has now been shown to reduce essentially to that of the relevance of the various versions of the theory of emotional processes that started to develop in the mid-1990s. The next question to be considered is accordingly: What can this specific area of emotion theorizing do, if anything at all, for those willing to prop up their explanations of international relations with a theoretical knowledge of emotions?

Answering this more targeted question first requires a critical examination of the present achievements of the emotive turn. It is a twofold task in fact, on the one hand demanding to establish a clear and detailed map of the state of the research it has produced, and on the other hand demanding to take a stand on the value of these results. But it also requires an additional and similarly twofold examination of existing attempts to draw on the resources of the emotive turn for developing an emotion-based approach to international relations. Only with such a fine-grained appreciation of what the emotive turn can really offer in terms of understanding emotional processes and how it has already been put to use by international relations studies can a constructive effort be then valuably developed. Both undertakings are nevertheless beyond the scope of this essay. One reason is that the neurocognitive investigation of emotion has already addressed a numerous emotional phenomena, such as emotional contagion, the role of emotions in economic behaviour, the recognition of emotional expressions and moral feelings. It is true that this difficulty seems absent when it comes to examining previous attempts to put these investigations to the service of an emotion-based approach to international relations. It has certainly been a long time now since the study of international relations has opened itself to a series of contemporary disciplines with an obvious bearing on its object of inquiry, particularly in the area of international negotiation, where game theory, social psychology and cognitive psychology of reasoning have been studied.

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37 This is also why there seems to be a misunderstanding in the debate that opposed Panskepp and Ledoux on the relevance of a distinct discipline of affective neuroscience.
substantially. An opening to be put in the perspective of the one operated by political
science at large, including in the direction of cognitive science,\textsuperscript{55} and well-illustrated
by the development of political psychology. However, the investigation of emotion
has arguably played only a minor role in this movement thus far, and references
are mostly to the psychology of emotion that developed outside of cognitivism.
A recent study, \textit{Psychological Processes in International Negotiations: Theoretical
and Practical Perspectives},\textsuperscript{39} in which F. Aquilar and M. Gallucio devote an entire
chapter to the “Affective Neuroscience Contribution to the General Understanding
of the Negotiation Process”, that perfectly illustrates how the emotive turn can be
seen as relevant to an emotion-based approach to international relations, stands
rather alone in the literature. The line between emotion-based approaches to the
particular chapter of international relations and emotion-based approaches to other
domains of political science is a difficult one to draw, as analyses of the role played
by emotions in political judgment or political decision within the political life of a
nation clearly have an immediate bearing on international relations issues. Taking
this point into account, however, does not lead to a modification of this general
assessment, although it requires emphasizing the importance of such publications
as \textit{Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment}\textsuperscript{40} and \textit{The Affect Effect},\textsuperscript{41} especially
given the role they granted to cognitive science, and cognitive neuroscience in
particular.

Short of carrying out the research agenda just outlined, or at least of being well
engaged in its realization, one is condemned to conjectures as to what the relevance
of the emotive turn is and will be. My personal conjecture reduces this relevance
to two very simple ideas. The first idea is that the neurocognitive approach initiated
by the emotive turn has put a fundamental aspect of emotion research on the right
track and that its potential for unravelling the mysteries of emotional processes is
truly promising. The second idea is that the gap between the coarse explanations of
these processes that it is currently able to provide and the sophisticated and detailed
explanations that an emotion-based approach to international studies in most cases
demands remain quite wide, and is likely to remain so for some time to come.
Consequently, caution seems to be recommended in attempts to bridge the two
domains, for fear of repeating excess mistakes that have occurred in the application
of theories of human behaviour – be they psychoanalytical, sociological or others –
to account for particular cases.

\textsuperscript{55} For an overview of the relations between political science in general and Cognitive Science, see
Marie 2008.
\textsuperscript{39} Aquilar and Gallucio 2008.
\textsuperscript{40} Marcus et al. 2000.
\textsuperscript{41} Neuman et al. 2007.
A brief consideration of recent developments about the phenomenon of emotion understanding will help to illustrate these two simple ideas.

**AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: THE SIMULATIONIST THEORY OF EMOTION UNDERSTANDING**

*The Idea of Understanding by Way of Simulation*

These developments constitute a specific version, emerging in the context of the mirror neurons theory, of the more general simulationist approach to emotions understanding. One particular interest of this specific version is that it is at the juncture of the neurocognitive theory of emotions and the field that in recent years came to be known as social neuroscience, which is dedicated to the investigation of the neurobiological underpinnings of intersubjective relations. It is also part of a debate about the broader phenomenon of others understanding, of which emotion understanding represents only one aspect, that puts to grips a generalized simulationist approach with a theory-theory approach on the one hand, and a narrative approach on the other hand. The debate initially focused on the understanding of what philosophers traditionally call intentional states, that is to say psychological states endowed with the characteristic of referring to something – a characteristic that the nineteenth-century Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano, under the name of intentionality, saw as the hallmark of psychological phenomena, as opposed to physical phenomena – and paradigmatically illustrated by the case of belief.

The theory-theory approach claims that understanding what others believe is a matter of elaborating an unconscious explanation of the same style as a scientific explanation – that is to say, an explanation relying on general principles invoking non-observational properties. It is, in other words, a matter of applying to a certain kind of behavioural manifestations observed in the other a body of theoretical knowledge supposedly stored somewhere in our mind, in the same way as Chomskyan linguistics hypothesized that speaking a language was a matter of mobilizing an innate and unconscious knowledge structure.

The simulationist camp includes a rather wide array of views coming from philosophy, psychology – especially developmental psychology – and cognitive neuroscience. One problem is how to clarify the differences and similarities between these various elements, which somehow all share the general idea that understanding is a process of doing what the other does, although not fully, and thus not really. It is a process of doing *as if* we were doing what the other does, and, in this sense, of simulating. Just like when I simulate playing the piano, I do as if I were playing the piano, although I do not truly play the piano. I sort of duplicate what the
pianist is doing, but not all the way. In a pioneering version of the simulationist view put forward by the philosopher R. Gordon, I understand what the other is doing by using my own cognitive system to process imaginary inputs that match the inputs that the other is supposed to be exposed to in the situation he is in. I put myself “in his shoes”, I place myself fictionally in his own situation and activate my cognitive system to see what I would think and do. But the inputs are not real, and I do not go all the way to real action. I run my cognitive system offline, so to speak.

THE MIRROR NEURON VERSION OF THE SIMULATIONIST THEORY

The mirror neuron theory – elaborated by a group of cognitive neuroscientists of action working originally in Parma (G. Rizzolati, V. Gallese, L. Fadiga and L. Fogassi) – is another version of the same fundamental idea. Their point of departure was the discovery at the end of the 1990s that a motor area in the brain of the monkey (designated as F5) contains neurons whose firing can be correlated with motor behaviours of the monkey that are characterized standardly in intentional terms, such as an intention to grasp, an intention to hold and an intention to reach. And, consequently, that these neurons can be considered as the neural bases of the various facets of the psychological intention to act, defined at its most general level as a goal-oriented state. The correlation is shown to be astonishingly strong: the grasping neurons cease to be activated when some crucial missing element in the behavioural data makes it impossible to categorizing them as being animated by an intention to grasp. As well as surprisingly detailed: some grasping neurons fire only when the grasping gesture involves the hand, others only when it involves the hand with a specific finger grip and so on. The next step in the development of the theory was the discovery that a subset of these F5 neurons is also activated in the context of certain visual activities disconnected from any action by the monkey. For instance, the visual perception of a banana routinely induces the activation of grasping and reaching neurons, even though the monkey remains perfectly motionless. Accordingly, the brain of the monkey performs some of the neural activity that it performs when the monkey actually grasps or reaches for a banana. In this sense, its F5 cortical area can be said to behave as if the monkey were grasping or reaching, or to simulate an effective act or grasping or reaching on its part. The difference between an actual grasping and a simulated grasping being that the second is not real. The key point is that the unreal grasping is nevertheless obtained by nearly the same mechanisms as the real one. Cortically speaking, the simulated grasping is a real grasping that simply is not fully carried out.

Even more crucial was the additional finding in the mid-1990s that a similar process of simulation is going on in the equally non-active context of the visual perception
of intentional behaviours of humans or other monkeys. It was experimentally demonstrated that another subset of F5 neurons of the monkey specifically gets activated when it sees goal-directed behavioural data, such as those falling under the category of grasping. For instance, when it sees a conspecific exhibiting the behaviour of grasping a banana with its fingers, the monkey activates some of the F5 neurons that it activates when it itself grasps a banana with its own fingers, and therefore behaves cortically as if it were itself grasping the banana. In other words, it cortically simulates the grasping of a banana. This specific subset of F5 neurons was labelled “mirror neurons”, while the previous subset was labelled “canonical neurons”.

The central difficulty raised by the discovery of the canonical and the mirror neurons is that of their psychological interpretation: With what does their activation correlate at the psychological level? Clearly, if F5 neurons truly constitute the neural bases of intentions to act, the firing of some specific subsets of these neurons outside an action context must also be correlated with an activation of the corresponding intention to act. So that the simulation to act existing in the monkey is in fact both a neurobiological and a psychological act. At the psychological level, the monkey is – for instance – also doing as if it intended to grasp a banana when it sees one or sees a conspecific grasping one. The real question is therefore: What does the monkey achieve through this activation of intentions to act?

The prevailing answer, in the specific case of mirror neurons, is that the activation of intentions to act corresponds to a process of understanding the intentional dimension of the behaviour of conspecifics. When the monkey simulates the intention of grasping, as the result of the activation of the appropriate mirror neurons itself elicited by the visual perception of the grasping behaviour of another monkey, it recognizes the intentional characteristic of this behaviour. And in a very basic but essential sense of the notion of understanding, it thereby understands it. This process of understanding is seen as immediate (versus inferential), low level (versus involving elaborate cognitive mechanisms and means of communication) and unconscious. According to this interpretation, the mirror neurons discovery teaches us that evolution has provided the monkeys with a hard-wired, dedicated mechanism to know about the goals of their respective behaviours.

The mirror neuron theory underwent several substantial extensions. Other areas with mirror neurons were discovered in the cortex of the monkey in the first place (prefrontal area PF). In addition, mirror neurons were located in human beings as well, first in the prefrontal cortex and then in the parietal cortex. But the most important of these extensions – from the perspective explored here – is the empirical demonstration that mirror neuron mechanisms exist outside motor areas, and particularly in human brain areas known to be correlated with behavioural and subjective aspects of emotions, thereby suggesting that we understand the emotion of others by simulating them internally, both at the neurobiological and the psychological levels.
Vittorio Gallese, one of the most important researchers of the original mirror theorists, declares for instance:

The human brain is endowed with structures that are active both during the first and third person experience of actions and emotions. When we witness some else’s action, we activate a network of parietal and premotor areas that is also active while we perform similar actions. When we witness the disgusted facial expressions of someone else, we activate that part of our insula that is also active when we experience disgust. Thus, the understanding of basic aspects of social cognition depends on activation of neural structures normally involved in our own personally experienced actions or emotions. By means of this activation, a bridge is created between others and ourselves. With this mechanism we do not just ‘see’ or ‘hear’ an action or an emotion. Side by side with the sensory description of the observed social stimuli, internal representations of the state associated with these actions or emotions are evoked in the observer, ‘as if’ they were performing a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion.\footnote{He suggests a reactivation of the old notion of empathy, introduced in the modern philosophical and psychological lexicon by T. Lipps at the turn of the twentieth century, to designate this process of immediate, basic and unconscious capturing of the emotional states of others by means of which human beings, far from being closed monads, naturally are open onto their respective emotional conditions. “When we observe other acting individuals, we are exposed to a full range of expressive power, which is not confined to what their actions are, but it encompasses the emotions and feelings they display. When this occurs, an affective meaningful interpersonal link is automatically established. Empathy constitutes precisely the capacity to establish this link . . . The empathic link is not confined to our capacity to understand when someone is angry, happy or sad. Empathy, if conceived, as I am doing, in a broader sense, also enables us to understand what is happening when someone else is experiencing sensation, such as pain, touch tickling".\footnote{Idem.}

The empirical evidence favouring this view has been gathered by Gallese in some of his publications.\footnote{This evidence includes the following facts:}\footnote{\footnote{See Gallese publications for detailed references.}}

\begin{itemize}
\item applied and observed stimuli (pinpricks to the fingers) elicit the same response in same anterior cingulated cortex of awake but locally anaesthetized patients;
\item a patient with damage to the insula and the putamen is impaired both in experiencing and detecting disgust in several modalities;
\item the existence of simulation mechanisms for emotions labelled “as if body loops”;
\end{itemize}
• the involvement of human insula in experience and perception of disgust;
• the involvement of human amygdala in perception of fear; and
• the involvement of human anterior insula and ACC in perception and experience of pain.

It is important to add that defenders of this interpretation do not claim that the mirror neurons-based simulation mechanism of empathy is the only way to understand emotion. They fully acknowledge the existence of different mechanisms involving a process of interpretation of perceptive data by higher-level processes, such as inference and judgment. But the entire point of the theory is to lay bare a more basic mechanism of sheer emotional “resonance” based on a dedicated brain system. “We do not maintain that the direct mapping is the only way in which the emotions of others can be understood. It is likely that others’ emotions can be also understood on the basis of the cognitive elaboration of the visual aspects of their expression. We do not take these two possibilities as being mutually exclusive. The first, probably the more ancient in evolutionary terms, is experience-based, whereas the second is a cognitive description of an external state of affairs”.

MIRROR NEURONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This psychological interpretation in terms of understanding the mirror neurons mechanisms laid bare by neurocognitive research has spurred a number of objections that still leave the exact significance of their discovery in a state of relative uncertainty. If this interpretation is fully confirmed, however, this discovery represents a theoretical achievement for several reasons. The first reason is that it provides an innovative hypothesis about the very roots of intersubjectivity, understood as the relation between two subjects as such, even though elements of the view have been anticipated by previous theorists or formulated in parallel from different disciplinary perspectives. Moreover, it crucially provides this view so far articulated in purely psychological terms with a neurobiological grounding, making it unprecedentedly plausible from the point of view of neurobiology. According to this interpretation, what makes certain physico-biological entities subjects is a number of high level properties rather well captured by traditional mental terms, and the apprehension of these properties between entities endowed with them rests fundamentally on a built-in dedicated mechanism that operates in an immediate way, as well as below the threshold of consciousness and will. It thus makes intersubjectivity a very basic process, and one of an essentially non-intellectual kind. Moreover, it makes this process non-intellectual not only in the sense that

it does not call on any intellectual faculty, such as conceptualization, judgment or inference, but also in the sense that it involves a key emotional component. In a word, it is a view that makes humans social animals of a strongly emotive kind; and therefore implies, given the deep connections previously analysed between intersubjective and international relations, that the latter are ultimately rooted in this emotional animal intersubjectivity. When nations enter, through their highest representatives, into future-shaping negotiations (such the Yalta negotiations), cognitive neuroscience of emotions tells us, according to the understanding reading to the mirror neuron theory, that emotional mirror mechanisms are at play and consequently contribute to the drawing of the geopolitical map of the planet.

Having scientific information of this kind is certainly an important piece of knowledge that invalidates in large part at least the more rational and intellectual perspective on intersubjectivity that implicitly lies at the foundation of international relations studies, especially when they draw – for instance – on game theory. However, how much information it really provides when it comes to accounting for the details of a negotiation (such as the Yalta division of the world) is a different matter. As already mentioned, it is not unlike knowing that Stalin, by virtue of the Freudian theory, was somewhere moved by his more or less happily resolved Oedipus complex. But granting ex hypothesis the correctness of such a view about human personality leaves entirely open the question of how to bridge the gap between the general principle it enunciates and the details of a particular situation involving the numerous and intricate psychological subtleties that political scientists, historians novelists have tried to penetrate for the longest time. However decisive a step into unravelling the ultimate underpinnings of emotional intersubjectivity might have been taken with the mirror neurons hypothesis at this point, many more need to be added to it to turn this hypothesis into a really useful theoretical tool for an emotion-based approach to international relations. Even if some quite suggestive attempts to take some of them have in fact already been made, even though they focus neither on the emotive aspect of the mirror neuron theory, nor on the international relations aspect of political life. Such limitation is not specific to this particular facet of the neurocognitive approach to emotion, as the whole field is at this stage primarily concerned with the most elementary dimension of emotional capacities as evidenced by its explicit focus on emotions common to human and non-human organisms and its insistence on the virtues of animal research for research on humans. Emphasizing this current limitation should in no way be read as an encouragement to look elsewhere and to adopt the sceptical attitude shared by a substantial part of the political science community with respect to the contemporary sciences of cognitions, or to postpone

48 In particular, Schreiber 2007.
49 Well reviewed in Marie 2008.
the very project of a theory-based inquiry into the role played by emotional processes in the study of international relations. It should be read only as a concern to provide as accurate as possible an assessment of its current relevance which certainly is the best way to foster the exploration of its undeniably potential role.

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Emotions of Uncertainty, Competition and Cooperation in the International Financial Sector

Jocelyn Pixley

INTRODUCTION

Tensions between competition and cooperation have been both cause and effect of an ever more international finance sector over the past four decades. It is also fair to say that governments’ responses to growing crises have been equally limited to ‘muddling through’. This chapter selects these notably Anglo-American tensions to show a few of their global impacts on the inherent uncertainties of money. The purpose overall is to discuss how these tendencies are driven by ‘impersonal’ emotions: trust and distrust. It is argued that these anticipatory emotions, and many reactive emotions, are institutionalised in norms and standard operating procedures. Public and private finance officials are required to deploy emotion strategies in order to cope. This chapter looks less at markets than at the main producers of money – banks and other firms. Specific emotions are codified in remits and in macroeconomic terms, such as ‘interest rates’ (which is a measure of trust), all readily available on the public record. Intense competition, it is finally suggested, damages international trust in money, but certain types of cooperation also damage money’s trustworthiness.

A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Money is a fragile institution that is often misunderstood. Visions of pure market coordination of the global economy are particularly misleading because buying/selling ignores how goods and services are produced and how money makes this possible. My attention is directed to the financial firms that act in markets and to the special state privileges of these money producers and to their competition. When bank crises occur, the relation between money-producing activity and ordinary economic activity is particularly obvious. Trustworthy bank-money is reliant on each nation-state and, although states try to repair this trust, that alone cannot overcome the banks’ destruction of economic activity.
My analysis is of the peak level, where emotions propel apparently rational strategies and institutional norms, laws, policies and actions. The key emotion in motivating cooperative activity is impersonal trust. Trust, not greed drives this global sector and creates booms, whereas the collapse of trust creates the busts. The chapter suggests this is a major international question, because money is so future-oriented. Yes, greed is fostered by quasi-market-type incentive structures for bank officials, but it is not the impersonal driver of banks or firms, which do not ‘feel’ but do scheme with and against each other and impose rules for their market activities. Markets do not ‘feel’, nor do they ‘think’.

The question of individual rationality and emotions, and their practical relation to the actions of international banks (or any organisation) is here not discussed (see Pixley 2009, 2012). This chapter poses an analysis of some of the impersonal, codified emotion-rules that, with cognitive and ethical rules and norms, are the only means for coping with the unknowable future. For the (powerless) public, for example, blind faith (not ‘trust’) in huge banks applies, until dramatic betrayal. Global banks had not only destroyed livelihoods, but blamed others as well. Thereupon, collective public anger, suspicion and moral panic against banks are perfectly rational, ethical responses of ‘hot’ emotions. Here I apply this idea of rational emotion-rules to the peak organisations that created the mess. Analysis is grounded in economic sociology and draws on Keynesian and Schumpeterian economics on money’s uncertainties. Sociologists such as Theodore Kemper (1978) and Niklas Luhmann (1979, 1988) give a basis for exploring anticipatory emotions. A.-A. Kyrtsis (2012) invented ‘immoral panic’, a concept he applies to banks’ reactions to the public’s moral panic from 2008 on. Keynes daringly codified emotions of money; and sociological literature on organisational emotions gives fine-grained views (Collins 1990; Flam 1990).

These emotion-rules and norms, it is shown, are deeply divided at the peak. On the one hand, shame or schadenfreude moves between the competing money-producing centres, as shown or enacted in public statements by officials who may or may not feel these emotions personally. On the other hand, open (not secret) cooperation of the financial sector with public sector authorities and business firms is one-sided or occasionally collusive in closed cooperation. The sector’s open cooperation with international authorities – such as the IMF or the Bank for International Settlements in Basel – is asymmetrical. The EU’s brave experimental tendency to open cooperation clashed with financial competition, giving new uncertainty and allowing big EU banks to copy London or Wall Street banks.

Today’s re-intensified emotion-rules emerged during the post-war period. By the 1980s, a conventional theme was about ‘international competitiveness’ in all things economic. Globalisation was the fashionable term of the 1990s, although it gradually became apparent that the international activities of the finance sector
were dominant and ever less healthy for livelihoods. Financial crises grew as did secret cooperation. At the time of writing, the severe economic dislocations from the 2007 crisis are less resolved than ever. The chapter, then, is mindful of one of Max Weber’s throwaway lines that capitalism could not survive a global order (empire) if banks (‘mobile capital’) were no longer able to play off nation-states (1981, 337). From this cognitive point of view, could one say that the financial world since the 2008 crisis is driven by collective fears of international regulations? If this is so, perhaps a collusive anger or ‘immoral panic’ arose against any hint that rules might control the regulatory arbitrage against states and state money.

Nevertheless, Weber’s question may imply intelligent, rational plans even via conspiracy on the part of global finance. My analysis, instead, is that the great uncertainties of money only lead to pseudo-rationality. Some emotions play more of a major role in the actions of this sector than rational calculation does: future-oriented emotions, the anticipatory emotions (Kemper 1978) of trust and distrust for the future; which usually form from confidence in the present or lack of confidence from ‘mixed signals’; and from optimism or pessimism about the past. Whether or not recognised, collective emotions from resistance to regulatory ‘threats’ via capital strikes, the distrust codified in shareholder value, heightened competition and the uncontrollable nature of big financial firms (Kyrtsis 2012) may be mundane, short-term and less ‘scheming’ than critics and defenders suggest. Fog of war metaphors may prevail.

For example, during the 2008–2009 peak of the U.S.-UK crisis, a collection of G20 nations was hurriedly put together, but meetings have been conflict-ridden or banal and pitifully weak. Yet some state regulators asked banks and ‘shadow banks’ a Joseph Schumpeter-type question about their economic purposes. Did the finance sector’s money production improve people’s well-being across the world? This is the sector’s promise and reason for its immense privileges. The sector has not answered this question.

Elsewhere I have explored the quests to control uncertainty – the sector’s emotional obsession (Pixley 2004, 2014). ‘That is irrational and unreasoning, not emotions per se. The patterns of seeking a ‘sure thing’ puts international society in danger because, in facing the unknowable, the preferable (potentially) stabilizing emotional strategies would be caution and care. Fiduciary duties and patient investment via trusting relations are the norms of precautionary emotions. Heightened tensions, to which I now turn, do not help.

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1 One of the three sins of mediaeval Christianity was a ‘lust for power’ (greed and sex are the others; see Hirschman 1997). It could be argued that demands of one specific sector for certainty, through socialising losses and externalising all damage, is now an emotion-rule for power and profits. See also Pixley 2012.
BANKING AND FINANCE COMPETITION AND COOPERATION

Although a hallmark of capitalist enterprises is competition, that is in contention with oligopoly and closed or open cooperation. In 1971, international fixed exchange rates broke down and, although the U.S. dollar remained the ‘anchor’ for money’s value, the democracies lost some measure of control over their national economies. That open international cooperation gave way to competitive currency markets running 24/7; these Forex markets became hugely destabilising. Competitive rules in the financial sector grew as well, often from demands from Wall Street and the City of London. If one gained more favourable rules to compete on other turf, the other demanded the same; further centres copied.

Competition

The governments promoting their financial centres claimed consumer rights and choices would increase; aims to ‘democratise’ share owning, pension plans and access to credit were mutually congenial to the sector and states (Pixley 2007). Neoclassical economics and finance ‘theory’, which captured finance policy from Keynesians, had no time for historical ideas that international political competition rarely brings peace, or that structures of feeling, such as fear or trust play any role in markets. ‘Performance’ on monthly benchmarks, in the name of ‘efficient’ transparency, put huge competitive pressures for raising profits on banks, firms and money funds, to meet demands from money managers for high shareholder value. But the sector lobbied for these ‘constraints’. As I show with just a few of the countless examples, in banking and money management ‘aggressive’ competition is particularly inappropriate. It fosters short-term emotion-rules and the spread of a trader persona to executive ranks. We find that professionalism, prudence and respect for meeting bank clients’ needs are difficult to find. Clients have become ‘customers’ for bank sales and marketing of ‘products’ over patient lending. International Forex and bond markets influenced countries’ management of their monetary economies; global money market financing also loosened trust relations.

As time went by, foreign entry and a growing array of financial firms in key centres built an overall oligopolistic sectoral situation, under short-term deals or ‘reactions’. Mutually owned pension funds, or state-owned banks and cooperatively owned building societies or thrifts declined. Privatisation and demutualisation removed these ‘choices’, first in Anglo-Saxon countries. Business and public choices, for local councils too, was reduced to a choice of ‘for-profit’ money management firms, and ‘for-profit’ banks, each offering similar ‘things’. Financial crises from the 1970s were
not only in poor ‘peripheries’ but the ‘core’ (everywhere). Germany’s Landesbanks (state-owned) were to be privatised by 2010, and perhaps to ‘improve’ their positions they, and many other non-Anglo-Saxon financial firms, succumbed to aggressive selling from Wall Street and the City of London, to disastrous results from 2007. Since the U.S.-UK financial crash, fewer bank oligopolies have greater global reach than ever, many with tainted balance sheets. The dangers are that financial monoliths can easily ‘move markets’ to internal short-term situational advantage, for example in high frequency computer trading, which have emotions coded into the programme (Lanchester 2014; Pixley 2012; Plender 2010). But a larger crisis is quite possible.

All these changes, however, should not be construed as an active conspiracy or cunning plan of the sector or governments. Oligopolies compete and spy on each other! Uncertainty is the means to understand the types of impersonal emotions involved in facing an unknowable financial future. The main drivers are trust and distrust in the quality of debt (money), inherently relational, with strategies incorporated into banks, also in international credit rating, legal and accountancy firms. Competition itself increases uncertainty; it heightens distrust among firms. Reactive plans go wrong.

Day-to-day competition can lead to what Harold Hotelling gave his name: clustering and ‘undue’ copycat behaviour in quality of products, among competitors trying to capture the same customers. Under uncertainty, past successes are copied. Yet this standardisation does not meet ‘public welfare’, he said (1929: 41, 56). With money production, different types of institutions, usually regulated, can keep competition in separate segments.

For example, the former mutual, thrifts or cooperative financial sub-sector fulfilled a different role to licensed banks. Victoria Chick (2008: 119) explains how in Britain’s building societies, long-term mortgage loan commitments were matched, at least somewhat, by expectations that ‘share-holders’ build up participation before gaining a loan. These quasi-deposits – seen as stable savings – paid interest and prepared for a future mortgage. But banks, the licensed money producers, wanted similar exemptions in ratios of equity that building societies enjoyed: Chick suggests banks probably regretted this lobbying later; worse, decline in non-borrowed equity was extreme. Compared to others, Swiss and British bank total liabilities to GDP in 2008 were (first) 629 per cent and (second) 550 per cent, respectively. The U.S.

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2 This story is complex: leveraged buyouts became ‘Mergers & Acquisitions’; oligopolies come and go. Japanese and U.S. banks ‘took over’ the City, then Barclays, Deutsche Bank, UBS and others ‘took over’ Wall St. and/or Tokyo. The nationality of these banks (French, Spanish or American) was disregarded until they rushed to their own states for bailouts. Most regulations are territorially based, making arbitrage on rules nicely profitable. For the early crashes and bank crises, see Minsky 2008, and Admati & Hellwig 2013, also on the global banks’ dubious solvency now.
of 93 per cent seems modest, owing to its larger general economy (Admati and Hellwig 2013: 238).

The haphazard process is also shown when, after UK members voted for demutualisation, competition intensified between mortgage lenders and banks, and both extended their risks (Chick 2008: 121). Demutualisation occurred in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and others. Liquid assets were further run down, and then banks turned to ‘securitising’ illiquid assets, their loans, and other schemes. ‘Clustering’ under high competition and imprudent, far too speedy expansion, led to Northern Rock, Halifax-Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and other former cooperative society failures in the UK. On Wall Street, many demutualised mutual funds had corruption charges (‘pump and dump’) after the Dotcom bust (Pixley 2004); and in 2007–2008 it was evident that mortgages could no longer be ‘sold on’.

### Cooperation

The opposite is also problematic, although Hotelling’s thesis shows the descent into copycat techniques occurs in competitive free markets. Adam Smith had a very bleak view of ‘cooperation’. In 1776, Smith argued that individual merchants/capitalists (firms were soon the norm), invariably colluded to cheat ‘the public’ or rather, consumers:

> People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some diversion to raise prices (Smith cited in Cassidy 2009: 32).

But if ‘conspiracies’ occur, they are surely reactive (e.g., hate of newcomers, envy and spite, social closure, ‘immoral panic’). Oligopolies try to beat or forestall competition’s uncertainties that, in banking for example, threaten profits when similar financial entities pursue similar activities. Any slide to collusion involves trust and secret agreements against regulators’ attempts to impose free market competitive rules such as the U.S. Anti-Trust rules over late-nineteenth century corporations. And yet

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3 A typical strategy was to ‘offer’ members proper (saleable) shares in century-old mutually owned firms. ‘Something for nothing’ won against moral anger expressed about former and potential future mutual contributions. Given later bankruptcies, many shares are now worthless.

4 Clustering is a spatial metaphor – better than ‘herding’ – on the analogy that ice cream beach sellers tend to cluster in the middle, not spread to each end of the beach. I prefer the problem stated as fear of uncertainty driving more fear of being alone and wrong. ‘Together and wrong’ tends to drive out the ‘alone and right’ strategy. Bankers seem to prefer to be ruined together: here mindless ‘herding cattle’ does seem apt.

5 Hill and McCarthy (2004) suggest that Smith mentioned the ‘invisible hand’ thesis merely in passing, and rather that collusion of merchants (driven by avidity) was Smith’s sustained critique of commercial society.
the ‘conspiracy’ thesis is partial. Thorstein Veblen (1904: 22) identified a financier/manager persona operating in cartels as disruptive, insatiable ‘financiering strategists’ aiming solely for ‘pecuniary gain’. Captains of industry aim not for efficiency but profit. They form and break down coalitions and trusts via ‘large and frequent … disturbances’ (Veblen 1904: 24–29, 39–40). Veblen also saw how relations between firms and owners were more impersonal. Investment banks made possible the fixed capital of industrial giants (Wray 2010), by selling ‘shares’ in firms to those anxious to avoid the dangers of personal ownership, and by offering a ‘mixed’ portfolio of rights to buy and sell, and rights to dividends, with no liability whatsoever. Personal contact diminished, leaving the new ‘businessman’ with an ‘easier conscience’ (Veblen 1904: 40–56). By the 1900s, it was routine for firm insiders and their Wall Street bankers to manipulate stock prices.

Anti-trust cases still try to stem predatory behaviour designed to smother competition (Cassidy 2009: 132) often to indecisive legal results. ‘Upstarts’ extoll competition until established; disruption of ‘trusts’ is also internal as Veblen suggests. Sociologists look at the process of conflicts, then, not the fixed slogans. With the global reach and networks of oligopolies today, closed cooperation through trust and its routine betrayal is international. If competition is hardly ‘the answer’ to the political and predatory power of finance oligopolies, regulation also offers chances for disruptions, for profitable evasions through playing off states. If, as R. Merton Senior argued in the 1930s, the hidden nature of violations produced a ‘faint twinge of uneasiness’ (cited in Wilson and McCarthy 2012: 161), today banks claim openly that any new rule will be evaded.

Banks and quasi-banks are enmeshed in these opposing cooperative and competitive relations with their disruptive tensions. This is common to ordinary capitalist firms but banks cannot be treated like other publicly listed firms. Why not? Banks are a special category and either enable or disrupt economic activity as shown in the analyses of Joseph Schumpeter, Max Weber and Karl Polanyi. From this sociological tradition, Geoffrey Ingham (2004, 2008) offers a contemporary theory of money. These are essential for understanding and identifying the dominant emotions involved (Pixley 1999, 2004, 2009).

**Tensions: Bank-Money**

First, the vast amount of the world’s money is created in the private banking sector. This data is routinely collected and usually ignored. The market vision aids this misrecognition, by focusing on exchange of goods/services (barter) as though money was just handy and reflects the ‘real’ economy. Second, banks have state privileges, unlike other firms, but with responsibilities. Up to the 1960s in the United States, shareholders of banks remained liable to some proportion of bank losses (Mayer
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2010; Johnson and Kwak 2011: 35–38). Shareholder ‘value’ was detrimental to banks’ societal remit, creating copycat moves, further evasion and regulatory arbitrage. Third, banks cooperate in technically legal ways but, given that fewer types of banking and money management exist, commissions between them may be hidden. Collusion can emerge (e.g., ‘shadow banks’). Genuine mutuals were dull but safe – not publicly listed and free of pressure to raise share value.

We take each point on tensions between bank competition and cooperation briefly in turn. The private banking system creates a huge amount of money in loans. This ‘normal’ drive for bank profits from the interest stream used to be understood, until ‘efficient’ market claims took over, until the previously unheard-of demand for loans exploded into defaults from 2007. Had demand for loans been pushed? The ‘market’ was also said to weed out banks’ dangerous leverage or dubious ‘securities’ of loans, but failed to do so. Pro-market attacks on ‘Greenspan’s cheap money’ or ‘China’ are quite secondary, in ignoring how loans are bank assets. Instead, the banks created the crisis with their accomplices. True, the obsession against wage inflation since the 1970s (and confidence induced from this ‘certainty’) distracted the entire public-private financial sector from banks’ two major (historical) tendencies: either towards credit inflation to make ‘better’ profits regardless of economic activity or, when that collapses, into debt deflation and depression. This pattern is or should have been well-known.

In other words, a huge increase in money by banks, if not directed somewhat (we later see), is eventually but unpredictably stopped in the markets, whereupon more credit is neither requested, nor is it given. Debts grow in value under deflation – the virtual situation since 2008 and also profitable for banks – and economic activity collapses under defaults, producing deleverage and lack of confidence in all sectors (Schumpeter 1954: 1113–1117). Relevant emotions are optimism and depression.

Another excluded fact about credit – which is publicly counter-intuitive – is that ‘loans create deposits’ in Schumpeter’s analysis. In 2014, the Bank of England, remarkably, saw fit to issue two pamphlets on the deposit-creating loan (McLeay et al. 2014). Depositors use their money at will – it is not simply stored or ‘saved’, while banks deposit new loans that are also used as money and deposited in many banks. Logic suggests the lack of a creditor. Past failures led, often under crisis policy

6 This obsession, that financial ‘repression’ should be replaced by union and wage suppression, was also counterproductive (for states), because the sector’s line that inflation is ‘solely’ caused by ‘too many people working’ (Pixley 2004), meant that many central banks created generations of unemployed and bankrupted businesses. Those same populations were eventually deemed to be worthy of a house mortgage in sub-prime, or a student or consumer loan, and also able to pay consumer taxes. That all reduced the economic activity for states to tax and increased banks’ credit inflation. The United States has a quarter of the world’s prison population (Western 2006), and now in debtors’ prisons too; a huge expense to government let alone to people.
to open political/social deals. The overall point is that money creation is a three-way cooperation between the private sector and the public, and the quality of loans has social effects.

Credit is piled into future time in millions of deferred promises (IOUs). In a boom, the sector acts as though uncertainty is beaten and trust is unnecessary. Confidence turns to over-confidence; bankers later say they had no ‘choice’. The creation of money ‘from nothing’ is not quite correct, however, for it rests on contracts, trust of promises being met, interest paid, future new wealth and jobs created, and ‘community’ obligations to vouchsafe money in taxes. Hopes for good outcomes are not only uncertain, but also fears of vulnerabilities, such as insufficient cash, insolvencies, default and losses may be repressed, say, in turning loans into ‘securities’. Banks felt shielded in this ‘strategy’ except that seemingly ‘safe’ loans with property as collateral depended as ever on a property price bubble. Banks ‘forgot’ that bubbles always burst, that runs on banks are always possible; and runs on banks by banks bring global economic standstill, as with Lehman’s bankruptcy in 2008. International finance had shredded its obligations, abused its privileges, publicly ridiculed objective fears about the direction of their loans and lobbied against doubters.

Tensions: Banks Are Special

Banks therefore do not sell the goods or services that produce value in an arduous way, but just produce money (Ingham 2008). Money is a promise, which can be promising, namely the funding of new ventures for creative, wealth-enhancing social needs. That purpose is typically called the ‘allocation’ of investment, which underplays banking’s ideally dynamic and special role. Schumpeter stressed that banks were the ‘engine of capitalism’ (1954: 318, 278) because ‘the creation of new purchasing power out of nothing’ by banks is the source of most development (1934: 73). The banker ‘authorises people, in the name of society’ to innovate, and is ‘the Ephor’ (supervisor/ magistrate) of ‘the exchange economy’ (Schumpeter 1934: 74): this is ‘creative destruction’.

His student, Hyman Minsky (1992: 6) worried more of Schumpeter’s warning about ‘destruction without function’: banks can be ‘merchants of debt’. Minsky described money’s phases, from early commercial to financial capitalism (late nineteenth century) and called the phase since World War II ‘money management capitalism’ (Wray 2010). Today banks and money funds – from hedge funds to for-profit mutual
funds – could be characterised as cooperative (although any specific asymmetry seems to switch), and as copy-cats in Hotelling’s sense. Only banks are state licensed to create money, but for what purpose?

Cooperation with and against Governments

Cooperation in some of the more important historical settlements occurred with merchants and states that vouchsafe bank credit-money with the currency. Early deals were public, if only to elites, long before democracy. Tory monarchists hated them. Central banks modelled on the 1694 Bank of England emerged – not in the United States until 1913 – in light of mutual benefits of war finance and lucrative bank money creation. Severe and frequent bank runs, however, also increased. In variable agreements, private banks could ask central banks to be (tough) lenders of last resort. In return, banks would lend (ideally) for social-economic development (Schumpeter 1934) and maintain the public payments system as a quasi ‘arm of the state’ (Dow 2012). These were open forms of cooperation of private banking and nearly all were reached after depressions from collapse of daily payments and of longer-term credit.

Central banks validated bank ‘near money’ with the currency (often called ‘high-powered money’), the public means of payment, as long as the private sector kept its side of the ‘bargain’. Bank licenses are (or were?) based on values and hopes that over centuries banks became skilled at assessing requests for loans, taking care not to create credit – ‘near money’ – on dubious proposals and IOUs detached from any economic activity. As Martin Mayer says (2010), the loan officer’s duty was to hope for his or her borrower’s success: in effect an emotion-rule of careful

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8 Monetary historians agree that the private Bank of England chartered by William of Orange (inured to Amsterdam banking practices), did nicely from lending £1.3 million to William III, by creating that deposit and lending out the same amount, earning interest from state and private loans (cited Pixley 2004).

9 The far older ‘switch’ from fourteenth–fifteenth century governments (sovereigns) defaulting on their loans from private merchants, to banks defaulting more frequently and requiring state bailouts since at least the nineteenth century in Britain, France and other countries, became the 2011 dilemma. State money is called ‘high-powered’ in economics because of governments’ coercive powers of taxation – whereas bank-money depends on ‘referring’ to state money (the former is only a ‘potential claim’ to state money) and on borrowers not defaulting. But the extent to which governments are bailing out banks is now putting high-powered money at risk (Alessandri and Haldane 2009; Brunner 1987). If U.S. Tea Party Republicans ever have their way, the U.S. economy would collapse because every sector relies on, and bank-money refers in regress to, ‘safe’ Treasury debt (Johnson 2011). In other words, private bank-money would disappear; the contraction of 2008 would multiply by 10. Only the government might grow (opposite to Tea Party intentions), because the Fed could create direct credit – like the old Soviet Union’s Gosbank – just to keep national security and transport going. The world economy would be affected.
optimism, patient support and trust. But because banks cannot know for ‘certain’ which proposals might succeed into the unknowable and/or long-term future, suspicion and worry also prevail.

The central bank ‘lender of last resort’ facility (LOLR) was not a ‘moral hazard’. It meant ‘last resort’ at penalty interest and public odium. In return banks were subject to special rules, supervision and monitoring (Dow 2012: 43). Evasion of the post-war bargain – the only ‘moment’ when money was democratized – started in the 1950s. Ingham (2002) argues wartime Trading with the Enemy Acts were more effective in halting global bank deals than Bretton Woods later.

Money is always contained in the state debt and money creation mechanism that is operated between state and private banking (Ingham 2008). So central bank LOLR support is no ‘distortion’ of markets, but an ad hoc response to ‘foolish banks’ that endanger social trust and economic activity. However, banks expanded credit with reduced equity. They shifted from meeting clients’ needs and promoting new projects, to maintaining market share and enhancing profits. Thereupon central banks imposed capital adequacy requirements, but banks sold off loans (securities), used ‘off balance sheet’ entities and dealt in derivatives to evade these equity rules (Dow 2012: 43–44). Banks’ own borrowing rose after credit-rating agencies factored in their likely state bailout (rarely available to ‘firms’), thus cheapening bank costs of borrowing (Admati and Hellwig 2013).

To add to Dow’s explanation, the reason banks came to ignore genuine cooperation with central banks was motivated by competition for profits, abetted by ‘shareholder value’, rise of money management, policies that promoted privatisations so lucrative to financial centres, and central banks weakened by independence from Treasuries. The brief democratic ‘bargain’ with states was based on trust between different parties: First, the non-financial businesses in goods and services wanted a relatively predictable environment of a payment system that worked (for paying wages, servicing debt and new ventures), and of currency and commodity prices that did not fluctuate daily across the globe. This sector wanted state supervision to prevent constant changes (from currency arbitrage, for example). Second, states need citizens’ taxes and work, as do banks. Polanyi argues that a trustworthy payment system is an achievement between governments and ordinary businesses (1957: 192), which keeps economic life going.

With additional support from their governments’ transformed view during the 1970s (for reasons not explored here), the City of London and Wall Street grew and their main banks operated globally. This trust is not among different parties; it is exclusive (Mafia-like). I do not believe much of this was ‘intentional’ or

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10 For example, international Eurodollar and petrodollar trading started in the City under the fixed exchange system, well before 1971, the date Nixon broke with Bretton Woods in floating the dollar.
Emotions in the International Financial Sector

rational; there were intensified emotion-rules and competition exacerbated them (most notably distrust). Bitter ‘wannabes’ wanted to dispose of old school ‘wets’ (see Pixley 2012: ch. 8). And, to ward off those uncertainties, the banking sector’s quasi- or actual collusion against the public and ordinary firms, against government regulations and their trustworthy settlements, became the new so-called ‘perverse effects’.

Today, loans could meet many social demands and jobs if banks patiently lent for alternative energy sources and other sorely needed ventures. But this lending is no longer the ‘done thing’. The decline of banks’ social role that keeps insolvency/deflation at bay is evident in Bank of England statistics. For more than 100 years, the UK private banking sector assets (its loans) stayed much the same as a per cent of GDP, at 50 per cent in line with general economic activity. Assets from the 1970s on grew to 500 per cent; the most spectacular growth was between 1982 and 2007. At the same time, and against all norms of credit expansion, banks also took on more risks, with capital ratios declining (Alessandri and Haldane 2009). A similar pattern occurred in the United States, also with ‘assets’ of bonds, loans and mortgages, although not including derivatives, which is estimated at possibly 1,000 per cent, of global GDP (Morris 2008: xii). This ratio of credit piled on top of real output, as Charles Morris says, makes a huge and ‘wobbly’ inverted pyramid, which is not any less dangerous today.

Ordinary businesses were forced to financialise in, at first, hedging against currency moves; firms, universities (and others) had to follow, and populations became ‘financialised’. Ultimately, the financial sector betrayed its trustworthy reason for being, for having licenses to create money validated by governments. The basic function of banks of creating money through lending for uncertain future projects to enhance global welfare was diverted into attempts to sell off their obligations, apparently to ‘spread risk’. Their feeble societal justification, to this day, is their capacity to expand liquidity. This only means the extent that financial ‘products’ are instantly saleable. Such near money, aided with cheap loans and with no ‘social usefulness’, as Lord Adair Turner put it (2010), and no new future wealth created to service loans, could not and cannot last. These firms secretly bet against their own clients and hid their liabilities (FCIC 2011: 43–45; Levin Report 2011), and are continuing so to do.

Andrew Haldane (2010: 13–18) shows that across Europe, the United States and the UK, the largest banks engaged in an ‘international competitive race’ to raise return on share value or return on equity (ROE). But the trebling of ROE between 1970 and 2007 did not produce the ‘economic miracle’ the sector trumpeted. This data ignored ‘risk-adjusted’ ROE, Haldane says, which includes the massive leverage, a tendency to disguise exposures and to book rises in asset ‘prices’ as profits (unrealised), under mark-to-market accounting. In the UK,
the ROE rise was virtually all about leverage but, incredibly, between 1997 and 2008 the UK banks’ ‘Return on Assets’ was flat or falling. It was, then, hardly trustworthy.

**Tensions: Banks Cooperate**

Banks are always interconnected; these are normal operations in any ‘economy with a Wall Street’ whereby, as Minsky said (2008: 197), a sense of stability during a boom creates instability through ‘the tranquility of success’. Keynes (1930; 1936) and Schumpeter (1934; 1954) both drew attention to how banks ‘move in step’; if one bank creates purely ‘destructive’ money it will collapse. But **collectively** banks can expand the money supply if there is enough demand for loans (tranquility) and stop when demand falls off (distrust). Deposit-creating loans are deposited in many banks; although as Keynes pointed out (1930: 23), a banker grants loans as though alone in ‘his parlour’. In reality, banks extend loans when businesses are ‘demanding’ loans through their confidence/optimism in a rosy future.

Yet the start of the twenty-first century was not a time of ‘rosy’ economic activity in ‘core’ countries like the United States, or **far less**, the UK. So, where lay banks’ optimism? Research showed their lending had only created **financial activity**. Regulators said ‘Ponzi finance’ (Turner 2010). Formerly, banks collectively developed capitalism. No longer was a new enterprise dependent on feudal church or state patronage. Banks could assess business prospects, create vast amounts of new money for a fee and take the dangers (of defaults) of extending loans. But banks only grew as confidence in bankers’ capacities to ‘honour their liabilities’ grew (Dow 2012: 41-2). Banks are ‘special’; but especially dangerous when hidden cooperation and frantic competition ‘rule’.

There is no secret global collusion necessarily, from collectively ‘moving in step’, but fewer default problems when the deposit-creating loan is productive for business and fosters general economic activity.

The ‘new’ slogan competition often collides against cooperation, as we can see in the case of Europe. Heather Gibson (2006) suggests that the EU policy of 1999 encouraged the development of financial markets (a ‘single wholesale market’ across the EU) to compete with banks, would not help build lasting relationships with the broader community or help ‘convergence’ of new lower income EU member countries. Competitive market-based finance undermines longer-term relationship banking, (Gibson 2006), and easily generates bubbles. Financial markets emphasise deal-making, not careful screening of borrowers and credit rationing by banks. Its existence undercuts cautious banks. Committed lenders (such as banks) see firms through good and bad times, and expect a better return
in good times. But banks became vulnerable to this competition from markets. It is easier for firms to renege on their bank commitments when cheap market financing is possible in ‘good times’.

Here, the borrowing firms betray their banks’ trust, but the necessity of trust is, apparently, so distant as to be irrelevant (‘wet’). Moving to the ‘distance’ of market financing leaves the entire debt/credit relation reliant on confidence in the market (it ceased in 2008). The single relation of a firm and bank can sometimes mean insolvency is isolated. Market financing is now displacing bank loans. Some argue that this will reduce bank power and dubious practices (Authers 2014). I disagree. It is wishful thinking of dystopians.

Regarding banks, if you cannot beat market-based finance, the answer seemed to be, you joined it. The higher competition and ‘innovations’ required to win (flog anything) on markets, brought about the unsustainable debt patterns (Gibson 2009). In the 1980s, one ‘innovation’ in finance hubs was the growth of the interbank market (Libor) for allegedly ‘more efficient distribution of funds’ – that is, banks could reduce liquid reserves by borrowing from each other. This avoided any scrutiny from their central bank – banks did not need Lender of Last Resort (not then), or the ‘stigma’ of opening their books. The Fed took this (sociology!) seriously in late 2007, giving banks other, less publicly obvious loans, unsure if they were in liquidity or insolvency crises. They seemed scared to know, and the Fed also lent to EU and UK banks.\footnote{Discussions cited in the FOMC December 2007 Transcripts. Further, if banks were no longer scrutinising their borrowers, who would? The credit rating agencies suddenly boomed, allowing banks to save on expensive credit assessments. Additionally, brand new markets (ABS, RMBS, CDOs) allowed banks and others to issue more securities. None of these reduced dangers of plain default from the supposedly way distant and commodified, but actual, borrowers (we now know). Gibson also shows how the credit rating agencies (like earlier problems with ‘syndication’ of sovereign loans of the 1980s), ‘restricted the range of opinions about the credit-worthiness of borrowers’ (Gibson 2009: 4).}

This further move to the market, the London Interbank Offered Rate – Libor – thus became an expression of the distrust or trust among banks collectively. The world only knew how huge this market was when rates spiked in 2008, and again in 2010 when we found out banks had rigged the Libor for years (Pixley 2012). As Gibson points out (2009: 2–3), innovations only change the kind of dangers, not their levels, and they increase interdependencies between these institutions. Interbank interest rates went through the roof on an international scale when no bank trusted any other’s balance sheets after Lehman in 2008. Credit raters savaged their previous mythical AAA ratings, to ‘save’ their reputations. Trust completely collapsed into distrust, at an abstract, global level: a ruinous ‘rate’. These numbers express relations of ‘rational emotions’ about the extent of trust between many international banks. All this was publicly clear and not illegal. We later learned
banks rigged Forex rates as well as Libor, involving further collusion among global banks, to which I now turn.

Tensions: Cooperation and Competition in Fear?

It bears repeating: markets are arenas for buying and selling. Only actors (banks and others) design and produce what is sold. To avoid buyer hostility and deep distrust to ‘hype’, actors spiral down to collusion. During 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Japanese and UK Financial Services Authorities (FSA), and EU regulators investigated rumours of Libor collusion. Bank traders and their treasury arms violated ‘Chinese wall’ rules, by internally colluding, so that insider bets could be placed on future yen and dollar rates. Traders knew bank treasury departments would ‘move the [interbank] rates in that direction’ (Masters et al. 2011). Tokyo, EU or London bankers’ associations collect this data on what rates each bank says it can borrow at on a given day. They average the data (reject outliers), but a weaker bank may ‘want’ to depress its rates, or a stronger one to knock them out. Collusion changes the averages, so too bets on the known rig.

I asked a Deputy Governor of an EU-member central bank (in September 2013) whether this Libor rigging undermined all central banks’ monetary policy, because Libor is another major measure for setting prices in derivatives markets. Thus trades using a rigged Libor are cheating on already flimsy measures of distrust. The European Central Bank (ECB) had in fact investigated, but it only looked at one category of derivatives (insufficient in my view). A derivative is calculated from packaged income streams of IOUs whose value rests on an interest rate. In the meantime, what to journalists was a huge scandal is now passed over in puny fines, as is the cheating in the Forex markets (exposed later). Ruinous bank lawsuits are averted with fines covered with a ‘neither confirm or deny’ clause. That rigs can undermine entire export industries of goods and services through exaggerating the meaninglessness of rates is rarely stressed.

Another aspect is the way that authorities uncovered the Libor rig: in the usual police manner. UBS confirmed in 2011 that it had received ‘conditional leniency and conditional immunity’ from the DoJ for turning over information on Libor and the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate. Later, UBS was fined for ‘improper attempts’ to manipulate the Libor rate in the crucial years of the 2007–2008 crisis; so too had Barclays, JPMorgan, Lloyds, Deutsche and Credit Suisse, of the sixteen banks that contributed data to U.S. dollar Libor.\(^2\) In any case, banks simply stopped lending
in September 2008 (Lehman) when the Libor rate spiked (FCIC 2011: 355). These colluding banks are the most global (some nations’ banks less so, e.g., Canada): Did the world need dishonesty on top of ephemeral trust?

After Lehman folded, there was a high chance internationally that no money at all would pass hands for wages, firms’ commitments or via ATMs. Banks abused their public responsibility, and any ‘faint twinge’ (Wilson and McCarthy 2012) had become rigging as the ‘done thing’, detached from any worry about reputation. Internal distrust and trust inherent in the anxiety of higher competition co-existed with interbank cooperation. Openings for ‘foreign banks’ gave potentials to exploit different national rules, to change locations quickly and to become more detached from any national public sphere. Emotion-rules of opportunism/cheating are ‘normal’. These are general Ponzis, not outright Ponzis that are always exposed when a boom collapses, such as the Bernie Madoff scheme (‘Made-off’ with the money). The difference is not on whether the world is trawled for the gullible, but whether there is a dubious scheme bought continuously or no scheme at all.

Betrayal and distrust between banks were recounted at the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission hearings (FCIC 2011). One issue was whether the ‘unwillingness of counterparties and creditors to deal with Bear Stearns’ created its downfall. Executives of Bear Stearns (not a bank) accused banks and hedge funds of ‘ganging up’; that rumours and conspiracies had turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. According to a Financial Times journalist attending the proceedings, FCIC commissioners became ‘irritated’: Republican-appointed vice-chair asked: ‘How could you folks, as sophisticated as you were, with the models that everyone felt comfortable with, believe you were the victim . . . of unsubstantiated rumours, fears and innuendo – that your colleagues did you in?’ In addition, Bear executives and the CEOs of Lehman (Dick Fuld), Citigroup (Chuck Prince) and others blamed their problems on an ‘unforeseeable market shock’.

Competition and cooperation are sources of mixed emotions, then, with conflicting cognitive rules and Mafia-like revenge enacted on the disloyal. Yet, while uncertainty is more acute in finance than for most economic sectors, nothing was ‘rational’ or emotionally cautious about this extraordinary build-up of credit. Traditional financiers were appalled about it for years. The FCIC (2011) devotes an entire chapter to the extent of veteran bankers’ warnings about activities reported that authorities contemplated ‘dawn raids’ in July 2011 (Masters 2011; Masters et al. 2011).

The FCIC graph shows the spread between the Libor one-month and the overnight index swap rate. It shows smaller spikes on the second half of 2007, before Lehman, as does Haldane or Lex just on Libor.

‘before our very eyes’, as did informed sceptics (in Pixley 2004); but these stand in contrast to claims of a ‘wholly unanticipated’ ‘hurricane’ as heard from Warren Buffet, Lloyd Blankfein and others. Impersonal distrust of competitors, fear of losing to competitors (and hence copycat, often predatory behaviour), metaphoric knee-capping and impersonal drives to power, or cultivated arrogance all drove this race. These emotions are the motivators in the absence of cooperative international political agreements. For the latter, many incumbent bank executives would need to go, some should go to jail.

**MONEY AND EMOTIONS**

Norms and emotion-rules about money are not changing despite the proven failures of the pro-market experiment of the past forty years. The U.S.-UK finance sectors resist and even attack their saviours (states). Policy makers, according to evidence put to the FCIC (2011: 170–174), long ago accepted the notion that ‘markets will always self-correct’. Regulators from the Fed through to Basel II of 2004, also had an ‘infatuation’ (according to a Fed official) with the accuracy of banks’ internal risk models. A ‘light touch’ let any bank do anything it wanted in the UK; Germany and France followed long after the Swiss.

Orthodox policies assume Rational Economic Man (REM). Market decisions, it is claimed, give ‘information’ and the future can be accessed with risk models. This fantasy of a ‘sure thing’ can tempt banks to rig the market. Emotions are allegedly serpents that create the crises externally, to REM models. That is to say, emotions are not endogenous to the sector or built into the models. Firms only improve on REM because they act with superior ‘opportunism’ and ‘guile’ to the opportunistic individual (e.g., according to Oliver Williamson 1993): trust is a waffl y addition. Williamson’s vision proposes betrayal. This is because interbank connections, cooperation and lobbying rest on trust; money rests on trust.

What the U.S.-UK credit crisis showed, above all of the financial crises since 1970, is that Wall Street and the City of London actively and lucratively evaded social-political settlements of cooperation with the public via democratically appointed government authorities and elected officials. This is *way over the heads of these bankers* who are now cast as a greedy oligarchy (e.g., Johnson and Kwak 2011: 189–213). But executives are merely replaceable officials. Their standard operating procedures are glamorous Darth Vader-type personas. (Evil is good!) Berle and Means (1932) raised an important issue in the 1930s that is still not answered: If there is no obvious owner (principal) of a firm, as there is not where no sole or family owner exists (Bell 1976) – there is no longer a line of responsibility of agents.

What would be the line of responsibility of banks that are patently un-owned? Their money production on Ponzis had no potential that this money could be
trustworthy. It is no wonder publics across the world are angry but confused as to whom to blame. Many democracies have dissembled to populations, in fear of capital strikes and downgrades on their debts.

To what extent is this best understood by emotions? From my research, interviewing about 200 senior financiers and central bankers since the 1990s (my ‘informed sceptics’) and citing U.S. Federal Reserve transcripts of meetings, I feel that I have proved that emotions in this fraught world are impersonal and tied to corporate cognitive rules (Pixley 2004, 2010). The previous section gave a fraction of the detail about the current social relations between financial firms and big centres, showing which emotions move this sector. Emotions towards the future motivate action in the present (this tautology bears repetition). If one does not understand money – and few do (Pixley 2007) – one comes to the wrong conclusions.

To accuse Wall Street or the City of London of greed is not an explanation. I accede that shareholder value imposed a distrust strategy on publicly listed banks and others. CEO-agents were alleged to behave ‘better’ because market evaluation of ‘success’ is measured in money: With no bank ‘owners’ in the English-speaking world, executives had to get more profits for shareowner ‘value’ any way possible, and they used this fantastic money-creating exercise (as excuse) both to reneging on the meaning of public bank licenses and routine central bank support and also to help themselves (yes, obscenely). If real owners in the past were liable for failures and had a longer anxious view of company survival (Pollard 1965), shareowner value is not the answer and never was. Basically no one is responsible for insolvency.

A bank does not feel anything; sophisticated, wealthy banks and their retinues are driven by remits, which are embedded with specific emotions in institutional forms. Freedom from financial ‘repression’ and shareholder value destroyed bank prudence and special purposes to industry, services and general economic activity. Exceptions like Canada require parliamentary scrutiny of bank charters every five years.

With respect to uncertainty, some sociologists do not see trust as an emotion, others do. Susan Shapiro (1987) argues that impersonal trust aims for future social control, and cites credit rating agencies and accountancy firms as no different to personal trust or legal judgements, in their remit of providing the users of their ‘distrust assessments’ a form of social control. Niklas Luhmann (1988) insists that trust is a modern, even capitalist emotion, in contrast to community social control and Fortuna, whereas trust is seen as necessary for gain that is uncertain (a leap of faith), or trust is a means to ‘divorce fate from destiny’ (Bauman 2000: 210). To

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15 U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings are taped; transcripts are released free to the public after five years. This, I submit, is our best data on board meetings so far. We do not have this openness from the private sector, and other central banks resist it. The U.S. Fed was only forced to do so after Congress discovered that the FOMC taped the full meetings. Pick any meeting you want from www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/#calendars.
Luhmann (1979), trust arises from the lack of contrary evidence, but he talks about ‘system trust’ which is too abstract.

Mabel Berezin (2009: 337) instead suggests that trust is only a ‘perception’ and not an emotion. Yet she cites collective phenomena – of enthusiasm, indignation or pity, which Durkheim called ‘social currents’, whose ‘pressure’ is only known if it is resisted: then ‘the emotions he denies will turn against him’ (Durkheim in Berezin, 2009: 337). To Berezin, however, trust is a cognitive act, not an emotion (2009: 340).

Yet it could be said that when trust is betrayed (‘resisted’), emotions of anger and lawsuits against the betrayer show impersonal trust as a ‘low-level’ emotion that is ‘hot’ only in its opposite: betrayal. Some authors cited here make distinctions between faith, trust and confidence. My version of this continuum is as follows. These are all emotions to the unknowable and are usually rational. Faith is the most strongly felt and, although evidence cannot apply, faith is not thereby rendered irrational as god may or may not exist. Trust is more ‘brittle’ as some argue (notably in finance, see Froud et al. 2012), and any contrary evidence, betrayal, is treated with great bitterness and vengeance: trust acknowledges the freedom of others (e.g., corporations), which is not possible or on offer with faith. Confidence is the most ‘evidence based’, the least prone to giving any motive to act, as we saw with ‘mixed signals’. I would class neoclassical economics as a faith-based belief (except, because we have evidence of the market, not of god, the former is irrational). Trust is less directly felt, perceived or defended than faith, and yet its betrayal is entirely self-evident. No one with the faith accuses the sainted market of betrayal, blame is always cast elsewhere. God is never accused of disloyalty; instead, despair or cognitive dissonance applies. In contrast, banks ‘kneecapped’ Bear Stearns for betrayal of trust. I do not see confidence as non-emotional or less emotional either. It is just less ‘hot’ either way: financiers all discuss ‘consulting one’s gut feelings’, one’s nervous flutters and anxiety.

Additionally, trust in money is also based on the ceteris paribus (extrapolation) rule: in today’s finance, this is the legal fallback excuse. This trust combines rational searches of past events in a suspicious mode, and failure becomes the buyers’ fault, under caveat emptor, or ‘buyer beware’. A ‘lack of contrary evidence’ – a trust or vague confidence – is extrapolated into the future. It is a backward-looking trust decision taken via emotion-rules of anxiety and distrust (e.g., deploying the credit-raters), and ceteris paribus is the escape clause (in the ‘fine print’) to let financial firms off the hook from their marketed ‘predictions’ (Pixley 2009, 2010, 2012).

The international anger when a money producing ‘technique’ disintegrates into broken promises and betrayals is widely evident (or was, because memories are short). One final example is pertinent. GS&CO mastered the ‘art’ of selling to and shorting its clients; and is known for giving favoured clients a ‘sure thing’, as shown in the U.S. SEC legal case against GS&CO (SEC 2010). Settled out of court for a minimal fine, Goldman was paid a fee in early 2007 to rig a subprime ‘product’
to be bound to fail, so that a hedge fund (John Paulson & Co.) could short it (the ‘sure thing’). GS&CO claimed its buyers were ‘sophisticated investors’ – that is, caveat emptor applied to buyers from ABN Amro, Dusseldorf, Sydney councils and others. GS&CO hired a third party (ACA) with experience in analysing credit risk in ‘subprime’ mortgages, to give it an aura of ‘due diligence’. The SEC alleged that ‘Goldman Sachs misled investors by representing that ACA selected the portfolio without disclosing Paulson’s significant role’ in handpicking the securities (SEC 2010: 11). The SEC fined JPMorgan in 2011 for a similar deceit (neither denied or confirmed).

Both Carl Levin, chair of the Senate inquiry, and Phil Angelides, chair of the FCIC, as well as other committee members, questioned at length the executives of GS&CO, including CEO Lloyd Blankfein on fiduciary duties. The clash in ethical principles and corresponding emotion-rules is stark in these public exchanges, some transcribed (see in Pixley 2012). On the one hand was banks’ duty of care to clients, their own published claims that they ‘serve their clients’ (which were totally contradicted); on the other hand were Blankfein and other executives’ defence of the firm’s role as a ‘market-maker’, where banks like Goldman bring together buyers and sellers of a security. The fact that it created these securities designed to lose their clients’ money, ‘aggressively’ solicited clients to buy, and also bet against them, was ethically indefensible to both inquiries. Anger is obvious (Levin Report 2011: 602–605; FCIC 2011: 142–146). This example shows that impersonal emotion-rules are prescribed for officials, and the particular rules depend heavily, but not only, on the type of institutional office (Everett Hughes 1937). There are brave whistle-blowers in banks whose ethics give rise to cognitive dissonance: anger to motivate their public revelation. Conversely, insiders whose ‘ethics’ are aligned with banks (Levin 2011) intimidated and sacked the cautious.

All these social interactions between different organisations are largely based on uncertainties. Is that private equity firm telling the truth? Is this entrepreneurial proposal honest and worthy of success? Deception now seems a sectoral norm, but can result from how anxieties are institutional, say in the raison d’etre of credit raters. Emotions from competition motivate the grasping at straws, like forcing ‘predictions’

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16 The Levin Senate Inquiry was a cross party report with no dissenters. The FCIC was appointed by Congress: six approved the report and four dissented. In their minority reports, three dissenters wanted more stress on ‘global capital flows’ from China and others as another cause (2011: 416–420), although they highlight the ‘impersuasive’ nature of bank CEO responses that cited ‘un-named’ rumour mongers alleged to cause a liquidity run (p. 429). The separate fourth dissenter opposed the assumptions of the FCIC and the three dissenters about China, and said it did not investigate fully the possible causes of the crisis, and instead gave a ‘just so story about the crisis’ (FCIC 2011: 444; this dissenter’s emphasis).
from the rated, such as property prices would never fall and the unemployed could service their mortgages.

COMPETITION BETWEEN NATION-STATES AND ‘CITY-STATES’

Responsibility lines that might restore impersonal trust in money look distant. As early as 2011, the depressing fact was that G20 states were unable to agree on a new social settlement; in 2014 they meekly called for ‘growth’. Cooperation among a far wider group of countries in the new G20 was cause for public hope (under former UK Prime Minister Brown’s instigation), but few countries could agree to temper the financial sector’s evasion of nation-state rules.

The United States blamed China at early G20 meetings. Canada and Australia were only too smug about their own bank rules (allegedly saving them from the City of London and Wall Street misdemeanours).\(^\text{17}\) The U.S. ‘Volcker rule’ was to return to Glass-Steagall rules and so to separate investment firms from ‘Main Street’ retail banking. To Europe, that would ruin the old universal ‘relationship banking’. According to Jacques de Larosière then president of Eurofi (2011), in contrast to the U.S. and UK, many big ‘universal’ banks in Europe keep their loans on their balance sheets and ‘do little in terms of securitisation’. That was before we found out about French and German banks (Admati and Hellwig 2013).

As well, divisions within the G20 arose on how to control the multiplicity of money funds – another source of fear, rivalry and crying for international agreement. New rules might come, ironically, from Wall Street. In 2011, the big banks made furious objections (lobbying) that new U.S. rules would not be applied to ‘money management’. Hedge funds, buy-out groups, commodity trading companies, clearing houses and money market funds had, at that time, combined assets exceeding those of licensed banks. It took one money market fund over-exposed at the Lehman bankruptcy – not factored in because few knew – to threaten the world’s payments system in 2008 (Guerrera 2011: 19; Johnson and Kwak 2011: 84, 162–163). It was called the Reserve Primary Fund, and in March 2006 it stated it had ‘underperformed its rivals’ owing to its ‘conservative and risk averse’ approach. Thereupon, it invested in short-term debt up to 2008, and grew enormously but, ‘flooded with redemption requests’ on Lehman’s bankruptcy; its custodian bank stopped its overdraft (FCIC 2011: 356–357). The entire global wholesale money market suffered a run on ‘banks’ by ‘banks’.

\(^{17}\) In Australia’s case, there are four regulated ‘pillar’ banks, yet they borrowed heavily, for the short term, on the wholesale international money markets. The Commonwealth had to guarantee all deposits without limit to stop any run. In 2011 they were back to mortgage loans requiring a mere 5 per cent equity.
Emotions in the International Financial Sector

The story remains familiar. After the crisis, U.S. Forex trading firms tried to destroy first the Euro during 2010 and then the Japanese yen in 2011 (the earthquake). Whether they are in a ‘conspiracy’ to play off nation-states (Weber 1981), is doubtful. Banks had lent copiously for a long time – mainly the Wall Street, London, also Frankfurt and Paris banks. Was that ‘rational’ or prudent in the case of Greece? After the credit crisis, banks looked for any openings for profit. But this has been ever more counterproductive. The collective fears among banks became greater, the more that they put sovereign governments under unsustainable interest rates. There is a European Central Bank that is stateless without a democratically elected European treasury, and a set of separate ‘sovereign’ states tied by one currency.

The UK and U.S. sovereign debts are more clear-cut than the EU. The U.S. dollar is now a shaky anchor to money’s world value as the high-powered money par excellence. State-money is created through debt (still a mere 3 per cent of the ‘broad’ money we use), but it is very different to private banking debt (97 per cent of this ‘broad money’). Typically, a central bank lends to its government, and a government treasury also borrows from creditors by selling bonds. But governments – unlike private bank credit – are always creditworthy provided they can foster economic activity to raise taxes: they do not logically need banks to destroy activity. The coercive powers of states to tax are very different from defaults by businesses and households which threaten private banks’ balance sheets. And the U.S. dollar is based still on the world’s largest economic and political power. Ingham suggests that only the Fed could call the bond vigilantes’ bluff (2013: 314–315). The logic of dubious bank loans that should never be made, on ‘scalping’ of buy/sell orders through high frequency trading, and on betting against nations’ debts, leads to further economic decline, further debt service collapse and the destruction of banks themselves. There is now a world asset bubble at last criticised by a central bank, Governor Rajan, of the Bank of India (Mallet 2014). Banks seem unable to stop themselves.

CONCLUSION

Between nations and between banks, the specific emotions and values in evidence today about money are unsettling and contradictory. The promise of money and the moral indignation and anger at the violation of trust might motivate, at an international level, a social agreement to render money more trustworthy, less abused and not treated with disdain. If anger drives more distrust, however, global tensions might become unbearable.

Intense competition between financial institutions encourages strategies driven by emotions that are calamitous in banking and stewardship of one of the world’s most fragile institutions, money. Cognitive and ethical rules that build caution, trust and prudence – different emotion rules – into long-term strategies for the recurring
patterns, not for relentless daily events, acknowledge that uncertainty can never be ‘beaten’. Apart from checking the past, the only possible ways to face the unknowable future are through anticipatory emotions and, ideally, democratic values to shape at least some general, honest and public forms of global cooperation.

REFERENCES


Emotions in the International Financial Sector


Exploring the Nexus of Emotions/Passions, Values and Rights in International Affairs

Jean-Marc Coicaud

This chapter is a study of the role of emotions and passions in international affairs in connection with values and rights. What makes this type of approach imperative, and possible, is that international relations have a social character. Indeed, the mere fact that they entail interactions among actors makes them social. It is also what makes them a hybrid of emotions, passions, values, norms, and power, which is an integral part of the framing and handling of rights, and of the sense of right and wrong in international relations. To explore this social dimension of international politics and what this means in relation to emotions and passions, the chapter is organized in four parts.

Part I indicates that the identity of actors in international life is a social construction, produced in a significant way by the interactions among actors. This identity engineering is as much about how a given actor perceives others and is perceived by others as it is about how a given actor sees itself, including its past, present, and future. In the process, the chapter shows that the social dimension contributing to the construction of the identity and actions of actors is made of both material (including power and interest) and psychological (emotions and passions) elements. Part II argues that the sense of right and wrong is a characteristic of the social dimension of international reality. It demonstrates this in part by highlighting the intricate relationship between the nature and dynamics of rights, which is associated with a sense of right and wrong, and that of emotions and passions. This is in part how emotions and passions turn out to be positive or negative. This shows that emotions and passions, in their interaction with the expectations, needs, and rights of actors, constitute a key factor of change in international politics. Part III

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refers to the contextual aspect of emotions and passions, as they vary across time and cultures, and how, internationally (as well as nationally) they play a power marker function and are at the center of the struggles for rights and the sense of right and wrong. Finally, Part IV ends the chapter by referring to pending issues concerning the study of emotions and passions in international politics.

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Once one is willing to recognize that the psychology of emotions and passions has a role in international affairs and that this role is not exclusively negative or an element of irrationality, there are various manners of accounting for this role. This section begins by alluding to some of the traditional ways to address it. It then shows that the social dimension of international relations cannot be understood without factoring in emotions and passions.

Traditional Accounts of Psychology, Emotions, and Passions in International Politics

One of the traditional ways of accounting for psychology, emotions, and passions in international politics has been to examine the impact that leaders have in international life. Fueled by the fact that politics, international as well as national, is partly shaped by people in commanding positions, this type of approach has been quite popular. For instance, it has focused on the modalities of exercise and influence of leadership in foreign policy, especially in the context of great power politics. More recently, this has also led to trying to analyze in a rigorous fashion the processes of deliberation, negotiation, and decision-making by people in positions of leadership.¹

Another approach called on to tackle the psychological character of international relations has been to analyze the use of emotions and passions for political purposes, either to achieve or to maintain power. In this regard, rhetoric has traditionally been viewed as a useful tool to mobilize, and at times manipulate, the psychology, emotions, and passions of people whose support is needed. This is already mentioned by Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War.² As such, rhetoric has been


one of the ways through which language in general, and what it conveys and allows to be conveyed in terms of images and signs, is supposed to reveal and project the significance of psychology, emotions, and passions in international politics and call on them to pursue a power agenda.

These kinds of approaches and studies are of course very helpful. But there is more than this to psychology, emotions, and passions in international affairs. It is equally important to analyze them in connection with collective actors, in particular states and countries, and their relations. That said, this is a challenging task.

First, there have been a number of problematic precedents. What has been labeled “the psychology of peoples” is a case in point. Its tendencies, both essentialist (implying that each group of people has more or less permanent features) and racist (treating for example non-Western peoples as inferior), are certainly not a path to follow.  

Moreover, to understand collective actors in terms of psychology, emotions, and passions amounts to anthropomorphizing them. It amounts to acknowledging that, as Alexander Wendt puts it, “states are people too.” And, indeed, although most scholars and decision-makers routinely refer to collective actors such as states and countries as having quasi-human qualities, such as identity, intentionality, rationality, interest, and more generally, a sense of self, as suggested by the realist assumption that states are self-interested, this can be questionable. After all, there are differences between an individual and a collective actor, which hint at the limits of anthropomorphizing the latter. One of these differences is that collective actors

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5 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 194.

6 Ibid., p. 221.
are less unitary agents than individual agents. This can make it a difficult task to attribute intentionality and feelings to collective actors. Also, they are not reducible to the individuals of which their groups are made. For example, their life expectancy tends to be much longer than that of a human being. This is in part why the idea and representation of states and countries, to which citizens link their identity (making them members of a “we” community) transcend individual persons. In addition, collective actors have their own decision structures that institutionalize collective action. This institutionalized collective action can make possible and authorize means that amplify their capability of organizations, implying that an individual’s actions (for instance that of a soldier in a war situation) are prone to be not only that of the individual, but acting in a larger capacity as part of the actions of the collective.

However, the differences between an individual and a collective actor do not eliminate the fact that the former (the individual) gives to the latter (the collective actor) a human dimension that is key. It is through and in connection with individuals and the human dimension associated with them that collective actors exist and that their narrative concerning their identity, history, values, relations with others, and – ultimately – their sense of worth are created, experienced, and have meaning.

Consequently, provided that we do so by being mindful of and factoring in the specificity of the human characteristics of collective (political) actors, it is possible to show that psychology, emotions, and passions have a crucial function in the “structuration” of international life and its evolution. As we are about to see, the social character of international relations, of how collective actors in international politics are constructed by interactions with one another – and including by the psychology, emotions, and passions that go with it – helps understand this.

**Exploring the Social Character of International Relations**

There is a certain amount of self-definition in the identity of actors in international affairs. For example, the notion of “self” present in a given country is based on the dialogue that over the course of its history this country has developed with itself about itself. Blending, among other things, facts and representations (without being necessarily primarily concerned with full accuracy and disclosure), this dialogue

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8 The distinction between representations and facts is used for the sake of simplicity. To some extent, there is no clear-cut delineation between the two notions. Representations can be made of facts, and facts of representations. See Hilary Putnam, *Realism with a Human Face* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, edited by James Conant, 1992), chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11.

9 On the nature and politics of dialogic memory and its manipulations, both conscious and unconscious, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread*
with itself about itself expresses and celebrates the experience of community and singularity at the core of the identity of the country. Furthermore, it is through this dialogue that the country sees its past, inhabits its present, and envisions its future. This also entails how it relates to other international actors and the environment in general.

Yet, the dialogue with oneself, important as it is, is not the product and the mark of an entirely self-contained and self-produced identity. It neither embodies the whole identity of the country nor is the sole source or cause from which the country’s identity is derived. To a large extent this dialogue and the national identity of which it is part and expresses and projects internally and externally are social. They very much result from how the country has interacted, and continues to interact, within the evolving international environment and the actors in it, including other countries. In essence, interactions significantly shape the identity of an actor, as well as how it acts and interacts with other actors.

Needless to say, stressing the social dimension of international politics is not a novelty. After all, the various schools of international relations have always referred to this dimension. Where and how they differ concerns the conception that they have of this social dimension and what this means for relations among actors, to begin with state-actors. For example, realism and its diverse strands view this social dimension essentially in terms of tension, if not conflict. Another international relations approach, the rational choice approach, focuses on the cost-benefits calculations that come with the atmosphere of competition of international life. As for constructivism, as its name indicates, it emphasizes the constructed character of the social dimension of international relations. In this regard, while constructivists have had the tendency to initially concentrate on the socially constructed mechanisms of cognition in international politics, in recent years they have begun to explore the emotive (emotions and passions) aspects of the social dimension of international relations. Incidentally, this last development echoes the fact that international
relations academic research in general is now paying more attention to emotions and passions in international affairs.¹³ This existing recognition of the social dimension of international relations, for all the analytical qualities that it entails, is nevertheless not enough. It does not provide a full understanding of the social dimension of international affairs. More research needs to be done in this area. This is especially the case when it comes to the role that emotions and passions play in connection with values and the sense of right and wrong – the focus of this chapter.

In this perspective, to push further the thinking on the matter, it is useful to begin by showing that the social, or interactive, dimension that enters into the fabric of the identity and actions of actors in international politics has three characteristics.

First, international politics takes place in an environment that is never totally blank or devoid of contextual factors. It always has a level of definition or determination, made of possibilities and constraints. In this context, considering the continuum that history is, each action of an actor can be viewed as a reaction to a previous situation, and, in turn, each reaction as a new action, with this succession

generating more possibilities and constraints down the line.\(^4\) Now, ideally, in this chain of actions and reactions an actor in international relations, as in other types of social life, prefers more to benefit from possibilities and opportunities than to be constrained. In other words, if an actor does not already enjoy a sense of the possible, it is only natural that it will try to achieve it or at least mitigate as much as possible experiencing limitations.

Second, the shaping of the identity and actions/reactions of actors by the interactive process is twofold. It contributes to building the content and modalities of existence of the internal identity of the actor and of the actions/reactions associated with it. Moreover, it helps to draw the line of demarcation, in terms of identity and actions, between the internal and the external, or between the inside and the outside, as is the case with the identity of a collectivity distinct from others. In this regard, the nature of the demarcation between actors and the relations affiliated with it vary with the identity of the actors involved. For instance, it will not be the same if the interactions happen between city-states (poleis) in classical Greece, or between the papacy, an empire, a corporation, and a principality in the Middle Ages, or between modern nation-states in the Westphalian international order.\(^5\)

Third, the construction and the composition of the identity and actions of actors are not set forever. They change over time, in particular with transformations in the distribution of power within (nationally) and among (internationally) actors.

**The Material and Psychological Elements of International Affairs**

But there is more to say about this interactive, social process that contributes to defining the identity and actions of actors in international politics. The fact that it is comprised of material and psychological elements needs to be underlined as well. The material elements are about how actors relate to one another from a distribution-of-power standpoint, and how they conceive of and pursue their respective interests in this context. When dealing with state-actors, this entails economic, political, military, and cultural considerations. The psychological aspects of the social process include how emotions and passions accompany the material elements. And here is the key point to have in mind: material and psychological/
emotional aspects are mutually constitutive in international relations (as they are in other social settings).

Material and psychological/emotional aspects as mutually constitutive. The relationships between emotions and passions on the one hand, and material aspects on the other hand, are not all of the same kind – one in which material considerations would be by definition in a commanding position. This is explained by the characteristics of emotions and passions and their relations, including how they simultaneously overlap and differ. If emotions give to passions their emotive content, if passions are built and developed on the basis of emotions, passions have also “activist” features geared toward making them especially important in a social and political context. ¹⁶

This helps understand that it is not as if emotions and passions always follow or echo material elements in a dependent or passive fashion, such as is the case when a disparity of power among two actors in competition can create confidence in the stronger and a sense of insecurity in the weaker. The focus on the dependency of emotions and passions vis-à-vis material considerations may have been part of a traditional approach, in phase with the assumed primacy attributed to materiality and interests. But emotions and passions can also have an active role in shaping the material dimension. For example, emotions and passions connected with drive can bring about the improvement of an actor’s material situation; on the contrary, emotions and passions associated with apathy can facilitate the degradation of one’s material predicament. Hence (and this is a point we go back to and stress later in the chapter), material and psychological considerations, with the possibility, according to the environment, of being both a producer/cause and an effect, are equally significant.

This is all the more the case because, in the reality of the social dimension of international life, material and psychological levels are not fully separated (although for reasons of analytical clarity we distinguish them here). They do not take place without one another. Instead, they work hand-in-hand. The material character of the social dimension of international affairs is not material without also incorporating psychological aspects (including emotions and passions). Conversely, the psychological character of international relations is not psychological without being material as well. Ultimately, they are not simply intertwined. They are mutually constitutive. This should not come as a surprise. Actors in international politics, as in any form of social setting, are prone to deliberate, feel, decide, and act by keeping sight in one way or another of the objective of achieving the best conditions possible

¹⁶ For a more detailed analysis of emotions and passions and of how, at the same time, they overlap and differ, refer in this volume to Jean-Marc Coicaud, “The Question of Emotions and Passions in Mainstream International Relations, and Beyond.”
for the regulation of their life.\textsuperscript{17} And it is a process that is based on the combination of the material and psychological, cognitive, and emotional elements that enter into the fabric of their identity and how they relate to others and the context.

The hybrid character of the social dimension of international relations, of the identity and actions of actors, made of material and psychological aspects, is deepened by the fact that it is not in play exclusively in times of effective interactions. Far from starting and stopping with real interactions, the hybrid character of the social dimension of international relations is more or less constantly activated or switched on, so to speak. This is the case because in social life – international as well as national – actors cannot exist or act while ignoring others. Others tend to be continuously part of the equation. In this perspective, and now perhaps more than ever, actors live under the scrutiny of others, perhaps even \textit{in the eyes of others}, in a state of “specularity,” of what could be called “existential reflection.” More often than not, this makes the assessment and vision of oneself and others quasi-inseparable from others’ assessment and vision. Much of the material and psychological, including emotional, pressure experienced by actors in the international realm, which can be, as is seen later in the chapter, positive or negative, is an integral part of this configuration.

\textbf{FROM THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGHT AND WRONG}

Is this all there is to the social dimension of international affairs and its connection with emotions and passions? The answer is “no.” The construction of the identity and actions of actors, with their material and psychological components, presupposes and factors in another layer. This layer has to do with rights, and the sense of right and wrong. That rights and the sense of right and wrong are an important characteristic of the social dimension of international reality is normal considering that when actors interact, they are prone to reflect on what they view as being fair, which includes a sensibility and a culture of rights and a sense of right and wrong.

This is to say that short of taking into account this sensibility and culture of rights and sense of right and wrong, it is difficult to fully understand and describe how actors perceive themselves and others, or how they interact with others and their environment. More to the point, short of doing this, it is also not possible to elucidate the meaning and role of emotions and passions in international politics. This is the case because at the international level, like at the national level, there is an intricate relationship between the nature and dynamics of rights and sense of

right and wrong, and that of emotions and passions. This is what is examined in this section by showing that emotions and passions are in international life, as in national life, deeply connected in three major ways with the idea that actors have rights and the sense of right and wrong that goes with it. Of course, these three major ways are not all there is to the relationship between emotions, passions, sense of right and wrong, and rights. But they are significant if not key components of it.

First, the emotions and passions of actors can be an effect, that is a response to or a result of whether their sense of right and wrong, and rights are respected or not, and the extent to which this is the case. This leads actors to experience, in emotional terms, a palpable sense of good and bad. The fact that emotions and passions are an integral part of the regulation of actors’ lives and the needs associated with them helps us understand this point.

Second, the emotions and passions of actors can be producers of rights and catalysts for the sense of right and wrong as well. This is the case because emotions and passions, and the actors’ needs they express, are central to the construction, including the pursuit, formulation, and implementation of rights and of the sense of right and wrong. These are engineered in a significant way by emotions and passions with the aim of each actor to be able to sustain itself or, in the words of the philosopher Spinoza, “to persevere in its being.”

Third, this double aspect of the relationship between emotions and passions on the one hand, and rights and sense of right and wrong on the other hand, is a key characteristic of change in international politics. Social change, as far as it is influenced by actors, becomes a possibility when reality is no longer perceived as satisfactory and is consequently considered to be in need of being transformed. At the heart of this sentiment of discontent is a bundle of emotions and passions amounting to the overall feeling that the notions of rights and of what is right and wrong with which actors identify, are at odds with what reality should be, introducing therefore a call for adjustment. Each of these three points is now examined in greater detail.

Emotions and Passions as Effects of Rights

Emotions and passions can be the result of whether or not the rights of actors, and the sense of right and wrong associated with them, are realized and of the extent to which this is the case. This is the first way in which rights/sense of right and wrong are connected with emotions/passions. The analysis of the links that exist, at the

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19 This of course is not all there is to social change.
most general level, between needs, values, rights, the sense of right and wrong, and the emotions and passions of actors clarifies this state of affairs.

**Needs, values, emotions, and passions.** In this regard, one has to begin with the idea that the existence of actors depends on a number of needs and values, of valued needs and their level of satisfaction. Short of having the valued needs taken into account and reasonably realized, the well-being of actors, if not their lives altogether, can be placed at risk. Against this background, it is useful to distinguish two types of valued needs, keeping in mind that in social reality they can be imbricated to some extent.

First, there are needs that are more valued, more fundamental than others, from a basic or physical standpoint. To simplify, we could say here that a need creates a value. For instance, for individual actors, it can be food and shelter. For collective actors, such as a state, it can be security. It is on the basis of these needs of actors that rights are prone to emerge, along with the sense of right and wrong. This is how the needs deemed important, if not essential for the conditions of possibility of the existence of actors are particularly valued and apt to be turned into rights, and become a benchmark of right and wrong. This is also how they can become the basis for outlining what the realization of rights, and sense of right and wrong, requires. Today, for example, international treaties of human rights indicate which essential needs must be acknowledged and protected as rights of individuals in the economic, political, social, and other sectors. And it is in this context that emotions and passions can result from whether or not the needs of actors, and especially needs turned rights, are satisfied (and to what extent), and that these emotions and passions can have a positive or a negative character.

Second, there are the needs that arise from the values (cultural, social, economic, and so on) of a given environment. In this perspective, social, cultural, and other values create needs for the actor, which it is difficult to ignore or underestimate. Indeed, while such needs may not be necessarily as primary and basic as physical needs, they are also essential in the sense that the existence of actors can to a large extent depend on them. This is the case considering that the needs deriving from

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20 This does not imply that the path from needs to rights is simple and straightforward. For example, for actors to be seen as having rights, and for them to be the pillars around which the sense of right and wrong is built, they first have to be viewed as legitimate actors (i.e., right-holders). This is not an easy task. Over the course of history, the question of which actors have rights as been as much, if not more, a matter of debates and struggles as the question of which rights the right-holders have. For more on this in the international context, see Jean-Marc Coicaud, “Deconstructing International Legitimacy,” in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud, Fault Lines of International Legitimacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 36–47. In addition, the less a need appears to be a basic universal need, for instance for reasons of cultural differences or disparity of levels of development among societies, the more there is an inclination to contest the possibility that it could become a universal right.
social, cultural, and other values express and project the importance of social validation. It is in relation with them that the value of actors and their existence are assessed and ranked (status) in a social context. Not surprisingly, these social needs and values, with the extent to which they are fulfilled or not, with the extent to which they can be accessed or not, cannot be understood independently from the emotions and passions, negative and positive, that come with them. In the context of the political psychology of democracy, Tocqueville has shown, for instance, how the culture of equality, with its values and rights, can create a (partly contradictory) variety of positive (drive, individualism, empathy, solidarity, and so on) and negative (envy, jealousy, and others) values/emotions/passions.

Positive and negative emotions and passions as effects of rights. Building on these remarks, let us examine emotions and passions as effects of rights, in both their negative and positive dimensions. In this regard, to start with, a few words of clarification are needed on the nature of the distinction between negative and positive emotions and passions.

The nature of this important distinction happens to be somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, the distinction is necessary because negative and positive emotions and passions are clearly different emotional experiences. They refer to distinct emotional content and, at times, outcomes. As such, from an analytical standpoint, distinguishing them helps to introduce a level of definitional precision. This is much needed considering how challenging it is to understand emotions. On the other hand, this should not lead to having a too-rigid and clear-cut conception of the distinction between negative and positive emotions and passions. In particular, the distinction does not mean that there is always an absolute separation between the negative and the positive when it comes to emotions and passions. They can be intertwined. They can blend. For instance, a negative emotion, such as frustration, is not negative without being inhabited as well by the feeling that reality should and could be different (hope and expectations).

- When it comes to emotions and passions that are effects of rights and are considered positive, their positive emotional content is linked with a sense of satisfaction. This is the case because they bring about a pleasant feeling, which itself is related to the realization of a need, possibly of a need elevated into a right.

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We should however add here an important point, that this should never mean that a feeling of satisfaction by definition gives a positive nature or character to an emotion and passion. After all, some people find happiness and joy in destroying others. When this happens, the happiness and joy experienced by an actor out of bringing down, if not destroying others is itself based on the existence, in this actor, of deep seated negative emotions and passions, frustrations and a sense of alienation, to a point that can be pathological. This phenomenon can be at work both at the individual and collective levels. It can also be a crucial aspect and engine of social and political change. It is as such that it has been one of the key features of the ideologies of resentment that have flourished in the twentieth century and of the destructive transformations they have brought about.

- This brings us to negative emotions and passions, the negative emotional contents (geared toward more negativity), as effects of a need-right. In this regard, it can be argued that negative emotions and passions as effects of rights are an experience of pain and are prone to be the outcome of the non-realization of what actors feel are their needs and rights. Take for instance the case of a country that is attacked by another and is involved in an existential war where its fate is at stake. For this country, winning is a need and a right. So think about the grief that is destined to be experienced after being defeated. This means that the experience of actors is likely to be as follows: the greater the fulfillment of the need-right, the greater the positive emotional experience; and the lesser the fulfillment, the greater the negative emotional experience.

We should add here that because the aspirations and expectations of actors have a tendency to increase with the gradual satisfaction of their needs and rights, the satisfaction of needs and rights does not necessarily bring about a positive emotional reaction or experience. For example, a level of realization of needs and rights that would have been perceived as reasonable and a source of positive emotions and passions before can now become viewed as not enough. In these circumstances, rather than encountering satisfaction, this can generate disappointment and frustration, if not all-out resentment. Aspects of the individual and collective dynamics of emotions and passions of developed countries, related for instance to disenchantment, can be in part an expression of this state of affairs.

*Emotions, passions, and oneself and others’ needs and rights.* Emotions and passions, positive and negative, as effects of the extent to which the needs-rights of actors are realized especially apply to how actors relate to what happens to them. This is normal considering that any kind of experience an actor goes through tends to be felt and assessed on the basis of what it signifies for its life, including its life regulation. This is all the more the case considering that this is experienced through the actor’s system of perception.
But this does not mean that emotions and passions are exclusively self-centered (that is, only about oneself). They are also social in the sense that they can extend to and be produced by what affects others, particularly how others’ needs and rights are either realized or left unfulfilled.

In this regard, the manner in which an actor reacts emotionally to the fate of others is largely based on how it identifies with them. The emotional identification with others can be so intense that it leads to selfless acts. In life or death situations, an actor can – for example – sacrifice its interest, indeed its own life, to save another. But such sense of absolute empathy and solidarity is rather exceptional and, generally, a system of social values is needed to help promote the fact that individual actors are willing to extend a hand to others, that they are going to feel responsible for and in solidarity with others. This echoes the fact that emotional identification with others has the tendency to go from thick, for those near and dear, to thin, for those far and away – to the point where it could be said that the closest is the thickest and the furthest is the thinnest.  

The value of positive and negative emotions and passions. Concerning the value of the positive and negative emotions and passions resulting (effects) from the fulfillment (or not) of needs and rights, positive emotions and passions are assessed and ranked higher than negative ones. One reason for this is that, as mentioned earlier, positive emotional experiences are prone to be the product of the realization of actors’ needs and rights. In that sense, the emotional elation consecutive to the achievement of goals is, quite logically, better than the emotional depression or alienation that can stem from non-satisfaction.

Moreover, in general, positive emotions and passions are in their own right more vital for actors and, consequently, can be considered primary compared to negative ones. We could say that even prior to being generated by the fulfillment of needs and rights, they are central to the existence of actors because they express, celebrate, and engineer life, the energy of life, of what is required for actors to be enjoying their being and moving forward in a constructive fashion. As such, they constitute a need at the root of all needs. After all, no actor in its right mind, so to speak, wishes to turn the continued experience of negative emotions and passions, and of feeling miserable as a whole, into a life-long condition.

Surely negative emotions and passions can have a useful role in the regulation of the existence of actors. The emotional reaction that is described as fear is caused by a sense of danger, either in the present or in the future. That danger threatens things that are valued, whether it is freedom from pain (to oneself or others) or

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23 For more on this, see Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) and Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 7–8 and 36–47.
freedom from some sort of loss. In this perspective, fear can be rational. As part of a life regulation system, it alerts an actor of the existence of a risk or danger and can prompt proper evasive action. In another genre, the feeling of depression can be viewed as a signal sent by the body that something is wrong and that the problem is in need of being addressed.

But when negative emotions and passions constitute the structuring mood, they introduce the peril for an actor of being the captive of a downward and destructive spiral. If not tackled and overcome, it is its ability to attain well-being and sustainability that is in question. This can be the case in international relations when two countries are dramatically at odds. When both vividly feel a fear of one another and both let this set the stage in the darkest manner, like with the constant fear of attack and fear of being subjugated, the results can be catastrophic. It can undermine the prospects for cooperation and hamper that trust on which long-term mutual security is built. In the process, preventing understanding and accommodation among actors, which in turn brings about further fear, chances are that a dynamic of mutual hostility will prevail. Ultimately, the outcome can be a lower level of security (with heightened international tensions) at higher levels of destructive power (since competition drives up the destructive potential that all possess), with the real possibility of destruction all around. This is what President Theodore Roosevelt, benefiting from the advantage of critical distance, noted as he observed the Anglo-German rivalry in the years before World War I:

(The German Chancellor) sincerely believes that the English are planning to attack him and smash his fleet, and perhaps join with France in a war to the death against him. As a matter of fact, the English harbour no such intentions, but are themselves in a condition of panic terror lest the Kaiser secretly intends to form an alliance against them with France or Russia, or both, to destroy their fleet and blot out the British empire from the map! It is as funny a case as I have ever seen of mutual distrust and fear bringing two peoples to the verge of war.  

**Emotions and Passions as Producers of Rights**

Emotions and passions do not function only as the effects of the fulfillment or not of actors’ need-rights, as well as of their sense of right and wrong. They can also be a cause and a producer of needs elevated into rights and of a sense of right and wrong. In this perspective, if the conception of and access to needs and rights deriving from

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negative emotions and passions tend to be very exclusionary and reserved to a few, positive emotions and passions are geared toward making the world more needs and rights inclusive.

**Negative emotions and passions as producers of rights.** By and large, negative emotions and passions are not the first choice of actors. This is because negative emotions and passions are linked to painful experiences. A painful experience, which can be physical and/or psychological, tends to be associated with adversity and hurt when something is not handled successfully (for instance having failed at something that is viewed as valuable). This applies to those negative emotions that are defined as primary (or basic), the list of which frequently includes fear, anger, disgust, and sadness, as well as those negative emotions that are presented as social, such as embarrassment, shame, guilt, jealousy, and envy.  

Although, as was alluded to earlier concerning the emotions of fear, a negative emotion can have a valuable life regulation function, once it becomes an overwhelming aspect of an actor’s identity, actions, and interactions with others, it acquires a pathological and counter-productive dimension. Becoming more than a simple negative emotion, a negative emotion can then turn into a structuring negative emotion or passion, which becomes the motivating factor for an actor’s actions.

This orientation is all the more dangerous considering that negative passions, which have adversity and hurt not managed favorably or in a healthy way at their core, have the tendency to be even more dangerous and destructive than the negative emotions on which they build. This is the case because they mix the primary and social elements of emotions with the general characteristics of passions – that is, the fact that passions tend to be willful, active, and purposeful toward what is valued, interested in change, and inclined to go public. As such, negative passions have an even darker side and dynamics than straightforward negative emotions. They are unlike simple negative emotions, in the context of which negativity is first and foremost experienced by the actor feeling the negative emotion and is more or less a mere marginal nuisance for the other actors in the surroundings. In comparison, illustrating the saying that “misery loves company,” negative passions have an activist agenda. This activist agenda has the key aim of targeting others and the environment, thereby trying to reduce others to their negativity. In this regard, an important goal of actors inhabited and motivated by negative passions

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27 For more on this, refer in this volume to Jean-Marc Coicaud, “The Question of Emotions and Passions in Mainstream International Relations, and Beyond.”

28 This is why actors guided by a healthy sense of self-preservation and committed to good governance in their own affairs and the affairs of the world are eager to avoid experiencing negative passions as much as possible and are inclined to stay away from or contain actors for whom negativity is a “way of life.”
is, if only to be reassured, to have the world resembling the nature and dynamics of those negative passions that define them, and forcefully working toward making it the reality of as many as possible. This can be interpreted as a form of perverse, extremely insecure, and lethal narcissism. In national and international politics, negative passions such as racism, anti-Semitism, and ethnic nationalism, and their destructive transformational impacts, can be examples and projections of this state of affairs. In the process, the emotional content of negative passions is driven to produce and put forward an exclusionary culture of needs and rights. It is only the needs and rights of a chosen few actors, at the exclusion of other actors, that are celebrated and pursued. Recognition of and access to needs and rights, rather than being widened, universalized, and shared as much as possible, become the expression and tool through which the gap between the group of right-holders, who happen to be also the power-holders, and the others, non-right holders, is engineered and made into an absolute barrier. In the most extreme circumstances, what matters is not some sense of balance or accommodation between the needs and the rights of a given actor or group and those of others, but the needs and rights of this actor or group, even if this means destroying others.

Positive emotions and passions as producers of rights. In analyzing positive emotions and passions as producers of rights, we begin with positive emotions per se. On this basis, we then focus on positive passions and the production of rights.

Positive emotions, such as joy, happiness, and others, for primary emotions, and empathy, sympathy, compassion, generosity, gratitude, admiration, and so on, for social emotions, are of high value and, as such, are widely craved and celebrated. This is the case because these emotions express and project a significant feeling of satisfaction for an actor. They are also an indispensable part of a fulfilled relationship with oneself, which to some extent presupposes a good relationship with others (considering that any relationship with oneself is made of relations with those outside of oneself as well). In this perspective, a reasonably fulfilled relationship with oneself is especially critical because, when it is lacking, this tends to be the product of weak connections with others in the past, and it is also likely to undermine the possibility of good relations with others in the present and the future.

Actors disconnected from themselves, as can be the case when they are unhappy with themselves, have indeed the tendency to experience a diminished capacity

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29 Think about, among other examples, the mass suicide by drinking poisoned punch, of close to 1,000 people led by Jim Jones in Jonestown, Guyana, on November 18, 1978. Think also about Hitler and his issuance of the “Scorched Earth” Decree (Nero Decree) on March 9, 1945. It seems that Hitler did not think that Germany could or, perhaps more importantly, should survive defeat and his own demise; hence, the fact that surrender was not an option and that Hitler was willing to let the destruction of the country go to extremes. There was to be no future for the nation after National Socialism.

of empathy toward others. The feeling of psychological non-satisfaction that unhappiness constitutes can lead them to disregard the needs and rights of others. This is to say that when there is little or no love of and peace with oneself, love of and peace with others are hardly possible. For if love of and peace with oneself tend to encourage love of and peace with others, war within oneself can easily translate into war with others. This is all the more the case when an actor, in a desperate quest to find love and peace within, is obsessed with its predicament and still unable to recognize and address on its own the inner tensions at work. Then, conflict with others can become a tragic substitute and also a false way out. This is as true for individual actors as for collective actors. For example, in international affairs, the imperialism of Germany and Japan from the late nineteenth century until World War II can be seen as part of this story. Their sentiment of (psychological) insecurity about their identity, status, and standing as recent and modern nations, fueled by injured pride, a sense of victimhood and resentment vis-à-vis the dominance of the major Western powers of the time, pushed them to overplay their hand and embark on policies of destruction, including of self-destruction.  

Incidentally, this shows that a fulfilled relation with oneself, with which positive emotions are prone to be associated, should not be all about oneself or about only one’s own needs and rights. For example, an authentic love of oneself is not essentially narcissistic or egotistical. When this happens, revealing a sense of personal insecurity and, ultimately, lack of love of oneself, it is an obstacle to a good relationship with others. It is in these terms that one can analyze what distinguishes bad nationalist emotions (exclusionary and discriminatory) from good nationalist emotions (mindful of other countries, including by trying to elevate oneself but not at the expense of others).

Hence, positive emotions, while being about oneself, are not meant to be a completely self-centered and self-referential satisfaction. As a matter of fact, at their best, the nature of positive emotions, primary and social, is to factor in others. Each in their own way, they imply pleasant and some sort of reconciled interactions with others. Moreover, they are conducive toward more sociability because reconciled interactions with others require taking others seriously, the satisfactory relation and experience that this creates being an invitation to further constructive connections with others.

In the process, positive emotions are designed to be an enjoyment of, and a presence to, oneself that is open to others and happens through being open to others. This at the same time reflects and engineers the emotional identification not only with others but with oneself as well. Indeed, with positive emotions, having a

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good relationship with oneself and a good relationship with others, that is finding the right balance in a given context between what is owed to oneself and what is owed to others, are one and the same thing. For example, the power of an actor to respect and admire another actor, to acknowledge without envy its ability to achieve objectives that it would like to realize but are beyond its reach, entails the recognition and appreciation of the other’s efforts. In the end, this presupposes the acceptance of one’s own limitations, of having made a healthy peace with oneself about its own circumstances. In this regard, for an actor to feel that it was given a fair chance to succeed and that it tried its best, irrespective of the outcome, can facilitate self-acceptance. This can prevent bitterness and resentment when failure is experienced. The actor can take responsibility without blaming others or the rules, or the lack of rules, of the game.

Now that we have examined in some detail positive emotions, what about positive passions as producers of rights?

Using the characteristics of passions in general (willful, active, and purposeful toward what is valued, interested in change, and inclined to go public) to activate and put to work positive emotions, positive passions are central to the creation and recognition of the needs and rights of actors. Their nature and dynamics are geared toward helping identify and produce the needs and rights that are likely to bring satisfaction to actors. We should add here that positive passions do not play this active role out of nothing. In line with the action-reaction or interactive nature of emotions and passions with their environment, which was noted earlier in the chapter, this active role presupposes that headway has already been made about the imagination of the possible, about what makes sense to aspire to because it is highly valued based on identified ideals, but based also on the evolving realities and sense of urgency and feasibility in a given context.

One example illustrates and helps clarify this point: in modern democratic culture the political passions built around the value-ideals of universality, equality, and liberty, channeled through liberalism and socialism (regardless of the different ways in which each of them have been conceived), have certainly played this role. They have contributed to the development of an agenda and a path for primary and socially oriented positive emotions, such as hope, happiness, empathy, and so on, to be realized as much as possible in the context of the opportunities and constraints of the time.

32 Refer to “The Social Character of International Relations,” in Section I.


34 On this issue, in the context of liberal values and constitutionalism, see Andras Sajo, *Constitutional Sentiments* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), for instance chapters 2 and 4.
To be sure, this does not mean that positive passions cannot generate problems. Their engagement in support of needs and rights of actors can, for instance, make them prone to be one-sided and, consequently, counterproductive. This is the case when the focus on needs and rights leads to overlooking the imperative of establishing limits for these and drawing a line by setting up duties and responsibilities vis-à-vis others. Short of this, social interaction and sociability run the risk of being jeopardized. We can see illustrations of this in today’s democratic environment at the national level with individualism and sense of entitlement, and we can see illustrations at the international level in the frequent self-righteousness and lack of self-critical reflection of (Western) democratic regimes.

That said, when they are part of envisioning the need-rights of actors in a socialized fashion that factors in what is owed to all actors enjoying a sense of legitimacy, positive passions have undoubtedly a decisive constructive impact. In this perspective, the combination of the pro-active aspects of passions in general and of the positive dimension of positive passions themselves mobilizes actors constructively by orienting their imagination, emotions, and activities in three manners: they orient (1) forward, (2) upward, and (3) in an embracing or inclusive way.

First, they push actors forward in the sense that positive passions are directed toward future goals. Second, this forward movement is also an upward movement. Positive passions have the tendency to aim at enhancing and elevating the possibilities of life, at attempting to better match what is and what could be, or what should be, at improving the conditions of actors’ existence. As for the third aspect, the embracing or inclusive one, it comes down to the fact that positive passions, while being about the well-being of one actor, tend to pursue this well-being by trying to identify modalities through which actors can come together, ideally in an optimal fashion, despite what separates them. The contribution to the empowerment of actors that positive ethical/political passions play in favor of the central values of modern democracy, such as equality and universality of rights, is a case in point. This is how we allude to the role that positive emotions and passions play in the quest for justice.

Positive emotions and passions and the question of justice. Positive emotions and passions are an integral part of the struggles surrounding the conceptualization and implementation of justice, both past and present. This is the case if only because there is no quest for justice that does not claim being committed to combating human misery for right-holders. This is a crucial objective of any sense of justice, for example by mitigating vertical (like between the powerful and the powerless) and horizontal (such as among competitive interests) disparities and tensions that put

35 Of course, who is a legitimate actor and how this is defined is another key issue, which we cannot address at this point but which has crucial implications for the questions tackled here.
actors at odds. This makes positive emotions and passions one of the constitutive elements of the quest for justice.

Against this background, it is intriguing that the recognition of the reality of the link existing between positive emotions/passions and justice has often been more implicit than explicit, when it has not been disregarded altogether. Such situation has frequently taken place in the context of influential schools of Western philosophy that have viewed emotions and passions, including positive emotions and passions, as not to be trusted from a rational point of view. As a result, calculated and calculating logic and reason understood to operate at the exclusion of emotions and passions have tended to be the “weapons” of choice for securing the possibility of giving a foundation to justice. Immanuel Kant and, closer to us, John Rawls have by and large embraced this approach.

On the other hand, despite the poor track record of some of the major Western theories of justice at giving credit to and acknowledging the place and role of positive emotions and passions, let alone of emotions and passions in general in the conception of justice, and at theorizing them as such, none of them has the goal of making actors miserable. Particularly, they run away from emotions and passions that are deeply negative, along with the morbidity they carry. In other words, in spite of their lack of explicit recognition and study of the importance of emotions and passions and, more specifically, of the positive emotional and passion-content for justice, the values and ideals for which they battle reveals that it is not so easy to get rid of them entirely. Hence the intellectual contradictions and the non-systematic analysis of all relevant aspects entering into the quest for justice – beginning with positive emotions and passions – that the theories of justice presenting these characteristics are prone to display.

The fact that positive emotions and passions are central to the quest for justice does not imply that negative emotions are totally useless for justice. I have alluded to this earlier. When they do not have a pathological character and do not render an actor pathological, negative emotions can support concerns for justice. For example, the personal experience of sorrow in relation to loss can help to comprehend the sorrow of others and, therefore, move one from sympathy to empathy. Sorrow also can be an effective springboard to think about the circumstances that cause sorrow and about the means to combat them. The same can be said of the experience of humiliation. Experiencing humiliation for oneself can lead to feeling empathy for another having a similar experience; and it can prompt looking for ways to change the conditions that makes humiliation possible. All this supports the argument that

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the experience of negative emotions can lead to wanting to experience and facilitate positive emotions and (more) justice.

But, by and large, more than negative emotions, positive emotions, and passions tend to be the strongest influences when it comes to justice and its pursuit, if not its realization. They capitalize on what the actors’ emotional empowerment calls for and identify the modalities to achieve this through the definition and implementation of actors’ need-rights, both individual and collective. The ultimate objective is to produce a situation in which actors feel satisfied in a manner that makes them not only able to endure and enjoy oneself and each other’s presence, but also grow mutually from the cohabitation and interactions with others. It is about building a “home-community” in which actors can be emotionally present to themselves, others, and the environment in general.37

It is true that at the international level, positive emotions and passions have had the tendency to be neglected. A realist vision and the negative emotions and passions that come with it (such as fear, distrust of others, and sense of insecurity) have prevailed in the conception of what international relations, particularly among state-actors, are supposed to be. This is all the more the case considering that, although international law is meant to be dedicated to justice internationally and, consequently, to be animated by positive emotions and passions supporting the needs and rights of actors in an inclusive fashion, it has a problematic history and track record.38 Rather than putting the power and hegemony situation from which it emerges at the full service of justice, all too often it has been prone to put justice at the service of (Western) power and hegemony, endorsing in the process a biased organization of international order and of power relationships within it. Frequently, the enjoyment of need-rights and of their related emotions and passions of satisfaction has been reserved to a happy few, with the rest being deprived of these same need-rights and condemned to the negative emotions and passions that a lack of empowerment can bring about (such as a sense of alienation and powerlessness or a sense of injustice, frustration, or resentment).

On the other hand, since the end of World War II, international politics, while continuing to be inhabited and structured by major inequalities, tensions, and conflicts, seems to make more room for more peaceful, balanced, and inclusive approaches. This can be seen both in the importance attributed to international

37 A victim for whom justice has not been rendered has much difficulty not only reconciling with the world and others, including the justice system that is not taking care of its defense, but also with him- or herself. On this Jean-Marc Coicaud, “Apology, a Small yet Important Part of Justice,” Japanese Journal of Political Science (Volume 10, Number 1, March 2009), pp. 93–124; and Susanne Karstedt, Ian Loader, and Heather Strang (eds.), Emotions, Crime and Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011).

38 Nathaniel Berman, Passions et Ambivalences: le colonialisme, le nationalisme et le droit international (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, translated in French, under the direction of Nathaniel Berman and Emmanuelle Jouannet, by Lucie Delabie, Marie Blocteur, Leila Choukroune, Céline Clerfeuille and Olivia Harrison, 2008), for example, pp. 279–357.
cooperation and in the fact that international law has, arguably, become more sensitive to the needs and rights of a greater variety of actors. The fact that the latter has facilitated decolonization and that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, its norms of human rights appear to be taken more seriously (regardless of how much remains to be done in this area\textsuperscript{39}), are illustrations of this evolution. This signifies that with gradually more attention given to the needs and rights of all, positive emotions and passions, like the ones associated with trust and empathy, tend to be more often acted on and shared by more actors. And yet, this is far from being an ineluctable orientation, a “done deal,” so to speak. Since the early 2000s, the so-called war on terror, first in relation with al-Qaeda and more recently in connection with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has indeed allowed some of the worst negative emotions and passions – such as fear, paranoia, distrust, ruthlessness toward the enemy, disregard for the “Other,” and so on– to make a furious comeback; and this has been seen more often than not on both sides of the cultural fence, both in the West and the non-West. In the process, it is the positive culture of democratic rights and emotions and passions, including that of tolerance that is under attack, if not in jeopardy.

\textit{Emotions, Passions, and the Dynamics of Change in International Politics}

The dual dimension of emotions and passions, as effects and causes/producers, vis-à-vis need-rights and the sense of right and wrong, and the fact that they can be either negative or positive, and that they can express and project negative or positive emotional content, is crucial for the dynamics of change at the international level. This is one way in which this section briefly addresses the question of emotions, passions, and change in international politics. The other way refers to an issue that was touched on earlier – that is, the fact that emotions and passions are not necessarily bringing about positive change. When negative emotions and passions are the sole structuring emotional force, they can engineer a turn for the worst in both international and national politics.

\textit{Emotions, passions and the possibility of change in international relations.} We saw it earlier, emotions and passions can be effects, produced by the satisfaction or dissatisfaction related to the extent to which reality fulfills the expectations of actors. In this regard, it is especially when emotions and passions of dissatisfaction predominate that change is in the cards. It is for instance when actors feel that their interests are not adequately respected that frustration and discontent settle in, and can lead to a call for change.

The modalities of this call for change anchored in emotions and passions of dissatisfaction vary with the context, particularly with constraints and possibilities, and they are not always distinguishable in a clear-cut fashion. There are two types of emotions and passions as effects, which – while somewhat at the opposite ends of the spectrum of dissatisfaction – can both bring about radical change.

To begin, and paradoxically, change can be triggered by emotions and passions of dissatisfaction expressed in a passive form. Feelings of disengagement and indifference can fit this situation. Indeed, when these feelings are widespread, and if the opportunity arises, they can become a force to reckon with and a factor of change. In other words, if it is more probable for change to happen when it is actively pursued, it can also result in part from the disengagement, including emotional withdrawal, of actors. Think about how totalitarian states in Communist Eastern Europe, which initially envisioned a mixture of mobilization and total control of people, broke down relatively easily in the fall of 1989 after decades of existence. Having ultimately transformed most of its citizens into non-believers and having made them cynical about the system, in times of need these states found themselves without real individual and collective support. Even its primary beneficiaries, the power-holders, had somehow stopped to believe in the regimes and the bright future that their ideology had promised. As the support of the Soviet Union was now anything but unconditional with “perestroika” and “glasnost” underway in Moscow, they did not have a strong motivation to defend either their interests or the socialist/communist order.

At the opposite end of the dissatisfaction spectrum are emotions and passions that can have an explicit activist and purposeful character. This is the case with revolutionary emotions and passions, fully engaged and invested in the overthrow of a regime.40

Emotions and passions of discontent as effects produced by unfulfilled expectations and needs can also turn into a cause of change. This can be understood in connection with the fact, alluded to earlier in the chapter, that there is not an absolute wall of separation between emotions and passions as effects and causes or, for that matter, between negative and positive emotions and passions. In both cases, between them there can be points of contact, continuum, and even imbrication. This reality plays a critical role in change resulting from human agency.

A good example is how in the late eighteenth century some societies began to reorganize within the framework of democratic ideals.41 As people became angry and frustrated with the old order, they came to identify with and support democratic


values and principles that echoed and gave traction and direction to their evolving emotional beliefs and deeply held aspirations. They invested in them especially through political passions, now taking on new forms, meanings, and intensity. In the process, a legitimate state started to be viewed as one that expressed and furthered the interests of its citizens, so that these would be able to achieve what was now considered a materially and emotionally satisfactory life.  

*Emotions/passions and the challenge of little or negative change.* In closing the question of emotions, passions, and change, one has to acknowledge that the transformative power of emotions and passions is not always part of a happy history. Concerning the transformative power of positive emotions and passions, the truth is that the gap between the goals they set and the reality at hand has rarely been fully filled. For instance, today, the world is far from having the commitment to human rights advocated by positive emotions and passions of solidarity and responsibility being seriously implemented at the international level. Events since the end of the Cold War have shown that the prevention of genocide, just to take one example, continues to be a work in progress.  

As for the transformative power of negative emotions and passions, it has been all too effective as one of the driving forces behind some of the worst political atrocities of the modern era. The ideologies and politics of resentment that have flourished in the twentieth century – such as with Nazism, Fascism and totalitarian communism – are cases in point. And before that, the Jacobin Terror during the French Revolution presents an unsettling and macabre example of how negative and positive emotions and passions can mix as effects and causes and produce aberrant results.

This shows that when trying to connect emotions and passions with the needs and rights of actors as a way to account for the possibility and dynamics of change, one has to be aware of the various pieces of the puzzle.

**CONTEXTUAL CONSTITUTION OF EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

To complete the picture of the nature and role of emotions and passions in international affairs, this chapter argues that, as human experiences, emotions and passions have a contextual dimension. Emotions and passions are to some degree influenced by the organization of the environment in which they take place, which

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42 See the 1776 United States Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the *pursuit of happiness* [my emphasis].” Quoted in Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, p. 128.

43 Jean-Marc Coicaud, *Beyond the National Interest*.

44 Arno J. Mayer, *The Furies*, for example chapters 3, 4 and 5.
includes the social values and norms to which actors subscribe. At the international level, as at the national level, the contextual constitution of emotions and passions unfolds in three major ways.

First, resonant with the fact that the social forms of collective entities and their relations have the tendency to differ across cultures and time, emotions and passions are not fundamentally the same everywhere. Second, as far as they are forged by the modalities in which collective entities, their social values and norms, and their relationships are arranged, emotions and passions are also social markers, meaning expressions, projections, and – ultimately – instruments of social distinction and differentiation within and among groups. As such, more often than not, they are closely connected with power hierarchies, structures, and preferences. The fact that it has historically taken so long to extend the range of the principle of compassion to all human beings regardless of their race, religion, sex, or other means of classification, is an illustration of this situation. Third, emotions and passions are domains and tools of competition and dispute for actors who are struggling to see their conception of rights and of sense of right and wrong prevail over others’. This reality is of particular relevance for those having a strong social component because they are associated with a belief that makes an explicit reference to other people. This is the case for emotions and passions related, for example, to shame, contempt, hatred, guilt, and anger (for those having a negative character), and pride, liking, admiration, glory, and honor (for those having a positive connotation). The comparative, and therefore, evaluative dimension they entail becomes the basis for the manners in which actors interact with themselves and others. It is in this perspective as well that they contribute to setting orientations for the dynamics of international life.

As a whole, this threefold contextualization of emotions and passions is a crucial part of the process through which the standing and status of actors and, consequently, their rights and sense of right and wrong, are conceived of, fought over, and established, including in the international realm. More details on each of these three points are given below as a way to end the chapter.

**Emotions and Passions: Perceptions across Cultures and Time**

The fact that emotions and passions are subject to historicity comes down to the idea that as human experiences they can take different forms and have more or less significance depending on the environment in which they occur. Some of them may exist in one setting and be absent in another. Like for any social milieu, this applies to international relations. The evolution of the nature and role of honor and of the emotions and passions built around it, especially as a source of motivation for actions and interactions of actors, illustrates this.
For a long time, honor and the emotions and passions associated with it were, perhaps more than fear and interest, a key trigger for the behavior of actors, within and beyond borders. As Richard Ned Lebow puts it, in reference to Classical Greece:

Invoking a common fifth-century understanding of human motivation, Thucydides explains the outbreak and the course of the Peloponnesian War in terms of fear, honor and interest. In their unsuccessful effort to justify their foreign policy, the Athenian envoys told the Spartan assembly that “the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honor and interest afterwards came in” … Not for the last time, Athenian words contradict Athenian behavior. Book I indicates that in 431 Athenians had few fears for the security of their empire, but rather welcomed the opportunity to augment their power relative to Sparta and Corinth … Thucydides leads thoughtful readers to a parallel conclusion about Sparta. Its decision for war had less to do with fear than it did with honor. Timē refers to honor in the sense of standing or status, but it also encompasses dignity and self-respect, which requires people to act in the right way, regardless of their standing. Most Spartiates saw both on the line in 431. If they stood aside, Athens would increase its absolute power and relative standing at their expense. Failure to come to the aid of their allies – independent of any outcome – would be dishonorable. Sparta’s standing as a hegemon and its reliability as an ally were twin pillars of its identity, and made the decision for war a foregone conclusion for most Spartiates. The Melians also put their honor – conceived as freedom (eleutheria) and independence (autonomia) – above security. So did the Athenians when they first opposed Persia, in sharp contradiction to their later assertion that they were activated by fear … Corcyra, Corinth and other key third parties who twice pushed the two hegemons into war were motivated by a combination of honor and interest.45

And beyond Classical Greece, in times closer to us:

Not only in Greece, but in modern Europe, competition among the great powers was from the very beginning a struggle for rank and honor … In the nineteenth century, it found expression in the scramble for Africa, the construction of battle fleets … It was key to the decisions that led to war in 1914. For Austria’s leaders, the assassination was not just a pretext to invade Austria, but an attempt to preserve the honor of the empire and its leaders. The German kaiser also framed the problem this way, and it made him willing to issue his so-called “blank check” to Austria. Russian leaders recognized the likely consequences of their mobilization but nevertheless felt compelled to back Serbia as a matter of honor. Like the Austrians – and the Spartans – they believed they could not sacrifice their honor and retain their standing as a great power.46

46 Ibid., pp. 272–274.
At the same time, the forms of honor and the emotions and passions connected to it have changed over the years.\textsuperscript{47} For instance, in the \textit{Iliad}, the passage in which Achilles exults as he drags the body of the fallen Hector behind his chariot is at odds with latter military codes of honor that stipulated treating a defeated enemy with decency.\textsuperscript{48} More importantly, while they continue to be a factor today,\textsuperscript{49} honor and the emotions and passions that come with it do not have the centrality and forceful motivating power they once had. The fact that in modern societies aristocratic and warrior cultures have ceased to be highly valued and aligned with one another helps explain this reality. It has contributed to lessen the international relevance of honor as a norm and of its related emotions and passions.

Moreover, and more disturbingly, it is as if the current modalities of use of force in conflicts were abandoning altogether the kind of balanced fight and recognition and respect for the other in combat, which at one point were parts of the culture of honor. On the Western side, growing reliance on high technology weaponry makes it possible to eliminate an opponent in an anonymous fashion and without risking one’s life, by pressing a button in the comfort of an office thousands of miles away from the battlefield. As for the other side, in part to compensate the lack of military parity, embarking on more or less indiscriminate (terrorist) killing seems to be by and large the tactic of choice. There is little honor in all this and, paradoxically, this is happening in a period of history that, supposedly, is committed to taking human rights more seriously than ever.

\textit{Emotions and Passions as Social and Power Markers}

What about the idea that emotions and passions, influenced by the organization of social life and its values and norms, are more than mere human experiences but constitute social markers as well (i.e., expressions, projections, and – ultimately – instruments of social distinction and differentiation), frequently associated with power hierarchies, structures, and preferences? In this regard, the content and projection of emotions and passions can amount to featuring, justifying, and naturalizing, for example, power separation between worthy and less or non-worthy actors, between those who have rights and those who have fewer or no rights. In the process, the line also tends to be drawn between the sense of right and wrong, between what is and is not appropriate, and also between what is and is not legitimate.

\textsuperscript{47} For an overview of the evolution of the culture of honor in the context of French history, see Lucien Febvre, \textit{Honneur et patrie} (Paris: Perrin, 1996).


\textsuperscript{49} Barry O’Neill, \textit{Honor, Symbols, and War} (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004), for example, p. 245.
Honor in Homeric Greece is again a way to illustrate this situation. Competition for honor and its related emotions and passions (such as glory) were only open to warriors of aristocratic background, distinguishing them from the rest of society. Furthermore, in this elite group, there was another ranking putting above those who had manifested the most bravery and valor. Similarly, at the international level, the premium placed on the culture of honor energized countries to engage in warfare as a differentiating component meant to affirm and convey their elite status vis-à-vis other political units for, to start with, being eager to defend ones’ honor signified that a country had an honor to defend and therefore an international standing.

There are many other cases of emotions and passions molded by social values and norms that have a role of power markers. We allude to two of them here.

First, think about how the respect and its social power (beyond diplomatic rhetoric and courtesy) that member-states receive and benefit from at the United Nations are unevenly distributed. In principle, all members are equal and equally important. But powerful members enjoy more prestige than others. In addition, although a country does not have to be a democracy to be a UN member, non-democratic regimes tend to have a lower standing. Because democratic values and norms are an integral part of the hegemonic power and belief of the time, they serve as legitimacy benchmarks for contemporary political and legal culture, both domestically and internationally. As a result, the emotional content (emotions and passions) with which and through which member-states relate to one another is colored by these values. This is seen in the fact that, regardless of the shortcomings of democracies, there is more “love” and respect for democratic regimes than there is for non-democratic regimes. This is significant if only because it entails a price to pay for the latter. At the outset, their rights are weakened, especially if they do not enjoy a big power status. Eliciting less respect, if not contempt, it is more palatable to go against or after them. The war launched against Iraq in 2003 illustrates this point. The track record of violence by Saddam Hussein’s regime played into the hands of the Anglo-American push for war. It contributed to undermine the respect for Iraq’s sovereignty and, in the end, its sovereignty itself.50

Racism in the context of colonization is another case of how emotions and passions shaped by social values and norms corresponding to the organization of societies and their relations have a social and power marker function. Particularly, they are called on to offer a rationale for subjugation. Because the colonizing power is deemed to be superior to natives and their forms of social arrangement, the argument is that it is normal to enslave them and not feel bad about it. Not being compelled to extend empathy and compassion to colonized people and their societies, denying them rights and mobilizing exclusionary emotions and passions to these ends is

50 Jean-Marc Coicaud, Beyond the National Interest, p. 191.
how colonial power, making itself solely competent to judge, intellectually and emotionally, what is good and right, asserts its existence and domination. The lack of emotional identification and the sense of emotional superiority that can be at the core of the racist is at the same time what expresses and makes racism possible. In fact the self-righteousness of colonial racism is such that the process by which it is victimizing the colonized is also the one by which it is claiming it is empowering it (see the ideology of “Civilizing Mission”).

Emotions and Passions, Struggles around Rights, and Sense of Right and Wrong

Emotions and passions can be elements around, through, and over which actors compete, struggling to ensure that their conception of rights and sense of right and wrong prevail. Take for instance the debates and conflicts surrounding nationalist emotions and passions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The choice of either embracing or shunning such emotions and passions amounted to being open or closed to the possibility of two types of enormous transformations.

First, a transformation amounting to a geopolitical revolution, with the aggregation of small units into bigger ones (as happened in Europe in the nineteenth century with the unification of Italy and Germany), or the breaking up of large entities into smaller ones (such as with the disintegration of Austria-Hungary following World War I).

Second, a transformation amounting to an internal reorganization of societies, which – in one form or another – meant the modification of the relations between the governors and the governed, as well as of the relations among people and within people themselves (from oneself to oneself). Ultimately, the profound redefinition and redistribution of power associated with these changes in international and national orders signified either going along with or opposing (nationally and internationally) new regimes of public and private rights, but also of private and public emotions and passions.

The fact that history around the world throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been a succession of battles between conservative and progressive, individual and collective forces around these issues shows how high the stakes are.


53 Ibid.
have been. Massive battles have unfolded, and continue to unfold, in the midst of deep confrontations of ideological emotions and passions that also are conflicts about rights, and senses of right and wrong.

CONCLUSION

Considering the complexities of the topic of emotions and passions in international politics, this chapter is far from having given definitive answers to the issues raised here. This is a work in progress, which asks for more efforts in the future. In this regard, three types of question need more research.

First, more work is needed on the relationships between emotions/passions on the one hand, and needs/rights and values on the other. Among other things, this calls for a better analysis of the notions of needs, interests, rights, and values and their relations. Second, there is a need to clarify the nature of the continuum that can exist between negative and positive emotions and passions. This includes doing more research on the fact that emotions and passions can be a mix of negativity and positivity. This should prove especially important for the study of the nature and outcome of social and political change. Third, and finally, it is important to know more about how emotions and passions as social and power markers change. Therefore, the present chapter is only the first step of a bigger research agenda.

The field of International Relations (IR) is an aspect of politics and, therefore, involves emotions and passions. Concerned with issues of war and peace, resources and scarcity, collective identity, power, institutions and legitimacy, international politics is rooted in human needs and desires. Ancient philosophers from Greek Antiquity to the founders of modern political thought – such as Hobbes, Machiavelli, Hume and Montesquieu – would not have imagined studying politics without reference to the passions.

Nowadays, students of international politics are necessarily confronted with problems relating to apparently irrational collective behaviour or fanaticism, especially as they deal with the scope and limits of sovereignty or with ideologies such as nationalism, ethno-nationalism and religious fundamentalism. By the same token, the increasing number of states that have collapsed into civil war and genocide represent a major conceptual challenge. However, interpretation of these phenomena remains mostly descriptive. Scholars are often content with reproducing the actors’ discourses and attitudes as if the equivocal significance of these ideological positions and behaviours can be understood by mobilising common sense psychological interpretation and the use of logic including “the prisoner’s dilemma”, or by analysing the impersonal socio-economic determinants of politics.

With the impressive growth of identity-based conflicts as a root cause of civil war and terrorism, and the resulting challenges to regional and global security, innovative research programmes need to be developed to understand better the role played by the passions in world politics. Psychoanalysis could enhance our knowledge in this regard.

**IR DISCIPLINE NEGLECTS EMOTIONS**

When IR was established as a discipline after World War II, theorists were inclined to scoff at emotions as something of little significance in the variables that influence
world politics. Morgenthau considered politics to be governed “by objective laws that have their root in human nature”. He tended to disregard the psychological inclinations of individuals in office, or the characteristics peculiar to different types of political regimes. He acknowledged however that nations sometimes pursue a “policy of prestige” aiming at “demonstrating the power a nation has or thinks it has”. He saw in “national character” and “national moral” a source of power. He quite correctly wrote: “The emotional intensity of the identification of the individual with the nation stands in inverse proportion to the stability of the particular society as reflected in the sense of security of its members. The greater the stability of a society and the sense of security of its members, the smaller are the chances for collective emotions to seek an outlet in aggressive nationalism, and vice versa”.

These emotional phenomena were, however, of little significance in understanding international relations; Morgenthau viewed them as either instruments or epiphenomena of power politics. Moreover, he disregarded the role played by public opinion in international affairs.

Realism was founded on the assumption that the study of international politics should focus on interstate relations. Emphasis was placed on establishing a positivist conceptual framework and developing a methodology deemed “scientific”. Individual and collective actors were supposed to be constrained by the international system. States’ national interests were reduced to the pursuit of power perceived as a rational and non-equivocal objective. It was assumed that government leaders engaged in cost-benefit calculations to determine their diplomatic and strategic commitments. The structure of international society and the causes of conflict were expected to be studied at the interstate systemic level. In developing the realist tradition, Waltz went so far as to assert that the international system operates independently of its states’ units. He agreed with Durkheim’s anti-reductionism following which social phenomena cannot be explained in terms of individual psychology.

The promoters of mainstream IR were so anxious to develop a specific field of study focusing on interstate politics that they were considerably limited by the very nature of their inquiry. Their theoretical undertaking was also impoverished by investing considerable energy in approaches geared towards empirical evidence. The influence of behaviourism was important, and as a result hardly any attention was paid to the psychological motives capable of influencing international politics. This narrow definition of the nature of politics prevented IR students from inquiring into the underlying emotional components of international politics. In addition,

most studies at that time focused on the East-West confrontation, more specifically on the bipolar balance between Washington and Moscow. It was of course difficult to miss the fact that the so-called Third World leaders did not always concur with the rationale of their counterparts from developed countries. This however was considered a temporary phenomenon bound to wither away with economic development and political modernization. Moreover, the UN system, where the emotional aspects of world politics could indeed have been studied, received little attention from IR specialists.

Leaving aside the ambition to produce a general theory of IR, some scholars, particularly in the United States, focused their attention on decision-making processes. G. Allison showed that statesmen did not always pursue strategies that aimed at benefiting national interests. Basing himself on two alternative models of policy-making – the “bureaucratic” and organizational” models, which require taking into account the rules of complex organizations and the motivations of their actors – Allison questioned the realist model of a unitary, rational decision maker. He did not, however, seek to invalidate the fundamental rationality of decision-making processes. Actors were believed to pursue particular goals aimed at benefiting the organizations they represented, rather than the broader “national” interests. Jervis also underlined that it was “impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without referring to the decision-makers’ beliefs and their images of others”. He underlined the importance of cognition in decision making, but set aside most of its emotional aspects.

Other paradigms did not fare any better when it came to analysing the role of emotions in international politics. Marxist scholars placed a great deal of emphasis on the structural conditions of war and peace, on imperialism and the relationships of dependency between capitalism and underdevelopment without exploring the passionate dimensions of these issues as exemplified in Third World nationalisms and other specific ideological constellations.

In the 1980s, students of regimes and transnational relations adopted a rationalist and utilitarian perspective that was also largely unconcerned with the emotional aspects of norms and institutions. The English School of IR attempted to develop a wider understanding of world politics built around the concept of international society. It focused on ideational forces, on norms that define the behaviour of actors, on the role of institutions, and on issues of justice, order and solidarity. Scholars in this tradition borrowed concepts and methods from classical disciplines such as history and law without however venturing into psychosociology or anthropology. It follows from the foregoing that the study of emotions was conspicuously absent from

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the main conceptual frameworks of IR, despite the fact that many social scientists after World War II were examining the root causes of human aggression, racism and prejudice.

NEW CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES

It has become evident to many scholars that the theoretical frameworks produced during the cold war to help understand the dynamics of world politics are now inadequate. Interdependence between states has grown rapidly with the global expansion of the market economy. Several mutually reinforcing processes have modified the structure and environment of international relations such as the growth of trade and financial flows, the multiplication of communication and information networks, the proliferation of transnational corporations and other non-governmental actors, as well as the development of new mechanisms of interstate cooperation and private regulation.

The mainstream theoretical orientation of IR, with its traditional emphasis on the structures and regimes set up and the strategies pursued by the great powers, has indeed become partly irrelevant. Although international politics is still dominated by state interactions, its domain has extended considerably to include political issues such as the role played by transnational socio-political movements in influencing policy agendas, security issues resulting from failed states and terrorism, and socio-economic problems arising from mass poverty, environmental degradation or pandemics. A host of non-state actors has emerged. Gone are the ideological certainties of the cold war. The world has seen a resurgence of nationalist, ethno-nationalist and religious sectarianism and activity. Moreover, the conventional divide between domestic politics and international relations has become obsolete as the former, while largely determined by the latter, can in turn affect regional and world security and well-being.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

The study of emotions in politics, particularly international politics, is a theoretical minefield because of the various conceptual approaches and methodologies that can be used. Some scholars have embraced the field of cognitive psychology or neuroscience to explore the connection between emotion and rationality. This intellectual undertaking is certainly worth pursuing. However there is a reason to believe that cognitivism can only remain at the surface of emotional phenomena. By considering expressions of emotion – for example fear, trust or honour – as a

response to ideas or beliefs, cognitivism does not analyse the underlying impulses of these feelings. Ethno-nationalism for example, is explained by reference to culture, customs, traditions and history, but the socio-psychological origins of these creeds are generally not dealt with. Moreover, cognitivism tends to highlight broad normative representations and value systems without providing an explanation for minority dissent or sporadic alterations of people’s mentality. It has been systematically deficient in accounting for the unconscious components of political discourse and behaviour.

We argue here that psychoanalysis might help to account for the role that emotions can play in international politics. Freud proposed a new type of hermeneutics that fundamentally changed our understanding of the human psyche. He was not the first to argue that human behaviour is influenced by a mixture of instinctive and libidinal drives, conflicting emotional impulses, and institutional constraints. He did however provide a comprehensive explanation of the origins of this complexity. He uncovered the intricacies of love and aggression, which have an impact on collective creeds and commitments.

From Freud’s perspective, it is not always possible to separate cognition from affects, because a large part of human mental life is experienced below the threshold of consciousness. Rational objectives and interests intertwine with instincts and drives. Affects permeate rational processes and form a constituent part of individual and collective belief systems and ideals. Freud sought to enhance our interpretation of ideological projects and political commitments by unmasking their unconscious dimensions.

His account has important methodological implications. It weakens the political scientist’s claim to analyse the beliefs of political actors by focusing on their apparent rationality, especially when these beliefs are emotionally charged. Nationalism is a case in point. There are powerful non-rational, non-utilitarian forces at work in this ideology that go beyond the rationalist arguments used to support it, such as sovereignty, security or freedom.

It is clear, however, that psychoanalytic concepts and clinical methods are not easy to use in the field of politics, even less so in international relations. The road leading from a purely theoretical perspective to meaningful case studies poses considerable challenges. There are nevertheless three areas in which psychoanalysis could make a difference in the study of international politics through inquiries into:

1. how the psyche of political leaders can affect their projects and behaviour;
2. which desires, needs and aspirations underlie ideological and political discourses;
3. to what extent institutions (in the broader sense of the term) contribute to the clash of collective identities that impact on world politics.
Psychoanalysis and the Study of Emotions in IR

The Leader’s Personality

There is no question that the psyche of leaders can play a decisive role in international relations, whether by influencing the outcome of a political crisis, reorganizing socioeconomic structures or more broadly shaping the course of history, especially in times of rapid socio-political change. Anti-Semitism may have been widespread not only in Germany, but also in France and other European countries after World War I. However, Hitler’s paranoid hatred of Jews was a crucial factor in enabling the Nazis to carry out their extermination plan of the Jewish people.

From the 1960s onwards, a series of scholars entered the field of psychobiography to explore the emotional make-up of a number of famous political leaders such as Woodrow Wilson, or Hitler. Psycho-biographers aimed at reconstructing the early childhood of leaders in order to grasp their subsequent political undertakings. The use of psychoanalysis by Freud and William Bullitt to interpret Wilson’s messianic foreign policy after World War I has been heavily criticised. His study can indeed be considered a failure, owing to its lack of biographical data and insufficient attention to the political environment of the President as well as his health problems when he negotiated the Versailles treaty with the Senate. Since then, a number of psycho-biographers have similarly attempted to interpret the actions of prominent political figures’ actions, generally with mixed results.

Historians and social scientists alike seek to establish causal relationships between disparate events. This ambition however is well out of reach of psycho-historians who can only speculate on the psychological consequences of a particular family setting, personal event or trauma. It may be fairly easy in some instances to validate the psychological disorders of a political leader. However, the origins of the pathology are usually impossible to trace with any precision. In fact, what appears to be the most relevant biographical data for a psychoanalytical interpretation of a political leader is usually sketchy at best. Psycho-biography is seriously impeded by its lack of access to clinical interactions capable of validating hypotheses. This has been one of its major weaknesses. Inquiring into the imaginary world of subjects during their childhood faces the significant obstacle of how to assess the impact of these early experiences. It should also be underlined in this context that historians do not have the same understanding of “events” as psychoanalysts. Infantile trauma, for example, is a psychological experience which does not necessarily relate to something

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that “objectively” happened. Consequently, psycho-biographers often stumble on how to unravel fact from fantasy.

Despite these methodological difficulties, psychoanalysis can interpret the personality and emotional involvement of at least some political leaders by methodically studying their leitmotifs. It can also shed new light on the emotional themes and metaphors used by policy makers and intellectuals to legitimize their objectives. Hitler’s pathological obsessions, hallucinatory delirium and megalomania are all revealed in *Mein Kampf* and in his public career. A leader’s pattern of behaviour can also disclose his personality structure. The extreme distrust that Stalin harboured against his closest collaborators was a clear sign of paranoia. The messianic and Manichean world views displayed by some contemporary political leaders could be an indication of psychological frailty.

The impact of personality variables on decision making is admittedly speculative on the grounds that the interaction between the leader and his environment does not allow simple causations. As Gordon J. DiRenzo rightly pointed out, “the more unstructured and ambiguous a political situation, the more likely it is that the response of the individual actor will involve a personality element”. However, in modern industrialized societies, the exercise of power is highly institutionalised. It is therefore difficult to draw the line between the personal emotional characteristics of decision makers and the requirements of their public environment. The emotional make-up of leaders, assuming that it can be grasped, may not be necessarily relevant in the context of certain state and intergovernmental bureaucracies in which decision making passes through rigid administrative procedures and formalized political channels. In other words, psycho-biographers need to demonstrate that the decision maker is emancipated from conventional patterns of behaviour associated with their position of authority and the requirements of their constituency. * Victims of Groupthink* deserves special mention here. In this now classic study inspired by the work of W. Bion and K. Lewin on group dynamics, Irving Janis analysed a number of crucial decisions that shaped American foreign policy after World War II. He convincingly showed how close-knit policy-making groups could be excessively subservient to their leader, suppress dissent and make decisions that – as a result – lead to policy fiascos.

The socio-political environment is a crucial factor in accounting for the advent and collective approval of a pathological leader, especially in situations of acute stress. This is another field of psychological research on leadership. Assessing the psychological characteristics of large groups, such as a nation or an ethnic community, is conceptually and methodologically problematic, although there appears to be a dialectical relationship between the psychological needs of the members of these

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Psychoanalysis and the Study of Emotions in IR

groups and their choice of a leader.\textsuperscript{10} Hitler’s conquest of power is a good case in point, and has given rise to a significant body of not always conclusive academic literature. Taking stock of the Nazi experience, Adorno and his team developed an important research program on the Authoritarian Personality to explain how certain individuals were inclined to support fascist and conservative movements. They established a set of personality traits, which were assumed to result from childhood experiences, and ranked these traits and their intensity in any given person on what they called the “fascist scale”. These traits included conventionalism, submission to authority, tendency towards aggression, stereotypes, racism in particular, and projection.

There is no shortage of biographical research on Nazi followers, particularly Third Reich war criminals. At first sight, these individuals appear to be deeply pathological. Well before Adorno’s study, Henry V. Dicks, a British psychiatrist, interviewed a sample of German prisoners during and in the aftermath of the war, including the most obvious sadists that made up Hitler’s group of executioners. He argued that there was a relationship between certain personality traits and an affinity for Nazism, but concluded his sociological and psychoanalytical inquiry by stressing that none of these individuals were pathological, though many of them experienced unhappy childhoods in authoritarian families.\textsuperscript{11} He wrote that “Nazis or near Nazis were likely to be men of markedly pre-genital or immature personality structure in which libido organization followed a sado-masochistic pattern, based on a repression of the tender tie with the mother, typically resulting in a homosexual paranoid (extra-punitive) relation to a harsh and ambivalently loved and hated father figure”.\textsuperscript{12} Our contemporary category of “borderline personality disorder” would probably better represent the personality traits of these fanatical Nazis. In other historical circumstances they would certainly have followed conventional professional carriers and lifestyles.

Nowadays, international politics is often influenced by the actions of individuals who are not part of a state or intergovernmental structure. This is the case of transnational terrorist networks. The group pressure exerted on individual terrorist engagement is well documented. Building on the work undertaken by Freud, Bion, Anzieu and Kaes, C. B. Tarantelli argues that suicidal terrorism should be understood in terms of both individual and group pathology. Terrorists’ capacity for apparently senseless violence may be an indication of their personal commitment, and their action can be considered value-rational.\textsuperscript{13} However, individuals who kill

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} \textit{Licensed Mass Murder: A Socio-Psychological Study of Some SS Killers}, London: Heinemann, 1972.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{International Journal of Psychoanalysis}, 91, 2010: 541–560.
\end{itemize}
themselves to expand Islam and join Allah manifest a religious fanaticism that bears some similarity with animism. Data on individual terrorists is sketchy. It would seem however that some do have a record of severe trauma, conflictual family relationships and inferiority complexes, are withdrawn, exhibit odd behaviour, are close-minded, have a feeling of omnipotence with a dose of narcissistic megalomania, and are prone to project their repressed impulses outwards. Yet many subjects suffering similar symptoms do not become terrorists and enjoy successful professional careers as bureaucrats or in the business sector. Psychoanalytical theory can contribute to a better understanding of the motivations and commitments of these self-destructive fanatics, which would otherwise remain hidden behind the veil of their own rationalizations and ideals.

**IDEOLOGIES**

Ideological discourses are an essential component of conflicting political interactions between and within state societies. As has already been mentioned, it is not enough to describe their apparently rational logic, the interests or values that they defend, the sociological basis of their promoters and followers, or the structural conditions that contribute to their development, to fully capture their influence. Although ideologies cannot be understood without referring to their socio-cultural environment, the fact remains that they are loaded with passion. Understanding the often repressed psychological motives of political actors and intellectuals is a task more complicated than Marxist attempts to unmask “false consciousness” (e.g., the material, ideological and institutional processes that capitalist societies allegedly induce to deceive the working class). Freud has indeed enriched our understanding of religious creeds, myths and ideological belief systems by showing that these representations express sublimated collective needs on a symbolic level and by deciphering their psychological foundations. Human desires can be repressed and sublimated into, inter alia, various forms of belief systems. These creeds have some common libidinal and affective origins as they are partial remnants of infantile idealisation. They are expressions of early childhood wishes of protection and derive from the grandiose image that children develop about their parents. They offer emotional compensation for the sacrifice imposed by the limitations of human nature, by loss, suffering and death in particular. As human beings cannot escape feelings of helplessness, they tend to invent different types of myths to cope with them. They displace their need for security, their nostalgia for a protective father- or mother-figure, onto an almighty God, or various divinities, or a providential holder.

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of authority, or a grandiose ideological abstraction. This also explains why those who hold political power, whatever the nature of their authority and the means and circumstances by which they gained their status, benefit from a presumption of legitimacy.

Religious convictions and ideologies allow individuals to contain or conversely express their aggressive impulses. They sustain the projection of hate, envy or contempt onto external groups. They are a source of fallacy and discomfort, but also of pleasure, as they are a means for various types of narcissistic satisfaction. Religion and ideology can sometimes provide safe harbours to justify criminal or sadistic behaviour. The experience of totalitarian states and dictatorships in the twentieth century tragically demonstrate how ideology can be used or diverted by leaders and their followers for aggressive purposes. Religious creeds and ideologies have frequently motivated the elite and the masses to engage in extreme forms of political fanaticism and self-destructive collective behaviour. Otto F. Kernberg underlined the pernicious political effect of what he calls the “paranoid ideologies” that divide the world between good and bad: “Paranoid ideologies are a powerful facilitator of social violence by directly neutralizing individual moral constraints against personal perpetration of suffering, torture and murder”.  

Nationalist ideals show the impact of collective passions on politics. Their analysis cannot be confined to doctrinal propositions or worldviews articulated in defence of the nation-state. The principle of national sovereignty was originally conceived to promote individual and collective freedom, justice and solidarity. Very early on, however, it served the purposes of demagoguery, domestic violence and aggression. We will never fully understand nationalism or ethno-nationalism and the aggressive behaviour it brings out in the elite and the masses if we do not attempt to uncover the conscious and unconscious fantasies and desires that lead individuals and groups to invest in these “imagined communities”. People take pride in their nation, ethnic group, community or religion, the ideals of which provide compensation for their individual or collective vulnerability. The repertoire of fantasies inherent in nationalist discourse is fairly consistent. Nationalism provides various forms of narcissistic satisfaction deriving from a sense of collective identity, a quest for dignity and a sense of superiority over other people.

Nationalists are particularly “touchy” when it comes to defending their territorial and symbolic frontiers. They view the nation as a spiritual creature that provides them with an identity, a purpose, a glorious lineage and a feeling of self-esteem. Nations have traditionally captured the minds of the elite and the masses as an

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object of desire, usually symbolized by an iconography representing paternal heroes or maternal figures. The idealization of “great men” or “charismatic leaders” in particular has been a recurrent theme in nationalist discourse from the eighteenth century onwards. Napoleon in France, Garibaldi in Italy, and Bismarck in Germany have all been worshiped as idols in the nationalist saga of their respective state. Fascist leaders were to subsequently reinforce these personality cults. Adoration has been sustained by an important iconography with the flag representing a fetishised object of collective narcissism.

In these myths, intellectuals and politicians develop narratives about their nation’s unique historical destiny, supposedly guided by providence and embodying the highest values of civilization. In some instances the myths are associated with narratives of humiliation or persecution, such as in the case of Serbian and Israeli nationalism. Nationalists yearn for a harmonious community, and this ideal invariably leads to the exclusion of those perceived as outgroups within or without. National cohesion requires foreign enemies and domestic scapegoats. The greater the enmity appears to be, the more the feeling of belonging to a homogenous in-group can be promoted. Such hostility fuels collective feelings of insecurity and aggressiveness, a phenomenon that rationalists call the “security dilemma”.

As we know, nationalism has flourished in most Western countries. Its emotional dimensions largely explain why the ideals of the nation-state have been extraordinarily resilient over the past centuries, especially in times of war and crisis. It is worth noting in this context that nation-states are not the only type of “imagined community”. The same holds true for clans, tribes, religious groups or any other form of community.

The Role of Institutions

Nationalist ideologies have flourished in times of socioeconomic crisis and rapid structural transformation as a way to overcome collective feelings of insecurity. This especially applies to Europe during the second part of the nineteenth century. The period was marked by rapid urbanization, critical changes in production patterns and socio-economic recession, which affected people from all walks of life, not only the working class or small-scale artisans. Following World War I, the crisis of political institutions, the breakdown of socio-cultural traditions, and the collapse of the European economy created fertile ground for the development of fanatical ideologies, which drew their support from social categories that had been most affected by unemployment, marginalisation and the loss of social status.

In his socio-psychological work, Freud underlined the leading role played by the institutional environment in the development of individual identities and collective behaviour. He shared Hobbes’s conviction that political and socio-cultural constraints
are necessary to contain human aggressiveness: “Men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved. . . . [T]hey are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowment is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness . . . . Homo homini lupus. Who, in the face of all his experience of life and of history, will have the courage to dispute this assertion?”

Instincts and passions can be assuaged and contained by cultural norms, in particular taboos, prescriptions, proscriptions and legal rules, in other words by an institutional framework that represses aggressive collective behaviour. Institutions have a central part to play in channelling instincts and drives. They provide checks and balances to limit the power of conflicting political forces. Following Hobbes and other classical thinkers, Freud associated the breakdown of institutional order with the unleashing of aggressiveness.

From his perspective, political order and social hierarchies are not only the product of coercion and necessity, but also of emotional ties. The social compact has an affective dimension involving the idealisation of the ruler and fraternal bonding between the members of the polity. Communal ties – whether at the national, ethnic or clan level – are cemented by bonds of collective identification. Freud took into consideration the importance of the social environment in his theory of identification. Subsequently, his successors, particularly Winnicott in England, developed the theory of “object relations”, which stresses the decisive role played by family experiences involving the primary caretaker during infancy in the construction of personality. Individual instinctive and libidinal compulsions may have different objects and support a great variety of ideals depending on historical circumstances. This means that the institutional environment greatly influences individual and group identification and behaviour. It has a direct bearing on the ways that they define their ideals, social projects and attachments. Anarchy breeds violence, as well as material destitution, wicked leadership and immoral laws.

Institutions can also play an equivocal role in ensuring social order and providing peace and security. It is not rare that governments, partisan leaders and intellectuals use legal rules and procedures to stir people’s instincts and libidinal drives to fulfil their own political ambitions and aggressive desires. Malignant political regimes can encourage violence and sadism. Societies that follow their governments may fall rapidly into violence as evidenced in 1914 and more recently in a large number of ethnic cleansings and genocides, from Yugoslavia to Rwanda and Sudan. In situations of war, which is by definition a breakdown of pre-existing order, it is not rare that states authorize and organize extermination of their enemies, be they foreign or national.

In 1920, some months after the end of World War I, Freud introduced the death instinct hypothesis: “The inclination to aggression is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man … it constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization. … This aggressive instinct is the derivative and the main representative of the death instinct, the hostility of each against all and of all against each”. This was certainly one of the most speculative of Freud’s hypotheses, which has been supported by numerous post-Freudians, Melanie Klein in particular. In reflecting on some of the most intractable, self-defeating and irrational forms of contemporary collective violence, it is difficult to dismiss it altogether.

Freud’s contribution to the issue of social and political order also lies in his explanation of individual and collective ambivalence towards institutions and political authorities as they repress instincts and libidinal drives. From his perspective, the severity of moral norms and legal rules express people’s desire to transgress them. Regardless of this, institutions that protect civilization are frail because human beings resent the constraints imposed on them.

Globalization and Institutional Failures

States are currently the most comprehensive institutional frameworks for ensuring political order and security. They are founded on the premise that their citizens share a common national allegiance. Today, however, governments find it increasingly difficult to create bonds of solidarity among their citizens whose interests, values and identities tend to differ. At the same time, globalization has transformed the very notion and practice of political sovereignty, further weakening the capacity of states to successfully carry out political integration. The expansion of trade, together with technological developments and financial deregulation have undermined governments’ fiscal and budgetary autonomy.

Globalization has resulted in increasing socio-economic disparities nationally and internationally. Individuals from the financial and business sectors owe their social status to transnational economic activities. They share the same background, lifestyle and world views which are largely motivated by utilitarian concerns. Simultaneously, a large number of people in the industrialised world suffer from various structural changes brought about by globalization. Since 2008, the number of unemployed, marginalized and migrant workers has significantly risen. As a result, globalization has hampered government efforts to foster a sense of national purpose. Few people today, at least in Europe, feel emotionally bound to a common national identity.

Although several governments in Asia, such as those of India and China, have managed to lift very large numbers of their citizens out of extreme poverty, development has failed in many states in the southern hemisphere. The population of these countries continues to grow rapidly. A majority still lives off the land, or from informal activities in inhospitable and insecure cities. Their youth, which has low levels of formal education and slim prospects of finding a job, is hard hit by the prevailing socio-economic conditions that threaten their individual dignity and group self-esteem.  

Many of their governments and bureaucracies are inefficient or corrupt, a reality that affects their economic performance and capacity for political integration.

More than ever, political order and social justice within states cannot be dissociated from the dynamics of international politics. The growing number of weak or failed states plagued by domestic conflicts or civil wars affect regional security and development policies in the southern hemisphere, and have led to a sharp increase in the scale of humanitarian aid. These problems arise largely because the institutional setting of globalization is frail. UN secretariats have an unquestionable influence on international politics, not only as negotiation facilitators and program implementers, but also as producers of norms and knowledge. They seek to contain political conflicts or to channel them into acceptable social behaviour. However, the relation between the UN’s very broad mandates and their effective capacities falls short of the mark most of the time. Rituals and procedures hamper the deliberative process of these intergovernmental bodies. Representatives of governments use the elevated rhetoric of peace, security, human rights and common welfare to legitimize their leadership. At the same time these gatherings are also the theatre of violent controversies between government representatives who seize the opportunity to express their political antagonism symbolically.

Currently, the most substantial aspects of global governance are managed by restricted intergovernmental meetings, such as the Security Council or ad hoc summits, bilateral diplomatic exchanges, where broad or sectorial issues are negotiated. The end of the cold war has had no lasting effect on the world order. Collective security remains unreliable, and there is no agreement between the great powers on the guiding principles of international order, on the norms of state sovereignty and on the strategies and policies that should be followed to implement the “responsibility to protect” proclaimed in 2005 by the UN General Assembly.

International economic regimes fare little better. Global trade negotiations have stalled. As a result, multilateralism is being gradually superseded by bilateral and regional trade agreements, which is detrimental to weak trading partners. Restricted clubs – such as the G7/8, G20 or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

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Development – are now the most common fora used to tackle major economic, social and environmental matters. Industrial states, which are a part of these fora, have nevertheless been unable to regulate the expansion of financial services, establish stable monetary regimes or supervise the activities of transnational corporations, all of which have a responsibility in recent economic crises. Nor have they reached a consensus on environmental problems, such as climate change of anthropogenic origin, decline or extinction of animal and plant species, natural habitats and ecosystems.

The Legitimacy Crisis

State failures, together with deficiencies in international governance, have fuelled insecurity through conflicts and crises. The end of the cold war was supposed to weaken ideological antagonisms and promote convergent world views, but this is far from being the case. Despite the development of universal and regional intergovernmental institutions and the growing influence of information and social media networks, political, ideological and cultural heterogeneity has increased at the global level. Nationalism, religious and political sectarianisms are on the rise again. Conversely, secular and rationalist goals, which were fundamental to state sovereignty and modernity and are enshrined in the UN Charter and human rights conventions, appear to be on the decline. In Europe, the disintegration of Yugoslavia during the 1990s marked the resurgence of nationalist movements combined with religious fervour. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in September 2001, President Bush, with the backing of various American evangelical movements, launched a crusade against the “Axis of Evil” and more generally against any government that resisted the providential hegemony of the United States. In the Middle East, Israeli settlers, supported by their government, have increasingly viewed colonisation of the occupied territories of Palestine and persecution of its inhabitants as a “sacred nationalreligious mission”, while Islamist fundamentalists have supported cruel forms of collective violence in the Middle East to expand the realm of Islam. Sectarian religious-cum-political movements and networks scattered across the globe have become a breeding ground for international terrorism and pose a major security threat to states and societies. Elsewhere, especially in the so-called underdeveloped world, from Pakistan to several weak or failed states in Africa, ethnicity continues to play a major role in conflicts, leading in some instances to mass killings and disintegration of countries into civil war. The Rwandan genocide is a reminder of the horrifying climax to which ethno-nationalist conflicts are liable to build. Another addition to this grim list is the fact that technological advances may enhance the destructive capabilities of non-state groups driven by fanatical creeds (such as clans, families, sects, tribes and criminal organizations) or of individuals prompted by lethal fantasies.
The resulting crisis of legitimacy that we are experiencing has become an emotional issue that stands high on the agenda of international politics. Huntington discussed the issue in his famous *Clash of Civilizations*, which contends that the main axis of conflict will be along cultural and religious lines. Although collective identities are in flux, and worldwide socio-cultural heterogeneity and antagonisms reflect a wide variety of socialization processes and institutional environments, the main argument of this essay has become difficult to challenge.

From a psychoanalytical perspective, fanaticism – whether religious or secular – that drives individuals or groups is linked to aspirations for psychological security, dignity and self-esteem. In troubled circumstances, social needs for illusory creeds tend to increase, as does the intensity of human aggressiveness inherent in the compensatory representations. The failure of states’ integrative capacities and the deficiency of global governance are indeed a fertile ground for all sorts of spiritual and ideological delusions. They contribute largely to the proliferation of ethnic and communitarian movements, to the development of religious fundamentalism and political fanaticism. These psychological realities are a crucial aspect of international politics as they influence the outbreak of collective violence, civil war and genocide in particular. Moreover, the disintegration of the state in civil wars also encourages the spread of gangs led by occasional leaders who order the commission of all manner of crimes to fulfil their own particular material advantages and inchoate desires, sometimes without even bothering to give an ideological or religious justification to their criminal activities.²⁰

Lethal passions have always been the bread and butter of politics. Psychoanalytical hermeneutics allow us to explore these phenomena beyond the traditional realms of realism and rationalism which tend to negate the importance of emotional thought and behaviour in politics. It can also contribute to understanding some of the intricacies of decision-making processes. It gives new meaning to ideological discourses, particularly nationalism and ethno-nationalism, as well as to the security dilemmas created by socioeconomic vulnerability and political instability. It broadens the interpretation of institutions, by stressing their equivocal role in shaping collective identities and political order. The contribution of psychoanalysis to the study of these complex phenomena will always be challenged, but so are the more traditional designs used to analyse complex decision-making processes, group solidarities and the collective illusions that influence world politics.

Emotions and International Law

Vesselin Popovski

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between emotions and law has been debated over many centuries. Some philosophers, Immanuel Kant for example, considered emotions as “illnesses of mind”, as destroyers of rational decision-making, counter-productive to politics and law. In the “Introduction” to *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant reveals four stages of rationalization of human actions: feelings lead to inclinations, which lead to interests, which lead to a choices, which leads to actions. Trying to satisfy their primal emotional needs, humans realize their interests, develop plans, establish goals, and strategize towards achieving these through rational actions.

Emotions are the force of nature, they impulse human behaviour; whereas laws are the force of society, they organize human behaviour. Laws are codified rules that gradually evolve from generally accepted customs and unwritten norms of behaviour. Emotions affect all human actions, whereas laws are supposed to discipline and limit the force of nature, to encourage the reasonable, and to discourage the unreasonable behaviour.

The role of emotions in law-making may vary – some may regard emotions as corrupting the legal judgement; others, in total contrast, may regard emotions as being essentially constitutive elements of legal judgements. Psychologists, engaging in empirical research on political and legal developments, may emphasize the latter approach. Conservative legal scholars may defend the former and advocate purely non-emotional justice with eyes bound, holding a sword in one hand and a scale in the other hand – as often portrayed.

Whether emotions are viewed as distinct from, or integral to, socio-moral reasoning has important consequences for both theory and practice, for legal studies and for development of the legal systems. Are emotions destroying the legal reasoning? Or

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are emotions essential constituents of it? Do emotions reduce reason and calculative abilities, driving laws into untested beliefs? Or do emotions enhance legal capacity to perceive the best interest of people and advance legal developments?

These questions describe the complexities of the relationship between emotions and law. The existing literature has focused extensively on the role of emotions on political decision-making – being it positive or negative; but less on the role of emotions on law-making and law implementation. Even less attention has been paid to emotions in international law. This chapter attempts to fill these gaps. It searches for a balance between two opposing claims: (1) emotions are corruptive to international law; and (2) emotions inform and develop international law.

The main hypothesis is that emotions do play a major role in law-making, but that they should play a lesser role in law-practicing. International criminal tribunals emerge as a major development to deliver justice for international crimes, which involves satisfying the demands and relieving the emotional stress of the victims. However, the criminal process should be de-emotionalized, judges need to remain un-biased, non-emotional, looking only at facts and laws when delivering sentences.

PASSIONS OF LAW

Emotions naturally drive the process of law-making. Norms and rules originate in empathy, in sharing dignity and commonalities with fellow human beings. Laws were developed and written in texts to make us safe and protected and to feel good. Law makers are human beings who love, hate, watch, listen, read, feel and so on. Judges are also human beings who love and hate, as are all the participants in the criminal process – prosecutors, accused, defence lawyers, victims, and witnesses – they all can bring their emotions to the courtroom.

Criminal courts deal often with crimes of passion. Love or jealousy killings (“Othello”-type), hate or revenge crimes are notorious incidents that judges and lawyers need to deal with often. Criminal justice necessarily deals with feelings – compassion, mercy, anger, vengeance, hatred, love, remorse – and these can be regarded as either mitigating or aggravating circumstances. A particular emotional status at the time of committing a crime can increase or reduce a sentence. In some legal systems, the law requires judges to identify or qualify an element of evil – that the murder is heinous, atrocious or cruel – before imposing a maximum sentence, including a death penalty. Famous trials illustrate how emotional the law and criminal justice could be: Oscar Wilde’s trial for obscenity, au pair Louise Woodward’s murder trial, O. J. Simpson’s first trial, Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin proposals to regulate pornography, laws against sodomy or same-sex marriages, the trial of the Oklahoma City bomber, Oscar Pistorius’ trial in South Africa, the ferry captain’s trial in South Korea. Even in the most intense
emotional environments, the judges must keep emotions at bay. Criminal justice need to remain rational and formalistic; judges and juries have to make decisions, disregarding not only their own emotions, but also working to not be overwhelmed by the emotions of victims and relatives or by media and public pressures.

Susan Bandes in her edited book *The Passions of Law* (2001) raises some profound questions: What role do emotions, ranging from disgust to compassion, play in the decision-making process of judges, lawyers, juries and clients? Which emotions can be linked to which legal contexts? How can one estimate the role of emotion in death sentencing, in hate crime legislation, in punitive damages or shaming penalties? Bandes destroys the myth that emotions have no place in law and argues that emotions are rampant in law, and that they are often central to positive decision-making.

In my edited book *International Criminal Accountability and Children’s Rights* (2006) we address a dilemma with child victims and witnesses: on the one hand, children should have the same rights as adults to seek justice done and participate in the criminal process; but on the other hand, cross examination by prosecutors and defence lawyers may add to children’s emotional traumas. Our book offers recommendations as how to improve the witness and victim protection system in the practice of international criminal tribunals.

Dan Kahan elaborates on two roles of emotions in risk regulation, contrasting the “irrational weigher” theory with the “cultural evaluator” theory. The first theory claims that emotional apprehensions of risk are heuristic substitutes for more reflective judgements; and, as emotions produce systematic errors, the risk regulation needs to be assigned to politically insulated experts, whose judgements are free of emotional distorting impact. The second theory counter-argues that emotional apprehensions of risk reflect expressive appraisals of putatively dangerous activities. These should be afforded normative weight in law and allowed to generate distinctive strategies for reconciling sound risk regulation with genuinely participatory, democratic policymaking.

“DISGUST” AS ELEMENT OF CRIMES. “SHAME” AS PUNISHING TOOL

Dan Kahan addresses also the propriety of considering “disgust” and “shame” as elements in law-making. He advocates that disgust is essential to accurate moral
perception and to express social protests, and even advises to use shame as a
punishing tool. In *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (2001), Martha
Nussbaum agrees that cultures give emotional vocabulary and that emotions have
an intelligent role;\(^6\) however, in another book – *Hiding from Humanity: Disgust,
Shame, and the Law* (2004) – she questions whether disgust and shame should play
such large legal roles.\(^7\) Unlike anger and fear – valid responses to real damages or
imagined dangers – shame and disgust, Nussbaum argues, are “unreliable as guides
to public practice”, but “connected in how society stigmatizes a person as less
worthy”.\(^8\) Ultimately, she concludes, disgust and shame are used as forms of social
behaviour in which a dominant group subordinates and stigmatizes other groups.

Early American anti-sodomy laws were based on considerations of unnatural sins,
or feelings of disgust that formed the basis for campaigns to outlaw same-sex marriages.
The British jurist Lord Patrick Devlin argued that, in the context of criminalizing
homosexuality, the average person’s disgust is a proper reason to make an act illegal
because a society has the right to preserve itself.\(^9\) Examining the ethics and laws
of human cloning, Leon Kass also accepts that there is wisdom in our feelings of
“repugnance”.\(^10\) Nussbaum, however, counter-argues that disgust is “at most a rough
heuristic for avoiding dangerous substances”.\(^11\) The feeling concerns the “prospect
that a problematic substance may be incorporated into the self”, especially corporeal
products such as “feces, snot, semen”, it embodies “magical ideas of contamination
and impossible aspirations to purity, immorality, and non-animality, that are just not
in line with human life as we know it”.\(^12\) Historically, meanwhile, societies have used
disgust to subordinate certain groups, exemplifying the boundary between the truly
human and the basely animal. The appalling way in which Nazi regarded Jews, but
also in which many previous regimes regarded minorities, women, homosexuals,
lower classes and so on is very instructive.

Disgust is an unreliable emotion when it comes to law-making, and therefore it
should be outside the legal definition of acts such as obscenity and homosexuality.
In the criminal investigation and prosecution processes, the reliance on disgust
may have a distortive effect. For example, in case of “disgusting” murders – such
as Rachel Nickell (UK) – the general public feeling of disgust – otherwise a normal

\(^6\) Martha Hussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2004).

\(^8\) Ibid.


\(^11\) Nussbaum, *Hiding from Humanity*.

\(^12\) Ibid.
human reaction – may become corruptive for the investigation and may push to bring to trial wrongly accused suspects.

An interesting issue in this regard is how far a can prosecutor go into very graphical details of a murder and suffering of a victim as to present “aggravating circumstances”. Can the accused be repeatedly described as an “inhuman monster” to influence a jury towards a maximum sentence? One problem could be that such prosecutorial strategy may raise considerations of insanity – as with Anders Breivik (Norway) – and jeopardize the competency of an accused to stand trial. Psychopathic murders could be the most “disgusting”, but the feeling of disgust may lead to consideration of insanity and result in acquittal.

The use of shame as punishment is a more complex issue. I support people who feel discriminated, who protest and shame the politicians; I support human rights organizations, monitoring violations and writing reports of “blame and shame” as alternative strategy in the lack of legal options or political power to influence change. Gandhi used shame against the British colonizers, as did Martin Luther King against the racist policies in the American South and Nelson Mandela against the leaders of the apartheid. People in Eastern Europe went to the streets to name and shame the communist dictators. To shame a cynical or corrupted politician, a totalitarian state or a corporation for environmental abuses does not raise problems. Shame has a long history as a powerful instrument of social movements. It helps to develop ideals and aspirations. But I would strongly resist using shame as a punishing tool in criminal process. A convicted criminal should be simply given the sentence based on what the law says. The role of the judge is not to shame the accused, it is the role of the judge simply to apply the law. I remember a colleague, who instead of applying the university regulation when two students plagiarized their exam essays, spent hours in talking to them, trying to make them feel ashamed, first individually and then in front of other students. This produced the opposite effect, the two students formally protested – correctly – saying that they will rewrite the essays and try to pass the exam with the minimal pass mark, as per university regulations. But they did not feel they needed to be exposed to shame and to apologize to anybody.

Shame has been used as a punishing tool, one California judge in 1990 ordered a man to wear a t-shirt reading “I am on felony probation for theft”, although the sentence was overruled on appeal. In a similar case in 1986 in Florida, a punishment requiring a drunk driver to affix a “Convicted DUI – Restricted License” bumper sticker to his vehicle, have been upheld. Shaming someone, or naming their acts disgusting, could be “hiding our humanity” as Nussbaum marvelously put it.

Shame should not be a punishing tool, but it can be used as a self-punishing tool. When former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama resigned when he failed to negotiate the U.S. troop withdrawal from Okinawa, feeling shame from failure to
deliver on electoral promises. Such resignation may gain public sympathy, which is also an emotion, to which politicians are usually sensitive.\textsuperscript{13}

I disagree with Kahan, Etzioni and others who recommend reviving the use of shame as a punishing tool to reinforce moral values.\textsuperscript{14} I find such punishment against our basic human dignity. It does not play any educational or other public role, and there has never been evidence that using shame as punishment reduces criminality.\textsuperscript{15} In fact, exactly the opposite may be true: shaming may create a feeling of revenge among convicted people. I was astonished to see an opinion by the ex-Prime Minister of Bulgaria and supreme judge, Dimitar Popov, recommending not only the re-establishment of death penalty, but even the public executions\textsuperscript{16} – almost a return to the medieval practices. Kahan and others advocate using shame as an alternative to lengthy prison sentences, similar to fines and community service, which have floundered as punishing techniques. But why not simply opt for fines and community services, a much more civilized form of punishment, than wearing t-shirts reading “I AM A CONVICTED THIEF” for a defined period of time. Letting offenders engage in community service works as an alternative will not only save government spending on prisons, but it will also rehabilitate offenders by engaging them in useful work. Using shame is uncertain both as a deterrent and as a rehabilitator; both these objectives can be accomplished without stigmatizing. Shame undermines the normal purposes of punishment, it exacerbates the offender’s alienation and isolation. It is better to focus on how the person engaged in the crime in the first place, rather than to ridicule the person. Shame, imposed from above, may have a boomerang effect and some offenders, after being publicly humiliated, may develop revenge feelings and re-offend.

\textbf{CRIMINAL LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY}

The criminal law has no unified theory of emotion and culpability, and legal scholars often seem to misunderstand or ignore what psychologists have developed as knowledge on emotions. Norman Finkel and Gerrod Parrott offer such deliberations in their edited book \textit{Emotions and Culpability: How the Law Is at Odds with Psychology, Jurors, and Itself},\textsuperscript{17} arguing that culpability theories are psychological

\textsuperscript{13} Certainly not all. Silvio Berlusconi would be an example of the opposite extreme.


\textsuperscript{17} Norman Finkel and Gerrod Parrott (eds.), \textit{Emotions and Culpability: How the Law Is at Odds with Psychology, Jurors, and Itself} (Washington, DC, American Psychological Association, 2006).
at heart and that there are various ways in which psychology can help inform the criminal law. More recently, Dennis J. Devine published an excellent volume *Jury Decision Making* (2012), exploring fifty years of practices and elaborating on the role of emotions in the process.  

The legal scholarship on behaviouralism and implications of cognitive biases for the law is increasing. In parallel with the rise of such commentaries, legal scholars have begun to discuss the role of emotions in legal discourse, the appropriateness of various emotions for the substantive law and to attempts to model the place in which emotions belong in the law. Implicit in some of these attempts (and explicit in others), however, is the assumption that emotions are predictable, manageable and under conscious control. This assumption is belied by psychological research on affective forecasting, which demonstrates individuals’ inability to accurately predict future emotional states, both their own and others. Such inaccuracy has surprisingly broad implications for both substantive and procedural aspects of the legal system. Jeremy A. Blumenthal reminds us of research findings that demonstrate the implausibility of some theoretical models on emotions, and that, if these models are flawed, the normative conclusions drawn from them may be flawed as well. He points to inaccuracies in affective forecasting and to potential flaws in the way civil juries assign compensatory awards or approach certain aspects of sexual harassment law. Contract law is also implicated by these findings, especially in the context of surrogate motherhood. The data is relevant to areas of health law too; for instance, the broad use of advance directives, as well as in the specific context of euthanasia. Implications of the affective forecasting research for law theories and emotions have specific drawbacks to some current theories. Also, the data implicates the theories of welfare and well-being that underlie much legal policy, as well as speculations about what the findings might have to say about paternalistic policies. The paternalism discussion, however, has been incomplete in a number of contexts, despite a substantial focus on the first line of scholarship, commentators have addressed the implications of emotional biases far less.

Regarding the effect of emotion on moral judgements, legal scholars and social scientists have conducted far less empirical research than might be expected, directly testing such questions. Nevertheless, the extent to which affect can influence moral decisions is an important question for the law. Watching a certain sort of movie, for instance, can significantly influence responses to opinion polls conducted shortly after that movie. The French movie *Deux Hommes dans la Ville* (1973, featuring

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20 Ibid.
Jean Gabin and Alain Delon) led to a massive public pressure to abolish the death penalty in France. Legislative action based on public opinion as so expressed, or media reports of public opinion based on such polls, could thus inaccurately reflect that public sentiment. This is especially so for social and policy issues that are heavily emotional, such as capital punishment or affirmative action.

Most discussion on law and emotions has been theoretical, addressing philosophical approaches. The psychological data is mixed, and very little of it appears in the legal literature. Thus, to bring the legal academic discussion into the realm of the empirical, and to provide additional data on the question of affective influences on moral and legal decision-making, Blumenthal conducted two experimental studies examining the influence of mood on moral judgements and offering data showing that individuals in a positive mood (happiness) tend to process information more superficially than those in a negative mood (anxiety). The results have implications for the legal system, including trials (victim impact statements or graphic testimony), and for public policy-making.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PUBLIC EMOTIONS

Emotional public and media reaction – outrage, anger, feelings of revenge – may jeopardize or influence the criminal process. Ideally, judges and juries should remain independent and distant from public and media opinions, but this is easier said, than done. Examples of such highly influenced trials are:

- **Lindy Chamberlain** (Australia) – parents camping in Uluru desert in 1980 lost their 9-week-old baby Azaria, who was abducted from the tent by a dingo dog. Parents were accused, prosecuted and sentenced; they were acquitted later, after evidential re-examination, but the public remained doubtful whether the dingo abducted the baby or the parents invented the story to get rid of unwanted baby. After a fourth inquest in 2012, an Australian coroner made a ruling that a dingo had indeed taken the baby from the camp and caused her death.

- **Thompson and Venables** (UK) – 3-year-old James Bulger cruelly stoned and murdered in 1993 by two 10-year-old boys. Public remained furious and debates unleashed regarding maximum sentence under English law for minors (eight years). Thompson and Venables became the youngest convicted murderers in twentieth-century England. After spending eight years in custody, they left prison, protected with changed names and identities. The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Art. 6 (right to fair trial) for prosecuting the boys in a court for adults.

- **Rachel Nickell** (UK) – young mother stabbed and her throat cut in 1992 in Wimbledon Common in front of her 2-year-old child. The police used a
controversial operation “Ezdell” to incriminate and prosecute an innocent man – Colin Stagg. Psychological profiling of suspects later criticized and banned in UK.

- Madeleine McCann (Portugal) – in 2007 a 3-year-old girl disappeared from a holiday apartment while her parents were dining only 100 meters away. Public and media demanded investigation of the parents’ negligence, expressing feelings of resentment for their middle-class status. Kate McCann, the mother, was particularly accused of appearing too cold on interviews (“not crying enough”), similar to Lindy Chamberlain case.

Crime justice for such atrocious crimes obviously inflate with strong emotions the legal process. Emotions, expressions of moral disgust with perpetrators or empathy with the suffering of the relatives of the victims may influence the process and engage the public in demonstrations in front of court buildings. Criminal law and criminal procedure reflect on collective emotions of fear and anger about crime, and public outrage about offenders and offences. The relationship between emotions and law is complex, particularly in the highly sensitive culture of post-modernity. How does law deal with emotions? Do we need to attach or to detach the emotional element from the legal judgements? How? These questions need further exploration and research.

EMOTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Most of the literature on the relationship between emotions and law focuses on domestic or municipal law. My chapter offers some thoughts on the role of emotions in international law. I start by looking at the development of international humanitarian law (IHL), historically advanced by emotional drivers, such as the empathy with wounded and captured soldiers and also with civilian victims of armed conflict.

EMPATHY FOR VICTIMS OF WAR AND DEVELOPMENT OF IHL

The first Geneva Convention in 1864 and the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the symbolic birthday of IHL, and was a direct result from an emotional account – the book A Memory of Solferino written by Henry Dunant. In June 1859, the military alliance of France and Sardinia under Napoleon III met the Austrian army at the village of Solferino in northern Italy, and – after fifteen hours of heavy fighting – the Austrians retreated, leaving more than 40,000 soldiers killed or injured. Surrounding villages were overwhelmed with bleeding and dying soldiers and the small medical services attached to the armed
forces and the few doctors in the villages were unable to cope. Medical provision was little or inadequate, and – as a result – thousands soldiers from both sides died from simple wounds because of this lack of medical care. Swiss businessman Henry Dunant, passing through one of the villages with most of wounded and dying soldiers (Castiglione), was appalled at the suffering of the wounded. With charitable organisations in Switzerland, he started working with local nurses to help the wounded. He brought in food, water and clean clothes and supplies to wash dressings. In 1862, Henry Dunant published *A Memory of Solferino* and proposed the creation of national relief societies of trained volunteers to provide neutral and impartial help to wounded soldiers on battlefields. He sent copies of the book to important people in Europe, including royalty and ministers.

At the time, Europe was experiencing a period of change and many welcomed Henry Dunant’s ideas. Advances in technology and the increasing use of firearms also meant that wars cause injuries which had not been seen before. Within months of the publication of *A Memory of Solferino* a temporary ‘Committee of Five’ was formed in Geneva to begin organising medical relief societies and later became the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The first Red Cross conference was held in Geneva and succeeded in drafting resolutions and recommendations to organize national relief societies. By the end of 1863, the first such society was formed in Wurttemberg, Germany. In 1870, another national society was formed in Britain and later became the British Red Cross. In 1864, the Swiss government called a second conference which resulted in the drafting of a convention which, when ratified and agreed by governments, aimed to bind them to give humane treatment to the sick and wounded in war and protect the medical teams who cared for them. This became the First Geneva Convention.

In 1899 and 1907, two other conferences – this time in The Hague – developed additional IHL guidelines, with the two Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land. One interesting statement in the Preamble of both Conventions is known as Martens Clause, named after a Russian delegate at the 1899 conference, reads: “Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties … declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations … inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from … the dictates of the public conscience”. In other words, acts that shock the public conscience do not need a written legal prohibition to be regarded as such. The idea of a “shock” on the public conscience is clearly an emotional, rather than a rational judgement.

The suffering of millions of civilians, in addition to wounded and captured soldiers, became the emotional impulse for adopting a Fourth Geneva Convention in 1949, a Convention dealing entirely with the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Later development in IHL also addressed protection of vulnerable

EMPATHY WITH VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

In parallel to IHL, human rights law also simultaneously developed out of resentment from some horrible inhuman and degrading treatment of people throughout the history of slavery, colonialism, exploitation, torture, arbitrariness, death penalty, illegal detention and unfair trials. In 1764, Italian philosopher Beccaria published Dei delitti e delle pene (Crimes and Punishments), putting forth an argument against the death penalty and advocating reform of the criminal law system, which – he said – should conform to rational principles. Beccaria wrote with a deep sense of humanity and urgency to end unjust suffering. Beccaria also argued against torture, as a cruel and unnecessary tool to treat human beings. It is precisely his humane sentiment that made his appeal for rationality in the laws so strong. His book had six editions and was translated into many languages. In its French translation, the book enjoyed an anonymous supportive commentary by Voltaire. Later, the work was quoted by Thomas Jefferson and others.

Basic human rights were written into the first constitutions (Poland, France and the United States) in the late eighteenth century, and in the twentieth century, the UN Charter became the first global agreement that put the respect and promotion of human rights at the top of the international agenda and among the main purposes of the Organisation. In fact, the UN Charter begins with a strongly emotional and inspirational statement: “We the People, have determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow”. Accordingly, the Charter puts an exclusive attention and primary focus on the freedom from fear (an essential human emotion) through maintenance of international peace and security as a main United Nations purpose (Art.1/1).

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The public outrage with human rights violations led to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which also includes a highly emotional statement in its Preamble: “Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which outraged the conscience of mankind”. The international human rights law was further developed after that, driven by empathy and care for the rights of particular vulnerable groups – minorities, women, children, migrant workers, people with disabilities, people affected by leprosy and so on. Interestingly, people affected by leprosy have been historically stigmatized through resentment and negative emotions, but in 2010 a General Assembly resolution adopted “Principles and Guidelines” to eliminate the discrimination against people affected by leprosy and their families.23

Emotional empathy towards victims of discrimination and other violations led the progressive development of the international human rights law. In 1984, the Convention against Torture was adopted, universally and unequivocally prohibiting inflicting physical or mental pain for any purposes. Similar to torture, the gradual prohibition of the death penalty came as a result of public outrage from errors in the criminal process, the sentencing of innocent people to die, or with the inhumanity of the execution itself.24

The campaign to prohibit anti-personnel landmines, leading to the 1989 Ottawa Protocol, was massively supported by civil society activists, exposing what disgusting damages to human beings such weapons could produce. Similarly, the current campaign to abolish cluster munitions is driven by repugnance towards the excessive civilian damage caused by such weapons.

Human rights progress has been significantly affected by emotional empathy towards discriminated people. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Children is an example of emotional care to the most vulnerable part of the population. One paradox that remains in the child rights agenda is that children can join armed forces voluntarily at the age of 15, but cannot vote in elections until they are 18. If we consider a 17-year-old mature enough to join the armed forces and fight in war, why do we not consider the same person mature enough to exercise a simple vote?

Emotions in more specific regional contexts also have driven the development of regional mechanisms of human rights. The tendency has been towards greater protection of minorities and groups of people that might be discriminated and their rights violated.

EMOTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

Similar to the IHL and human rights law, the notoriety of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity have led to the recent rapid development of the International Criminal Law. After World War II, the Allied powers set Nuremberg and Tokyo Military tribunals to prosecute the Nazi and Japanese leaders.

After the mass crimes and genocide in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, the international public outrage from discoveries of mass killings led states to agree and the UN Security Council to establish the two ad hoc tribunals – for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.\(^{25}\)

In 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) came into existence in The Hague – a permanent court with jurisdiction to try aggression (upon definition), genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in any country in the world. The ICC is constituted by the Rome Statute adopted in 1998. Its Preamble begins with a highly emotional statement: “Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time; Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity”. We sense again the spirit of the Martens Clause, which brings the emotional shock from crimes against humanity into support of the legality of the prosecution of the perpetrators.

EMOTIONS IN THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

Clearly, international tribunals face a range of challenges that domestic courts seldom face. They involve lawyers and judges from a range of legal traditions, whether the more inquisitorial, civil law countries or adversarial, common law traditions. Judges in international courts may have been appointed because of their professorial expertise, and in some instances may have a diplomatic background, without having operated previously as a judge. The levels of training and expertise in all legal staff may vary significantly, as may the legal cultures from which they come.\(^{26}\) In particular, views about corruption, at the worst, and about consultation with colleagues, at the best, may vary. However, this may be all the more reason to ensure that there are baseline consistent rules.

The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had to grapple with assessing the fact or appearance of emotional judicial bias.\(^{27}\) An


\(^{26}\) McMorrow, “Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in International Tribunals”.

important element is the hatred and stigmatization of evil. The problem of evil has reasserted itself as the world has witnessed a wave of humanitarian atrocities such as Srebrenica, which have come to be described not simply as “crimes” or even “crimes against humanity”, but simply as instances of “evil”.

No consensus exists as to what “evil” entails, how it is manifested and, following from this, what we ought to do about it. Foremost amongst those to use the word “evil” in this sense is ex-President George W. Bush who identified an “Axis of Evil” in his 2002 State of the Union Address. Ronald Reagan famously denouncing the Soviet Union as “evil empire”. Revolutionary Iran labelling the United States “that great Satan”. In 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) used the term “evil” with reference to the humanitarian atrocities perpetrated in Rwanda. “Evil” has similarly been used by UN agencies and other representative bodies to describe a range of atrocities including Rwandan genocide, massacre at Srebrenica, the Beslan school siege and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the term has been extended to recently include racism, nuclear weapons and rape in war.

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28 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809. August 21, 2000, paragraph 50. The sentence reads: “Genocide in Rwanda went as far as it did in part because the international community failed to use or reinforce the operation then on the ground in that country to oppose obvious evil”.


30 Beslan Albert Likhanov, “Against Evil – in the Name of Good”, 5th Conference of UN Associated NGOs.

31 United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan Addressing the General Assembly on Terrorism: “The terrorist attacks against the United States – resulting in the deaths of some 6,000 people from 80 countries – were acts of terrible evil which shocked the conscience of the entire world” SG/SM/7077 GA/9920 1/10/2001; General Assembly President on the anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the United States, “Terrorism is our Irreconcilable Enemy” argues: “In our fight we must see terrorism for what it is – a global evil filled with hatred and extremism, an evil which threatens the common values and principles, as well as the diversity, of the entire civilised world” GA/SM/289. On September 12, 2001, the attacks of the previous day were condemned as “evil” by Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom), Richard Ryan (Ireland) and James Cunningham (United States) at the Security Council. SC/7143.

32 Ri Yong Ho, Counsellor, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban, South Africa, August 31–September 7, RD/D/34.

33 President Bedjaoui argued at the International Court of Justice that nuclear weapons were the “ultimate evil”, 103. The Legality of the Treat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, July 8, 1996, www.un.org/law/icjsum/9623.htm.

HIV/AIDs,\textsuperscript{35} cybercrime and even money-laundering.\textsuperscript{36} At the ICTY, “evil” has been used also to provide a moral impetus for technical legal arguments; for example, one of the judges argued that the Serbian general Radislav Krstic had “agreed to evil”,\textsuperscript{37} while the Appeal proceedings of Zlatko Aleksovski, a jail warden indicted for a range of crimes against humanity considered whether the appellant’s claim to have chosen a “lesser evil” in mistreating the prisoners in his care could be justified.\textsuperscript{38}

To take some language from the judgement on \textit{Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic Case} where Judge Mumba, sentencing the three accused for mass rapes, used the words:

- nightmarish scheme of sexual exploitation, that was especially repugnant;
- Muslim women and girls, mothers and daughters, robbed of their last vestiges of human dignity. Women and girls, treated like chattels, pieces of property at the arbitrary disposal of the Serb occupation forces, and more specifically at the beck and call of the three accused.

It is interesting also to look at the sentencing of \textit{Krstic} and \textit{Blagojevic} on Srebrenica massacres and deliberate on the crime of genocide – the most serious and repugnant crime in the ICTY jurisdiction. Although the crimes against humanity are not less repugnant than genocide – in fact they could mean even more casualties, indiscriminate on ethnicity or religion – the crime of genocide keeps a higher stigmatizing effect and its evil aspect, because it sub-humanizes some groups, make them unworthy of human life.

The judicial ethics code for the ICC may offer a good starting point for elaboration of judicial rules in international courts and to recognize that judges face particular challenges because they operate in a court of international character; and they could be used as a foundation for more detailed regulations incorporating the principles and concerns that are more clearly articulated in domestic judicial codes.

Given that international tribunals, and particularly international criminal tribunals, operate in highly charged political situations, they are frequently accused of bias and political manipulation and they could enhance their legitimacy with coherent codes of professional conduct. These would help to signal coherence in process and adherence to a normative hierarchy, and help to counter claims about selectivity in proceedings and externally imposed norms. This is not to say that

international tribunals should necessarily have codes modelled on those present in common law countries such as the UK and the United States – existing model codes developed by international actors might equally be used to guide the drafting of codes for judges, staff and counsel at the international tribunals where there are none.

**BIAS OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND COMMISSIONERS**

Another connection of emotions to international law is the consideration whether appointed international judges or commissioners may not have emotional bias prior to being appointed to one of the parties in a dispute. Prosecutorial bias is another problematic matter, existing when a prosecutor becomes loyal to a particular version of events (the guilt of a particular suspect, for example), even when the evidence discredits that version of events. Psychological insights, particularly from the field of cognitive neuroscience, place divided loyalties and conflicts within prosecutorial office in the broader context of loyalty to one’s beliefs. Reforms are more likely to succeed when they recognize and attempt to ameliorate our ingrained and tenacious loyalty to pre-existing beliefs.

Bias is also a defence lawyers’ concern: how, in an emotional sense, one can defend people accused of terrible crimes, and what toll such defence takes, both professionally and personally. One can explore both the defence mechanisms employed by criminal defence lawyers and how these mechanisms affect lawyers both as advocates and as people whose work is comfortably integrated into their lives. The legal profession needs to overcome its aversion to acknowledging and addressing the emotional aspects of lawyering.

The literature on heuristics and biases in decision-making, as well as on emotional influences on judgements, is burgeoning. Commentators reviewing such work have begun to discuss its practical implications for the law. Most recently, they have focused particularly on what the research might suggest for an increased third-party role to help protect individuals from their own biases. The most recent discussion has focused on the findings’ implications for the appropriateness and scope of paternalistic policies. I can illustrate the emotional bias with a few examples.

**GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**

On March 13, 2004, the Special Court for Sierra Leone handed down a decision on the matter of perceived bias in its then-President, Geoffrey Robertson QC. The defence counsel for Issa Sesay, head of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), argued that passages regarding the Sierra Leone conflict in Robertson’s 2002 book, *Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*, indicated the prejudging
of the culpability of several defendants at the Court. Challenge mounted at the Special Court to remove Robertson as a justice because of the comments he had made in the book. The Special Court agreed, against Robertson’s protests, that the requirement that justice be seen to be done admits of no exceptions: the author of specific allegations of culpability should not sit in judgement over those against whom he had made those allegations. Robertson was stood down from cases involving RUF members and subsequently his tenure of the Presidency was determined to have run its course. Robertson refused to recuse himself despite defence claim of the appearance of bias, but he was removed pursuant to Rule 15 of the Court.39

The example is salutary, while embarrassing or frustrating for Robertson in view of the enormity of the criminal acts that are to be on trial and the probable accuracy of his published account. Orthodox guidelines for the administration of criminal justice retain their relevance in the extraordinary circumstances of the international criminal tribunal. In such circumstances, rules for procedural fairness are of equal, if not greater, significance than they are in the municipal setting.

CHRISTINE CHINKIN, UNHRC FACT FINDING MISSION (GOLDSTONE) ON GAZA

Christine Chinkin, professor of international law in London School of Economics, is a well-published author and a recipient of numerous awards. On January 11, 2009, her signature appeared, along with the signatures of other lawyers, below a letter in the Sunday Times that was highly critical of Israel’s military action in Gaza. The signatories deplored Hamas’s rocket attacks on Israel and claimed that “Israel has a right to take reasonable and proportionate means to protect its civilian population…. However, the manner and scale of its operations in Gaza, amount to an act of aggression and is contrary to international law, notwithstanding the rocket attacks by Hamas”. The signatories, Chinkin among them, left no doubt where their opinions lay.

Chinkin joined later the UN fact-finding mission into alleged violations in the Gaza conflict. The UN Watch, an NGO based in Geneva, filed a twenty-eight-page legal brief asking Chinkin to step down, with the argument that “International law and the rules of due process require fact-finders in the human rights field to be impartial and that means ‘being free of any commitment to a preconceived outcome’”.

Chinkin, admitted she signed and shared the opinions in the letter, but responded that she feels unbiased and fully entitled to join an impartial committee of inquiry established under the auspices of the UN’s Human Rights Council to investigate all violations of international human rights law, that might have been committed during, before or after the Gaza operation. Her position was supported by Justice Richard Goldstone, the Chair of the fact-finding mission, who agreed that the inquiry is not about the right of self-defence of Israel (jus ad bellum), but about war crimes during the war (jus in bello). Justice Goldstone further defended Chinkin, declaring that his was a fact-finding expedition, not a judicial inquiry.

But the critics continued the fight for Chinkin to step down, they found that on January 5 her signature also appended to a letter in *The Guardian*, characterizing Israeli bombing raids in Gaza as “brutal” and calling for EU action against the Jewish state “until it abides by its international legal and humanitarian obligations”. They emphasized the matter that justice should not merely be done, but it should also be seen to be done. It is simply not good enough for Justice Goldstone to say that he was “absolutely satisfied” that Professor Chinkin had “a completely open mind”. Even if she had, her inclusion on his panel was an astonishing affront. “The legal requirement for impartiality as developed by international tribunals, whose principles fully apply to quasi-judicial fact-finders, is absence of bias or even the appearance of bias”, said Neuer from UN Watch. Christine Chinkin fails the legal test, he argued, because, prior to seeing any evidence, she declared Israel guilty of the very charges that she is now supposed to impartially examine. How can Justice Goldstone claim that his fact-finders are operating with open minds, when one of them has already made up her mind?

**RELEASE ON COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS**

Compassionate release grants prisoners or detained people an early release on special grounds such as personal terminal illness or having a child with an urgent need for their incarcerated guardian. Compassionate release procedures – also known as medical release, medical parole, medical furlough and humanitarian parole – can be mandated by courts or by internal corrections authorities.

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40 Geoffrey Alderman, September 24, 2009.
41 UN Watch.
42 Ibid.
Pinochet 1998 (Chile)

In 1998, Pinochet – the former dictator of Chile – was arrested in London, under an international warrant for extradition on torture charges to Spain, filed by Baltasar Garzon. A 3:2 Lords decision approved the extradition, but Interior Minister Jack Straw let Pinochet go back to Chile on compassionate grounds in January 2000.

Pinochet's immunity in Chile was lifted by the Parliament and he later faced various trials for murder, torture, disappearances, money tax fraud and money laundering, and Pinochet often was moved between house arrests and releases, as judges recognized that he suffered from dementia and cannot defend himself in the courtroom. Some commentators exploited the fact that Pinochet never showed any mercy to old people being in custody in his prisons. The feelings of relatives of the victims could be sympathized, but these should not distract judges to make unbiased decisions.

After many rulings to put him on house arrest and release him on compassionate grounds, Pinochet passed away on December 10, 2006 while still under house arrest. Even without being formally convicted, his legacy was severely compromised by more than 300 charges filed against him in Chile.

Al-Megrahi 2009 (Libya)

The release of the terminally ill Libyan terrorist Al-Megrahi in Scotland in August 2009 was also made on compassionate grounds. The Scottish Justice Minister McAskill released al-Megrahi, convicted for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, killing all 273 people on board and falling on the Scottish town of Lockerbie. At the time of this writing, Al-Megrahi is still alive, making regular hospital visits for chemotherapy hospital. Some of the Lockerbie victims and general public continue to protest the release. The British government has been strongly accused of making a political or business deals with Gaddafi. The accusations, that the release has been connected to political or business interests, remain speculative, and have not been accompanied yet with serious evidence.

Some observers exploited the suspicions of whether or not al-Megrahi was in fact guilty and whether the evidence when prosecuting and sentencing him was reliable. To be released, al-Megrahi had to drop his appeal against the sentence. He did so unwillingly, but with the realization that the action would speed his release to go home.

McAskill’s decision was not about the guilt of al-Megrahi; he could not question whether the sentence was genuine or false. McAskill was not a second or third judge on the guilt or innocence of al-Megrahi. The relatives of the victims could see al-Megrahi properly prosecuted, properly sentenced and properly serving a decade
in Scottish prison. The justice for the victims of Lockerbie could be seen as having been properly served, and that the quest for justice could be satisfied at the moment of pronouncing the sentence.

CONCLUSION

This chapter addresses the role of emotions in international law. It discusses the role of emotions in domestic law and the criminal process in particular, but not much attention is paid to the role of emotions in the literature on international law. The chapter deliberates the role of emotions in the development of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law.

The chapter presents the significance of the original emotional impulse – empathy to victims of war and empathy to victims of human rights abuses in developing norms and rules of war and respect for human rights. It illustrates with texts from the Preambles of various international legal documents how the sorrow from the scourges of war and how the shock of human conscience from crimes against humanity led states to adopt international treaties and conventions that are the core of international law.

The chapter finds a balance between one extreme statement (that emotions are corruptive to international law) and another extreme statement (that emotions should be at the centre of international law). It looks at the emotional environment surrounding the work and practice of international criminal tribunals and discusses how emotions penetrate judges’ minds when they face charge of mass atrocities.

The chapter also defends both the need to de-emotionalize the international criminal justice system and, particularly, the need to be un-biased (eyes bound) when working in international courts and commissions. It also looks at release on compassionate grounds – another example of employing emotions in international law – and presents two very controversial cases – Geoffrey Robertson and Christine Chinkin.

In summation, emotions played an essential role as major drivers for originating and developing international law norms. However, the judges in international tribunals and commissioners need to detach from their emotions when deliberating in the courtroom. Only de-emotionalized decisions will grant legitimacy to the international criminal tribunals.
PART II

Emotions in Foreign Policy Decision Making and in War and Peace
Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations

Yohan Ariffin

This essay looks at some of the challenges faced in trying to assess the role of emotions in international relations. Methodologies need to be developed to analyse their impact. As discussed in the Introduction, the difficulties that scholars encounter in their efforts to assess adequately the influence of emotions in decision-making processes are manifold. They stem from the elusive nature of emotions as compared to the relative stability of ideas, from the unfeasibility of observing decision makers in salient situations, and from the lack of valid methods to identify genuine emotions from instrumental ones. At the heart of this chapter is a discussion of what can and indeed deserves to be studied. It is argued that emotions in world politics may be assessed insofar as the inquiry is confined to their discursive expressions by significant subjects. This implies studying the role of emotives rather than emotions per se. By which I mean cognitions whose distinctive nature is to excite an emotion for political purposes. When emotives are successfully brought into play, they impart stimuli for behaviour and can as a result be implemented in policies and eventually embedded in institutions. The essay concludes by discussing how a fuller understanding of the role of emotives in international affairs can contribute to the paradigmatic debate.

WHICH EMOTIONS ARE RELEVANT TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? TOWARDS A TAXONOMY

The sheer variety of phenomena covered by the word emotion can discourage any effort aiming at rendering them intelligible. Some selection is therefore necessary.¹

¹ This section is a slightly revised version of part of an article originally published as “On War Causation: Passions, Polities or International Relations?”, Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2004: pp. 94–118.
I begin my ground-clearing exercise with the following characterization of emotion proposed by Broad (1954: 209): “There are two aspects to every emotion. In its cognitive aspect, it is directed towards a certain object, real or imaginary, which is cognised, correctly or incorrectly, as having certain qualities and standing in certain relationships. In its affective aspect, it has an emotional quality of a certain kind and a certain degree of intensity”. Broad gives the example that to be fearing a snake “is to be cognising something – correctly or incorrectly – as a snake, and for that cognition to be toned with fearfulness”.

This characterisation is useful because it enables us to further specify the type of emotions liable to be appealed to in international politics. As regards their cognitive content, one obviously needs a taxonomy of sorts, and it may be useful to begin by distinguishing emotions according to whether they relate to cooperation or to conflict objects. As concerns their affective aspect, one can rely on Hume’s classification and consider that the emotions involved in cooperation have a “calm” quality as opposed to the “violent” nature of emotions elicited in conflict.

For clarity purposes, it may be best to first address conflict-related emotions. Their prehended objects are potentially numerous, but it appears to me that they can be collapsed into the three “principall causes of quarrell” pointed out by Hobbes, namely: safety, gain and reputation. Moreover, the particular emotions tied to these objects may be divided into those that are functionally disruptive and those that are functionally restorative. Rage, for example, is disruptive in that the “uneasiness” aroused in the subject can only be got rid of by striking out against its target. Fear, on the contrary, is restorative in the sense that its main object is to recover a feeling of security perceived as threatened. Now, if one accepts the self-evident view that conflicts are generally subject to the play of antagonistic drives, which, in the case of the emotions aroused, take the form of disruptive and restorative desires, or rather desires perceived by the actors involved as disruptive or restorative, one can dichotomise, for each object of quarrel, the relevant emotions into the one that seeks to disrupt and the other that seeks to restore the “absent good”. Let us take up each object in turn.

Anger (or cholera) is the disruptive emotion associated with security issues, as its purposeful behaviour is liable to threaten the sense of safety in another-than-self, while fear is the emotion that seeks to restore security for the targeted self. Gain, for its part, is subject to the antagonistic drives of envy and jealousy; conflicts concern a possession which is coveted by an envious non-possessor and suspiciously watched over by its jealous possessor. The stake here is to gain or preserve an object whose ownership is perceived by a disruptive “have not” as resulting in the undeserved superiority of a “have” who, fearing the threat, reacts so as to preserve the possession.
Reputation, finally, is tied to rank or status, and can occasion conflicts when disruptive actions – that is, actions perceived by another-than-self as manifesting contempt – engender feelings of indignant humiliation powerful enough to warrant restoration of the shattered self-ideals.

I am aware that my treatment of the topic may appear extraordinarily schematic. But I believe the scheme to be adequate for the purpose of identifying the main emotions that are liable to be elicited in conflicts between collective players. Some notes of caution are in order, however. First, the listed emotions are only meaningful insofar as they involve an antagonist. While the opposite of anger is peacefulness, the opposite of envy is admiration, and the opposite of contempt is humility, the antagonist likely to cause conflict is respectively fear, jealousy and indignant humiliation. Second, the listed emotions are meaningful only insofar as they involve a dyad of actors whose relationship is mediated by conflicting desires relating to a particular object. Third, the actors involved are collectives whose representatives consider that a value tied to security, possession or status is thwarted by another collective; these representatives are political leaders or activists who hold sufficient power to steer conduct within a polity. Fourth, no single emotion should be conflated with a particular group. The substance of my argument is to distinguish various emotions liable to be summoned up according to the matter in dispute. By no means is the way that actors cognise the situation likely to be cut-and-dried. A may posture because he allegedly fears B, who interprets it as anger and strikes A pre-emptively, which results in A eventually manifesting choler by returning B’s blows. Neither A nor B are likely to acknowledge anger prior to the phase when B struck A, although both would probably impute the emotion to the other party and thus claim having been, as a result, justifiably affected by fear. Fifth, most conflicts concern more than one object. In fact, one can argue that interstate wars usually involve issues pertaining all at once to safety, gain and reputation; moreover, the longer a conflict drags on, the more objects tend to get drawn into it, and the more emotionally intractable it can become, as Clausewitz made clear.

Figure 9.1 offers a graphic view of the main subjects of conflict and their attendant emotional dyads.

As regards prosocial international behaviour, motivations include the desire for self-benefit, or to benefit others, or to conform to external evaluations. The first type of behaviour is founded on trust, the second originates in sympathy or empathy and the third flows from guilt or shame.

Trust is an emotion primarily motivated by the desire for self-benefit, and has long been acknowledged sufficiently important as to initiate studies in sociology (Luhmann, 1979), economics (Pixley, 1999) and law (Lange, 2002). Contributions
in the field of international relations have remained surprisingly sparse (cf., however, Hoffman, 2002), despite the fact that trust constitutes the emotional foundation of cooperation (Barbalet, 1996). Its behavioural enactment involves undertaking actions that otherwise would prove unpredictable, risky or costly, on the confident expectation that others involved, by acting dutifully, will cancel accruing uncertainties, risks or costs, or at least reduce them. In this respect there is often a close link between trust, fear and anger. It is often assessments based on fear—of uncertainties, risks or costs—that lead actors to cooperate and establish trust relationships, which can take the form of more or less institutionalized rules and regulatory processes. Conversely, negative affects such as anger, indignation or outrage may be mobilized from perceived failure in integrity displayed by one or many members of a trust relationship, or from perceived lack of competence displayed by the relationship as such. These considerations alone should be enough to indicate the contribution that an analysis of trust in its various manifestations can make to a fuller understanding of the establishment and break-up of international regimes.

Socially engaged emotions intended to benefit others are either empathetic or sympathetic. *Empathy* can be defined as “an emotional response that stems from another’s emotional state or condition and is congruent with the other’s emotional state or condition” (Eisenberg, 1991: 129), while *sympathy* involves an emotional concern for the other, particularly for the one who suffers, and often elicits helping behaviour. The most obvious examples of empathy and sympathy in recent history are provided by the international reactions both to the 9/11 attacks and to victims of natural disasters.

Finally, prosocial international behaviour can be motivated by the desire to conform to external evaluations. The moral emotions of *shame* and *guilt* promote such behaviour by involving images of a disapproving other. These emotions—which stem from implicit or explicit moral codes—are grounded in the fear of negative appraisals of self-ideals in the case of shame, or the fear of transgressions in the case of guilt (Lewis, 1971). A moral code, as Simmel argued, does not have “the precision
and sanction of the legal norm, yet it has a certain guarantee of observance through instinctive shame, and through many perceptibly disagreeable consequences of transgression” (Simmel, 1904: 678). We know that non-state actors constantly use naming and shaming strategies in their attempts to modify international behaviour. The Access campaign provides a striking example of how a network of NGOs was eventually successful in reframing intellectual property protection as a public health issue by underlining the shameful consequences resulting in restricted access to affordable drugs.

These general considerations should be enough to indicate the potentially important role that emotions are liable to play in world politics. The pressing question that now needs our attention, however, is how to render this role intelligible. It is one thing to draw attention to the significance of emotions; it is quite another thing to offer suggestions as to how to actually study them.

**HOW TO STUDY EMOTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS?**

Emotions have been defined in this essay as comprising three components: (1) feelings of pleasure or displeasure associated with (2) the perception, the idea, or the judgment that a particular desire is satisfied or not, and (3) they consequently motivate people to take different sorts of action. Determining the feeling component or the specific phenomenological experience associated with an emotion defies research designs in international relations. To conflate a particular emotion with a collective can hardly avoid gross simplifications (reminiscent of Gustave Le Bon’s “group mind”), and the unfeasibility of observing leaders in salient situations ruins all hope of proving empirically whether and to what extent emotions do play a role in their decision making.

But does it really matter? To give up the idea of studying emotions in international relations simply because we are unable to assess their feeling component would tacitly endorse the James-Lange theory, which viewed emotions as perceptions of physiological disturbances. To put it crudely, is it necessary to have observed a head of state feeling hot and agitated to conclude that anger may have motivated his decision? Or can we not infer this particular emotion from the cognitions produced and their attendant behaviours?

Except possibly in the case of dictatorships, war and peace in international politics are not caused by the emotional state of decision makers, but by a situation or event that is subjected to appraisals leading to the formation of an attitude by the political elites. Attitudes refer to expressions of favour or disfavour towards an object. They are generally understood as having three components: affective, cognitive and behavioural (Katz and Stotland, 1959). All three components may
be studied in individuals. We can determine that a subject has a negative attitude towards spiders because he cognises them as harmful or evil, accordingly fears them, and avoids them wherever possible. In collectives, however, only the cognitive and behavioural components of attitudes can be determined empirically. Their affective component needs to be deduced from the context. Does this cripple research on emotions in international politics? Most definitely not. Taking our previous example, suppose we only know that our subject considers spiders to be harmful and avoids them as a result. Would it be a wild deduction to assume that he fears spiders?

The same is true of collective players. Analysis of attitudes in international relations can address their cognitive underpinnings with little difficulty. Data is readily available in the form of statements made by representatives of state and non-state actors expressing emotions towards particular objects with purposeful political intents. Similarly, the behavioural component, which consists of follow-on policies, can be studied with relative ease. However, we have to rely on logic to assess their affective component.

What, if any, conceptual or theoretical framework should be used for the study of attitudes in international relations? It would appear that constructivism may be the approach best suited to address such issues. Premised on the general assumption that subjects act towards objects on the basis of the meaning that these have for them, constructivism implies that ideational processes, by way of defining actors and situations, shape possibilities of action and interaction (cf. Checkel, 1998; Legro, 1997; Raymond, 1997; Wendt, 1999). International politics does not merely reflect objective, material conditions. The behaviour of actors, the interests they hold and the structures within which they operate are defined by ideas and social norms that need to be addressed. Adler (1997: 322) argues that “constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world”.

Although I agree with the constructivist approach that ideas and interests are not separate in that interests involve ideas and that the latter should not merely be considered “road-maps” for action (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993), I do believe that ideational processes should be studied alongside material forces. The latter—in short, power and wealth—are obviously tied to cognitions, but so are they to capabilities. To address major developments in matters relating to international affairs, there is need to take simultaneously into account material capabilities, active policies and their attendant motivations. Although motivations do of course include rational assessments of interests based on material forces, they also comprise emotional evaluations made by various political entrepreneurs who partake in international agency. These evaluations involve ideas or judgments
which are emotionally toned. They form the cognitive component of the attitudes that actors hold.

I use the term *emotives* to refer to such evaluations. Emotives are particular performatives, which following Austin’s classic analysis (1962) are distinct from constatives by seeking to perform all at once a locutionary act (to issue a specific meaning), an illocutionary act (to express an attitude) and a perlocutionary act (to produce certain consequential effects). By way of example, when President Bush in a speech delivered on 7 October 2002 pronounced the words “the threat comes from Iraq”, he was performing the locutionary act of indicating that Iraq represented an impending danger. More importantly, however, he was performing an illocutionary act (or expressing an attitude) in saying what he said – in this instance the act performed was obviously to warn the audience that it should be fearful of Iraq. He attempted moreover to perform a perlocutionary act by saying what he said – in this instance the act performed (or the consequential effects that the utterance attempted to produce) was to persuade the audience that it should indeed be so fearful of Iraq as to recognize that only forceful policies aiming at changing the regime could put an end to the threat that it posed.

Emotives intend to “do things to the world”. By naming or signifying certain emotions, they seek to intensify them by altering, repressing or displacing other

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2 The concept of “emotives” was introduced by William Reddy (1997, 2001). It refers to emotional expressions that are analogous to performatives because they “alter the states of the speakers from whom they derive” (Reddy, 1997: 327). Emotional statements such as “I am angry” attempt to describe a feeling but at the same time “alter what they ‘refer’ to” (Reddy, 2001: 105) because the utterance itself changes the feeling by intensifying it, contradicting it, or transforming it into another feeling. Reddy addresses what these statements do to the speaker. My use of the concept is quite different. I am concerned here with attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something or to refrain from doing something in a context in which the latter is not obligated to comply. Emotives at issue here are issued by state and non-state representatives who enjoy sufficient authority to use the first person plural (“we are angry”, “we are fearful”, or “we are confident”). My understanding of the term “emotive” draws perhaps more on Charles Leslie Stevenson’s notion than on William Reddy’s. Stevenson (1937: 23) wrote that there is “a kind of meaning . . . which has an intimate relation to dynamic usage. I refer to “emotive” meaning. . . . The emotive meaning of a word is a tendency of a word, arising through the history of its usage, to produce (result from) affective responses in people. It is the immediate aura of feeling which hovers about a word. Such tendencies to produce affective responses cling to words very tenaciously. . . . [C]ertain words, because of their emotive meaning, are suited to a certain kind of dynamic use – so well suited, in fact, that the hearer is likely to be misled when we use them in any other way. The more pronounced a word’s emotive meaning is, the less likely people are to use it purely descriptively. Some words are suited to encourage people, some to discourage them, some to quiet them, and so on. . . . [T]here is an important contingent relation between emotive meaning and dynamic purpose: the former assists the latter.”
possible attitudes about a particular object, and to exclude behaviour not consistent with the one that they attempt to motivate.

Emotives can be evinced in the three types of ideas described by Goldstein and Keohane (1993), namely world views that establish the possibilities for action, normative ideas that provide criteria to distinguish right from wrong, and causal notions that provide guides as to how to achieve ends. As such, they constitute specific frames, defined by David Snow and Robert Benford (1992: 137) as “interpretative schemata that [simplify and condense] the world out there by selectively punctuating objects, situations, events, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment”. Emotional framing serves motivational ends: when successfully used they impart stimuli for purposeful behaviour and can as a result be implemented in policies and eventually embedded in institutions. Emotives can moreover be diagnostic, prognostic or both at once (Snow and Benford, 1988). In diagnostic framing, emotives serve to dispel doubt or cognitive dissonance (such as “why did we previously support Saddam Hussein who is in truth our own creature?”). In prognostic framing, emotives seek to create confidence in the behaviour towards which they are directed.

Emotives are liable to be mobilized by state and non-state actors who enjoy sufficient authority to use the first person plural (“we are angry”, “we are fearful” or “we are confident”). These performatives may be seized on by heads of states or governments to support their policies, particularly to legitimize costly or risky ventures or to inhibit them. Emotives may however just as well be mobilized by non-state actors – representatives of NGOs, office holders of international organizations, significant economic actors, leading scientific experts, editors of major daily newspapers – with the view of influencing or constraining foreign policy agendas. As such, they may collude or conversely collide with the interests of major powers as defined by the political elite. In sum, emotives can be used to facilitate, complicate or inhibit foreign policy or collective action.

Emotives leave observable traces allowing for their analysis. They are encoded in discourses produced within various forums that are either public, restricted (partially or totally) or gateway. Public forums, such as international institutions, national parliaments or party conventions usually provide open access to significant debates carried within. Restricted forums – such as governments, committees, negotiating meetings and expert panels – are backstage forums where a select few work out ideas and policies as well as the strategies as to how they are to be presented. Analysis here is only feasible when access is partially restricted, when restriction is subsequently lifted, or when some leakage has occurred. Finally, the mass media represent gateway forums where stakeholders compete to voice concerns, interests and ideals in order to set agendas. They moreover provide nationwide and/or worldwide broadcast
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for speeches delivered or opinions voiced by senior officials, business leaders and prominent civil society advocates.

How to assess the impact of emotives? It appears to me that emotives may influence the conduct of international affairs insofar as they carry illocutionary force, which in turn requires consistency. Illocutionary force may be defined as the property of emotives to actually perform their attitude, which can be assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, or declarative. Consistency refers to how sharply emotives are formulated, notably in regard to their associated cognitions. The more clearly emotives are articulated, the more likely they are to be considered by their addressees capable of contributing adequately to policy outcomes. Consistency can be checked by analysing (1) the frequency with which relevant emotives occur in a significant message; (2) their association with “is” statements (in particular diagnostic statements assessing situations); (3) their association with “ought” statements (in particular prescriptive statements assessing what is right and/or what should be done); and (4) their association with antecedent cognitions (world views, normative and causal ideas).

To pursue our example of the speech delivered by President Bush, the illocutionary force ascribed to fear in the purpose of the message is highlighted by the sheer frequency with which the words “threat” and “danger” occur (respectively, seventeen and nine occurrences). Fearful assessments are moreover associated with numerous diagnostic “is” statements, such as “the threat comes from Iraq”; the Iraqi regime “possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons”; “it is seeking nuclear weapons”. They are likewise associated with prescriptive “ought” statements, such as: “the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons”; “confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror”; “facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud”; “Saddam Hussein must disarm himself – or, for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him”. Finally, fearful assessments are associated in the speech with antecedent cognitions, in particular with the “rogue state” image: “the fundamental problem with Iraq remains the nature of the regime”; Iraq is depicted as an “outlaw regime” controlled by a “tyrant”, which “enslaves” its population and “threatens us”.

As a result, this speech can be considered to be emotionally framed by fear. The fact that the Bush and Blair administrations took the unusual and risky move to release intelligence reports, which have since been proven contentious, on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction programme demonstrates the importance ascribed to creating fearful appraisals of the Ba’ath regime in order to justify the recourse to war.
However, the study of emotives requires attention not only to significant speech acts, but also to the various cognitive processes involved in attempts to make the emotion fit in the relevant stream of messages. This implies inquiring into the source of ideas associated with them. As Adler (1997: 338) noted, there is need for “an account of the agents, the innovators, the carriers of collective understandings who socially construct the alternatives, and the ‘proofs’ that legitimate the choices”. Antecedent cognitions related to world views, as well as normative and causal ideas, should be studied.

The perlocutionary force (or general intended effect) of emotives in international politics can best be understood by linking it to the notion of non-decision, which Bachrach and Baratz (1970: 44) defined as “a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker”. Bachrach and Baratz underlined that non-decisions are achieved notably through the “mobilization of bias”. Emotional framing in politics amounts to a particular kind of mobilization of bias that can be captured in speech acts. Its perlocutionary function lies in suppressing or thwarting challenges to the particular intentions of the speaker to organize an issue either into or out of politics. When emotives are mobilized to organize an issue into politics, their perlocutionary force results from their capacity to suppress or thwart challenges by other actors to maintain the issue out of politics. Conversely, when emotives are mobilized to maintain an issue out of politics, their perlocutionary force lies in their capacity to suppress or thwart challenges by other actors to organize the issue into politics.

The perlocutionary force of emotional frames can be assessed against two combined criteria: diffusion and follow-on policies. Because the perlocutionary force of emotives relates directly to their capacity to frame foreign policy agendas in such a way as to affect the ability of reluctant actors to defend their claims adequately, dissemination of the frame is essential. This involves checking for the circulation of emotives in the stream of messages produced by significant stakeholders. Concordance is an indicator of success: evidence of perlocutionary force may be inferred when emotives mobilized by a class of stakeholders are subsequently restated or at least not contested by other significant stakeholders, particularly potentially reluctant actors. Conversely, discordance is an indicator of failure, either relative or total: evidence of lack of perlocutionary force can be inferred when emotives mobilized by a class of stakeholders are subsequently challenged by others. The intensity of the challenge and the ability of opponents to impede the policy objectives testify to the degree of failure. This implies analysing the messages produced to raise or suppress an issue. Such challenges can and usually do involve the mobilization of emotives, either similar or dissimilar. By way of example, the French administration expressed its opposition to military intervention against Iraq by similarly using fearful emotives, as evinced in the speech delivered by de Villepin
at the UN Security Council, which underlined the “incalculable consequences for the stability of a scarred and fragile region”.

Combined with the dissemination of frames, analysis of follow-on policies provides evidence as to whether the mobilization of emotives achieved the political purposes intended by their proponents, mainly to facilitate or inhibit international action. It is widely acknowledged that issues in international politics relating to security go through a complex process of legitimation. Emotives play a significant part in this process. When they are used to introduce an issue into the global agenda, there is need to examine whether and to what degree the prescribed policies were in actual fact implemented in the face of strong, weak or no opposition. Implementation that goes unopposed by potential opponents likely to challenge (and capable of challenging) the policy outcome would indicate that the use of emotives was successful in supporting the policy. Conversely, lack of implementation in the face of strong opposition would testify to failure. Finally, implementation in the face of strong opposition may demonstrate the ability of the issue raisers to carry out policies in spite of their being challenged on the grounds of their legitimacy; in which case there is need to examine whether and to what extent opposition became a subsequent source of complication (as in the case of the invasion of Iraq when anti-war activists sought to create moral outrage at what they depicted as contentious emotional techniques used by the American and British governments to conceal geostrategic and economic self-interests). Such complication – which we can refer to as emotive entrapment or blowback – may affect further policymaking and needs therefore to be addressed. The same framework combining analysis of the diffusion of emotives and of follow-on policies can of course be applied to cases in which emotives are used to keep off an issue from the global agenda.

To be effectively assessed, moreover, the impact of emotives on policy outcomes requires taking into account the material capabilities of the actors involved in the political process. Emotives can be said to have an impact on international politics: (1) when actors with relatively limited resources mobilize emotives to organize an issue either into or out of politics, and are successful despite opposition from actors that hold significant resources; (2) when actors with significant resources mobilize emotives to organize an issue either into or out of politics and succeed without facing opposition from potentially reluctant actors; and (3) when actors with significant resources mobilize emotives to organize an issue either into or out of politics, face emotionally toned opposition, nevertheless carry out their policies, which however encounter subsequent complications owing to the emotionally framed opposition.

The method proposed here aims at taking up the challenge put forth by Bleiker and Hutchison (2008: 125) who contended that the numerous problems that scholars face in their attempts to render emotions intelligible can only “result in research
that is speculative or tenuous at best”. I argue that empirical research is feasible and that the study of emotives can open up avenues of research in world politics. A fuller understanding of their role in international affairs could also contribute to the paradigmatic debate. Emotives represent specific cognitions that attempt to excite an emotion for political purposes. They are a resource capable of supporting power policies when mobilized by state actors. They can however be used by non-state actors to achieve political change in the international system.

It is important to note here that the study of attitudes in international politics through the use of emotives should not succumb to a kind of linguistic imperialism by focusing solely on utterances. Obviously, the greatest achievement that can be attained by mobilizing emotives is to eventually institutionalize like-minded emotional communities. As Barbara Rosenwein (2010: 35) notes, “emotional communities” establish systems of feelings that assess what is valuable or harmful to the community, evaluate the emotions of out-groups and define the affective bonds between their members and “the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore”. In addition, it should be made clear that emotives are expressions of attitudes, which are positive, negative or indifferent manifestations of sentiments. Following Nico Frijda et al. (1991: 207), a sentiment is a particular “disposition to respond emotionally to a certain object”. Although emotives are used to frame issues and are instrumental to particular ends, they are nevertheless sentiments that influence the behaviour of those that mobilize them. It therefore follows that exploring the role of emotives in international politics is not tantamount to bringing back rationalism through the window.

Relevant topics of study can relate to war and peace activities, and easily expand to international political economy or international environmental politics. It is time to assess not only whether and to what extent the emotions of anger and fear, of envy and jealousy, of trust, guilt or shame have been used in association with large scale international disruptive, reconstructive or otherwise transformative actions undertaken after the cold war, but more importantly the measure in which they have been embedded in new institutional arrangements. Surely empirical analyses of the sorts will lend support to the hermeneutically oriented studies on emotions in international relations which have so far based themselves on cultural theory, on political philosophy or on psychoanalysis.

REFERENCES


Cf. my Introduction to this volume.
The Role of Emotives in IR


The Role of Emotives in the International Management of Plant Genetic Resources

Yohan Ariffin

BACKGROUND

It is a well-known fact that several legal instruments and institutional mechanisms (FAO, UPOV, CBD, and TRIPs) overlap in the international management of plant genetic resources. In their seminal 2004 article, Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor suggest that such situations – referred to as “regime complexes” – tend to reduce the effectiveness of power relations in the process of rule-making and evolution. This arises from the fact that regime complexes are thought to be non-hierarchical institutional arrangements wherein no one agreement is supreme over others. When creating new legal instruments, negotiators are constrained by existing norms and rules, which can limit the ability of large players to impose their will in specific issue areas. As a result, agreements tend to be broader and less demanding and intrusive. Forum shopping is another effect of regime complexes. Actors, including the less powerful ones, have the opportunity to graft their agenda onto the forum best suited to serve their interests. Yet another effect is “legalization”: actors struggle to solve overt legal conflicts that arise from overlapping rules by attempting to weld regimes “at their joints” through what the authors characterize as a bottom-up process of rule interpretation and implementation.¹

Raustiala and Victor’s argument remains deliberately hypothetical. This chapter seeks to address a question that remains unanswered. How can we explain that

¹ Raustiala and Victor 2004.

The following abbreviations will be used throughout this chapter:
Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS); Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA); Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV); World Trade Organization (WTO).

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a regime complex was eventually set up to govern plant genetic resources at the international level? Raustiala and Victor hypothesize that actors gradually converged on a property rights approach as the value of plant genetic resources began to rise with the development of new technologies, the effect of which was that potential owners vied to capture the added value. However, the story appears to be more complicated than just one of propertization, or how a system of “property rights” gradually superseded the “common heritage” regime, which previously applied to plant genetic resources. Today the right to possess phytogenetic resources – referred to here as juris possessio – takes more than just two forms. It has in effect been divided into four distinct proprietary claims. Access to and use of phytogenetic resources was first deemed a common heritage right of mankind. Resources were made freely available for use by all. During the second half of the twentieth century, entrepreneurial claims to private ownership over phytogenetic resources became recognized internationally as a specific form of juris possessio alongside the common heritage system. Then, in the 1990s, sovereignism emerged as a third form of juris possessio, which assigned to governments the authority to determine access to phytogenetic resources in their jurisdiction. A fourth type of juris possessio surfaced concurrently with that of sovereignism in the form of community rights allowing for the involvement of indigenous and local communities in consenting to the use of the phytogenetic resources and knowledge that they held.

These four claims, which represent conflicting interests, have been supported by a variety of actors, involving not only governments – of both “Southern” provider countries and “Northern” user countries – but also multinationals, plant breeders, trade associations, NGOs, transnational social movements and groups of experts. To date, each claim has been enshrined as a core norm in at least one of the legal agreements forming the array of existing institutions regulating the use of genetic resources. Considering that the various stakeholders involved have unequal capacities, how can we explain that each of them eventually obtained recognition of the rights that they supported within one or more of the legal instruments currently in force?

In this chapter, I argue that what Raustiala and Victor call a regime complex can be best defined as a set of “overlapping regimes” described by Oran Young as follows: “a separate category of linkages in which individual regimes that were formed for different purposes and largely without reference to one another intersect on a de facto basis, producing substantial impacts on each other in the process”. Plant genetic resources became the subject of functionally, and I argue emotionally distinct claims made by various stakeholders, and these claims were ultimately consolidated into rights. Plant genetic resources are not a value in themselves.

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Their worth is socially and emotionally framed according to the purpose for which they are intended to be used. If the intended effect, as in the case of the FAO, is to explore, preserve, evaluate and make plant genetic resources available for breeding and scientific activities, access takes precedence over any other claim. If, however, the purpose is to encourage the development of new high-yielding varieties of plants, legal protection of these varieties will be deemed necessary, as it has been for UPOV and the WTO. If the focus is on the sharing of benefits arising from the use of wilderness resources of potential economic or scientific value, access requires a legal structure within the provider state defining how it should be granted, as in the case of the CBD. Finally, if emphasis is laid on capturing the value added by knowledge associated with the environment held by indigenous and local communities, particularly on preventing “biopiracy”, legal solutions to the protection of the rights of these communities shall be sought, as in the CBD.

I argue that the international management of plant genetic resources is especially interesting because it shows the kind of impact that emotives can have on policy outcomes. Actors with relatively limited resources – representatives of peasant and indigenous movements as well as developing countries – were able to organize a number of issues into politics despite opposition from powerful opponents. As I discuss later in this chapter, they proved successful in their attempts to frame the issue of plant genetic resources management by defining it as one of benefit sharing and/or of conservation. Their frames were infused with emotives (of indignation and fear), which were eventually encoded in norms and embedded in binding international treaties.

In the Introduction to this volume, I defined emotions as feelings associated with the perception, the idea or the judgment that a particular desire is satisfied or not, thereby motivating subjects to take different sorts of action. Following Dewey’s lead, I believe that it is important when dealing with emotions to address “the “feel”, the “idea” and the “mode of behaviour” in relation to one another”. However, as concerns international relations, I noted in my chapter Assessing the Role of Emotives that it is neither practical nor feasible to empirically determine the affects or feelings of collective players or of even only their representatives. Emotions in world politics can nevertheless be studied empirically, provided the inquiry is confined to their remaining two components – namely, their cognitive underpinnings and their purposive mode of behaviour. Affect or feeling can be inferred from the entire context as the “subjective valuation of that which is objectively expressed in the idea or purpose” following Dewey’s definition.

3 Dewey, 1895: 20, emphasis added.
4 I base my argument here on Dewey’s definition of emotion: “Emotion in its entirety is a mode of behavior which is purposive, or has an intellectual content, and which also reflects itself into feeling
This, I have argued, implies studying the role of *emotives* rather than emotions *per se* and the actions that they attempted successfully to motivate or not. Emotives involve specific cognitions that seek to excite an emotion for political purposes. They aim at performing all at once a locutionary act (to issue a specific meaning), an illocutionary act (to express an attitude) and a perlocutionary act (to produce certain consequential effects).

**ACT I: PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES AS RES COMMUNIS FAUTE DE MIEUX**

Until the end of the twentieth century, plant genetic resources were regarded as a public good subject to free access and unlimited exchange. There was a wide consensus that crop seeds in particular should be shared for research and breeding purposes. As Brush (1998: 761) argued, “the lack of possessive individualism among peasant farmers regarding seeds and genetic resources might be seen as an adaptive cultural trait in the face of the risks in agriculture and the importance of diversity in meeting those risks”. For millennia, fear of famine led farming communities to practice free exchange of seeds (Brush, 2007: 1500). These practices were replicated at the international level, within the network of gene banks set up in the early twentieth century in Russia, the UK and the United States, and subsequently in developing countries where international agricultural research centres were established with the support of private donors (such as the Ford and Rockefeller funds). The mission of these centres was to promote crop improvement and to collect and preserve germplasm to be made freely available for research and breeding programmes. The centres created in the developing world were brought gradually under the auspices of the Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) – a consortium of public and private donors established in 1971 with the goal of expanding the production of food of importance to developing countries. Free flow of plant germplasm was deemed essential to attaining the objectives sought after by the CGIAR. By making phytogenetic material available to public researchers, commercial breeders and farmers alike, it was assumed that innovation and improvement – and hence food security – would be fostered. Juris possessio of plant genetic resources was therefore implicitly vested in mankind, although it should be noted that before the adoption in 1983 of the International Undertaking (to which I revert shortly), there was no international agreement that formally endorsed

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7 Plucknett 1987.
8 Pistorius 1997.
the common heritage principle. I am concerned here, however, with the fact that the converse is also true: there were no regulatory systems restricting movements, so much so that Roa-Rodriguez and van Dooren are right to point out that “the overwhelming tendency among both farmers and scientists was to make germplasm of plant varieties freely available to others” 9. Fear of food shortages appears to have been the main disposition that governed practices in this area.

ACT II: THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL CLAIMS TO PROPRIETARY RIGHTS OVER PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES

The era of free access to seed-reproduced plant varieties began to draw to a close in 1961 with the establishment by international convention of the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), an intergovernmental club comprising only nine West European nations and South Africa in its beginnings. The history of UPOV dates back to the initiative taken by the International Association of Plant Breeders for the Protection of New Plant Varieties. The latter had been lobbying since the 1950s to gain recognition of their entrepreneurial claims to private ownership over worked varieties. Their main argument was that breeding requires substantial economic investments and should accordingly be protected so as to allow breeders to achieve a return on their investment by preventing unauthorized large scale reproduction of their allegedly improved seeds. 10 They too raised the spectre of food shortages, which in their view would result from disinvestment in research and development activities. UPOV was set up to promote a particular form of intellectual property protection granting exclusive monopolistic rights to breeders over the production, marketing and selling of plant varieties on the condition that the latter are proven distinct (from any other variety), uniform (true to the original when propagated) and stable (true to the original when reproduced). As Santilli writes, “the UPOV system is aimed at protecting innovations made by professional plant breeders from public and private research institutions, through methods and techniques that are considered ‘scientific’, and usually have as a target the development of plant varieties that are high yielding, genetically homogenous and stable (after repeated cycles of propagation), and well adapted to the large-scale, industrialized agricultural model”. 11 However, in the 1961 and the revised 1978 UPOV Conventions, the eighteen-year monopoly was restricted by two exemptions, one explicit and the other implicit. First, the breeders’ exemption explicitly allowed for a protected variety to be made freely available as an initial source for the creation

11 Santilli 2012: 77.
of new varieties. Second, farmers were not explicitly disallowed to save harvested material (grain grown from protected seed) and re-sow it on their own land or freely exchange it for non-commercial purposes. The fact that the two UPOV Conventions laid down no provision thereupon was widely interpreted as an endorsement by the regime of the farmers’ privilege.

It has been said that the 1961–1978 UPOV regime sought to balance the interests and needs of both plant breeders and farmers, and consequently the objectives of technology innovation on the one hand and of food security on the other. It provided plant breeders with an economic incentive for varietal development; however, by allowing breeders to use protected seeds to create new lines, and by not disallowing farmers to store harvested proprietary seed for the purpose of improving local varieties or providing for their own subsistence, UPOV breeders’ rights did not extend to acts done for the purpose of crop improvement or food. The main reason for this was that, as Schubert, Böschen and Gill point out, “the general situation between the end of the First World War and the 1980s, roughly speaking during the Fordist era, can be characterised as a compromise between public and private governance, with basic research and quality assurance tests funded and made available by public organizations on the one hand and some applied research, seed multiplication, and market distribution organized by private plant breeders on the other”. Precisely because breeding was at that time still dominated by academic institutes, which aimed inter alia at enhancing food security through innovative research in high yielding seeds, a legal distinction was established between “the variety as an “invention”, protected by exclusive proprietary rights of the breeder, and the variety as genetic resource, and as raw material/input for the development of new plant varieties, which is free of any right and accessible”.

In any event, the creation of UPOV was a turning point, in that it removed a certain type of plant genetic resources from the commons – the so-called cultivars whose characteristics are produced in cultivation – and established a new form of juris possessio granting ownership over these varieties as a means to reward and thereby encourage the entrepreneurial activity underlying their production.

Notwithstanding the exemptions allowed for by UPOV, governments of many developing countries were disquieted by the passing of the Convention, mainly on two grounds. Firstly, they argued that a questionable distinction had been set up between “raw” and “worked” seeds whereby only the latter were eligible for protection. Secondly and concomitantly, they took issue over the fact that the UPOV Convention created a legal asymmetry between, on the one hand, the landraces or

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12 Barton 1982; Dutfield 2004; Ariffin 2007.
14 Santilli 2012: 80.
“folk varieties” cultivated by farmers, which continued to be regarded as a public good subject to open access despite the fact that for thousands of years they had been conserved and improved by farmers who as a result were entitled to be considered as at least informal breeders; and, on the other hand, the “elite cultivars”, which could be granted proprietary rights regardless of the fact that the latter are often adapted from domesticated varieties furnished by farmers in the southern hemisphere. This legal asymmetry is mirrored in the prohibition by UPOV members to sell within their jurisdictions varieties other than those granted a plant breeder’s right and thereupon listed in an “index” or “catalogue”. In sum, the UPOV Convention transformed the legal status of plant genetic resources from that of a res communis (a “common possession” owned by everyone and that cannot be alienated by anyone) to that of a res nullius (a thing owned by none but that is appropriable insofar as the claim is deemed legitimate).\(^{15}\)

Recognition of entrepreneurial claims can be attributed to the successful grafting of plant intellectual property rights by agro-industry firms in the North onto the issue of food security worldwide. They argued that if “unimproved seeds” were not made freely available and intellectual property rights adequately recognized, food shortages would ensue, as low supplies of basic material and insufficient returns on investment would seriously hinder research on crop improvement. Against these views, a group of NGOs allied themselves with representatives of developing countries to lobby within FAO. They sought to arouse indignation about how corporate actors profited from the North’s dominance in the international exchange and use of genetic resources to the detriment of developing countries and smallholder farmers. As a result, the debate on genetic resources was reorganized into one concerning social justice and loss of genetic diversity with the spread of Green Revolution crops and high-input agriculture.\(^{16}\)

ACT III: FAO STRIKES BACK, EVENTUALLY MAKING USE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY TO REINSTATE THE RES COMMUNIS STATUS OF PHYTOGENETIC RESOURCES

For the following twenty years, developing countries supported by agricultural NGOs endeavoured to reinstate the principle that plant varieties were res communis. FAO

\(^{15}\) Following the terms proposed by Peter Drahos, res communis corresponds to a “positive commons”, whereas res nullius matches a “negative commons”: “The difference between a positive and a negative commons is that in the case of the latter resources are owned by no one, and therefore appropriable by anyone, whereas in a positive commons resources are owned by everyone, and therefore cannot be alienated by any individual without the consent of all others” (Drahos 2006; also, Roa-Rodriguez and Dooren 2008: 182).

\(^{16}\) Led by Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) and its Director, Pat Mooney. Cf. Pistorius 1997: 70 sq.
and its Commission on Plant Genetic Resources appeared to be the forum best suited for achieving their goal. An organization dominated by agriculture ministries and scientists concerned with food security (in other words, with the fear of food shortages), FAO proved sympathetic to the principle of res communis, which had been in Roa-Rodriguez and van Dooren’s words “the modus operandi of those involved in public breeding for food and agriculture”. Moreover, public-sector scientists were acutely aware that overlapping claims to intellectual property were liable to seriously hinder their research activities. In 1983, the members of the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources adopted the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (Resolution 8/83). In its Article 1, this legally non-binding instrument affirmed the “universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources are common heritage of mankind and consequently should be made available without restriction”. Juris possessio over plant genetic resources was now formally vested in mankind.

However, widespread international acceptance of the common heritage status of phytogenetic resources proved impossible to obtain. It was obvious that common ownership of all plant genetic material, including new plant varieties, was unacceptable to members of UPOV. In the face of their opposition, FAO quickly shifted gears, abandoning the struggle for the immediate advancement of the res communis principle in favour of a wider application of the res nullius principle. In a Resolution adopted in 1989 and annexed to the Undertaking, FAO endorsed the interpretation following which “Plant Breeders’ Rights as provided for under UPOV (International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant) are not incompatible with the International Undertaking”.

Owing to lobbying by agricultural NGOs, the same resolution gave farmers a legitimate claim for compensation based on their contributions to plant conservation and improvement. Such a claim was incorporated in the Resolution under the general canopy of “Farmers’ Rights” defined as “rights arising from the past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving, and making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centres of origin/diversity”. This was a de lege ferenda indication that farmers should be recognised as breeders for their role in the conservation, selection and domestication of folk crop varieties – and that they should be compensated for their contributions. Implementation, however, of farmers’ rights at this stage was vague to say the least. The Resolution stated that they should be vested in the “International Community as trustee for present and future generations of farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full benefits

to all farmers, and supporting the continuation of their contributions, as well as the attainment of the overall purposes of the International Undertaking”.

To achieve the aims of the Resolution, FAO began hosting intergovernmental negotiations. Resolution 3/91, which aimed principally at endorsing the implementation of Farmers’ Rights “through an international fund on plant genetic resources”, recognized that “the concept of mankind’s heritage, as in the Undertaking, is subject to the sovereignty of the states over their plant genetic resources”. This amendment was not as contradictory as it appears at first sight. Because plant species are located within state territory, particularly in “centres of origin” or areas where wild or domesticated specimens first developed their distinctive properties, recognition that “nations have sovereign rights over their plant genetic resources” was in fact a necessary step in attempting to make the principle of res communis operative again. From the standpoint of FAO, states enjoy a possessio juris, or are in possession of a right, that of exercising sovereignty over access to plants within their jurisdiction (considered rei nullius or ownerless things). Sovereign possessio juris should not be confused with possessio rei, or possession of the thing itself (e.g., plants). Sovereignism provides that the authority to determine access to plant genetic resources is subject to national legislation. It was hoped that states, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, would decide to confer the status of res communis to a select number of plants deemed important for food security.

Negotiations span ten years and eventually concluded in 2001, with the adoption of the legally binding International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which entered into force in 2004. The Treaty implements a “Multilateral System to Facilitate Access and Benefit Sharing” for the germplasm of sixty-four core crops and forage species that are listed in its Annex I. In the terms of our discussion, this legal instrument confers res communis status to a select number of species hitherto considered res nullius by placing them under a multilateral system. Contracting parties holding plant genetic resources of these species in in-situ or ex-situ conditions commit themselves to facilitate access. Recipients, whether private or public entities, who commercialize a product incorporating material accessed from the multilateral system are required to pay a share of the benefits into a financial mechanism. The latter is expected to channel part of the benefits “primarily, directly and indirectly, to farmers in all countries, especially in developing countries, and countries with economies in transition, who conserve and sustainably utilize plant genetic resources for food and agriculture”. Eventually, therefore, the FAO regime was able to equip the heritage principle – following which a number of plant genetic resources were deemed common property – with an international management authority responsible for organizing resource

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19 Falcon and Fowler 2002; Gerstetter et al. 2007; Frison et al. 2011.
use and benefit sharing. This outcome can be partly attributed to the role played by challenger groups made up of NGOs, scientists, researchers and government officials who were successful in presenting an alternative framing of plant genetic resources as an issue of social justice and conservation. These groups were able to reorganize the problem both by appealing to anger at how the historical role of small-scale, locally adapted agriculture in maintaining wild relatives and landraces had been negated and by eliciting fear that this process contributed to the erosion of genetic diversity in the fields.

INTERMISSION: SOVEREIGNISM AS THE HONEST BROKER

While FAO was hosting its intergovernmental negotiations in the early 1990s, state delegations convened to complete negotiations over a United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which was opened for signature in 1992 and entered into force the following year. The scope of this instrument is far more ambitious than the legal frameworks previously examined. Indeed, the notion of “biological resources” is wide-ranging, as it includes “genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity”. The Convention states three objectives: the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The first two objectives were sought by conservationists, as well as pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies anxious that a major source of potential profit was being lost in southern hemisphere rainforests where more than half of all plant and animal species are thought to live. The third objective was pursued by governments of developing countries who were convinced that many top-selling drugs worth billions of dollars in sales derived from natural products discovered within their jurisdictions.20

The compromise was that signatory developing countries committed themselves to conservation, but obtained recognition of sovereign rights over their genetic resources and, concomitantly, the authority to determine access. The Convention begins by “reaffirming that States have sovereign rights over their own biological resources”. Article 15 stipulates that any access, where granted, should be “subject to prior informed consent” and “on mutually agreed terms”, meaning that countries providing resources should be notified and would be liable to demand payments or transfer of technology in exchange for access. Representatives of developing countries were successful in casting the issue of biodiversity in an evaluative mode that translated sentiments of jealousy, or fear of losing a possession, into an

overall attitude of indignation at being robbed of valuable resources. The resulting alternative mode of action was to assign to governments the authority to determine access to resources in their jurisdiction.

ACT IV: THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED. WHAT ABOUT THE INDIGENOUS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES?

Article 8(j) CBD provides for respecting, protecting and rewarding the knowledge, innovations and practices of local communities. This provision was largely the result of an alliance between developing country governments and a nebula of civil actors comprising indigenous movements, ethnobiological experts, natural parks and protected areas movements, and various transnational advocacy networks.21 However, it would be more than an overstatement to say that the Convention thereby vested juris possessio over plant genetic resources in the communities holding traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. This stems from the fact that the various stakeholders involved pursued different goals under the guise of local knowledge protection. Developing country governments were primarily concerned with so-called acts of biopiracy involving the unauthorized use of traditional knowledge as a means to develop and to patent products or processes. Their objective was to provide states with the ability to control attribution of sources of local knowledge in order to capture part of the value added by the eventual use of this knowledge.22 Environmental NGOs, for their part, viewed native peoples as having little negative impact on the environment, or as conservationists with useful knowledge in terms of the sustainable management of their resources. They promoted a stereotyped image of the native as a gentle custodian of nature whose knowledge and simple ways needed to be preserved in order to maintain high biodiversity.23 As for native leaders, they appeared at the time to be less concerned by access to financial proceeds from products based on local knowledge than by “preventing inappropriate exploitation of sacred or secret cultural processes, products or symbols”.24 They did however help promote the image of the “ecologically noble savage” through their appreciation then that conservationists could help them in their struggles against appropriation of their lands.25

Protracted negotiations ensued, and concluded, almost twenty years later, with the adoption in 2010 of the Nagoya “Protocol on access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their utilization”. This instrument

21 Dumoulin 2003 and Brenni 2015.
22 Dutfield 2004: 98.
24 Oguamanam 2008: 40.
enjoins each party to “take legislative, administrative or policy measures” in order to secure the aforementioned benefits for the providing “country of origin of such resources” (article 4.1) and for the “indigenous and local communities” that hold the resources (article 4.1 bis). The Protocol mainly rests on “prior informed consent” procedures, which represent its key provision. As in the case of the FAO Undertaking, the rights of communities were now entrusted to state discretion. As Simon West aptly notes: “Rather than creating a powerful rights-based empowerment among local communities to protect and feel comfortable sharing their knowledge, Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) regimes work to create a state of legal dependency within biodiversity-rich communities, as ‘benefits’ do not result from a legal right actionable by an individual or community but are dependent upon a conventional legal relationship struck between state (potentially via the community involved) and bioprospecting party”. As the protocol relies on states to legislate over access and benefit sharing provisions regarding genetic resources that are held by indigenous and local communities, one can conclude that sovereignty eventually prevailed over community rights. It remains to be seen, however, whether the coalition formed by representatives of megadiverse states on the one hand and indigenous and local communities on the other will hold together. Some representatives of indigenous peoples have begun using the emotives of jealousy and anger in attempts to frame the Nagoya Protocol as a threat to the rights of indigenous peoples, expressing fears that states now have the power to alienate traditional knowledge when negotiating benefit sharing schemes with third parties.

ACT V: BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH ENTREPRENEURIAL CLAIMS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

In the early 1990s, genetic engineering had brought about a scientific revolution in the life sciences making it possible to deliberately modify the characteristics of an organism by manipulating DNA material and transferring it from one organism to another by means of a technique called recombinant DNA. Until then, issues regarding the legal protection of phytogenetic resources had concerned plant breeders whose new varieties incorporated certain observed characteristics – or the phenotype – of other plants. From the 1990s onwards, the possibility of using the biological coding or genotype of various resources and transferring this material from one species to another, resulted in the expansion of chemical and pharmaceutical companies into the life sciences. Through a series of strategic mergers and acquisitions, huge conglomerates were now combining food, agrochemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, and assembling the intellectual

26 West 2012: 34.
property rights needed to develop their new products so as to increase the barriers to entry into the germplasm industry massively confined to developed countries.\textsuperscript{27} These new corporate interests, in alliance with the entertainment and informatics industries had the power to lobby successfully for the inclusion of intellectual property rights within the remit of WTO.\textsuperscript{28}

As a result, they managed to secure exclusive commercial rights not only over plant varieties but more generally over life-forms. This is reflected in article 27.3(b) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which came into force with the WTO in 1995. WTO members are now obliged to enact laws that provide patent protection for micro-organisms and for non-biological and microbiological processes. In addition, the article calls for protection of plant varieties by either patents or an effective \textit{sui generis} system, or a combination thereof.

The \textit{sui generis} concept for plant varieties is vague to say the least. The UPOV system of plant breeders’ rights was obviously the meaning that TRIPs drafters from developed countries had in mind; but drafters from developing countries insisted that the provision remain deficient in details, and this imprecision has given their governments and legislatures a margin of appreciation in determining how to set up plant variety protection, and to allow them to introduce plant breeders’, farmers’, and, in some instances, indigenous communities’ rights. For their part, developed countries sought to align UPOV on the patent system by revising the Act in 1991. The revised Act extends considerably the exclusive rights enjoyed by breeders by allowing the use of protected varieties to create new varieties only insofar as the latter are not “essentially derived” from the former, and by limiting in scope the farmers’ privilege, which must now be exercised “subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder”. One argument that has frequently been used by corporate actors and governments of industrialized countries in support of strengthening plant intellectual property protection worldwide is that access by farmers in developing countries to high-yielding varieties will be improved. The frame used here involves the promise that seed developers will more willingly transfer their technologies abroad if national intellectual property laws pertaining to plant genetic resources are adjusted globally to provide breeders with more assurance that they will be able to recoup their investments.\textsuperscript{29} The main emotive articulated in this context by the business firms involved with the support of OECD governments has been the fear of food deficit in developing societies.

\textsuperscript{27} Falcon, and Fowler, 2002.
\textsuperscript{28} Ariffin, 2007; May, 2000.
\textsuperscript{29} Galushko, 2012: 59–60.
DISCUSSION: THE ROLE OF EMOTIVES IN THE MAKING
OF THE REGIME OVERLAP

The sheer institutional density in the international management of phylogenetic resources, where at least four legal agreements (FAO, UPOV, CBD and TRIPs) appear to overlap, has proved intriguing to scholars of international relations. Raustiala and Victor assume that actors gradually converged on a property rights approach, whether private or public, as the value of plant genetic resources began to rise with the development of new technologies. The aim was to capture added value. This utilitarian explanation, grounding property in the protection of expectation, leaves open the question of why so many legal instruments were introduced in the first place and how they achieved similar legal status and are by and large fairly robust. I argue that the appeal to emotions can largely account for this enigma.

Emotives certainly contribute to account for the large number of legal instruments of comparable effect that have been introduced in the field of plant genetic resources use and management. Business together with developed countries’ governments were able to connect plant intellectual property protection with food security in the developing world. They repeatedly evoked the spectre of shortages with the obvious purpose of magnifying fear and effectively suppressing issues relating to other societal concerns. In so doing, they successfully pressed for changes in international law through the two major systems of UPOV and TRIPS that institutionalize the notion that intellectual property translates into higher crop yields. However, an alliance composed of developing country governments and a network of agricultural and conservation NGOs was able to move the issue from how to break out of the cycle of subsistence farming to an altogether different domain that linked the international management of genetic resources to issues of conservation and social justice. Jealousy, fear and indignation were the emotives used to repackage the issue in the institutional settings of the FAO and the CBD. The international management of plant genetic resources shows how agency rather than structure can be – in this instance through the strategic use of emotives – “crucial in changing the power equation between competing networks”. Actors with relatively limited resources – representatives of small farmers, indigenous movements and developing countries – were capable of imposing their policy preferences in two out of the four regimes in spite of opposition from their more powerful opponents. They made extensive use of emotives to that end.

How can we account for the relative robustness of each regime in terms of non-defection, observation of rules, and initiatives to adapt the legal framework to new circumstances? I venture to advance the hypothesis that the purpose of each

30 Sell and Prakash, 2004: 147.
legal instrument has been supported by emotive meanings associated with specific, often incommensurable, ideas. Emotives can indeed be evinced in the three types of ideas that are liable to influence international politics, namely world views (which establish the possibilities for action), normative ideas (which set criteria to distinguish right from wrong) and causal ideas (which provide guides on how to achieve ends).31

Regarding world views, the regimes under study all share a similar concern about nature perceived as impotent, weak and incapable of supplying the needs of humans. It is worthwhile here to recall the opinion formed by Freud in *Civilization and Its Discontents* to measure how far we are today from the commonly held view on nature at that time: “we are threatened with suffering from three directions: from our own body, which is doomed to decay and dissolution and which cannot even do without pain and anxiety as warning signals; from the external world, which may rage against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction; and finally from our relations to other men”.32 Although communities are indeed periodically subjected to “the superior power of nature”33 as tragically evidenced in Japan in 2011, this is clearly not the concern of the regimes examined here, nor generally of international environmental politics, which deal with the possibilities or the implications of human powers over the natural world. Whereas the UPOV and TRIPs regimes picture humanity as a conqueror of nature – “for the relief of man’s estate” following Bacon’s words in *Novum Organum* – the CBD and, to a lesser degree, the FAO regimes express concern about negative human impacts and ecological footprints. The emotive meaning which hovers about the idea of nature in all four regimes is one of impotency rather than “merciless force” – an impotency to be remedied by managing it technologically (UPOV and TRIPs) or sustainably (FAO and CBD).

The normative ideas on which all four regimes are founded are equally emotion-involving. The UPOV and TRIPs regimes apply what appears to be a “heuristic of hope” to patents on life forms. Both regimes promote the idea that patents and breeders’ rights are “good” because they are deemed essential for economic development. If individuals are not given the right to the “fruits of their labour”, following Locke’s words, then inventions of potentially useful products, processes and technologies will cease. Although the FAO and CBD regimes by and large endorse this normative idea, they articulate it to a “heuristic of fear” that other rights may be violated in the current state of international regulation of property. The latter two regimes expound the view that patents and breeders’ rights can be

33 Ibid.: 33.
The causal ideas involved are similarly emotion-laden. This is usually the case when we are puzzled over the cause of an uncertain situation. Emotion is introduced as a simplifying hypothesis. However, when we move towards an empirical understanding of the situation, the power of the emotion hypothesis is weakened. The UPOV and TRIPs regimes seek to establish a cause-effect relationship between the protection of new varieties of plants on the one hand, and the “development of rural economy” on the other. However, the latter term is obviously not value-free. As a result, the power of the emotion hypothesis – which in this instance takes the form of a heuristic of hope about the positive effects of patents – cannot be weakened. One has to adhere to such a heuristic in order to establish a causal relationship between proprietary protection of plants and beneficial outcomes for agricultural development.

The same can be said of the other two regimes. FAO establishes a causal relationship between the conservation of germplasm on the one hand, and food security on the other. Because the idea of food security is not value-free, the heuristic of hope about how conservation may achieve this end cannot be weakened. Similarly, the CBD establishes a causal relationship between various benefit-sharing mechanisms on the one hand, and the conservation of biodiversity on the other. However, biodiversity “means different things to different people”. In this instance, too, the heuristic of hope about how such mechanisms may contribute to biological diversity cannot be weakened.

The purpose of each regime is supported by emotive meanings associated with specific world views as well as normative and causal ideas. All four regimes are based on particular ways not only of thinking but perhaps more importantly of emoting. Their ends appear to be as vague as they are highly desirable to, and hoped for by, the various actors that partook in the making of their frameworks. Hence, the relative robustness of these institutions none of which is likely to wane in the near future.

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Shadow of Guilt: U.S.-Rwandese Relations after the 1994 Genocide

Ainius Lašas

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the victorious Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Paul Kagame built a distinct political system combining a semi-authoritarian rule at home with a hypersensitive and assertive regional security agenda. While some of the measures were clearly necessary to stabilize a very fragile situation or to ensure the effective functioning of the state, many Rwandan government (GOR) actions began to turn more repressive and exploitive over time (Longman 2011). Despite the accumulating evidence of human rights abuses and dubious military adventurism, Washington willingly took up and maintained the role of Rwanda’s principal advocate and ally on the international scene. U.S. politicians were reluctant to publicly criticize Kigali. On its part, the new Rwandan leadership seemed to clearly understand and exploit their “victim” status in order to achieve various domestic and regional goals (Reyntjens 2004). In this way, the affective tags of the genocide came to play a noticeable role in post-1994 U.S.-Rwandan relations.

This chapter begins with an assumption that the U.S. political elites, who were in charge of foreign policy in the run up to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, experienced guilt and/or shame once the full scope of the tragedy began to emerge. The evidence for this claim is discussed in the “Emotions and Beliefs” section. Given the abundance of public acknowledgements of wrongdoing, the chapter focuses not so much on proving the existence of the phenomenon as such, but rather probing the behavioral implications of these emotions in a policy setting. I approach post-1994 U.S.-Rwandan relations as one of the most likely instances in which the role of self-conscious emotions in International Relations can be observed. To what extent can one detect behavior consistent with the feelings of guilt and shame? How and when (if at all) does self-conscious affect manifest in policy-making processes? Can we talk about an institutionalized culture of guilt and shame? What are the theoretical implications of observed behavior? Two particular developments are used to explore
these questions: the establishment and functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and alleged RPF human rights abuses and reprisal killings. These topics cover some of the most pressing post-genocide policy areas both for the new government in Kigali and the international community – security and justice. Also, they partially help to differentiate between self-conscious affect and other alternative explanations, as both issues came to light before the Rwandan political situation stabilized and Kigali could provide certain strategic benefits – such as peacekeeping troops – for its newly found Western allies.

I begin this chapter with theoretical and methodological considerations in testing the role of emotions in political decision-making. Next, I discuss the historical/policy background of U.S.-Rwandan relations. The chapter continues with the presentation of two case studies, which help to evaluate a proposed hypothesis. Based on the findings, the “Evaluating the Scope of Self-Conscious Emotions” and “Theoretical Implications” sections grapple with broader implications of this chapter. I conclude by revisiting the proposed hypothesis and its relevance in understanding the role of emotions in International Relations.

EMOTIONS AND BELIEFS

Although the study of emotions in International Relations has recently gained some momentum (e.g., Crawford 2000; Lowenheim and Heimann 2008; Lebow 2008), this subfield is at the early stages in terms of theory and methodology development. Most of emotions-related research in political science to date has been focused on measuring American voter feelings and subsequent voting patterns (e.g., Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007). Such an approach tends to focus on a narrow range of basic emotions – enthusiasm, anxiety, anger, and fear – leaving aside self-conscious emotions. It also ignores the issue of emotions in International Relations because of the inability to directly measure and/or manipulate their impact in a controlled setting.

This chapter focuses on self-conscious emotions manifested, to use Greene et al. (2004) terminology, as “personal moral dilemmas and judgments.” In such situations – and the Rwandan genocide largely fits this category because of the in/decisions made by the Clinton administration – emotions appear to have the strongest effect. Specifically, I examine the role of shame and guilt in political decision-making, which – according to some scholars – may have overlapping influences (Harder 1995: 387). As noted by social psychologists, controllable failures

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tend to generate guilt, while uncontrollable failures generate shame (Lewis 1971: 84; Tracy and Robins 2006: 1350). Because the U.S. behavior during the Rwandan genocide had both controllable and uncontrollable aspects, the chapter does not clearly delineate between these two emotions. Instead, the U.S. political elites are seen as being on the shame-guilt continuum. Those who believe that the situation in Rwanda was largely outside of the UN and U.S. control may feel shame. Others, who believe that the U.S. government could have prevented or at least minimized the extent of the genocide, should experience guilt. Although guilt is generally regarded as a reparative action-oriented emotion and shame is generally regarded as a self-oriented emotion, their collective forms, at least in some cases, converge in line with guilt-like attitudinal dispositions (Lickel et al. 2006). Thus, both of them should elevate actors’ awareness and sensitivity in connection to the source of psychological distress. In the context of U.S.-Rwandan relations, U.S. policymakers should approach the new regime in Kigali – the principal victim – with special support and exoneration.

The very existence of self-conscious emotions suggests that deeper information processing can lead to a self-conscious form of affect. In such a model, a basic anxiety spurs additional information searching, which can in turn reinforce or legitimate affect. Thus, in contrast to the dual habituated-deliberative choice hypothesis advanced by the affective intelligence theory (Mackuen, Marcus, Neuman, Keele 2007), deeper information processing does not necessarily lead to a more “rational” decision-making, but rather to the rationalization of emotional dispositions. In fact, guilt, shame, or embarrassment can be seen as a rationalized and more targeted form of anxiety. Thus, information-seeking seems to legitimize and reinforce initial anxiety, transforming it into a self-conscious emotion. The latter then, in line with propositions advanced by Lodge, Taber and Weber (2006), generates affective tags to particular events and actors, which influence subsequent decision-making, once direct or indirect linkages with these tags are established. Thus, the affect effect extends into the realm of higher-order deliberation and even among sophisticated decision-makers (Lodge and Taber 2005). This suggests that not only basic emotions (Mackuen, Marcus, Neuman, Keele 2007), but also self-conscious emotions (Wohl and Branscombe 2008) can influence existing belief structures forming what Mercer (2010) calls new “emotional beliefs.” The interaction of specific self-conscious emotions and preexisting beliefs should produce concrete and testable hypotheses. Before examining likely interaction effects, I begin this analysis by looking at each element – self-conscious emotions and existing beliefs – within the context of U.S.-Rwandan relations.

Despite efforts, the robustness of the guilt-shame variable remains somewhat problematic because it is hardly realistic to measure the attitudes and feelings of political elites in a controlled experimental setting. Thus, the focus of the chapter is
first and foremost to establish the plausibility of collective self-conscious emotions and their congruence with the observed outcomes and the process of U.S.-Rwandan relations. Likely alternative causal explanations are also discussed to establish the reliability of the alleged congruence and causality.²

What were the dominant beliefs and policy preferences of U.S. political elites on Rwanda and the Great Lakes region at the time of the genocide? Since the 1993 Mogadishu debacle, the Clinton administration reformulated its policy of humanitarian intervention, scaling back any participation in peacekeeping operations that did not advance “American national interests” or “national security objectives.”³ U.S. policy based on this doctrine of vital strategic interests, stipulated in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), exhibited reluctance for any military involvement in African conflicts (Weiss 1995). U.S. behavior during the Rwandan genocide clearly demonstrated how this doctrine worked in practice.

Despite the mammoth proportions of the human tragedy, this event did not fundamentally alter regional economic or geopolitical conditions in favor of Kigali. U.S. regional interests, as marginal as they were, should have continued to focus on the interrelated goals of regional stability (i.e., the embrace of status quo) and democratization (Rothchild 1998). At the same time, the United States should have maintained the standard practice of public criticism and diplomatic pressure even in the case of “nonessential” conflicts. Such an active, but rather shallow, profile helped the U.S. not only to alleviate pressures from domestic and international human rights groups, but also to maintain the myth of exceptionalism in promoting democracy and stability around the world (Mertus 2008: 86). Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Charles Snyder argues that the genocide “that did not elevate Rwanda in the pantheon of priority issues of the United States. Africa was always a humanitarian concern, more than anything else.”⁴

If the PDD 25-driven outlook toward Africa dictated the continuity of the strategic restraint (at least until the 9/11 attacks), guilt and shame over the Rwandan genocide led in the direction of reengagement and support for the victim state. The discursive evidence for the presence of these self-conscious emotions can be detected on multiple levels. Following the uproar of human rights organizations over and media investigations into the Western neglect of the Rwandan genocide, the Clinton administration publicly admitted its mistakes. President Clinton himself went to Rwanda in 1998 and acknowledged the responsibility of the international community for “not act[ing] quickly enough after the killing began,” for “hav[ing] allowed the

² For more on the congruence method, see George and Bennett (2004: 181–204).
⁴ Interview with Charles Snyder. Department of State. February 19, 2010, Washington, D.C.
refugee camps to become safe haven for the killers,” and for “not immediately call[ing] these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.” Madeleine Albright spoke in very similar terms during her visits to Africa. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake also acknowledged that the Rwandan tragedy “sits badly [for me], and I can’t begin to give you a psychological response to that.” One of the key architects of the U.S. post-genocide Rwandan policy, Susan Rice, repeatedly expressed regrets over the Rwandan debacle as well. Most recently, marking the fifteenth anniversary of the genocide, she, now the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, spoke of “the sorrow of all who stood by.” After leaving the office, all of them singled out U.S. reluctance to intervene in Rwanda as the most regretful policy “indecision” during their tenure. In fact, while visiting Rwanda in 2005, Clinton went even further and expressed regret over the “personal failure” on his part.

In the same way, during my interviews with former U.S. officials, the issue of self-conscious affect was repeatedly mentioned as an important variable in understanding recent U.S. policy toward Rwanda. A high level Department of Defense official provided the following, rather typical, assessment: “I can summarize how the Rwandan genocide affected US foreign policy formulation in the post-genocidal area as one word – guilt. A lot of it was driven by guilt.” This is also corroborated by academic literature that touches upon the topic of U.S.-Rwandan relations in mid-1990s. Prunier (2009: 338), one of the leading scholars of the Great Lakes region, insists that “the United States was deeply embarrassed at having passively connived in a genocide and tried to make up for that by turning the RPF into a black Israel.” Clark (2002: 7) also points a finger in the same direction: “Western guilt about its inaction at the time of the 1994 genocide exerts a decisive – and somewhat perverse – influence over the policies of the Western powers in the region.”

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11 Interview with Ambassador Richard W. Bogosian, Department of State, February 22, 2010. Interview with Charles Snyder, Department of State, February 19, 2010, Washington, DC. A number of anonymous interviews conducted during the period of February 2010 through July 2011.
12 Anonymous interview, July 9, 2011.
Shadow of Guilt

(2002: 156–157) argues in a similar vein, linking Western guilt with reluctance to criticize the new government in Kigali.

Given such broad consensus, this chapter does not question the existence of self-conscious affect among Clinton administration officials, but instead seeks to examine whether and to what extent these emotions played a role in the U.S. policy-making process. They should have clearly placed Rwanda in the category of the utmost victim that deserves unequivocal U.S. support. Thus, a hypothesis based exclusively on the guilt-shame continuum expects consistent and broad-based U.S. support for Kagame’s government following the genocide. Furthermore, such self-conscious feelings should generate reluctance to openly criticize the victim, even if it subsequently exhibits inappropriate behavior. Instead, similarly to Rwandan politicians, U.S. politicians should have a tendency to view and justify any subsequent Rwandan missteps in the context of the 1994 tragedy. The prevailing emotional tags of Rwandan victimhood and American inaction should provide grounds for this new policy approach.

If self-conscious emotions shape the nature of actors’ beliefs, then the experience of guilt and shame should in some way alter the paradigm of “strategic indifference” toward Rwanda. What kind of hybrid hypothesis does this interaction between self-conscious affect and belief of nonintervention produce? At the most abstract level, it is clear that the focus should be on the changed relationship between a distressed party and a victim, where the latter gains attention and support to its domestic needs, and substantial space for maneuver. Thus, I propose the following hybrid hypothesis:

H: A shame/guilt-ridden party should be willing to endorse, support and work on behalf of a victim state as long as this partnership does not expose the patrimonial state to substantial domestic costs. This partnership should also exempt a victim state from open criticism of its actions, granting a substantial room for policy maneuver, if necessary.

This hypothesis exhibits both proactive and passive elements of support for the victim. As long as it does not generate any potential domestic political vulnerabilities or costs, the U.S. administration should not waver to pursue this policy. Thus, the concept of strategic interests should act as a policy “tunnel” constraining the scope of emotions-driven support for Rwanda.

Next, I turn to two case studies – the establishment and functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and alleged RPF human rights abuses and reprisal killings – to examine the validity of the proposed

14 In the context of the PDD-25, substantial domestic costs can be defined as either risking the lives of American citizens and/or reallocating noticeable financial resources to a victim state at the expense of domestic constituents.
interaction effects between self-conscious emotions and existing beliefs. Both case studies represent key human rights and international justice issues that have been traditionally advocated and promoted by the United States government. In the case of post-genocide Rwanda, their importance was essential and immediate for the successful rejuvenation of the state. Each case study contains several distinct events or series of events (observations) that are used to probe the validity of the proposed hypothesis.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

Setup

Once the U.S. government realized the scale of genocide in Rwanda, it began to consider the idea of the criminal tribunal. The first indications can be traced back to May 24. During the press conference by U.S. delegation to Special session on Rwanda of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Ambassador-Designate Geraldine Ferraro admitted that there is “a real possibility that the end result might be some sort of a tribunal dealing with the issue.” The following day, the State Department press guidance still insisted that “the primary responsibility rests with national judicial systems,” but the tide began to turn in favor of the tribunal. It went hand-in-hand with the growing acknowledgement of the Rwandan genocide. On June 30, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher indicated official administration’s endorsement of the tribunal. A month later, the U.S. managed to convince the new Rwandese government to again support the idea, which they (Rwandese) floated at the beginning of hostilities. For the U.S. government, the tribunal was not only a response to the genocide, but also a way to address the ongoing cycle of revenge and violence. As John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, noted, “Rwanda was not just a tragedy we had failed to prevent; it was another crisis in the making” (2003: 68).

The acceptance of the tribunal idea as such did not make it any easier to agree on the statute of the proposed judicial body. The Clinton administration was

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initially planning for the enlargement of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) rather than the establishment of yet another separate
tribunal. Like for the ICTY, The Hague was the preferred location for headquarters,
although the Department of State was also open to Nairobi or Kigali as potential
sites for hearings and trials. In terms of the start date for the jurisdiction of the
ICTR, the U.S. initial position was April 1, 1994. However, given the conclusions of
the UN experts’ interim report, which indicated considerable pre-April activities in
preparation for genocide, January 1, 1994 looked like a more reasonable date. From
the beginning, the United States was also open to expanding the jurisdiction of the
court beyond the territory of Rwanda, while the UK and New Zealand were more
cautious in this regard.\(^\text{19}\)

In the meantime, the Rwandans were growing increasingly frustrated with the
slow nature of the UN process in determining the facts on the ground, which was the
first necessary step toward the establishment of the tribunal. They interpreted it as
yet another example of UN and Western insensitivity to Africa in general and to the
Rwandan tragedy in particular. UNSC Resolution 935 legislated the Commission
of Experts to finish the investigation on the occurrences of genocide and war crimes
in four months’ time, but Kigali demanded faster action. If not, it threatened to
start its own judicial proceedings using military courts. The United States was quite
sympathetic to GOR concerns. The State Department requested its embassies to
contact the members of the Commission asking to mobilize quickly and provide the
results of the investigation as soon as possible.\(^\text{20}\) Also, the U.S. expressed the need for
clear action with P5 members.\(^\text{21}\)

However, not all Security Council members seemed to be as open to Rwandese
concerns as Washington. For example, in September 1994, the U.S. sponsored a
Security Council resolution urging and authorizing UN member states to arrest
escaped genocidaires in their own countries. The draft resolution was nipped in the
bud by France and never saw the light of day (Morris and Scharf 1998: 308). This
clearly frustrated Rwanda because the arrest and trial of runaway masterminds of the
genocide was one of the key motives behind its support of the tribunal.

As negotiations over the tribunal progressed and its outlines became clearer, Kigali
grew increasingly hostile toward it. In addition to frustration over the slow bureaucratic
pace of the UN and distrust of some SC members, Kigali was disappointed with the
new U.S.-New Zealand proposal. Some of these concerns seemed quite legitimate

\(^{19}\) U.S. UN Mission, Rwanda Tribunal, 94USUNN04448, October 4, 1994, www.rwandadocumentsproject
.net/gsd/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASHf285/2e099700.dir/3163.pdf.

\(^{20}\) U.S. Department of State, Rwanda Commission of Experts Demarche, 94State21579, August 6, 1994,
www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsd/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASH500g/9a670f5.dir/2811.pdf.

\(^{21}\) U.S. UN Mission, Rwanda Tribunal, 94USUNN04448, October 4, 1994, www.rwandadocumentsproject
.net/gsd/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASHf285/2e099700.dir/3163.pdf.
points for discussion – temporal limitations of the court’s jurisdiction, location of the tribunal seat, relationship between the ICTY and ICTR – while others were nonstarters for the U.S. and/or other Security Council members – exclusive focus on the genocide without investigation of war crimes, death penalty, Rwandan veto on the membership of the tribunal, and Rwandan right to review ICTR’s pardons or commutations of sentences. Still the United States was willing to compromise on a number of requests. For example, it was in favor of a provision for the ICTR to inform the GOR in advance about any possible pardons and commutations of sentences. Also, it agreed with the GOR to prioritize genocide over war crimes and crimes against humanity. Unlike Europeans, the United States was ready to accept the death penalty requirement, an understandable position given its own domestic policy. Furthermore, it was willing to leave the question of the tribunal seat open. And finally, it was fine with an earlier start date for tribunal’s jurisdiction, although not all the way to November 15, 1992 as demanded by the Rwandans.  

Negotiations with the GOR were frustrated by two factors. First, the GOR was more willing to compromise once approached by U.S. officials, but the promises did not always translate into policy flexibility at the UN Headquarters. So there was an apparent gap between positions of Kigali and of the Rwandese permanent representative in New York. Second, it seemed that Kagame was ultimately in charge of many questions, but he was not always willing or interested to listen to Westerners. For example, when the U.S. embassy chargé Bob Whitehead tried to get in touch with him regarding the UN resolution on October 30, one day before the scheduled voting, Kagame was reportedly busy presiding over a soccer match between the Rwanda and Burundi army teams. Because of Rwandese intransience, the voting was postponed until November 7. The U.S. government made one more effort to persuade Kigali at least to abstain rather than vote “No” on the resolution. In addition to embassy officials, Under Secretary Wirth and Assistant Secretary Moose contacted Rwandan officials by phone, but to no avail.  

The U.S. position on the resolution was both an attempt to restore its own image as the protector of human rights and to accommodate Rwandan interests. As a memo from the legal adviser Michael J. Matheson noted:
USUN [United States Mission to the United Nations] has consulted at some length with the Rwandan delegation to accommodate Rwandan concerns to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the fundamental objectives of the exercise and with past practice. We have, however, not been able to accommodate a number of Rwandan demands that would have the effect of unacceptably limiting the tribunal’s jurisdiction or subordinating the process to Rwandan national control. It is critical that this process be seen as impartial and consistent with international practice, and not be seen as tilting toward one of the parties involved.25

Is it possible to detect any manifestations of U.S. guilt or shame in the setup of the ICTR? Because the decision-making process involved a number of states, it is quite difficult to single out the uniquely American take on the issues at hand. Given the fact that other Security Council members came out strongly for or against certain issues, the limits of U.S. preferences were not fully tested and revealed. The only possible effects of self-conscious affect were U.S. willingness to take charge of negotiations with Rwanda, its attempts to speed up the overall process and to demonstrate maximum flexibility where possible. Following the vote, Madeleine Albright, acting as the President of the Council, explained the limitations of collective decision-making quite clearly: “While we understand their [Rwandese] concerns regarding several issues – indeed, on the death penalty we might even agree – it was simply not possible to meet those concerns and still maintain broad support in the Council” (quoted in Morris and Scharf 1998: 308).

ICTR at Work

When it comes to the actual functioning of the ICTR, the fact that not even one Tutsi was prosecuted by the court raises some obvious questions. Did the ICTR try to prosecute not just Hutu, but also Tutsi-related crimes? If so, why was it not successful in achieving the intended goals? Did the United States have anything to say about that?

It turns out that the United States not only had something to say, but also to do with the nature of ICTR prosecutions. The memoirs of Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte and her spokesperson Florence Hartmann reveal a number of interesting details about the work of the Tribunal and its rocky relationship with Kigali and Washington. With the coming of Carla del Ponte, the Court publicly announced that it collected information on RPF crimes. Prosecutor Louise Arbour had already started this process, but del Ponte brought it to another level (Off 2001: 331). In

December 2000, she informed President Kagame and the international community that the court was preparing thirteen potential cases. Kagame promised to cooperate, but the promise has never been kept. Instead, the Tutsi-dominated government decided to teach Del Ponte a lesson and “was effectively blackmailing the tribunal, sabotaging its trials of accused Hutu genocidaires in order to halt the Office of Prosecutor’s Special Investigation of crimes allegedly committed by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1994” (Del Ponte 2009: 225). At the time, Western diplomats in Rwanda interpreted Kigali’s intransigence in exactly the same way as Del Ponte (Peskin 2009: 213). However, Del Ponte, to her own disadvantage, preferred to keep such frustrations from media attention, presumably hoping for a more constructive attitude from Kigali. But the Rwandese government had very little respect and patience left for the tribunal. Kagame’s real take on ICTR investigations of RPF became clear in July 2002, when he met Del Ponte, as the Chief Prosecutor, for the last time. Kagame accused her of “destroying Rwanda” and told her to investigate the genocide and not the military, which they would take care of themselves (Del Ponte 2009: 226).

Del Ponte reported Rwandan intransigence to the Security Council, but the members were not eager to take any actions, even rhetorical. At the same time, Rwanda used the opportunity to divert attention from its noncompliance by submitting a letter with a long list of exaggerated concerns. Among other things, the ICTR was accused of corruption, harassment of witnesses, employing genocidaires, and leveraging false allegations against the Rwandese government. The letter asked the Council to separate the Office of the Prosecutor for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. While most Rwandese complaints had some factual basis, Kigali applied individual incidents or misunderstandings in broad brushes to the whole institution and all of its work. Although judge Navanethem Pillay, the president of the ICTR, provided a detailed reply to the letter countering every point raised by Rwandans, there was more at work than just the facts of the matter. Kigali had key Western countries firmly on its side.

The U.S. government seemed to support not only Rwandese demands for two separate prosecutors, but also their attempts to transfer the ongoing ICTR investigation of RPF crimes to Rwandan courts. This is surprising given the fact that the U.S. government had been unsuccessfully asking Kigali for records of prosecuted RPF officials for the previous eight years. During May 2003 meetings between Rwandan representatives, Del Ponte and U.S. Ambassador-at-large

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Pierre Prosper, the latter suggested to Del Ponte to “surrender responsibility for investigating and prosecuting the alleged crimes of the RPF, along with all the highly sensitive evidence we had collected against individual Tutsi suspects, to the same Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government that had for nine years failed to undertake this investigative effort” (Del Ponte 2009: 231–232). Later that day, Prosper took an even more dramatic step and threatened not to reappoint her for the next four-year term as the ICTR chief prosecutor. In twenty-four hours, the verbal threats were followed up by a draft agreement of a joint U.S.-Rwandan request to hand over RPF investigations to Kigali (Hartmann, 2007: 270). When Del Ponte raised a number of issues with the proposed document, Prosper promised to revise the agreement and take her concerns in consideration. On May 20, Del Ponte received a fax from the State Department that contained pretty much the same text. Under the proposed terms, the ICTR would “not seek an indictment or otherwise bring a case [before the tribunal] unless it is determined that the [government of Rwanda] investigation or prosecution was not genuine” (Del Ponte 2009: 233–234).

Although the Rwandan pressure and the eventual decision to appoint a separate prosecutor were formally done for efficiency purposes, there is little doubt that diplomats close to the matter interpreted the developments somewhat differently. According to a New York Times story, Rwanda, unhappy with Del Ponte’s pursuit of RPF alleged crimes, lobbied Security Council members to replace her. Other media outlets also found the evidence of political pressure. Such rationale and the American-British backing of Rwanda is further confirmed by Peskin, who conducted a number of interviews with tribunal officials and diplomats (2009: 222–223). Thus, there is no reason to doubt Del Ponte’s spokesman Hartmann, who at the time stated that the replacement was not done “for reasons of efficiency or effectiveness,” but because the Rwandan government wanted “to stop the investigation of the RPF.” Finally, the efficiency argument also does not stand up to scrutiny because the Council did not take any substantive reforms of the tribunal, but just split the prosecutor position. If the purpose were to make the tribunal more efficient, then a number of other institutional reforms would have made more sense (Peskin 2009: 220–221).

At the time, the Rwandans were pretending like they already made the deal with the ICTR on handing over the investigation of RPF crimes to Rwandan courts. Rwandan Prosecutor General Gerald Gahima insisted on the already familiar scenario: “She [Del Ponte] would hand over this dossier, and we would

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investigate…. This was the agreement we reached.”31 Such blatant misinformation was clearly meant to dull the political pressure argument advanced by Del Ponte’s team members and to put a burden of expectations on the new prosecutor.

Why did the United States come out in favor of Rwandan demands, when knowing of their real intentions? It is possible to argue, as Del Ponte does, that Washington was returning a favor for a bilateral immunity agreement (BIA) between the United States and Rwanda signed on March 4, 2003. Indeed, the agreement looks like the best proximate cause, however, given the overall nature U.S.-Rwandan cooperation and the continuous accommodation of Rwandan interests over a decade, Western guilt/shame-based explanation adds a deeper explanatory dimension to the U.S. behavior. It is also consistent with the overwhelming British support for Kigali and their pressure on Del Ponte to drop RPF investigations (Peskin 2009: 221).

**HUMAN RIGHTS AND RPF WAR CRIMES**

There is no question that the U.S. government was aware of RPF crimes early on. The State Department report issued a few months after the genocide acknowledged that “credible reports of RPF atrocities, including summary executions, continue to trickle in alongside with scare stories fabricated by former government officials to discourage Hutu refugees from returning.”32 There were numerous occasions for U.S. officials to publicly confront the new Rwandan government over alleged crimes, but they preferred to keep matters private so as not to embarrass Kigali.

**Gersony Report**

One of the first opportunities was the so-called Gersony report that was never released once its assertions of Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) crimes came to surface. During August 1994, UNHCR team led by Robert Gersony interviewed approximately 300 refugees inside and outside Rwanda. Because its primary focus was the analysis of prospects for the return of Rwandan refugees, the report paid most attention to potential hindrances for comeback. Surprisingly, the interviewers found that the RPA post-genocide brutality has become a major roadblock as a number of prefectures have been “the scene of systematic and sustained killing and persecution of their civilian Hutu populations by the RPA.” The report estimated that from April/May through July about 5,000–10,000 persons per month “may have been killed.” According to the authors of the report, multiple interviewees

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independently corroborated the information.\textsuperscript{33} In late September, the UNHCR also reported that there had been an increase in refugee flows from Rwanda indicating at least a perception of growing threat.\textsuperscript{34}

The initial U.S. reaction to the Gersony report was quite constructive. After the debriefing by the UNHCR team on September 17, the Department of State had no issues with the planned public release of the document and were considering “complementary actions.” However, the UN asked the United States to restrain from any public statements until UN officials confront Kigali about the allegations first. Following the UNHCR meeting with Kagame on September 21, U.S. Under Secretary Tim Wirth was planning to raise the same issue with Rwandan officials as well.\textsuperscript{35} He extended his visit in Kigali in order to meet Kagame regarding this issue. However, once confronted, Kagame did not take criticism lightly, but instead expressed his “irate rejection.”\textsuperscript{36} The reason for a strong counteraction was most likely related to the fact that the report indirectly implicated the new leadership in committing war crimes.

Apparently, September 17 was the first time Kigali found out about the existence of the document. The Rwandan government was very upset with the report and especially with the fact that the UNHCR did not first consult with them about its existence and planned release. In response, Kigali took two simultaneous steps. On the one hand, it tried to discredit the report internationally as completely baseless supposition and speculation.\textsuperscript{37} On the other hand, it decided to put pressure on the UNHCR field officials through intimidation and sabotage.\textsuperscript{38} Despite Rwandan attempts to discredit the report, UN officials did not seem to have problems with its substantive analysis. For example, the topic of the report came up in the October 6 meeting between UN Undersecretary Kofi Annan and Joint Chief of Staff Director Wesley Clark. During their conversion, Undersecretary General noted that the report helped getting GOR’s attention on a need to deploy UNAMIR throughout

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Shaw, Angus, “Climate of Fear Stops Rwandans from Going Home,” Associated Press, September 28, 1994.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} U.S. Department of State, New Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda, September 12, 1994, www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASH01ba/d4d84e47.dir/3144.pdf.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} U.S. Department of State, Trilateral Meeting on Rwanda, State 272535, October 7, 1994, www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASH0127/7c33e491.dir/3176.pdf.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} American Embassy Kigali, Shestack Meeting with U.N. Officials, 94Kigali201710, October 6, 1994, www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASHbf92/9ea89631.dir/3177.pdf.
\end{itemize}
By that time, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali imposed a gag order on UN officials preventing them from discussing the findings.

Back in Kigali, on October 1 Kagame himself urged RPA soldiers to restrain from revenge killings and criticized “foreigners” (read as the UN) of trying to divide the country. 39 Rwandan president Bizimungu accused UNHCR of playing a negative role and challenged them to show the evidence of bodies. Furthermore, he argued that the UNHCR together with France was siding with defeated Hutu militias and giving them a reason to launch a military counterattack on the new government of Rwanda. 40

However, even within the Rwandan government, there were growing concerns about the RPA and its behavior. During his visit to Washington, Rwandan Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, in conversation with Deputy Assistant Secretary Bushnell, expressed “serious concerns about the RPA’s behavior and urged the U.S. to insist on application of the Arusha accord and civilian control of the military.” While dismissing the Gersony report, he admitted that there have been reprisals by undisciplined elements of the RPA. 41 This was not the first time the Rwandan president raised doubts about the RPA behavior to U.S. officials. In his meeting with a U.S. Embassy charge on October 20, he talked about “rumors of intra-military conflict from extremist elements unhappy with the course of events, especially three months without salary in the wake of a military victory.” 42 Twagiramungu admitted to U.S. officials that “there had been some reprisals, but said the RPA was an army of liberation that had never worked under a government before.” 43

The story of shelving of the Gersony report can be best understood as a response to Rwandese vehement protest and pressure. According to the New York Times correspondents who interviewed UN officials related to this investigation under conditions of anonymity, Washington put pressure on the UN not to release the

42 U.S. Department of State, Twagiramungu, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs discuss help for Rwanda, 94State323633, December 5, 1994, www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASH01c8/44a79e56/dir/3279.pdf.
44 U.S. Department of State, Twagiramungu, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs discuss help for Rwanda, 94State323633, December 5, 1994, www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASH01c8/44a79e56/dir/3279.pdf.
report as it might reignite civil war.⁴⁵ The argument has some parallels to Kagame’s and Bizimungu’s line of reasoning. Prunier also asserts that the US took active steps to discredit and to suppress the report (2009: 31).

Why did Washington change its initial positive assessment of the report? Was it concerned about the reliability of the data? That does not seem to be the case because Washington, like the UN, did not take seriously the follow up UNHCR investigative mission. Despite Boutros-Ghali’s promise to conduct an in-depth investigation, the UN Commission of Experts on Human Rights paid a very short visit to Rwanda and concluded that, while some of the killings indeed took place, the nature of the killings was not systematic and thus did not fall under the Genocide Convention (Prunier 2009: 31). A more likely reason for suppressing the report could have to do with the endangerment of the speedy return of refugees. If they and the international community were aware of the killings, the return of refugees to Rwanda would be halted. However, even this explanation is still unsatisfactory because it requires a deeper reason. Why would the United States overlook inappropriate conditions in Rwanda and endanger the lives of returning refugees? A likely answer is the U.S. interest in stabilizing the region as soon as possible. Raising questions about the new government would endanger this strategic interest and might even require a more substantial U.S. involvement. Another likely answer seems to be a feeling of guilt and shame by the Clinton administration. Self-conscious affect explains why the United States supported the new Rwandese government despite the evidence of war crimes and domestic instability. It also explains why the U.S. government sought to suppress the findings of the Gersony report as it would have embarrassed the new government and cast a shadow over it. Therefore, in order to make up for their own inaction, Washington tried to avoid questioning and investigating the conduct of the new Rwandese government.

Continuity of Violence

Despite the controversy over the Gersony report, the topic of reprisal killings and RPA excesses remained relevant for years to come. In the spring of 1995, Kigali decided to close Kibeho displaced persons’ camp, one of the largest camps within Rwanda. In the aftermath of their military action, there were at least 2,000 people killed, according to conservative estimates. Other sources reported four times greater numbers. Whatever the actual count of victims, there is no doubt that the RPA overstepped some boundaries. However, if one approaches this massacre just an expression of frustration because or earlier genocide, as Colonel Odom does,

then it is quite easy to rationalize the incident. Odom, former intelligence officer at the U.S. embassy in Kigali, argues that “compared to the 800,000 dead in the genocide, the 2,000 dead was but a speed bump” (2006: 9). While the numbers clearly do not compare, such logic is faulty because it becomes a justification for excessive violence.

The official U.S. reaction to the incident was quite modest. As specified in the non-paper submitted to the Rwandan government by U.S. Ambassador Rawson a week after the incident, “the events at Kibeho have seriously undermined your government’s credibility and weakened your international support.” However, in the next sentence, the criticism turns into praise as Kigali is lauded for “speedy call for an independent international commission of inquiry into these tragic events.” The topic is quickly abandoned in favor of self-flagellation for relatively slow donor performance and promises of additional assistance. U.S. officials agreed to continue their current policy approach toward Kigali, unless the investigation of Kibeho incident revealed “intentional killing (planned/premeditated) by the RPA.” The standard of proof turned out to be quite hollow as Rwandan-picked commission members merely pretended to conduct the investigation. Led by RPF representative Christine Omutonyi, the commission took just two meetings and no sight visits to draw conclusions in line with government’s position. The U.S. government seemed content with what Terry (2002: 209) calls “the flagrant sham the commission created” and resumed nonhumanitarian aid to Rwanda. Commenting on the subject, Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck seemed to be untroubled by the numbers of killed at Kibeho ranging “anywhere from 300 to 4,000.” Instead, he emphasized that “the appointment of the commission and the report of the commission and the acceptance of that report [by the Rwandan government] I think goes a long way toward a more honest approach toward this subject.”

As various RPF-related incidents were piling up, Kagame and other Rwandan officials began to more openly acknowledge the fact of RPA reprisals and insisted that guilty soldiers were held accountable. Given such claims, U.S. officials asked to provide a list of punished RPF soldiers. During an August 1995 visit to Kigali, Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye and Deputy Assistant Vincent Kern secured a promise from Kagame to send them the list. However, Kagame later reneged on this promise and the list was never provided (Odom 2005: 257). According to Ambassador


Richard Bogosian, who served as the U.S. special envoy for the Great Lakes region, the Rwandans wanted “to let us know they would not be pushed” (ibid.). However, as noted by Prunier (2009: 22), no high-ranking Rwandan officials were brought to trial, and – even when they were – the punishment was rather symbolic. It is hard to believe that U.S. officials were not aware of this fact.

Although Washington placed certain human rights-related contingencies on Kigali, especially in terms of financial aid and military training, the strategy was more of a front rather than a substantive policy. The indication of that can not only be corroborated from U.S. in/actions, but also from official documents. For example, during Kagame’s meeting with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake on December 13, 1994, the issue of human rights came up. In a typical fashion, Kagame strongly objected “to the idea that others can tell Rwandans what is good for them and said that the current leadership of the country almost single-handedly stopped the genocide and had a stake in maintaining their own credibility.” In response, Lake remarked that “he was not suggesting that aid be withheld, he simply noted that there are those in Washington, who are not as interested in Rwanda or see better ways to use USG funds, and actions by the GOR – even symbolic ones – would be helpful to shore up support for aid to Rwanda.” This is a rare case in which one can directly observe how a possible dynamic of moral emotions can play out in political decision-making. Once challenged over certain shortcomings, Rwandan officials use the genocide card to ward off any intrusions or reprimands. In response, U.S. officials back down, soften their position, and try to mollify Rwandan frustration. U.S. officials suggested the path of “symbolic” actions, which with time Rwanda seemed to have perfected quite well. Kigali realized that this was usually enough to calm the guilty consciences of Western allies that otherwise had little strategic interests in the region. Thus, it is no surprise that some U.S. officials thought that “over-zealous international condemnation of RPF reprisal attacks and human rights conditions inside Rwanda has understandably frustrated the new government.”

Can this episode be dismissed as simply another real-politik move on behalf of the United States in order to maintain regional stability? The main challenge for this kind of argument is the fact that, over the years, the new Rwandan government began to play an increasingly destabilizing role in the Great Lakes region. By the time of the Second Congo War, there was every reason for Washington to be

50 U.S. Department of Defense, Main Issues/Key Points to Make in Meeting with Kagame, December 1994 (exact date unclear because the document is an accumulated version of different memos) www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collection/udocs/index/assoc/HASH0e1eb/adfe5323_dir/3295.pdf.
seriously concerned about the Rwandan military adventurism, but the U.S. and other Western countries maintained deep reluctance to publicly criticize or pressure the ultimate victim state (see e.g. Prunier 2005: 218). What was the U.S. gaining in exchange for its oversight of human rights abuses in Rwanda and Kigali’s subsequent flexing of the military muscle in the Great Lakes region? Kagame had little to offer Washington except psychological exoneration for past U.S. inactions. Guilt and shame provide a relatively coherent explanation for U.S. behavior, although it does not automatically negate the coexistence of more strategically driven motives as well.

EVALUATING THE SCOPE OF SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS

The analysis presented in this chapter indicates that guilt and shame are relevant variables in understanding the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy-making processes in general and post-genocide U.S.-Rwandan relations in particular. Their role seems to be conditional on at least four factors. First, there must be a strong emotional experience shared among top-level decision-makers. In the case of the Clinton administration, it was the National Security Council members and their immediate subordinates responsible for Africa policy. Thus, it is not necessary for the whole bureaucracy to feel in a similar way, but only for some of the key officials who set policy direction. A related second point is that self-conscious emotions seem to play a more pronounced role when there are fewer actors involved in policy decision-making. A broader engagement inevitably brings in decision-makers with different interests and beliefs, which can weaken the effects of guilt and shame. The example of the establishment of the ICTR demonstrates such limitations. Third, unless self-conscious affect is a shared political-societal experience, as in the case of German-Israeli relations, national interests tend to curtail its effects. Politicians are rarely willing to encounter significant domestic costs and subsequent electoral risks for issues that have limited appeal to voters. In the case of Rwanda, the U.S. administration was not ready to contribute any peacekeeping troops to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) monitoring mission after the genocide. It preferred to limit U.S. engagement to short-term humanitarian missions and a few training programs for the RPF. This low-risk strategy affected not only developments within Rwanda, but also regional security dynamics, which again puts in doubt the previously discussed regional stability hypothesis. Finally, looking at the case of U.S.-Rwandan relations, there is an indication that guilt and shame may take time to manifest and to become a part of institutional culture. Its effect seems to grow with the increased awareness of past mistakes and the activism of victim states. Still the power of self-conscious emotions should not be overstated in a policy setting.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The role of guilt and shame in post-genocide U.S.-Rwandan relations not only helps to better understand the dynamics of self-conscious affect, but also weighs in on some ongoing theoretical discussions in the field of political psychology. First, it demonstrates that deeper levels of information processing, which defines most of policy making processes, do not necessarily lead towards “cold” cognition. The emotional tags of Western guilt and Rwandan victimhood seemed to have influenced U.S. policy toward the Great Lakes region. These were not automated decisions, which are often associated with familiar situations (Mackuen, Marcus, Neuman, Keele 2007). In fact, most situations were unfamiliar requiring substantial policy analysis and innovation, but the actors and their emotional tags were the same. It is difficult to imagine that the U.S. political elites were unaware of such tags. More likely, self-conscious affect shared among them to a different degree motivated the most sensitive ones to become policy entrepreneurs and to establish networks of like-minded colleagues, who pushed through their agenda. Given public confessions of guilt and shame at the highest levels of U.S. government, dissenting bureaucrats had fewer opportunities to challenge or dilute this policy course.

Second, the affective intelligence theory (as well as the rational choice theory) has an implied assumption that additional information processing reduces uncertainty. However, many political decisions and outcomes are highly uncertain not only ex-ante, but even post-hoc. The Second Gulf War is a case in point. Thus, additional information processing in politics is not always conclusively informative. That is where heuristics, ideologies, or emotional tags can become important additional pieces of “information” (Cassino and Lodge 2007: 110). Their impact further strengthens when high uncertainty is combined with short decision-making timespan and a narrow like-minded group of decision-makers (Lašas 2012: 1073).

Third, the feelings of guilt and shame not only transform actor’s belief structures, but also create new opportunities for the perceived victim state. These opportunities have less to do with proactive support from distressed parties, and more to do with the new levels of tolerance and exoneration for the subsequent actions of a victim state. The latter is given ample space of maneuvering to restore order and security. Even when a victim clearly turns into a victimizer and goes well beyond the limits of its legitimate security needs, as it has happened with Rwanda’s protracted military adventurism in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the shield of silence is maintained presumably owing to the perceived loss of moral right to criticize.

Finally and more generally, because of its highly experimental nature, current research on emotions seems to largely circumvent the issue of the affect effect on political elites. While it might be impossible to fill this gaping hole with the same kind of lab-driven experiments, a better understanding of affective underpinnings
of policy-making process is crucial for political science in general and International Relations in particular. Self-conscious emotions get relatively little attention in IR because of their linkages with moral judgments. Because international politics have been traditionally defined as a self-help system, morality becomes nothing more than a discursive charade for naïve voters or for international self-image preservation. However, the case of Rwanda does not fit such standard molds because this was a policy of little consequence both at the voting booth and in terms of the balance of power in the international system. And that is exactly when (and why) moral emotions become most relevant.

CONCLUSION

In the post-1994 genocide era, the United States became one of the most active and loyal advocates of Rwanda on the international political scene. This newly found friendship carried limited strategic weight, but had noticeable psychological underpinnings. For the Clinton administration, it was a way to redress guilt and shame over inaction during the 1994 tragedy and to restore its exceptionalist image. The analysis of the two case studies – the establishment and functioning of the ICTR and the alleged RPF human rights abuses – demonstrates that theoretical expectations based on moral emotions provide a reasonable match with events on the ground. However, it is also necessary to take into account the role of national interests as setting boundaries for shame and guilt-driven action.

Such self-conscious emotions require relatively deep levels of cognitive processing. However, if viewed as a rationalized form of anxiety, guilt, and shame support the primacy of affect hypothesis. It also demonstrates that deep cognition does not necessarily lead to “cold” decision-making. In fact, additional information searching may legitimate self-conscious affect and create an emotional belief. In the context of U.S.-Rwandan relations, this was the belief that the Tutsis were the victims of the genocide and, given the American failure to prevent or at least to minimize the scope of the disaster, the new Tutsi-led government deserved special attention and support from the United States as well as the international community at large. This belief was based on the guilt-shame experience by the U.S. officials following the genocide. The consequences of such affective tags reverberate in the Democratic Republic of Congo to this day.

REFERENCES


Emotions and Passions of Death, and the Making of World War II: The Cases of Germany and Japan

Jean-Marc Coicaud

This chapter is a case study that focuses on Germany and Japan, and the role of emotions and passions in the making of World War II. The first part of the chapter highlights the overall relevance of this case study in the context of the analysis of emotions and passions in international politics. The second part of the chapter shows that both for Germany and Japan a sense of psychological insecurity regarding their international status and their urge to catch up and compensate, put them on a collision course with the great powers of the period. In the third part, the chapter explains how, in time, this contributed to the fact that Germany and Japan embraced negative and exclusionary political emotions and passions that translated into belligerent and deadly policies, both for others and, ultimately, themselves. As a way to conclude, the fourth and final part of the chapter alludes to how a better understanding of the nature and role of emotions and passions in international affairs can encourage a psychology of peace, and, overall, international peace.

CONTEXT AND ARGUMENT FOR THE STUDY OF EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS IN RELATION WITH WORLD WAR II

What has triggered my interest in the nature, function and significance of emotions and passions in international relations begins with what led to World War II and the modalities taken by that conflict. In this perspective, two sets of issues principally stand out.

First, there is the aim to better understand the extreme and massive violence of the first half of the twentieth century, domestically and internationally, and the fact that it was accompanied by an entire spectrum of negative emotions and passions – what we can call “emotions and passions of death” – expressing and contributing to a systematic disregard for human life. This included the horrors of World War II...
and the cold reality of the fact that, as John W. Dower puts it, “(t)o over fifty million men, women, and children, it meant death. To hundreds of millions more in the occupied areas and theaters of combat, the war meant hell on earth: suffering and grief, often with little if any awareness of a cause or reason beyond the terrifying events of the moment.”

Second, and more generally, there is the attempt to make sense of the fact that actors, individual and collective, seem to find it easier, at the international level and in other settings, to treat others (individuals or collectivities) with indifference or even outright disregard rather than treat them well. As such, there is the attempt to make sense of the fact that embracing positive values, emotions and passions of inclusion, of life and life-affirming, appears somewhat more challenging than endorsing negative values, emotions, and passions of exclusion and, in extreme circumstances, of death and death-affirming.

Historians, philosophers, psychologists, and other scholars have spent much time and energy reflecting on the human, intellectual, and political puzzles that these two sets of issues constitute. But, interestingly enough, until recently, international relations specialists have been less interested in these matters.

To be sure, in the United States, the first generation of post–World War II international politics scholars addressed in their writings the World War II catastrophe and what led to it. This was normal: many of them were continental European émigrés who had to leave their country because of the unfolding tragedy. Furthermore, their rich academic background – frequently including law, philosophy, and history – made them versed and interested both in the complex questions of the rise of massive violence and in the result of war.

However, following this first generation, the next generations of American international affairs scholars, essentially homegrown, have been less committed to the examination of these questions. Two major reasons explain this state of affairs: (1) until recently most of these scholars favored almost exclusively a positivist approach to international relations and the conception of rationality it entails; and (2) coming with a somewhat narrow focus on U.S.–Soviet Union competition in the environment of the cold war and the challenges of building a world order around American hegemony, they generally did not have a deep interest for history and its multifaceted characteristics. This tended to distract scholars from concentrating on the World War II era, and exploring complex historical, philosophical, and psychological questions and their significance in international politics.

In this context, when some room was made for the analysis of the emotional aspects of World War II, international relations specialists have had the tendency to view them as elements of irrationality, including as irrational emotions and passions. There was some truth in this approach. But, while the period was certainly exceptional and one in which much irrationality and even all out madness was on full display, this approach cannot be seen as exhausting all there is to say on the topic. After all, together with the other traits of the time, irrationality itself and the emergence of such exceptional features in domestic and then world politics are in need of explanation. Gaining clarity on the matter is important for the World War II years. But it is crucial for international relations in general as well. After all, the possibility that emotions and passions can take a negative and radical turn, and drive the international agenda, is never to be entirely excluded. This can be seen in the demonization of the other and the negative emotions and passions, and policies that come with them, that since the early 2000s have accompanied terrorism and the “war on terror.”

In this perspective, understanding how negative emotions and passions and the culture associated with them become a defining feature of the international landscape, how this can be mitigated if not completely avoided, and how emotions and passions related to peace can be pushed forward internationally, calls for studying the nature and role of psychology, emotions, and passions both in general and in the international context. And it calls for analyzing them in connection with other key components of international affairs.

In the recent past, a number of international relations scholars have been giving more attention to the emotional dimensions of international politics, generating in the process a growing scholarly literature on the topic. Yet, this new intellectual context in international relations has not necessarily translated into revisiting the study of what led to World War II and the war itself through the lens of emotions and passions. This is all the more troublesome considering the momentous and epochal importance of the atmosphere and events leading up to World War II and the war itself, and their formative character for twentieth century international relations, if not for the late modernity.

This is not to say that the present chapter has the ambition of proposing a new narrative and explanation on the events and causes that brought about World War II. Instead, it is simply an invitation, through a focus on Germany and Japan, to pay more attention to how psychology and emotions/passions stand in relation to the dynamics of violence and war that came to prevail in the first half of the twentieth

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2 For an overview of recent publications on emotions and passions in international relations, refer to Jean-Marc Coicaud in this volume “The Question of Emotions and Passions in Mainstream International Relations, and Beyond.”
Coicaud

century. Moreover, this chapter does not pretend to be all there is to say on the emotions/passions and psychology issues in the context of World War II. It is more of an exploration of some of the possible angles on the question. Its goal is simply to further our understanding of the events that took place and of why and how these events happened in connection with emotions and passions.

More specifically, the piece of the intellectual puzzle we tackle in this chapter can be formulated in the following terms:

Competing interests among big powers played a role in the making of World War II; but, and not separated from this, another element had a serious impact: the sense of psychological insecurity experienced, each in its own way, by Germany and Japan in the context of their quest for recognition by other major powers – Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States – and the implications this had internationally. Their material conditions (both internal and international) compared to other great powers, pushed Germany and Japan to embrace policies that were ultimately self-defeating. This led them to see and assess themselves, others, and the international environment in conflicting terms and, faced with the unwillingness of other big powers to accommodate them to the extent they wanted, to overplay their hand, with lethal consequences all around.

While not pretending that this argument represents the whole and sole explanation of the path to World War II and its modalities, we argue that this is part of it.

As such, the thesis we explore in the chapter concerns the link that we believe exists, based on the interactions between oneself and others, between lack of peace with oneself and lack of peace with others, between war within and war with others. Indeed, while this thesis applies to individual relations among people and their identities, it also shapes the collective relations of states and countries – what we could describe as their relational identities and their effects. That the consequences of this can be disastrous in international affairs is evidenced by the level of destruction brought about by World War II.

Against this background, the next part of the chapter examines why and how Germany’s and Japan’s senses of psychological insecurity, fueled by features within themselves and their relations with the outside world, and their interactions, took place in the context of their drive for international recognition as great powers – with this situation ultimately contributing to bring about world war.

PSYCHOLOGICAL INSECURITY AND THE QUEST FOR RECOGNITION IN WORLD POLITICS

Usually, when reference is made to the notion of “insecurity” at the international and national levels, it is meant to designate tangible material threats to which
an actor is exposed. Internationally, the term “insecurity” is for instance utilized when a country’s interests are at stake because of competition among states, risks of war, or – more generally – unfavorable international distribution of power.

In this perspective, looking at Germany and Japan, and the world they found themselves in during the second half of the nineteenth century, it is true that the situation of these two countries was materially challenging. It was an uncertain situation for Japan, and a somewhat fragile one for Germany. In Japan, in Northeast Asia, the imperialist policies of the major powers of the time were a source of great pressure and, in their most dramatic aspects, were creating a danger for the preservation of its independence. As for Germany, it was not forgetting that, over the course of history, its geopolitical centrality but also vulnerability at the heart of Western continental Europe had exposed it to the threats coming from the rivalries and wars of big European powers, with the risk of being conquered and occupied. Both, therefore, had good reasons to be mindful and fearful of state-power competition in their respective regions.

That said, Japan and Germany would not have been so sensitive to the concrete, or material, threats they were facing if these threats had not been accompanied by and dovetailed with their own feelings of psychological, or emotional, insecurity. In this regard, in addition to their position in the international distribution of power, Germany’s and Japan’s ambitions to be respected by acquiring prestige and emulating the great powers of the period and reaching similar status and stature, which were orienting their policies in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century, played a role. In a way, rather than strengthening them psychologically, this weakened them. Indeed, this state of affairs was particularly psychologically unsettling, considering the pressures it was introducing on each country and their relations with other powers. To reverse the material and immaterial international balance of power in their favor and introduce power relations and terms more to their liking, Japan and Germany were asking a lot of themselves and the world order.

Internally, this entailed for their sense of collective self and identity to go through drastic changes. Internationally, it implied carving room for themselves, which established powers, eager to preserve their interests and privileges, were uncomfortable allowing.

In this context, three factors were especially challenging for the type of recognition and validation Germany and Japan yearned for: being latecomers as modern nations; having to experience rapid and deep societal transformations (and the stress associated with it); and having to face the reluctance of major powers to accept them as “members of their club.”
Germany and Japan as Latecomers

What about the fact that Germany and Japan were latecomers as modern nations?

Concerning Germany, in January 1871 the formal unification of German-speaking Europe took place. The official unification of Germany into a politically and administratively integrated nation-state occurred at the Versailles Palace’s Hall of Mirrors in France, after the French capitulation in the Franco-Prussian War, with the proclamation of Wilhelm I as German emperor.

As for Japan, although the establishment of the Tokugawa regime at the beginning of the seventeenth century played a key role in its unification, Japan still was not a modern nation when the Tokugawa period ended in 1867 with the resignation of Hitotsubashi Keiki, the last Shogun or military leader. Japan had lived in isolation, to the point that by the nineteenth century, it had become more insular than it was in early Tokugawa times. It had also fallen far behind the West. It is only following Commodore Perry’s arrival in 1853 and being forced to sign the 1854 Treaty of Peace and Amity with the United States and to open commercially to the world, which triggered the restoration of imperial rule in 1868 and the Meiji revolution, that Japan started to modernize.

Compared to older big powers such as Great Britain, France, Russia, and even the United States, these late entrances on the international scene must have been humbling, intimidating, and a source of much psychological trepidation for Germany and Japan.

Competitive Struggle and the Stress of Change

Another source of anxiety was the extent to which, in order to be at the level of the major powers, Germany and Japan had to catch up and, in the process, change and

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3 Following the fall of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna – convened in 1814 – founded the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund), a loose league of thirty-nine sovereign states that lasted until 1871.


adapt, both nationally and internationally. In this perspective, the challenge was to find a balance between, on the one hand, the still valuable features of their histories and identities and the imperative to tailor and mobilize them for the demands of international competition, and, on the other hand, the necessity to leave behind and dispose of what was viewed as a handicap and a burden.

While engineered to make the two countries competitive and stronger, this process was destined to produce traumas as well, hence the tensions it created and, ultimately, its ambiguous nature and outcome.

Domestically, to be able to compete with the other great powers, Germany and Japan had no choice but to go through structural transformations in a short period of time.

For Japan, the first two decades of the Meiji era, from 1868 to 1887, were epoch-changing and epoch-making:

> [P]olitical developments included centralization, conscription, tax reform, the movement for parliamentary government, and the drafting of a constitution. Social change, too, had been considerable, with the legal leveling of the classes, compulsory elementary education, westernization, leaps in material culture, and increased stature for the rural agricultural elite. Industrialization on a strong agrarian base, an aggressively entrepreneurial private sector... Japan’s capitalist economy began to take shape during the same period. There would be accelerations and setbacks, but by 1890 the direction of the economy was clearly set. Equally under way was the development of the national infrastructure: railroads, communications, financial institutions.8

In Germany, the internal changes were also fast and profound. For instance, from the 1870s onward, industrialization, urbanization, and modernization took place a good deal quicker than in Britain and France.9 Among other things, this came with a rapid increase in the working class population and the invention, as part of the “West[‘s] most thorough industrialization process,”10 of the compulsory state-operated and state-subsidized social security system.

By the end of the nineteenth century, these transformations had allowed Japan and Germany to strengthen their positions. Nevertheless, they also had their downsides. Nationally, as they were fundamentally altering German and Japanese societies, changes were introducing massive uncertainty.

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10 Ibid., p. 229.
For example, in Germany during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, the question of German identity became a contested issue. As Ernst B. Haas puts it:

Germans could never agree whether a primordial ethnicity or loyalty to the state defines their collective identity; the adoption of social imperialism and the practice of selective upward mobility did not suffice to mute class conflict; ethnic minorities were not sufficiently assimilated; the “democratizing” reforms of Wilhelm II were all rhetorical. . . . One could be a German because of one’s descent from German stock – the primordial tie of Blut und Boden. In German history this position is known as völkisch (ethnic). One could also be German by virtue of being a loyal subject of the sovereign – the state and its constitution define citizenship – which meant that a popular-parliamentary view should prevail. Or one could seek a formula that somehow combined both positions. If so, one had to offer a conception that dealt simultaneously with the cultural roots of identity and the constitutional role of the Kaiser.  

The reorganization of Japan was equally unsettling for the Japanese people and what had been the balance of their society. As the transition to an industrial economy progressed and techniques, practices, and institutions borrowed from the West supplanted local skills, customs, and wisdom, historical and cultural dislocation came to be part of life. Even those who had embraced the need to modernize Japan (that is, “Westernize”), be it the Meiji leadership or the younger generation, had to recognize this. The brusque evolution between old and new, traditional and modern, Japanese and Western, produced identity confusion and psychological self-doubt about the sense of place and the course to be followed. Relatedly, and more dramatically yet, the strategy of imitation, implying the superiority of Western civilization, tended to undermine Japan’s own self-image. Rather than providing the self-assurance and dignity that a positive national identity requires, it pointed to the loss of cultural autonomy and authenticity of the new Japan and weakened Japanese self-confidence and self-esteem.

In this context, for the novelist Natsume Sōseki, one of the most penetrating writers of the Meiji period, the outside-in impact, or the “external enlightenment” of Japan by the West amounted to nothing less than the endangering of Japan’s spiritual existence. In his novel Sore Kara (And Then), the hero, Daisuke, a young well-to-do intellectual, gives a pessimistic assessment of the society in which he lives:

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11 Ibid., pp. 230 and 231.
A people so oppressed by the West have no mental leisure, they can’t do anything worthwhile. They get an education that’s stripped to the bare bone, and they’re driven with their noses to the grindstone until they’re dizzy – that’s why they all end up with nervous breakdowns. Try talking to them . . . They haven’t thought about a thing beyond themselves, that day, that very instant. They’re too exhausted to think about anything else; it’s not their fault. Unfortunately, exhaustion of the spirit and deterioration of the body come hand-in-hand. And that’s not all. The decline of morality has set in too. Look where you will in this country, you won’t find one square inch of brightness. It’s all pitch black.”  

From an international standpoint, Germany’s and Japan’s predicaments were not any easier to overcome. To begin with, as countries that previously had not been central actors in the international system, they had to learn rules of the game that had been conceived, imposed, and dominated by others. This meant making sure as much as possible that these would not limit them to second-class nations, if not worse.

Despite the fact that German-speaking entities had been involved in the international relations of the European continent for a long time, thinking and acting as “one” was a novelty for the new Germany and, therefore, challenging. For Japan, as a non-Western country having lived behind closed doors for more than 250 years, the learning curve was even steeper.  

This helps understand why Germany and Japan felt it so important to assert themselves militarily. In this regard, it was particularly significant that Germany prevailed in the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War, and that Japan emerged victorious in the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War as well as in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. These military victories contributed to release the heavy pressure Germany and Japan experienced for having so much to prove. It showed that the two nations were catching up, and that they were catching up fast.

Although these successes gave Germany and Japan some breathing space, at the same time they were creating new problems, which made it all the more difficult for Japan and Germany to achieve the type of recognition and validation, the type of ease (both material and psychological) they were seeking from attaining preeminence in the international system.

**Projecting Power: In Search of Psychological Validation**

The root of the problem was twofold. First, as their emulations of the great powers was putting Germany and Japan on collision courses with the likes of

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Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia, these countries could only be made nervous and unwilling to recognize the rising powers as full-fledged peers. Second, in the process, the threshold for recognition and psychological validation as great powers grew only greater, more tense, and more challenging for Germany and Japan. Over time, what had initially developed as a position of increasing strength (at the end of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth century) was gradually transformed, from the 1910s onward, into a position much more perilous, with Japan and Germany cornered in their ambitions and more inclined to hope for the best while gambling their way into preeminence. This would worsen in the late 1930s and in the first part of World War II.

At the beginning, indeed, the big powers marveled at the ability of Germany and Japan to rapidly progress on the domestic and international planes. However, over time, as their rise turned Germany and Japan into a source of geopolitical competition, their rise made the major powers uncomfortable. The major powers were open to live with the ascent of the two countries, but only up to a point. From their point of view, it had to be within “reason,” so to speak, so that they would continue to have an edge and be in a commanding position. Accommodation was possible as long as Germany and Japan were disposed to function as junior partners (i.e., acknowledging the overall leadership of the great powers). This could include imperialist cooperation in taking advantage of weak powers, which Germany and Japan were happy enough to do because they were eager to become imperialist nations themselves. But it did not entail harming the interest and predominance of the great powers. Nor did it mean accepting Germany and Japan as full members of their club. This is to say that the established powers had no intention to release what Germany and Japan coveted most: membership to the great power club. Yet, second-class status would not do for the rising powers. They had parity in mind, if not surpassing the big powers.

As a result, tensions were unavoidable. The more Germany and Japan pushed forward, the more the major powers became defensive; and the more the major powers became defensive, the more Germany and Japan felt frustrated about their standing in the world and alienated by the international system and its main custodians and beneficiaries.

A brief account of the facts at the core of the evolution of the relations among Germany and Japan and the great powers, and the conflictive turn that it gradually took, illustrates this state of affairs.

Following its victory over France in 1871, one of the key aims of imperial Germany was to achieve world-power status. The acquisition of a colonial empire and altering the European balance of power by expanding on the continent were
core aspects of this ambitious agenda, known as *Weltpolitik*. German scholars of geopolitics and intellectuals such as Max Weber, helping to formulate the idea of “liberal imperialism,” contributed to this policy. The appropriation of colonial possessions started in the 1880s. But it is not until the first years of the twentieth century that Germany considered itself sufficiently strong to take on the great powers themselves. By then, it was controlling a larger percentage of European industrial strength than did any other state, including Great Britain, and its army was seen as the most powerful in the world. In this perspective, the assumption was that the formidable navy that Germany was building would be able to challenge the British command of the oceans and serve as a crucial tool for the pursuit of its *Weltpolitik*. Nevertheless, Great Britain, France and, eventually, the United States got in the way. By defeating Germany in World War I, they crushed its plans to expand further and install its hegemony in Europe. Subsequently, in part because the Versailles Treaty in 1919 did not solve anything, Germany under Hitler and the Nazi regime tried again to upset the status quo in the context of World War II, but without success either.

What about Japan? Initially, after it signed the equal treaties that in the 1880s reversed the unequal ones that had been imposed on it at the time of its opening to the world, Japan found some common ground with the Western powers. It aligned itself and cooperated with them, including on imperialist policies of its own. It is in this perspective that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was established in 1902. As Charles A. Kupchan argues, “Tokyo was attracted by the prospect of British protection as well as London’s backing for Japan’s continental ambition. In return,
Britain was able to retain effective naval supremacy in the region.”26 The Alliance contributed also to the development of an understanding with the United States. In a series of agreements, the latter acknowledged Japan’s position in Northeast Asia, acquiescing in 1905 to the Japanese protectorate of Korea.27

But as Great Britain and the United States came to progressively see Japan’s foreign policy as dangerous for their interests and the status quo, the relations soured. During World War I, Japanese appetite for expansion, geared particularly toward an extension of its rights and holdings in China, aroused the distrust and suspicion of British and U.S. leadership. In London, the predominant view was that Japan was using Great Britain’s misfortunes in Europe to pursue its imperial ambitions in the Far East.28 In Washington, President Woodrow Wilson reached the conclusion that the American people must be the champions of the sovereign rights of China, resulting in the United States as protector of the new Chinese republic brought into existence in 1912.29

The aftermath of World War I, rather than marking an improvement of relations, confirmed the growing tensions. That was all the more the case considering that the postwar conception of international order, as a distinctive product of President Wilson’s ideas, was at odds with Japan.

Stating, among other things, that the international system should be founded on the institution of collective security, based on universal law and not the balance of power, on morality and not national interest, Wilson’s ideas gave prime of place to self-determination and the sovereign rights of every people. On paper, this meant the end of cooperative imperialism and of military and political expansion. More specifically, this amounted to a substantial effort to contain further extension of Japanese power, especially in China.30 This flew in the face of what had been Japan’s commitment to national power since the beginning of the Meiji period. Also foreign to Japanese values was the idea that a nation, let alone an international order, could be governed by abstract principles equally applicable to all societies.31 Moreover, this approach appeared eminently hypocritical to Japan. Indeed, it did not prevent Western powers, Great Britain to start with, from continuing to enjoy the benefit of their colonies. Neither did it stop racial discrimination against non-Westerners. In this regard, for Japan, the rejection of the racial equality clause at the Versailles Treaty negotiations32 and, in the United states, the enacting of the new Immigration

27 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising, p. 139.
29 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising, p. 143.
30 Ibid., p. 144.
31 Ibid., p. 147.
32 With this clause, the Japanese intention, however, was not to assert a principle of universal applicability: “The Japanese delegation proposed a racial equality clause for inclusion in the League of
Act of 1924, which in effect singled out the Japanese for no further migration to the United States, were insulting and showed deep prejudices. For Tokyo, this was an indication of the double-standard approach of the West.

Ultimately, from Japan’s standpoint, Anglo-American cooperation had now become a concerted effort directed, contrary to the rhetoric put forward, at engineering a racially biased and unequal “pax Anglo-Americana” – an Anglo-Saxon order geared toward hegemony over dominions and the containment of rising powers.

In this context, with the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1923, it is as if a line had been drawn in the sand between the two camps, each of them increasingly preparing for a confrontation. And since in the 1930s, not to give up its expansionist policies became more than ever a question of national honor for Japan, war loomed ever larger on the horizon. In the words of Henry Kissinger and Kenneth B. Pyle:

As Kissinger observed, “No nation will submit to a settlement, however well-balanced and however ‘secure’, which seems to totally deny its vision of itself”. The U.S. insistence on Japan’s withdrawal from China was completely at odds with the vision that Japanese leaders had of Japan’s place in the world. The loss of status and prestige was such a blow to the national self-image that the leaders believed the demands jeopardized Japan’s survival.

RIVALRY AND VIOLENCE: FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL INSECURITY TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR

Before we go any further, we need to highlight three points. First, as alluded to earlier, to stress the psychological/emotional dimension of the interactions of Germany and Japan with other powers and the impact it had on the possibility of
war does not mean that this dimension is the sole factor that led to war. It is only one among many factors. But its significance and the fact that it has tended to be overlooked justify the attention that we give to it in this chapter.

Second, to refer to this psychological dimension as part of the causal mechanisms accounting for the actions and policies of Germany and Japan does not imply some sort of revisionism geared toward minimizing German and Japanese responsibility in World War II. After all, events did not have necessarily to unfold the way they did and it was mainly the decision of these two countries’ leaderships to handle international competition the way they did and to choose the path of violence.

Third, underlying the psychological and emotional contexts that contributed to war and its modalities has the advantage of also shedding light on the question of the role of the great powers in the years preceding World War II; this is a matter often glossed over. In this perspective, the approach shows that the big powers’ part of the story is not entirely positive. In particular, the premium that they put on their international preeminence regardless of the costs, either for people under their domination or concerning the tensions this generated with rising powers, points to their own responsibilities.

That said, let us now examine how Germany and Japan each moved from a psychology of insecurity to a psychology of war. In this regard, as their interactions with the outside world became increasingly tense, German and Japanese conception and psychology of themselves, others and the world, came to display (each in their own style) a deepening and intensifying gap between “we” and “them,” which took an increasingly dividing toll. They did so through systems of thoughts, beliefs, and representations, including emotions and passions, that — dovetailing key aspects of their inherited history and culture and the political idiosyncrasies, ideologies, and needs of the period — were oriented both inward (domestic policy) and outward (foreign policy). The two orientations worked jointly and, as such, proved to be a recipe for disaster for the two countries and the world.

The Inward Looking Psychology of Germany and Japan Pre–World War II

The inward looking dimension of Germany’s and Japan’s systems of thoughts, beliefs, and representations prior to (and during) wartime celebrated how these

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countries were different and somehow superior. This is to say that they were prone to both elevate themselves and, concomitantly, downgrade others. In this context, and not surprisingly, the internal features of their culture and their contemporary developments were not entirely separated from their interactions with the rest of the world.

From this standpoint, in the pre–World War II environment, three elements came to play a significant role. First, there was the sense of insecurity, if not inferiority, vis-à-vis the more established and more modern great powers. Second, there was the frustration and resentment experienced by Germany and Japan as they felt that their rights as rising nations were not being sufficiently appreciated and recognized, not being given a “proper place” internationally. Third, knowing the great powers to be formidable adversaries, there was the need to psychologically mobilize their culture and their distinctive and differentiating traits in comparison with others. Stressing the uniqueness, unity and internal solidarity, and spiritual strength of the national polity by calling on traditional and “modern anti-modern” values was a component of this inward (although in a large part responding to the international environment and directed to the pursuit of outward goals) dynamics and agenda.

To begin with, let us review the case of Japan. In this regard, indicating how the country is unique has always been a Japanese passion. Highlighting what makes it different has been a way to put it in a class of its own. Reluctance of being compared to others for fear of not being ranked high enough is, to some extent, part of this attitude. Consequently, it is no surprise that when interactions with the international environment denied Japan of the type of recognition and validation it was seeking and compromised its self-esteem, celebrating its distinction and how this made its identity and value irreducible to others’ views became essential for Japan’s sense of self.

This was all the more the case considering that one of the pillars of Japanese modernization entailed the cultivation of its specificity through a reconstruction of the conception of the national community in traditional, semi-archaic, and semi-mythological terms that gave centrality to the figure of the emperor. Connecting the past and the present to project Japan into a renewed future, it symbolized divinity, government, and people and their fusion, and was instrumental for tying Japanese uniqueness to the pursuit of harmonious unity. In this perspective, in contrast with the individualism, divisive politics, materialism, and hedonistic behavior that for

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36 The notion of “proper place” has been long used in Japan to legitimize inequitable relationships in Japan itself. In the context of World War II, it was mobilized by Tokyo to justify the hierarchical regional order it envisioned in Asia and the top position it reserved to Japan in it. See John W. Dower, War Without Mercy, pp. 9–11, 205–206, and 264–266.

Japan partly characterized the West, the imperial system helped to conflate state and civil society within the broader national community.\(^\text{38}\) Contributing to the reduction of the autonomy of the social arena and the indexing of the individual self on the collective self, it ensured that the Japanese were “subjects – responsible, active, subjects serving the state, to be sure – but not sovereign citizens in whose hands decisions of state ultimately lie.”\(^\text{39}\) The amalgamation of spiritual authority with political power that the emperor represented made “serving” all the more imperative for the people of Japan. During the war, this became a central aspect of the near-mystical purity of the imperial war and, if necessary, of dying in battle.\(^\text{40}\)

Needless to say, the authoritarian regime that dominated the Japanese landscape from the 1930s until 1945 benefitted from this system. It was useful because the manner in which the imperial system organized Japan’s uniqueness and unity was geared toward people feeling bound and proud to carry duties set from above.\(^\text{41}\) But it was useful also because of the direct access the military enjoyed to the emperor, the “centre of all authority and the fountainhead of all virtue.”\(^\text{42}\) Furthermore, it allowed the Japanese authoritarian regime to echo and capitalize on some of the long-term distinctive features of Japan’s collective identity and consciousness. As S. N. Eisentadt argues:

> Japan can be seen as the model nation-state, as indeed it has always been, in one way or another, coterminous with the Japanese collective identity, which was constructed … in terms of “sacred particularity”…. Two closely interconnected facts are of special importance here, in the context of the analysis of the military regime of the 1930s. First, this political and ethnic or national identity or collective consciousness, couched in sacral-primordial terms, developed early in Japanese history – even if, for long periods, it was limited to some elite groups – and did not constitute a point of continuous internal ideological and political struggle. Second, unlike in Europe, this collective consciousness did not develop within the framework of a universalistic civilization with strong transcendental orientations. Even if its development was greatly influenced by its encounter with Chinese Confucianism and Buddhism it refused, as it were, to cope with the problem of the relation of its primordial “ethnic” symbols to membership in such universalistic civilizations. The confrontation with

\(^\text{38}\)  Ibid., p. 35.

\(^\text{39}\)  Robert N. Bellah, \textit{Imagining Japan}, p. 34.


\(^\text{42}\)  In the Constitution of the Empire of Japan promulgated in 1890, commonly called the “Meiji Constitution,” and in force until May 1947, the army and navy were to report directly to the emperor, and not to the prime minister or the cabinet.

universalistic ideologies … was seemingly resolved by the denial of these ideologies – albeit a highly principled, ideological denial of their universalistic and transcendental components. … At the same time this concept of nationality entailed a very strong tendency – which has played an important role in Japanese society from the Meiji up to the contemporary period – to define the Japanese collectivity in terms of incomparable uniqueness, couched very often in semi racial, genetic terms, or in terms of some special spirituality…. (I)n Japan … (such spirituality) was presented in terms of the unique spirituality of the Japanese collectivity or nation, often defined in highly exclusive, particularistic terms. This attitude, asserting the distinctiveness of Japanese nationhood, could easily develop in extreme nationalistic directions – and was indeed characteristic of nationalistic trends throughout the modern era – but in some form it was probably prevalent in much of Japanese society.”

Now, what about Germany? As a way to cope psychologically with its injured pride, Germany in the 1930s also relied increasingly on the idea that it was unique and uniquely united. It did so by both radicalizing and idealizing its estrangement from the modern West, all the while continuing to work as much as possible at modernizing itself, for instance on the (military) industry front.

In this perspective, the type of conservative German nationalism that had developed in the nineteenth century, itself having deep historical roots, played a key role. Considering the people (Volk) as an organic body and ethnicity as the ultimate definer of identity and, therefore, of belonging and membership, Germany conceived the national community in autochthon and exclusionary terms. Already during the Wilhelmine empire, one of the central tropes of this form of nationalism was to present German culture as a third way beyond, on the one hand, Western “civilization” and – among other things – its individualism, and, on the other hand, “barbarism” in the East, which made Slavs and Jews the targets of its racism.

On top of the frustration experienced by Germany in its quest for great power status prior to World War I, the resentment that came to typify the German atmosphere after the war built on and exacerbated this state of affairs. The sense of humiliation in Germany associated with the belief that the Treaty of Versailles was unfair furthered a pressing need to end its terms as Germans continued to have big power ambitions. The economic and social difficulties encountered by the country and their emotional toll, including in the context of the 1929 Great Depression and the collapse of the international trading system, also called for the psychological compensation that was pursued in the celebration of a unique and unified Germany.

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46 Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, p. 72.
This situation, encouraging the discredit of parliamentary institutions and political parties, served as fertile ground for Hitler. His obsessive and paranoiac views put forward and cemented the centrality of extremist interpretations of aspects that had become part of German conservative nationalism, as such qualitatively transforming this nationalism. “(P)lebiscitary cesarism” and “ethno-racist chauvinism,” to use Philippe Burrin’s expressions, established as core features of the national culture of the time, emerged as essential to Germany’s cult of uniqueness and unity. In this “holist universe of the tribe, with its exclusivism and brutal morality”, the Jewish “difference” was unacceptable and, consequently, to be eliminated.

Projecting the Psychology of Germany and Japan in War

What Kenneth B. Pyle wrote about Japan applied to Germany as well, for the two countries shared a similar predicament:

To win recognition that would be truly satisfying, Japan . . . would have to discover how to live in an order of its own creation, governed by its own norms. . . . Driven in their national life by a complex psychology of ambition, pride, self-doubt, and anger, the Japanese came to believe that their goals could only be fulfilled when they were strong enough to create their own international order.

To the extent that their deep-seated national feelings of anxiety were connected with tense international relations, they could not be inward-oriented without turning also outward. In this regard, as the international system reached a breaking point, the radicalization and idealization of the German and Japanese collective/individual self, including the self-aggrandizement that this constituted, was accompanied externally by others (collective and individual others) being more and more devaluated. This amounted to a kind of “manifest destiny” implying that the world had to be remade on the basis of their values.

Yet, the German and Japanese sense of manifest destiny was never self-assured, optimistic, unreflective, and self-righteous – the way the American one has tended to be. In fact, more often than not it was lacking self-confidence, relatively self-aware

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48 Ibid., p. 49 (translated from the French by the author).
49 Ibid., p. 33.
50 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising, p. 136.
52 The notion of “manifest destiny” refers to the nineteenth century American belief that the expansion of the United States was readily apparent (manifest) and inexorable (destiny).
of the dubious character of its claims, quite gloomy, and even morbid, oscillating between phases of exhilaration and of desperation; and it was prone to always factor in defeat and even national destruction as a real possibility. But, in the meantime, before Nazi Germany and authoritarian Japan would experience annihilation, they would bring devastation to others as their philosophy meant all rights for themselves and hardly any for others.

The German and Japanese “war within” – that is, the fixation on and uneasiness about themselves that internal conditions combined with interactions with the outside world contributed to generate and the disregard it brought about for others – translated into an external war.

In this context, three elements came to be closely interrelated: the rationale for war, the nature and modalities of war, and the intellectual and psychological method of evasion of responsibility.

• Rationale for war started with the disqualification of the international system. It was comprised of two aspects. On the one hand, echoing Darwinist believes, Nazi Germany and authoritarian Japan saw international politics as a struggle for survival. For them, contrary to the position of hegemonic powers, the international system, its organization, institutions, and norms, including international law, and dominating actors had little to do with justice, and much to do with the powerful doing whatever it took to stay on top. On the other hand, while stating that might is everything in international affairs, they still identified with the language of right: they argued that they were treated as second-class international citizens and that their rights were not respected.

• This disqualification of the international system as all about power did not only give them a reason to take matters into their own hands in order to challenge the status quo; it also allowed them to define in defensive terms the nature of the war on which they were embarking. And as they presented the wars they were initiating as acts of self-defense, they felt they could not be viewed as and certainly did not consider themselves as real aggressors. Going to war was not a choice but an existential necessity, a question of life and death.

54 The cult and culture of death, comprising an entire palette of emotional intensity and a variety of modalities, that Nazism and Japanese fascism, as well as other various fascisms of the prewar and World War II period, share would be worth exploring further.
55 For Japan, see Kenneth P. Pyle, Japan Rising, p. 204. For Germany, see Philippe Burrin, Ressentiment et apocalypse, pp. 75–76.
57 On Japan for this issue, refer for instance to Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931–1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
Coicaud

In this regard, for Germany and Japan, the big powers, as the primary underwriters and beneficiaries of the international order, had a major responsibility. Their self-righteousness did not make them any less guilty. It only showed their hypocrisy, working essentially for themselves and, in the process, wronging others while claiming to care about the greater good.

Even worse, especially with Nazi Germany, victims were said to be responsible for their own victimization and demise. The culture of paranoia and resentment of the Nazi elite, and the lack of identification, empathy, and solidarity with others that came with it, reducing its moral imagination to no one but itself, at the same time made Jews its absolute target and portrayed them as having a part in their own annihilation. In particular, because they were at the core of the conspiracy to humiliate and destroy Germany, they were the architects of their own death. 58

As for authoritarian Japan, the combination of a victim-mentality with its own brand of racist tendencies and the fact that it continued in the midst of challenging them to be impressed by the big powers and the status they enjoyed, made it inclined to be dismissive of the weak and the weakened. In relation to China, the fact that this country had once been a dominant force in the region and was now seen as backward and inferior, encouraged Japan’s blindness to the crimes its was committing against its population.

In the end, Germany’s and Japan’s points of view were that, even if they were going to be defeated, their honor would be safe. As Hitler put it, Germany would have brought down as many Jews as it could in its fall. 59 And regarding Japan, it too would have tried to stand its ground. Interestingly, after World War II, Germany and Japan did not stop entirely considering themselves as victims and, as a result, being reluctant to take responsibility for their acts. 60

58 Philippe Burrin, Ressentiment et apocalypse, pp. 91–92.
59 Ibid., p. 76.
OVERCOMING WAR WITHIN AND WAR WITH OTHERS: TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF PEACE

One of the ideas that triggered my interest in the topic addressed in this chapter is that both for individual and collective actors, war within is likely to come with, if not bring war with and to others; in contrast, peace within tends to go hand in hand with peace with others. In other words, in every terrorist there is a terrorized actor; and, alternatively, inner peace tends to be echoed by peace with others, serenity within is likely to nurture serene relations with others.

As we have seen in this chapter, part of this reality is that interactions with the outside world can contribute to forms of internal uneasiness and that this situation is associated with the more general dynamics of emotions and passions (positive and negative, inclusive and exclusionary). 61

In this perspective, an analysis of the role of negative emotions and passions in the context of Germany and Japan and their relations to others prior to World War II is not simply a matter of advancing our understanding of how World War II came about. It is also a matter of generating practical benefits from the advancement of this understanding. Indeed, the lessons that we can draw can help identify what can help make the world better. In way of conclusion, therefore, I highlight two suggestions to enhance the psychology of peace, and subsequently, international peace.

(1) For a better understanding of emotions and passions to improve the world, including international life, we must go beyond simply stating the correlation we noted between peace within and peace with others, and, conversely, between war within and war with others. This correlation has to be explained. At minimum this calls for addressing two questions for individual and collective actors: How does one achieve peace with oneself, so that peace is reached with others? How does one generate and nurture emotions and passions of peace with oneself and in relation with others?

(2) It may be that part of the answer to these questions lies in the fact that the psychology of peace in general and the psychology of international peace more specifically amount to conceiving peace (and some form of happiness) not as a situation of total stability and stillness, but rather as one of “socialized instability,” 62 and one in which dynamic and evolving emotions and passions

61 See Jean-Marc Coicaud in this volume, “Exploring the Nexus of Emotions/Passions, values and Rights in International Affairs.”

are guiding actors to morally and existentially address, cope with, learn from, and be strengthened by the challenges that life and history do not fail to throw at them. Here the objective is not to be egotistical. It is to be present to oneself, others, and the world in the most reconciled and open fashion possible.

This can happen only if the dynamics and evolution of emotions and passions, rather than expressing and being at the service of conflicts and negative/reactionary energy and values, are animated by reconciliation concerns and positive and life-affirming/life-celebrating energy and values.

In the end, it leaves us with the task of thinking about the kinds of requirements (institutional and others), which, at the local, national, and international levels, can be best suited for actors, both individual and collective, to pursue and achieve positive and life-affirming/life-celebrating energy and values. Much more work needs therefore to be done to elucidate this human, social and political puzzle.
From Group Identity to Ethnic Violence

Pierre de Senarclens

Ethnicity is among the most dramatic expressions of collective emotions within the domain of contemporary politics. Almost everywhere it has become a widespread source of insecurity by raising the stakes of collective identity and placing it high on the agenda of international politics. No form of conflict is today more intimately entangled with lethal passions impacting state order and regional security than ethnic conflict. It lies at the root of civil wars, genocide and terrorism. It engenders massive flows of refugees or internally displaced persons. It causes enormous suffering of civilian populations, particularly women and children. It is not rare that the violence associated with ethnicity provokes military interventions and humanitarian engagements by the UN or by a coalition of states, usually under the aegis of NATO. In the 1990s, the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia, the genocide in Rwanda and the ferocious armed conflict in the Caucasian region or Southern Sudan represented some of the most acute and cruel forms of contemporary war, and they were all at root ethnic conflicts. Since 2003, rebel tribal groups in the Darfur region have been the victims of armed groups supported by the central government of Khartoum. In various parts of Congo, especially in the Eastern part of former Zaire, collective violence with ethnic components has been widespread. These events have resulted in both the deaths of millions of people and an influx of refugees. Mass killing, enslavement, rape and looting continue to afflict daily countless unprotected civilians. More recently, Syria and Iraq have disintegrated in civil war fuelled by ethno-religious divisions.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore some conceptual and methodological avenues drawn from psychoanalysis to elucidate the emotional dimensions and consequences of ethnic conflicts.

1 In this chapter, I use “ethnic” as including tribal and religious groupings.
ETHNIC REPRESENTATIONS

Ethnicity is a collective identity based on culture and history. It is one possible pattern of group allegiance. It can be seen as a form of attachment closely related to feelings of kinship. Such communities exist first and foremost in the minds of people who adhere to their creeds and ideals. Members of strong ethnic groups are inspired by the fiction of mutual blood ties originating from a common ancestor or from ancestral tribal connections. Representation of the past is indeed an integral part of these bonds of solidarity: legends, myths and traditions are incorporated into the historical narratives of ethnonationalist communities and play a decisive role in this respect. These memories represent the cement of the groups’ collective identity. They are transmitted through socialization processes. Ethnic communities preserve common cultural values and religious practices, which eventually form an intrinsic part of what they claim distinguishes them from others and may become a source of political conflict with those “outside”. Solidarity of ethnic groups is based on a sense of identity nourished by prejudices. Ethnicity provides a means to express differences between ingroups and outgroups, most often in ways that so greatly magnify division lines that they may be transformed into cleavages. Yet the valuation of ethnicity, as vindication of religious fanaticism or sectarian political creeds, can mask different sorts of individual and collective drives.

It should be underlined that people may defend specific cultural traditions, in particular religious creeds, short of giving an exclusive and political meaning to their beliefs. In Europe, as in other parts of the Western world, kinship slowly yielded to the constraints of modernization and to the development of the nation-state. Today, individuals in advanced capitalist societies can belong to separate groups claiming distinct allegiances. They are able to coexist because their alleged bonds do not breed political aspirations.

Ethnic conflicts usually erupt in pre-modern societies where religion, dominant worldviews and social conventions do not encourage tolerance, pluralism, individual autonomy and social justice. In many Asian and South American countries, ethnic identities continue to enjoy significantly more attention than other forms of socio-political solidarities. Ethnic bonds can in some instances become the principle source of political divisions and conflicts. They are often characterised by strong hierarchical social organizations that submit to an authoritarian leadership and perennial traditions. Tribalism appears to have progressed on the African continent with the development of colonial and post-colonial structures, and with the unequal and disorderly expansion of capitalism. Free elections often give way to parties

organized along ethnic lines and their candidates who engage in vote-catching behaviour and play a decisive role in mobilising political violence. Ethnicity can also be a loose component in a chain of social and political relationships whose main characteristics are feuding among warlords, looting and criminal activities as is the case today in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The distinction between ethnic communities and nations is not always easy to identify. Some ethnic groups claim the right to become a nation and succeed in this regard, whereas others are content to defend their socio-cultural rights within an established state structure. There is still an ongoing debate on the role of the State in the construction of the nation. Robert Nisbet quite properly underlined that the nation is “the offspring of the State” and that “the emotional elements which earlier populations found in kinship and region, in local community and church, have been transferred, so to speak, to the nation”. Modern nationalism has entailed the “weakening and destruction of earlier bonds and of the attachment to the political State of new emotional loyalties and identifications”.  

The chameleon dimension of nationalism has often been underlined, although too much attention has been paid to the distinction between its ethnic and civic components. From a psychological point of view, both ethnic communities and nations tend to defend their dignity uncompromisingly. They promulgate similar narratives about their unique origin, their exceptional historical destiny, their political and cultural specificities, the necessity to form an undivided and totally harmonious community, and the threats presented by external groups. Thereby, civic nationalists, like ethnonationalists, express the same type of emotional attachment to an idealized society. As such, they are the product of collective illusions, usually strongly associated with religious worldviews.

The Politics of Ethnic Conflicts

It is recognized that the “conversion of cultural differences into bases for political differentiation between people arises only under specific circumstances which need to be identified clearly”  and that “elites” plays an important role in this respect. Ethnic claims reflect political aspirations, such as demands for fundamental freedoms, human rights and dignity. Collective violence, which appears to be related to ethnic and religious intolerance, is actually about politics. Mobilisation of ethnic identity may indeed be part of different strategies, such as gaining access to political

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and economic advantages, fighting oppression and injustice, promoting alternative development strategies or seceding from an internationally recognized State.

Repression and discrimination, because they impact on individuals’ and peoples’ dignity and self-esteem, are the most common and immediate determinants of ethnonationalism. In the Middle East, Palestinians have been deprived of their right to form a nation and severely oppressed in the context of Israel’s continued colonization. Kurds are also a dispersed people living in five different countries, mainly in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. They have been fighting for decades to obtain an autonomous status or full independence. In several regions of the world, minorities suffering from discrimination within centralized states demand greater political rights or protection of their cultural identity. Socio-economic problems are also an important factor in ethnic conflicts, as they entail competition for jobs, various forms of inequality, antagonisms between groups, which may all occur along “racial” lines drawn by the state. Misery, regularly associated with economic inequality, gives rise to aggrieved populations prone to violence. For instance, there is no doubt that the collective frustrations provoked by the socio-economic crisis in Europe during the inter-war period was a key factor in the establishment of the Fascist and Nazi regimes, which – as we know – succeeded in arousing strong ethnonationalist passions.

By the same token, rapid structural political and economic transformations can be a fertile ground for ethnic conflicts. For Roger Petersen, ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe were the consequence of structural changes that produced a “new day-to-day experience of dominance and subordination”, and created “emotions and tendencies toward certain actions”.

According to several authors, the disintegration of Yugoslavia into conflict along ethnic lines was less the consequence of hostile bias exhibited by communities than of the particular political and socio-economic circumstances prevailing in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s. It should also be noted that people forming marginalized groups fighting for autonomy or independence may not always agree about their common interests. Minorities are usually divided along “cross-cutting loyalties to different clans, localities, classes, or political movements”. One has also to recognize that the ideals of liberty, justice and dignity, which legitimize ethnonationalist activists, should not be taken at face value. Consciously or not,

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7 Id., p. 256.
such ideals are often intrinsically likened to the appetite for power, to patrimonial privileges or material advantages, or conceal various forms of libidinal drives.

The Emotional Aspects of Ethnic Conflicts

Ideological and cultural representations have often been singled out as the main source of ethnic conflicts. However important they may be, the political and ideational perceptions of ethnicity cannot be analysed without reference to their emotional impact on individual and group behaviour. As of yet, research on ethnonationalist conflicts has failed to produce a comprehensive analysis of their affective characteristics.

Cognitivist psychology has the merit of describing the belief systems that contribute to intergroup hostility. It has experimentally established that social categorization is an important aspect of prejudice, discrimination and – more generally – ethnicity. It has also demonstrated that most individuals strive to achieve a good image of themselves through group allegiance. It has led to the wide recognition that belief systems and emotions interact in the development of ethnic conflicts. In their study of “intractable conflicts” – such as the one between Israel and the Palestinians – Eran Halperin and Daniel Bar-Tal stressed the importance of incompatible shared beliefs. In such situations, people resort to black and white thinking. They evaluate their society in a solely positive light and view it as the victim of the other group(s). They describe the latter in delegitimizing ways. The socio-psychological barriers instigating such conflicts involve antagonistic historical memories that justify the use of violence. Affected societies develop an “ethos of conflict”, which juxtaposes collective beliefs about the justness of the goals pursued, security issues, self-image and the imagined nation. They may also develop specific emotional dispositions, such as fear, distrust, hatred, humiliation, guilt, shame or pride. Fear associated with security threats tend to activate ingroup-outgroup polarization. It reinforces ingroup solidarity and the denigration of the outgroup as a whole. However, the fact that mentalities, particularly collective memories, may be crucial in influencing the dynamics of politics does not mean that all individuals and every group view the world in the way in their socio-cultural environment dictates.

Following a cognitivist perspective, several authors state that ethnic world views are “constructed”. They consider that politics plays a decisive role in framing ethnic categories and in engaging groups in violent actions. In their opinion, political

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leaders, intellectuals and activists exert decisive influence over the way in which people think in terms of their identity and in promoting cultural prejudices and nationalist ideologies. The vision of history and politics and more generally the world views propagated by these actors help promote their personal ambitions. They activate myths and symbols of ethnicity to subdue other forms of individual and collective identities. In this context, ethnic violence is instrumental.

Several “constructivist” narratives about ethnicity – or nationalism in general – tend to belittle the bonds of ethnic solidarity or to blur their affective significance in the context of a rather conventional political analysis. Following a standard hypothesis, ethnic conceptions and attitudes do not exist as such: they result from cognitive bias that arises, particularly “historical circumstances”, and/or or when the political establishment and the intelligentsia are successful in likewise processing information. This form of constructivism often boils down to underlining the importance of ideology in politics, and more generally in historical processes, particularly in ethnopolitical movements. In this perspective, belief systems promoting group dominance and scapegoating of minorities are the consequence of misguided ideological perceptions. By thus implying that communal violence is rooted in ideology, and that the latter is merely an expression of misguided views promoted by self-interested actors, constructivist approaches to ethnopolitical conflicts appear comforting in that one might assume that a change of the dominant mindset – which would involve a removal of the political entrepreneurs that uphold it – may well suffice to put an end to the violence. In other words, ethnicity is merely the result of some sort of collective misunderstanding.

However, supporters of this approach cannot explain convincingly why individuals and groups consent in the first place to the ethnic prejudices and violent strategies promoted by their leaders or governments, even – as constructivists rightly note – as identities are multiple, heterogeneous, fragmented and fluctuating. In his study of the Yugoslav civil war, Stuart J. Kaufman aptly points out that manipulative elites need certain pre-conditions to mobilize ethnic symbols: “Without perceived conflicts of interest, people have no reason to mobilize. Without emotional commitment based on hostile feelings, they lack sufficient impetus to do so. And without leadership, they typically lack the organization to do so”. One should add that elites may also react to people’s emotions.

In sum, constructivists do not usually attempt to elucidate the emotional dynamics of group behaviour. Why is ethnicity, and more generally ethnonationalism, repeatedly appealing to so many people? How do political and intellectual elites

manage to manipulate groups into making them believe that they have common bonds distinguishing “themselves” from the “others”? Constructivism does not explain why people “obey their passions far more readily than their interests” and why “their interests serve them, at most, as rationalizations for their passions”. Nor does it account for the emotional foundations of ethnic conflicts. It is a fact, however, that citizens are not merely puppets to their political environment and its command structure. They play an active role and are liable to influence their leaders and the policies and strategies pursued.

Another shortcoming of constructivism is that while it rightly acknowledges a range of emotions associated with ethnic conflicts, such as fear, resentment, anger, contempt or hatred, it does not delve into exploring the deeper sources of these feelings. The impact of emotions is sometimes simply considered from a stimulus-response perspective. “[A]nger is an emotion evoked by a stimulus external to the person who feels it”. In this sense, explains D. H. Horowitz, “anger is based, however loosely, on reason”. Violence is supposedly caused by fear and antipathy is caused by hatred, and Aristotle is the reference for explaining what all this is about. The influence of the past might explain ethnic violence, but “people misremember past experiences and evaluate them incorrectly (sic)”.

In essence, fear becomes a “faulty reasoning”. It is true that individual and collective fear in some cases can have an objective cause. The Hutus were certainly rational in being scared of the Tutsis, as they remembered the 1972 genocide in Burundi and the crimes committed against their people by the fighters of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the 1990s. Yet nonsensical emotions may also play a fundamental role in political conflict and violence. These emotions stem from anxieties which are not anchored in reality, nor are they related to significant cognitive bias. To interpret Nazi anti-Semitism or the intercommunal violence between Hutu and Tutsi, it is not enough to base oneself solely on official propagandistic discourse expressing hatred, fear or resentment. The unconscious affective foundations of the myths and fantasies shared by the members of communal groups need also to be explored.

More importantly, cognitivists neglect the libidinal source of collective emotions, in particular the unconscious and deceptive nature of belief systems and collective phantasies that are liable to influence ethnic movements and crowd behaviour. Freud’s notion of illusion is important in this regard. Illusions should not be confused with erroneous perceptions, although they are indeed generally contradicted by objective observation. Instead, they can be seen as an equivalent to

15 Ibid., p. 550.
creeds that mobilize particular desires. Religious belief systems are expressions of collective illusions. They express the desire of a protecting father who governs the world and will eventually alleviate suffering. Ideologies display similar appeasing functions. When dealing with the emotional aspects of politics, one is confronted with pervading illusions.

Ethnonationalism is a case in point. It reflects the collective desire of a harmonious and protective community. Such an aspiration is intimately related to socio-political vulnerability. Rapidly changing structures, involving inter alia deteriorating economic conditions as well as political despotism, may have an impact on individual and group self-esteem. When faced with anxiety provoked by economic and political insecurity, individuals may regress emotionally to a period of early childhood during which the significant figures were the subjects’ parents. In such circumstances, they are liable to experience the illusion that the community can perhaps assume the form of the family and provide them with similar satisfactions, particularly a sense of security, as those resulting from the primordial bonds of solidarity and attachment.

The Elusive Nature of Collective Identity

The use of ethnicity for political and strategic purposes involves the mobilization of collective identity. This notion has been criticised for its elusive nature. Brubaker considers that it should be abandoned altogether. From a clinical point of view, the development of the ego is relatively well defined. Following Freud’s findings, it is widely recognized today that the primordial bonds of the family play a decisive role in the construction of personal identity. The child’s intimate relationship with its mother, father and siblings, and subsequently with its teachers and peer groups, largely determine its individual and collective identity. Later, new bonds of attachment – as well as influences provided by all kinds of group – allegiances contribute to the transformation of these primary experiences, without however erasing the imprint formed by the intense emotional interaction between the child and its parents.

Freud acknowledged the complexity and equivocal nature of socialization. While underlining the imperishable nature of the early stages of childhood, he recognized the “extraordinary plasticity of mental developments”. He also acknowledged the possible occurrence of personality regression in the course of adulthood. He insisted particularly on the chameleon aspect of individual identity when he dealt with groups. In his reflections on narcissism, he reminded that “the feeling of our own ego is subject to disturbances and the boundaries of our ego are not constant”.

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Personal identity is therefore dynamic and should be dealt with parsimoniously, as there is a myriad avenues from early childhood to ego construction, and from an assembly of individuals to the development of a civic society.

The notion of “collective identity” is even more complex because dominant representations of polities and communities never crystallize in definitive patterns. Sudhir Kakar defines cultural identity as “a group’s basic way of organizing experience through its myths, memories, symbols, rituals and ideals”. He recognizes that because it is “socially produced and thus subject to historical change, cultural identity is not a static affair even while it makes a decisive contribution to the enhancement of an individual’s sense of self-sameness and continuity in time and space”.

As these collective representations are the result of desires, they represent evolving psychic constellations, all the more so as modern socialisation processes are diverse, changing and heterogeneous. People are indeed exposed to a large variety of socio-cultural models and representations of authority. They develop different types of group affiliation and communal solidarity. They can evolve and be disrupted. As noted previously, the shifting nature of group identity is also related to socio-economic and political circumstances. Consequently, social and cultural patterns are never coherent and stable. They do not form a cage that locks individuals in a perennial vision of the world. Moreover, people belong simultaneously to multiple groups ranging from family, friends and colleagues to larger collectivities such as the nation. The glue that holds communal groups together is provided by the emotional bonds that determine group identification and sustain outgroup rivalry.

From a Freudian perspective, the definition of groups has little to do with classical sociological approaches, which include in their classifications broad denominations such as class, age, partisan affiliation or sexual inclination. A group is an emotional phenomenon. Individuals form groups when they share a feeling of common identity. Freud refers to two types of assemblies: unstructured collections of individuals (such as a mob) and large hierarchical organizations such as an army or church. In both types of groups, individuals tend to regress – that is, return to a childlike position; they establish fraternal bonds of solidarity and fall under the spell of a leader. Most empirical studies, which have built on Freud’s hypothesis, focus on the dynamics of small groups. Yet Serge Moscovici has underlined the fact that mass communications tend to create, at least on a temporary basis, very large and weakly structured crowds. Historically, nationalist fervour has sparked in mass movements in urban centres.

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The issue of leadership is central in Freud’s explanation of groups. Cohesion results partly from the idealization of the bearer of authority. Members project their ego ideal (or part of the ego that contains an idealized self) onto the leader. Feelings of solidarity arise not only from fraternal identifications with other members of the group, but from an identification with the leader. Members also gain gratification from shared ideals and from a feeling of belonging to a greater whole. Idealisation and narcissism are indeed key aspects of collective identity, of group membership and consequently of social integration. The emotional satisfaction of being part of a group comes however at a price, that of being bounded by an “ingroup” which in turn means that there are necessarily “outgroups”.

Collective identity implies the establishment of boundaries. As said before, these dividing lines are imaginary constructs. In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* Freud writes that small differences between groups may produce “feelings of aversion and hostility”. This “narcissism of minor difference” can be explained by psychological overinvestment in the boundaries of the community, a phenomenon which we alluded to previously and that results from the tendency of “ingroups” to constantly compare themselves with “outgroups”. The self-esteem of individual members is thus boosted by group allegiance. Paradoxically, however, these comparisons may give rise to narcissistic feelings of insecurity, which can in turn lead to conflicts.

**FROM ETHNIC CONFLICT TO ARMED CONFLICTS**

When studying ethnic conflict, a major distinction should be made between the phase of socio-political conflict and open warfare. Clausewitz provided an explanation of the dynamics leading to “absolute war” between states, which may shed some light on the viciousness of ethnic violence. By definition, civil wars have few constraints, especially when external moderating actors fail to intervene. Once ignited, violence, whatever its immediate cause, rapidly becomes a struggle for life because “race” and religion in particular are non-negotiable. Mutual abhorrence incited by crimes permeates the whole course of the war, which loses its rational and moral constraining principles.

The rationale behind the decision to engage in military confrontation tends to disintegrate into quixotic and criminal violence. All the more so as civilians are the primary targets of ethnic violence. In Rwanda, the victims were “hacked to pieces, drowned, speared, or beaten to death with clubs, their bodies left unburied, at the mercy of dogs and vultures”. As in Bosnia and Darfur, systematic rape was

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a deliberate means to humiliate and destroy the adversary’s kinship ties, besides enabling perpetrators to satisfy their sexual needs and sadistic impulses.

The political and ideological workings of dictatorship come to mind as the most common explanation for genocides. The Third Reich’s totalitarian command structure largely accounts for the holocaust. Hitler’s world views were propagated through his hold over the state apparatus and were decisive factors in the criminal conduct of Nazis and in the implementation of the “final solution”. While collective feelings of hatred between Hutus and Tutsis had long been rampant in Burundi and Rwanda, the architects of the 1994 genocide were a small group who meticulously organized and carried out the plan. “Planned annihilation, not the sudden eruption of long simmering hatreds, is the key to the tragedy of Rwanda”. The genocides in Armenia and Cambodia were similarly planned by a small clique of political and military leaders.

It is undisputable that perpetrators of wars and genocides that have marked the twentieth century mobilised large crowds of soldiers and civilians to commit slaughters. They were moreover assisted by innumerable passive bystanders. Government propaganda and military discipline are not sufficient to explain the slaughters of World War I or the German massacres of Belgian civilians. State terror does not account for the support so many Italians and Germans gave to Mussolini and Hitler. The “Führer” was extremely popular and the regime he established enjoyed strong support by the masses, at least until 1942. Dictatorship and military discipline alone fail to explain why ethnic cleansing was so widespread in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda or Burundi. The command structure cannot fully capture why individuals followed orders and participated in the maiming and killing of others.

Ethnic violence is never a simple top-down process. The rationale of executioners of massacres has an undeniable emotional component. Their self-esteem was elevated by their right to despise and humiliate other ethnic groups and more so by their criminal engagement. They found emotional incentive to follow orders, not only because they shared their leaders’ ideological views, but because their behaviour enabled them to satisfy their aggressive and sadistic drives. Gérard Prunier notes the participation of the most wretched in the Rwanda genocide. “They had the blessings of a form of authority to take revenge on socially powerful people as long as they were on the wrong side of the political fence. They could steal, they could kill with minimum justification, they could rape and they could get drunk for free”.

22 Ibid., p. 79.
Psychological insecurity also plays a decisive role in explaining individuals’ incentive to kill, as well as taking revenge for past sufferings and hardships that some Hutus had experienced at the hands of Tutsis, and extortion of the victims’ goods.\textsuperscript{24}

One precondition of these crimes is the dehumanisation of victims. It is a well-known fact that anti-Semitism in its more extreme forms promulgated by right-wing parties contributed to the dehumanization of Jews. Nazi propaganda depicted them as “vermin”, in other words, as even less than animals. Those who would subsequently take part in the genocide had lost the capacity to identify with their victims. In Rwanda, where so many were slaughtered by their own neighbours, the process of dehumanisation of the Tutsis by Hutu ruling circles was widespread. It was supported by the ongoing propaganda broadcast by the sinister “Radio des Mille Collines”, which described the Tutsis as “cockroaches”.

Mechanisms of projection need to be taken into account here. Ideologies, nationalism, ethnicity or religious creeds lead individuals either to contain or conversely to express their aggressive drives. Through them, painful emotions such as hate, envy or contempt may be projected onto external groups. Subjects are led to believe that it is “the others” – whether foreigners or internal minorities – that harbour hostile intentions against them rather than the converse. When they resort to violence, they attribute all sorts of criminal intentions to their own victims. Hitler and his gang presented the war against Jews as a struggle for life that Germans had to pursue right to the last day of the Third Reich. Architects of the Rwandan genocide developed similar views to justify mass killings.

Ethnonationalist symbols allow people to offset feelings of hopelessness, humiliation, ignorance or impotence by providing them with grandiose and protective ideals. They give them a sense of belonging and of certainty. They often provide the reassurance that Manichean world views, with their black and white predictability, lend themselves to. In sum, ethnonationalism, as well as religious fundamentalism, enhance individual and collective narcissism. Horowitz, from a different perspective, similarly underlines the role of low self-esteem in violence. He writes that “group worth remains enduringly uncertain”.\textsuperscript{25} Psychological insecurity of this kind explains why perpetrators of genocide endeavour to violate the honour of the adverse community by committing mass rape or by desecrating or destroying sacred monuments and places of worship. This was notably the case during the Armenian, Jewish and Yugoslav genocides.

\textsuperscript{24} R. Lemarchand, \textit{The Dynamics of Violence}, p. 1248.
\textsuperscript{25} Donald Horowitz, \textit{Ethnic Groups in Conflict}, p. 143.
Memories

Memories of the past transmitted through the process of socialization exacerbate intergroup hatred. Writing about the genocides committed in the Great Lakes region, René Lemarchand notes: “What gives ethnic conflict in the region its peculiarly savage edge are the myths that have grown up around Hutu and Tutsi. Behind the twisted memories, distorted histories, and demonized ethnicities that have contributed to the bloodshed lie mythologies, which have thus been summoned to legitimize the butchery”. The Tutsis based themselves on the myths of their celestial origins to allege their “natural” differences with the Hutu and the Twa and to invoke the superiority of their civilization. Although colonizers contributed to the crystallisation of such mythology and racial vision, there is no way to uncover with precision the agents of this ancestral socialization process.

As violence spread in Yugoslavia, it was largely interpreted as the resurgence of ancestral hatreds. Kaufman uses the concept of “symbolic politics” to refer to the “combination of myths, memories, values, symbols that defines not only who is a member of the group but what it means to be a member”. His central assumption is that people make political choices and may engage in ethnic violence as an emotional response to myths and symbols. Volkan, another specialist of Serbian nationalism, gives the example of the role of the battle of Kosovo (1389) in the “Serb psyche”. According to Volkan, “as decades and centuries passed, mythologized tales of the battle were transmitted from generation to generation through a strong religious tradition in Serbia, reinforcing the Serbs’ sense of a traumatized, shared identity”.

At the individual level, trauma is the irruption of an event – actual or imagined – that cannot be represented or symbolized. Is there something of the same nature at the collective level? Freud assumed that there could be a transgenerational transmission of trauma. He was convinced that certain historical events and myths leave a strong mark on the evolution of communities and nations. Although he rejected the Jungian notion of collective unconscious, he nevertheless believed that some secular or religious myths could express something similar to the “return of the repressed” at the individual level. This is the main argument put forward in his *Moses and Monotheism*. He hypothesises that Moses had been killed by his own people and that this traumatic experience had a decisive influence in creating collective guilt feelings that have since been a dominant trait of Judeo-Christianity.

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26 René Lemarchand, pp. 52–53.
There is no way to validate this type of hypothesis, although it opens some promising avenues towards the interpretation of culture and politics. Esther Benbassa has written an important essay underlining the role of suffering associated with guilt in the Hebrew religion and in Jewish culture in general. When we look at the fences and watchtowers circumscribing Israeli settlements in the occupied territory of Palestine, it is difficult not to be reminded of the Jewish ghettos in Europe, which have no doubt left a long-lasting imprint on the collective psyche of the Jewish people, so much so that it appears that the settlers are condemned to re-enact this traumatic collective experience through their own enclosure. Contemporary history suggests that collective traumas go through phases of repression and come to the fore after a long period of travail. We must, however, admit that such assumptions remain conjectural.

Institutional Breakdown

In many regions of the world, state institutions have become extremely fragile, indeed evanescent, creating situations of social and political unrest – if not anarchy – that encourage intergroup violence. In such circumstances, violence can no longer be controlled or contained by public authorities vested with the monopoly of legalised violence. The current situation in central Africa is just one sad example. Neither the central government of DRC nor foreign peace-keeping missions are capable today of bringing peace and security to a large part of Congo, in particular the Eastern part. As a result, local ethnic leaders and militia fight against each other for land and mining resources, destroying villages and expelling the civilian population in the process. They kill to have access to power and material resources, rape to satisfy their sexual needs and mutilate to satisfy their deviant instincts, humiliating village communities and destroying those that may hamper their mining activities. These atrocities are some of the most tragic consequences of the government’s failure to maintain security. Anarchy engenders anomy, which is immediately exploited by criminal gangs. Leaders of these groups do not even bother to give any ideological reason to justify their ambitions. Even tribal links tend to disintegrate in this kind of lawlessness with its indiscriminate violence.

Freud’s explanation of group dynamics, particularly crowd behaviour, can also improve our understanding of some of the lethal consequences arising from the disintegration of states and social institutions. In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud explains why in strict institutional and hierarchical settings, such as an army or a church, but also in unstructured crowd movements, individuals are inclined to give up their personal autonomy. In this type of groupings or

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organizations, subjects take on the ideal of their leaders and establish “fraternal” solidarity bonds among themselves. In this process, it is not rare that they lose their autonomy or capacity to dissent as well as their sense of individual responsibility.

Sudhir Kakar notes that identity in a crowd gets “refocused”. It “amplifies all emotions, heightening a feeling of well-being into exaltation, fear into panic”.\textsuperscript{30} Unstructured group dynamics is indeed important to understand rapid changes in people’s mentality and behaviour. From the French Revolution to fascist movements, crowd behaviour has often formed the basis of violent social and political upheavals. Under certain circumstances, the moral and legal norms of a society may become weak and ineffective, enabling individuals to deviate from their normal behaviour. In situations of war or conflict, subjects are prone to lose all restraint. “When the community no longer raises objections, there is an end, too, to the suppression of evil passions, and men perpetrate deeds of cruelty, fraud, treachery and barbarity so incompatible with their level of civilization that one would have thought them impossible”.\textsuperscript{31} Individuals tend to lose their inhibitions and develop a sense of omnipotence. They may give free rein to their most cruel, brutal and destructive instincts. Psychoanalysis provides an explanation for the “broad appeal of the riot in attracting masses of participants and the high pitch of destructive enthusiasm rioters bring to the task”. Stathis N. Kalyvas echoed this view in his essay on civil war: “The advent of war transforms individual preferences, choices, behaviour and identities – and the main way through which civil war exercises its transformation function is through violence”.\textsuperscript{32}

Regimes of sovereignty and boundaries between political entities have been constantly fluctuating in the course of history. They continue to change, particularly with migrations, socio-economic transformations, technical developments, trade expansion and regional integration. Nations and ethnic communities are not fixed entities. As with any social group, they evolve, change and even disappear.

However, the nature of politics remains constant and universal. Politics is about authority and social hierarchies. It involves conflicts pertaining to values and interests, to defining a legitimate regime as well as the in- and the outgroups. It is also in the nature of politics to create and nurture illusions, as there is no political community without collective ideals relating to a protective leader and to some form of fraternal solidarity within an imaginary community. These ideals are partially utopian, because conflict is the essence of politics. They are potentially dangerous

\textsuperscript{30} S. Kakar, \textit{The Colour}, p. 46.


as they entail some form of collective narcissism, which breeds feelings of contempt or hostility towards other communities.

The world order today is founded on the principle of state sovereignty. Modern industrial states have established complex institutional mechanisms to inhibit the passions that are inherent to the conflicting dimensions of politics, all the more so as their societies have learned from past experience how lethal nationalist illusions can be. They have also managed to provide a fair amount of social welfare. They have succeeded in promoting all sorts of acceptable derivatives for these illusory desires. Fanatical nationalism is no longer a threat for them.

Unfortunately, the economic and political conditions of this form of institutionalization are absent in many parts of the world where governments are not only unable to satisfy the basic needs of their population, but moreover contribute directly to arouse passionate illusions, such as those that flourish in certain forms of ethnonationalism and religious fundamentalism. The United Nations is composed of a large number of states, whose integrative capability is fragile or non-existent. Their governments and local authorities are incapable or unwilling to provide their population with a minimal degree of security. Moreover, mechanisms of governance at the regional and international level remain weak and consequently incapable of assisting these fragile states in improving their political and social structures and in fighting mass poverty. These institutional failures contribute greatly to ethnic violence.
Exceptionalism, Counterterrorism, and the Emotional Politics of Human Rights

Andrew A. G. Ross

From the preventive use of force to the abuse of detainees, the United States’ vigilant approach to terrorism has sparked widespread criticism at home and abroad. And yet, while numerous critics have questioned both the legal basis and political wisdom of U.S. counterterrorism, we still lack a full understanding of the cultural context in which those policies acquired veneers of legitimacy and legality. How, for example, was the Bush Doctrine of anticipatory self-defense sustained at a time when the unilateral use of force was so widely considered illegal? How were abusive interrogation practices legitimized, even in the face of a seemingly universal commitment to the ban on torture? The contention that the political and economic interests of the United States superseded international law is hard to refute, and yet that idea tells us little about how people—from ordinary U.S. citizens to activists, experts, and elites—made sense of legal exceptions. Abstract discussions of power trumping law cannot tell us about the social capillaries, cultural meanings, and, I suggest, collective emotions through which power was translated into legal exceptions. Rather than echo the common lament that law has been ineffective in this case, this paper considers ways in which law was effective—by facilitating a repertoire of unstated exceptions.

Standard accounts of legal exceptionalism tend to miss the complex cultural processes involved in motivating, sustaining, and legitimizing norm violation. Scholarship on “American exceptionalism” in the period since September 11, 2001 has only reaffirmed this trend. Harold Koh, for example, worries most about the schema of double-standards in which U.S. policymakers and leaders hold others to human rights institutions and rules they regard as inapplicable to the United States. American exceptionalism is, in this rendering, a form of hypocrisy—a disjuncture

between word and deed. Without denying the existence of such disjunctures, I suggest that this formulation privileges a specific understanding of how norms and rules acquire force. The charge of hypocrisy reveals moments of violation, but it also affirms that the violated norm or rule is one to which the violating state has directly committed itself. Worries about hypocrisy reflect a kind of positivism: even as they announce moments of transgression, they quietly urge us to regard the law as a body of rules originating in state consent.

My aim in this chapter is to explore the specifically affective processes through which U.S. policies received moral legitimacy, legal justification, and popular support. I suggest that, in areas such as human rights and humanitarian law, international norms and rules acquire moral weight at multiple levels – not only explicit declarations of consent, but also a variety of background processes, including emotional beliefs, moral commitments, and religious convictions. With specific attention to human rights and humanitarian law in the U.S. context, I argue that American exceptionalism has long been the product of affective commitments to moral outreach in a world of evil. This collective enthusiasm and moral confidence in the face of norm-violating (and violent) means – what I call “affective exceptionalism” – deserves to be studied as a phenomenon unto itself. The United States’ involvement abroad has become entwined with the moral ambitions of Americans in subtle ways: human rights and humanitarian objectives often lie silently at the core of internationalist engagements. For this reason, I suggest that it is misleading to view U.S. policies in the War on Terror as violations of human rights standards; constructed against the backdrop of affective exceptionalism, such policies are integral to the United States’ self-image as a powerful protector of human rights.

Elucidating the affective basis of exceptionalism can help expose assumptions and prejudices that, while unspoken, help to sustain and direct legal exceptions. We still know relatively little about the way in which legal exceptions after 9/11 interacted with cultural prejudices regarding the terrorist subject. Influential contributions to the study of legal exception – especially Giorgio Agamben’s *State of Exception* – have tended to overlook the psychological, social, and cultural conditions in which legal exceptions become viable. My preliminary suggestion is that part of the

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4 While Agamben insists on the “biopolitical” and “mystical” roots of sovereign authority, his philosophical account focuses on parsing the general logic of legal exception rather than exploring
affective work of exceptionalism is to sustain implicit, unstated exceptions to even universal standards. Across a variety of extra-legal venues, from popular culture to journalism, a reserve of stereotypes, suspicions, and resentments accumulated in the post-9/11 period. While these affective patterns did not determine political outcomes, they appear to have influenced political and legal discourse in more subtle ways. Terrorists could be exempted from human rights protections – and rogue states from limitations on the use of force – on the basis of not only public argument, but also implicit cultural prejudice. Lawyers with the Bush administration made legal determinations with the unstated assumption that rule violations would mostly affect America’s cultural others. By tracing these affective discriminations, we can account for the undeclared ways in which the application of international law continues to be filtered through cultural difference.

Tracing the process of affective legitimation after 9/11 demonstrates the multiplicity of affective orientations that lie beneath the surface of the abstractly conceived practice of international human rights law. Many analyses of human rights in the War on Terror have noted how U.S. policies were met with global outrage. Global reactions combined with domestic discontent following the release of evocative images coming from the prisons at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay in spring 2004. Critics at home and abroad regarded U.S. policy as a violation of accepted international standards. While this impassioned critique reveals an important dimension of international human rights in the War on Terror, my analysis here reveals countervailing emotions that appear to have bolstered U.S. vigilance for at least the two and a half years following September 2001. The collective emotions associated with “affective exceptionalism” are not permanent fixtures of U.S. internationalism but bursts in an on-going economy of popular affect.

This essay proceeds as follows. First, I draw from social theory and several contributions to the historiography of human rights to show that international norms and rules are not only principled, intellectual commitments but also affective orientations. Second, I demonstrate the historically intimate connection between human rights and American exceptionalism. In particular, I show how the emergence of human rights in the United States since the 1970s has been infused


with moral and religious ambition. The confluence of evangelical Protestantism and human rights advocacy is the most recent manifestation of this reciprocal infusion of affective enthusiasm. I define this emotional strand of human rights exceptionalism as “affective exceptionalism.” The third section summarizes the culturally targeted exceptions contained in U.S. counterterrorism; and the fourth section offers one account of how affective exceptionalism has underwritten those exceptions.

AFFECTIVE UNDERPINNINGS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

The idea that norms have emotional roots runs counter to much recent scholarship on norms in international relations (IR). Various scholars explain normative change in human rights, for example, as the product of clever and persistent advocacy by “principled” norm entrepreneurs; others stress the importance of deliberation and argument in the world of norms. 8 While these are important innovations in a field traditionally skewed toward material variables and power politics, this work sustains an image of norms as the stuff of clear-headed deliberation over moral standards and legal compliance. Focusing on these intentional forms of agency encourages the assumption that a norm’s legitimacy is proportional to the intensity of deliberation and willful advocacy in its favor. That view is perhaps strongest in cases in which advocacy organizations are involved, for these groups have been regarded as, by definition, motivated by critical reflection on moral and legal principles. 9 Normative change and legal reform are thus domains in which reflection and debate are assumed to be paramount.

Celebrating the willful contributions of norm entrepreneurs can, however, conceal the social and cultural contexts in which norms acquire force. Intuitively, it seems undeniable that the topics addressed by international norms have emotional significance for global leaders and publics alike. Human rights violations have frequently inspired outrage, for example, humanitarian crises have sparked waves of compassion and empathy, and climate change has arguably triggered emotions as diverse as fear, distrust, and bravado. As plausible as these assertions seem, however, such emotional responses have yet to be integrated into the social science of international norms. 10 A sustained examination of the moral and social psychology


9 Keck and Sikkink, for example, explain that what defines so-called transnational advocacy networks is “the intensely self-conscious and self-reflective nature of their normative awareness.” Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond, 35.

10 One exception is Crawford’s account, which emphasizes moral argument but treats emotions as among its ingredients. Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization,
of international norms is needed to uncover the non-intellectual pathways through which norms acquire – and shed – legitimacy.

A growing body of research in various disciplines shows that beliefs emerge from the wellspring of emotion. Jonathan Mercer taps this literature to offer a compelling account of these “emotional beliefs” in international politics. Research in neuroscience indicates that decision-making and judgment rely heavily on complex emotional response systems. These emotions engender explicit beliefs, but they also extend beneath conscious awareness. Studies of emotional memory suggest that the brain uses multiple memory systems, some of which involve implicit forms of nonconscious memory. The work of William James remains an important reference for this contemporary research on emotion. In later writings, often considered contributions to American pragmatism, James shows the important connections between beliefs and emotions. A “will to believe,” he explains, involves “all such factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitations and partisanship.” The very possibility of holding a view as a live belief derives from a prior emotional commitment. Moreover, for James, even the most secular belief benefits from a degree of faith: religious convictions and scientific hypotheses alike are forged initially at these affective levels.

Acknowledging that beliefs have emotional foundations does not negate their intellectual dimensions. Durkheim came close to such a denial when he argued that...
moral authority, because it stemmed from powerful collective emotions, “precludes any idea of deliberation or calculation.” 18 The literature on norms is surely correct to maintain that beliefs are subject to persuasion and intense deliberation. But, as the Jamesian theory of belief suggests, a focus on argument is unlikely to tell us about the complex emotional sources from which they spring. Joas explains this well:

Though we may often judge something valuable with our intellect, without at the same time experiencing strong feelings, this does not mean that there are not certain values which are deeply rooted in our emotional life. Though we may believe that we should be able to justify our value orientations – and justifying and discussing may themselves be an important value for us – this does not mean that we actually obtained our values through processes of justification and discussion. 19

The process of deliberation is often conditioned and inspired by emotionally significant practices and memories. James and Joas thus resist Kantian and other rationalist theories that view emotions as atavistic or pathological responses. Many others, including Nussbaum, Damasio, and Elster, have recently questioned the view that emotions infect an otherwise autonomous system of rational judgment. Even our most banal beliefs are accompanied by some emotional significance. 20 The result is an account of emotions as ubiquitous elements of human agency that both hinder and help us in navigating complex moral and political landscapes. If the Jamesian view is correct, we need to qualify abstract studies of reasoned argument with a broader concern for the emotions that inspire normative beliefs.

Understanding this emotional dimension of normativity demands that we think differently about the politics of compliance. My contention in this essay is that norms acquire and lose force on the basis of not only the arguments made in their favor, but also the affective forces present in a given social environment. Where normative advocacy succeeds, its achievements rest partly on prevailing moral sentiments and social expectations. Lynn Hunt argues provocatively that the emergence of human rights consciousness in eighteenth-century Europe must be understood as an emotional one. The “Rights of Man” had to become “self-evident,” and they did so through a gradual extension of empathy across social and economic boundaries. 21 As the history of human rights advocacy suggests, significant events and personal stories can affect the viability of norms. 22 As Richard Rorty argues, the recognition of human rights abroad

20 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 93.
typically requires the prior existence of moral sentiments. 23 The history of human rights can thus be rewritten with attention to its emotional underpinnings.

If emotions are integral to legitimizing human rights norms and rules, it seems plausible to suggest that they might also be implicated wherever that legitimacy is undermined. Ian Hurd shows that norm violation is best understood as a moment in an on-going process of norm contestation: the breaking of one norm involves the making of others. 24 As norms concerning human rights gained traction during the 1970s and 1980s, for example, standards on domestic jurisdiction were eroded. During the 1990s, images of atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia gave rise to greater public concern in the West regarding genocide and international criminal justice. That we are unable to quantify the contribution made by emotions to such processes should not disqualify them as factors variously supporting and eroding the viability of norms. In an environment of fear, norms favoring sovereignty and national security may acquire greater force, while those concerning multilateralism or human rights experience decline. International norm dynamics are more than a linear process of extending empathy, compassion, or trust to others; they involve a waxing and waning in response to cross-cutting fluctuations in public sentiment and normative context.

Uncovering such affective contexts can help us understand the cultural and psychosocial contexts sustaining human rights law in specific times and places. We are also better positioned to identify, explain, and challenge retractions and qualifications of that law. David Kennedy argues that legal scholars need to shift from studying the “foreground” of political leaders and power brokers to investigating the “background” of experts, norms, and assumptions against which official policies and statements are made. 25 Social patterns of affect may turn out to comprise an important part of these backgrounds. As I suggest later, where international law has historically permitted distinctions between the civilized and the barbarian, for example, those silent discriminations are enabled by a repertoire of cultural sentiments. If legal practice is as layered as Kennedy suggests, affective processes occupy one of its most pressing but least understood strata.

HUMAN RIGHTS, AMERICAN STYLE

The Bush administration’s early steps toward unilateralism, together with the advent of the War on Terror in September 2001, breathed new life into the study of American

exceptionalism. In the field of human rights, various scholars have highlighted the risks of hypocrisy. For Koh, upholding a “double standard” in human rights both undermines the “soft power” of the United States and threatens to weaken international standards.\textsuperscript{26} Julie Mertus offers a similar complaint, highlighting the many instances in which leaders employ “human rights talk” when doing so suits U.S. interests, and yet adopt policies that violate the very standards they invoke.\textsuperscript{27} These accounts identify a growing legal culture of exceptionalism in U.S. policy on human rights, which affects participation in multilateral institutions, ratification of treaties,\textsuperscript{28} and the deployment of international law in U.S. courts.\textsuperscript{29} These authors have done us a great service in cataloguing such trends.

And yet no list of exceptions captures the moral conviction and zeal we often associate, if intuitively, with “American exceptionalism.” The policies associated with exceptionalism are undoubtedly products of political calculation and reflections of the structural primacy of sovereignty and national interest. Nevertheless, as some scholars have noted, there is often a cultural basis to exceptionalism, where U.S. recalcitrance reflects not only strategic calculation but also principled objections and doctrinal differences. Michael Ignatieff, for example, notes that analyzing the politics of power can only take us so far, because Americans have historically supported the very institutions from which they seek exemption. “It seems impossible to explain this paradox,” he argues, “without some analysis of culture.”\textsuperscript{30} Exceptionalism is not strictly a strategic calculation but a moral vision, and moral visions tend to be infused with affective significance. Beneath instances of “hypocrisy” lies a rich background of cultural allegiances and moral aspirations.

Understanding legal exceptionalism thus requires excavating some of the background assumptions and sentiments affecting policy-making and adjudication. Central to this background is, I suggest, the moral confidence behind U.S. values. Exceptionalist policies are fueled not by contempt for moral values or legal processes but by an impassioned commitment to them. Across the political spectrum, U.S. leaders have historically approached human rights as part of the United States’ gift to the world rather than a set of standards the world might use to evaluate their own policies. Donald Pease describes American exceptionalism as a “fantasy” that replaces standard patriotism with “the abnormal desire to propagate the U.S. model

\textsuperscript{26} Koh, “On American Exceptionalism,” 1487.
\textsuperscript{27} Mertus, \textit{Bait and Switch}, 17.
What Pease’s psychoanalytic approach calls “desire” is an affective orientation toward the elevated moral status of U.S. values. These convictions may take the form of intellectual beliefs and philosophical doctrines, but their intensity and seemingly automatic application suggest an affective basis as well.

The moral confidence behind American exceptionalism contains within it the seeds of messianic internationalism. As one historian has proposed, we cannot understand the United States’ transnational involvements without tracking their roots in exceptionalism – exploring, that is, the “complex dialectic between exceptionalism and internationalism.” Doing so suggests that there is no opposition between human rights and U.S. values and interests. As Ignatieff writes, “for most Americans human rights are American values writ large, the export version of its own Bill of Rights.” In this culture of exceptionalism, moments of formal noncompliance with international standards are filtered informally through higher registers of moral validation. Standard formulations of American exceptionalism – positing a disjuncture between theory and practice or between international standards and U.S. policy – fail to capture the complexity of a moral ambition whose enthusiasm and ambiguity have the capacity to erase seeming contradictions.

The growing affinities between evangelical Protestantism and human rights reflect this messianic orientation. The nature of that affinity has been contested among scholars of American culture and religion. One approach is to suggest that evangelicals have achieved direct influence on foreign (and domestic) policy formulation. Evangelical leaders seem to be playing a larger role in human rights advocacy, especially in areas such as religious freedom, abstinence education, and sex trafficking. However, as Robert Wuthnow points out, that influence demands careful interrogation, because both religious and political officials have an interest in inflating the impact of religious groups on policy. Another approach considers the religious motivations of specific political leaders; indeed, a variety of scholars have recently focused on the convergence of evangelical rhetoric and foreign policy discourse during the Presidency of George W. Bush. Especially in the aftermath

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31 Donald E. Pease, The New American Exceptionalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 22.
of 9/11, Bush frequently used religious metaphors and allusions to interpret the challenges the United States faced in the War on Terror. During the 1970s, similar observations were often made about the apparent impact of Carter’s religious values and his support for human rights. While these personal connections may affect political rhetoric, however, their effects are mediated by other political actors and institutional processes. Mapping the direct influence of religious leaders and organizations proves more difficult than it first appears.

An alternative approach is to suggest that religious ideas, metaphors, and convictions work indirectly to influence a faith community’s receptivity to human rights. In this view, religious values are more significant than specific actors and channels of influence. There are undoubtedly important doctrinal differences and tensions between evangelical Protestantism and human rights: the emphasis on a personal relationship with God, an other-worldly eschatology, an emphasis on personal sin, and the instrumental goal of securing conditions necessary for missionary work. And yet recent research and commentary examining the relationship between U.S. Protestantism and human rights confirms that some connection exists. While the connection is indirect and incomplete, it seems to be consequential not only in shaping U.S. responses to counterterrorism but also in defining foreign policy priorities such as religious freedom and HIV/AIDS assistance. Borrowing from William Connolly, we could more effectively describe the connection as a “resonance,” “in which heretofore unconnected or loosely associated elements fold, bend, blend, emulsify, and dissolve into each other.” For Connolly, affinities of doctrine exist alongside “affinities of sensibility.” While the specific legal footprint of human rights – for example, their precise definitions and implementation regimes – may remain inconsistent with or unknown to evangelical Christians, the moral ambition behind them resonates with deeply religious sensibilities.

This resonance may help explain the political support among evangelical protestants for Bush’s post-9/11 policies. For example, some reports suggest that evangelicals interpreted the National Security Strategy (NSS), which outlined the Bush administration’s doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, as a moral defense of freedom. Evangelical leaders regarded the Bush Doctrine as a “faith-based foreign policy” that reflected their “vision for international human rights, religious freedom,

39 Ibid., 871.
democracy, free trade, and public health.”

An official with the National Association of Evangelicals reportedly explained that, while the NSS did not directly “talk in moral arguments,” it was nevertheless amply framed by “ethical matters.” Thus, as a 2004 Wall Street Journal report concluded, “the evangelicals’ growing involvement in foreign affairs creates a new constituency for intervention abroad.” The author cites religious studies scholar Martin Marty, who explains: “evangelicals are much more ready to claim God’s purposes as their own. If God calls us to be the ‘righteous nation,’ they act.” The resonance thus involves both the substantive concerns of a policy (for example, the objectives of military intervention) but also the personal commitment and moral conviction underpinning that policy.

In the work and statements of former President Carter, we can glean insight into an early moment of evangelical human rights resonance. Carter had often declared concerns about freedom, democracy, and the moral risks associated with anti-communism, and each of these appeared to reflect his personal religious convictions. During the early period of his presidency in 1977, he assimilated these concerns under the “publicly acknowledged buzzword” of “human rights.” That language made it possible to forge consensus among members of Congress whose reasons for supporting human rights were quite different. From the left or the right, they found room under a flexible, expansive, and ambiguous umbrella. One foreign policy official thus described human rights policy in the early months of the Carter administration: “No one knows what the policy is, yet it pervades everything we do.” The remark reveals the affective quality of human rights discourse at the time: “The cumulative result of the new human rights talk,” one historian explains, “was that the very phrase ‘human rights’ developed an aura around it.” This moment in 1977 marked the beginnings of an informal but powerful association in

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47 Cmiel, “Emergence,” 1248.
U.S. foreign policy between moral advocacy, religious commitment, and human rights.

The resonance between evangelical culture and human rights discourse is – all at the same time – subtle, indirect, and powerful. Historians have often noted direct connections between human rights advocacy in the West and Christian groups and leaders. The Catholic theology of Jacques Maritain, for example, influenced the post-war discussions on the universality of human rights. The advocacy work of Amnesty International was founded as an “improvisation on earlier Christian peace movements,” and some argue that the organization’s culture continues to reflect a kind of religious commitment to the rights it protects. These more direct connections are forged, however, against a more subtle and ambiguous background of ideological affinities, epistemological habits, and emotional commitments.

Human rights in the United States is a field densely populated by what Mercer terms “emotional beliefs”: convictions whose objective basis is incidental to the intensity with which they are held. “Human rights” is a malleable category, allowing convictions to receive inspiration from a range of religious values, secular ethics, and cultural sentiments.

In the area of international human rights, then, American exceptionalism bears a markedly emotional profile. This “affective exceptionalism” consists of the constellation of cultural expectations, ambitions, and sentiments that underpin the United States’ special authority in matters of human rights. These affective underpinnings create a distinctive legal culture but hail from a variety of extra-legal sources – from religious values to the secular moral ambitions of U.S. liberalism. The constituent elements of affective exceptionalism are analytically separable from but empirically integral to the arguments, principles, and other intellectual constructions through which human rights law is debated publicly. As I suggest was the case with the U.S. War on Terror, the affective dimension of exceptionalism takes on special political significance in situations in which official arguments in support of a legal exception are deemed politically unacceptable.

**AFFECTIVE EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE AFTER 9/11**

Affective exceptionalism involves resonances, implicit values, and ambiguous discourses rather than direct causal relations, explicit arguments, or clear doctrines. These qualities make it difficult, but not impossible, to study empirically; we can

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49 Moyn, *Last Utopia*, 130.
51 Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs.”
identify affective exceptionalism and trace its effects in several ways. Preliminarily, we can infer the existence of emotions from patterns of intensity within political communication: where events become widely publicized spectacles or subjects of special scrutiny, we have reasonable grounds for further tracing the emotional processes that might follow. Second, we can appeal to secondary accounts, by historians and journalists, that identify and scrutinize the patterns of shared emotion involved in legal discourse. I approach these sources with caution, because they often employ emotional terminology, cultural stereotypes, or evaluative framings that obscure underlying affective processes. Finally, we can read between the lines of public discourse on human rights, looking not only at the content of what is being said but also at the tone and intensity with which that content is expressed. As Denise Riley argues, “there is a tangible affect in language which stands somewhat apart from the expressive intentions of an individual speaker; so language can work outside of its official content.” Political speeches, legal documents, and other communications media express emotionally significant meaning through content but also tone. By tracing the tone and intensity of a discursive expression, we can construct plausible inferences about both the emotions generating it and those it sustains. In this section, I use these methods of inference to uncover affective processes underpinning U.S. responses to counterterrorism.

Adjustments to international rules and norms concerning the use of force were made against a complex backdrop of affective exceptionalism. A standard account of law and war would suggest that restrictions on the use of force are lifted as populations experience fear and insecurity. Faced with national emergencies, states are in fact often permitted to derogate from some legal commitments. Indeed, the advent of the Bush Doctrine and the defense of preventive war in the NSS of 2002 seemed to follow this pattern: standards concerning self-defense, and norms concerning the use of force more generally, were being modified in light of new security threats. Yet normative adjustment in the wake of the attacks was also more subtle and qualified than such an account would suggest. Efforts by the Bush Administration to justify

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the use of preventive force did not result in a wholesale modification of existing norms; instead, it allowed for their selective retraction in relation to a specific class of actors: terrorists and rogue states. As Agamben argues, a moment of exception “releases a particular case from the literal application of the norm.”56 The Bush lawyers injected a gap into the norm’s field of application, and, while that gap was not declared as official policy, the project nevertheless required a degree of cultural legitimation.

Evidence of the gap can be read within official documents and speeches from the prelude to war in Iraq. The NSS, for example, defended the Bush Doctrine as a legitimate response to states that “brutalize their own people” and “reject basic human values.”57 The document carefully explains how and why such actors are not amenable to the logic of deterrence. While these arguments justify the use of anticipatory self-defense on a strategic level, they also serve to qualify the political competency of the new enemy. Because terrorists and rogue states fall outside the accepted logic of deterrence, they are regarded as deficient in moral and political agency. The enemy’s “tactics” are not connected to strategic goals but to “wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents.” Official justifications for the war in Iraq echoed these images of backwardness. Bush’s speech on March 17, 2003, for example, explains that “terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats [of chemical and other WMDs] with fair notice.”58 Iraq, he notes, had demonstrated not only a “deep hatred of America” but a “history of reckless aggression.” In Cincinnati on October 7, 2002, Bush presented Saddam Hussein as “merciless,” “ruthless,” and “deceptive.”59 These statements do more than cast Iraq a security threat; they construct it emotionally as an unpredictable, dangerous, and savage actor.

In enumerating these pathologies, the official discourse on Iraq effectively disqualified detainees from accepted legal standards and entitlements. Not only was Iraq’s “rule of terror and torture” in violation of international law; the state itself was a “lawless” political domain.60 Alongside claims concerning Iraq’s ambitions to dominate the Middle East were opposing statements suggesting the rogue state was, in fact, without clear or predictable ambitions. In this rendering, Iraq, other “terror states,” and terrorist groups cannot be parties to a process of political deliberation or bargaining because they are incapable of sustaining intelligible interests in the first place. The strategic arguments floated to the American public during 2002 and early 2003 thus coexisted with and relied on a thread of suggestive constructions that cast

56 Agamben, State of Exception, 25.
60 Ibid.
America’s new enemy as ineligible for moral consideration or legal protection. The result was not simply the suspension of norms outlawing force or restricting its use in self-defense; it was instead an internal modification that allowed the norm to remain in force within a newly selective field of application.

Advocacy for, and public discussion of, the Bush Doctrine was taking place within a broader context of legal and political discussions about the war on terror. Currents of resentment and outrage flowed from discussions on the use of force to those concerning the treatment of detainees. Accounts of Iraq cannot be separated entirely from the earlier arguments concerning Afghanistan. In that case, the use of force was widely considered justifiable, both within the United States and internationally. The United States used military force without a Security Council resolution but with a tacit consensus that 9/11 amounted to an “armed attack” and, as such, an action allowed under A.51.61 The case did, however, involve extensive legal justifications on the application of humanitarian laws, and these too betray assumptions about the possibility of qualifications to the United States’ legal obligations. As in the justifications for war in Iraq, direct statements concerning the legal and strategic considerations coexist with indirect and suggestive commentary on the kind of political agents inhabiting the “failed state” of Afghanistan. The image of political incompetence in the various “torture memos” formed part of the cultural knowledge against which legal determinations were made.

The infamous “torture memos” can also be read for their tone and expressive imagery. One example is a memo from January 22, 2002 on the application of the Geneva Conventions to Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. Alongside legal arguments about international recognition of the Taliban as an official government and the extent of treaty ratifications by these two groups, the document contains a steady stream of allusions to Afghanistan as a failed state. Afghanistan’s economy is described as a “black hole . . . sucking in its neighbors in illicit trade.”62 The memo cites Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who had described the country as effectively overtaken by Al Qaeda. Another source declares it a country “on the edge of collapse.” Beneath the explicit argument about Afghanistan’s eligibility for protection under treaty law, the document also evokes failure through a series of unsettling images. The content of these statements concerns Afghanistan’s status as a political entity lacking sovereignty, but their expressive form sustains a more gut-level sense of a cultural zone where politics and law no longer apply. The political project of reconstructing Afghanistan and Iraq needed both legal argument and its affective underpinnings.

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The legal anthropology in this and other memos was reminiscent of nineteenth-century legal positivism. Beneath the surface of legal classification lay implicit suggestions of cultural backwardness. Mégret has shown that justifications for colonial wars were often the product less of “principled legal reason” than “a hypertrophied distinction between the ‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized’ world.” Within the legal documents concerning the war on terror, he finds a similar discourse of civilizational difference. Justifications for the non-applicability of Geneva were, he argues, invariably tied to assertions about the conduct of would-be detainees. Al Qaeda personnel were said to conceal themselves among civilians and to behave in other ways that signaled an incapacity for reciprocity in the application of humanitarian law. The doctrinal content of American counterterrorism drew from an emerging culture of hostility and moral disdain for the agents of terrorism.

Rhetorical strategies and affective orientations thus cross over between assessments on whether to apply the Geneva Conventions to detainees and discussions on the use of force. Each issue area concerned different laws but overlapping legal subjects. In both cases, legal determinations are affected by assumptions and sentiments concerning the level of political agency attained by Afghan and Iraqi leaders and alleged terrorists. IR scholars have recognized that the success of one norm can affect the success of another. Emerging norms are perceived through collective memory of obligations and events associated with earlier ones. As Finnemore provocatively asserts, “Norms do not just evolve; they coevolve.” This case suggests that what is migrating across these legal domains are not only cognitive assumptions but also more subtle and implicit affective orientations. And, while this process of co-evolution has mostly been studied as a feature of norm-diffusion, this case suggests it may play a role in legal exceptions and perhaps “norm regression.”

THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF COUNTERTERRORISM

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, a repertoire of racialized images and sentiments concerning “terrorists” proliferated in U.S. political and legal culture.
Some of these meanings were explicit, as talk show hosts and cultural conservatives forged associations between terrorists, on the one hand, and Muslims and Arabs, on the other. However, in a liberal context where racial and cultural differences are no longer accepted as metrics of moral or legal entitlement, ideas and practices surrounding race also took on a subterranean form. As scholars of race in the United States have suggested, an official politics of race can become taboo, and yet unofficial discriminations and prejudices continue to circulate.\footnote{Patricia J. Williams, \textit{Seeing a Color-Blind Future: The Paradox of Race} (New York: Noonday Press, 1998).} My concern here is not that unspoken cultural prejudices caused the decision to use force in Afghanistan or the policy to relax standards of interrogation for terrorist suspects. Rather, I am suggesting that the moral confidence behind U.S.-led international interventions concealed an implicit economy of emotional exceptions. As Pease writes, American exceptionalism “suppl\[ies\] its adherents with the psychosocial structures that permitted them to ignore the state’s exceptions.”\footnote{Pease, \textit{New Exceptionalism}, 12.} In the face of affective exceptionalism, certain culturally defined actors were quietly deemed ineligible for human rights protections.

The cultural and historical context of affective exceptionalism can help us assess the role of cultural sentiments in public receptivity to the exceptions entailed by counterterrorism. By the early post-9/11 years, popular commitment to human rights had intersected more dramatically and explicitly with evangelical advocacy.\footnote{Wuthnow, \textit{Boundless Faith}; also, Hertzke, “Evangelicals.”} Evangelical groups had played a leading role in advocating for the rights of Christian minorities, culminating in the passage of the \textit{International Religious Freedom Act} of 1990. For this growing constituency, protecting human rights was connected specifically to the plight of persecuted Christians – in China and, especially, in the Middle East. From this perspective, vigilant counterterrorism demanded little justification; exceptional measures were already amply supported by the presumed resentment toward Christians in the Middle East. For some constituencies, then, the use of force and other techniques of counterterrorism were not threats to human rights protection but its necessary instruments.

A notable feature of debate over the War on Terror has been the relatively low level of public knowledge about the people behind the attacks of 9/11.\footnote{Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life and Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Post 9–11 Attitudes: Religion More Prominent, Muslim-Americans More Accepted,” (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2001).} Americans were aware of topics such as: the persecution of Christians in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states; the importance of the Middle East for oil; on-going disputes with “rogue” leaders such as Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi; and
the imperiled status of Israel, the United States’ most celebrated ally in the region. But these fragments offered a weak foothold for comprehending the complex roots of terrorism. In this context, the Bush Administration had latitude to shape public images of terrorism to suit strategic objectives. The vagueness of the enemy also, however, created possibilities for other actors – including religious authorities and social conservatives – to shape public debate. The result was a decentralized and creative construction of the enemy, in which preexisting sentiments and prejudices seeped into popular assessments of counterterrorism.

In the years following 9/11, much was made of the so-called war between Islam and the West. Pundits, together with some scholars, clung to the idea of a “clash of civilizations,” first authored by Bernard Lewis and later popularized by Samuel Huntington. Lewis explained that anger over colonialism, modernization, and secularization surfaced within the Islamic world during the 1970s and 1980s. And he argued that the United States, although not the real cause of that anger, soon became its target. Huntington saw the tension between Islam and the West as the paradigmatic conflict in a world of clashing civilizations. For him, the end of the Cold War had given way to a greater salience of cultural and religious identities. If most civilizational conflicts involved Muslims, it was because the Islamic world was beginning to assert itself after failed experiments with secular, pro-Western governments during the 1950s and 1960s. The idea of civilizational identity became a powerful lens through which to understand U.S. interests in the Middle East and its stake in the War on Terror.

As foreign policy experts sought to explain the terrorist attacks, the language of civilization offered a useful, if controversial, vocabulary. The news media was especially enthusiastic, and the White House supplied additional support. In a meeting with the press on September 16, President Bush described the War on Terror as a “crusade,” sparking images of historical conflict against enemies of Christendom. The reference provoked harsh and immediate criticism, however, prompting Bush to issue a series of caveats in subsequent speeches. The war was

72 For a detailed discussion of these and other American perceptions toward the Middle East, see Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008).
not, he later stressed, being waged against Muslims, and Americans should respect Islam as a faith espousing peace. The speech made to Congress on September 20 gave special attention to this point: “The enemy of America,” he insisted, “is not our many Muslim friends.” But these qualifications seemed unable to forestall the circulation of ill feeling toward Arabs, Muslims, and those perceived as belonging to those groups. There were limits to what could be said in a liberal and multicultural United States, and yet discriminations persisted.

These cultural stereotypes rarely featured in official public discourse. However, members of the Bush Administration did speak in ways that resonated with felt aversions. Bush’s September 20 speech notes that the attackers were representatives of a savage and cowardly enemy, opposed to the ideals of freedom and democracy. Their attack on the United States was an attack on “civilization” as such. As a speech to the UN General Assembly on November 10 put it, “Civilization, itself, the civilization we share, is threatened.” These references express a distinct meaning of “civilization” not as a category of cultural difference but as a degree of moral achievement. The post-9/11 rhetoric of civilization captured the dual meaning accorded to the concept beginning in the nineteenth century: the term presupposed that it was possible to distinguish between the enemies of civilization and its moral guardians. Official discourse emboldened those who felt the distinction was clear-cut and immediately intelligible. The strategic language of civilization reflected the moral confidence at the heart of U.S. affective exceptionalism.

The failure of Bush’s retraction tells us something important about the affective embedding of cultural sentiments toward Muslims. The clarification did little to alter popular unease; as one observer suggests, “the association had been made and the damage done.” A similar pattern occurred when evangelical pastor Jerry Falwell declared on 60 Minutes in October 2002 that he considered the prophet Muhammad a “terrorist.” He too offered a caveat: “Most Muslims,” he later explained, “are people of peace [who] abhor terrorism.” Once again, the damage had already been done. The result was a swirl of vague allusions and associations that filled the gap left by America’s collective ignorance of the non-Western world. Conflation of “Muslims” and “Arabs” was ubiquitous, and journalists alluded to the

volatile passions of the pejoratively termed “Arab Street.” Popular culture, too, had helped to consolidate cultural stereotypes of Arabs as angry warriors and Muslims as religious fanatics – all incapable of proper political conduct. Resonating with the “Arab-as-terrorist,” the “angry black man,” and other insolent terms, the idea of the “angry Muslim” (or “Islamic rage”) constructs a political subject who is incapable of mature political conduct and, as such, whose rights elicit a less vigorous defense. It became difficult for informed commentators to thwart associations of terrorism with Islam, and Muslims with Arabs. Vague feelings emerged that, when put into words, cast Muslims as fundamentalists and terrorists as an extremist branch of Islam.

These associations are consistent with the moral and legal universe seen by America’s evangelical advocates for human rights. For this constituency, Muslims were not simply members of a different religious faith who could claim rights comparable to those of Christians. The followers of Islam were, rather, understood as agents of hostility toward Christians and, as such, people who had forsaken any entitlement to human rights. As a participant at a 2003 meeting of the Christian Coalition explained, Muslims “want to kill Christians by any means.” In this view, one only had to look at the barbarous events of September 11 – still regarded in the United States as acts committed by representatives of Islam – to be reminded of their limited legal and moral entitlements. Even sympathetic evangelicals concluded that Muslims were offenders whose evil called for evangelizing. In the years after 9/11, many evangelical churches chose, for example, to accept American Muslims as sinners to be saved. Even these magnanimous gestures offered evidence of the growing consensus position in America: that Muslims possessed an inherent affiliation with violence and evil.

America’s acceptance of legal exceptions has been tied to the resentments and prejudices that underpinned constructions of the terrorist subject as an object of fear, resentment, and cultural backwardness. That tie is not a single and direct causal connection but a looser collection of resonances. As scholars of law or foreign policy, we are trained to appreciate the complex contextual factors differentiating Iraq from Afghanistan, Arabs from Muslims, and counterterrorism from human rights. In the

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84 Waldman, “Diplomatic Mission.”
court of public opinion, however, these terms bleed together, and policy options are selected and legitimized through the messy confluences that result. Mahmood Mamdani has recently reflected, for example, on the subterranean linkages adjoining the War on Terror to the most successful human rights mobilization in U.S. history – namely, the “Save Darfur” campaign. While Mamdani’s evidence is not precise, his intuitions are compelling: Americans gravitated to genocide in Darfur both because it offered an opportunity for moral redemption over the war in Iraq and because it conveniently showcased an Arab enemy capable of genocide. In a cultural environment characterized by cable news, talk radio, and a poorly informed blogosphere, loose associations across issues, actors, and legal domains can thrive. In such a context, it would be surprising if prejudices concerning Arabs and Muslims did not seep into expert and popular discussions about the legality of counterterrorism.

CONCLUSION

Among Americans, the question of the legality of counterterrorism was never broached on a clean slate. Debates over the use of force, the application of the Geneva Conventions, the United States’ obligation to abstain from torture – all were discussed against the backdrop of an affective exceptionalism. The moral confidence inspiring the U.S. culture of human rights created a psychosocial environment in which the objects of counterterrorism were imagined in ways that made their legal marginalization less pressing and minimally visible. In this context, it would be mistaken to regard the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, and the treatment of detainees as violations of human rights standards. Legal experts, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations are correct to point out that U.S. practices have violated widely accepted international norms. And yet those observations tell us relatively little about why and how such practices were accepted within certain constituencies as part of the United States’ exemplary commitment to human rights.

To suggest that the consequences of this affective exceptionalism were widespread and significant is not to view them as universally shared. Some commentators, activists, and politicians, unaffected by the moral confidence in the United States’ internationalist vision, actively resisted the War on Terror as an alarming violation of human rights and humanitarian law. However, in the two and a half years following 9/11, those critical voices were remarkably faint and few. Collective emotions rivaling the inertia of affective exceptionalism did not seem to coalesce until spring 2004. A number of factors seem to have sparked popular outrage over

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U.S. counterterrorism: the rising insurgency in Iraq, which revealed the depth of indigenous opposition to U.S. intervention; the publicizing of the Abu Ghraib photographs in April 2004, which provided visual evidence of the United States’ lost innocence; and the circulation of the Bush administration’s legal memos, which raised questions about the credibility of those who had planned post-9/11 interventions. How such factors converged to form a countervailing regime of public sentiment is a subject for future research.

My concern has been the policies of intervention and counterterrorism that succeeded in eliciting widespread support from Americans in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. I find resonances between moral confidence in U.S. internationalism, cultural prejudice and evocative stereotypes regarding the terrorist enemy, and the selective retraction of legal obligations in human rights and humanitarian law. Uncovering these resonances does not explain how the United States was able to succeed in violating widely recognized international legal standards, but it does help to illuminate the cultural mechanisms that allowed certain constituencies in the United States to understand those practices not as violations but as integral components of America’s exemplary global leadership. For every time a legal argument was made in favor of anticipatory self-defense or enhanced interrogation, there were many more moments when no such justifications seemed pressing. Existing prejudices and sentiments sustained the assumption that U.S. leaders were pursuing a higher calling, to combat an enemy with dubious moral standing.

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The Dialectic of Rage

How Anger, Fear, Pride and Other Passions Combine, Interact and Fight Each Other in the Post-Cold War World

Pierre Hassner

This paper originates and builds on my earlier contributions,¹ which grew out of dissatisfaction with the neglect of passions and emotions in international relations theory, a dissatisfaction that I share with the other contributors to this book. Unlike some contributions, it does not operate in the field of I.R. theory or, in general, of the social sciences, in spite of some inevitable references to psychology and psychoanalysis.

Instead, it moves between political philosophy, in which I have been educated and to which I tend to return, and the analysis of current international relations, to which I have devoted most of my work. I believe that passions are as important as interests and ideas in driving the behaviour of peoples and leaders and that, conversely, one cannot understand their role without referring to the empirical conditions (power relations, technological environment, urbanization and so on) that are specific to our time.

I use the term “passions” rather than “emotions” which is currently preferred in the social sciences for two reasons. First, it is the term used in the philosophical tradition, from Aristotle to Albert Hirschman. Second, passions combine the force and intensity of emotions, with the depth and durability of sentiments.

Within this generally defined approach, I focus in this paper on the ambiguity and ambivalence of the passions, on their conflicts, their combinations and their mutual influence and on the manipulation of their relationship by interested, open, or relatively hidden leaders. Among individuals and peoples or cultures, one can rightly distinguish between those for which the dominant occupation is war and those for which it is commerce – that is, the prominent ethic of manliness versus


This chapter was written before Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the rise of the so called “Islamic state” (Daesch). In the transformed global arena, passion and moderation are both present, but in different quarters. Their combination, wished for in the last paragraph of the original text, occurs as rarely as ever.
compassion, or the dominant passion of pride as opposed to those dominated by greed. Great psychological thinkers from Plato to Freud, however, have analysed the struggle or competition between different passions within the same individual, society, or international scene. These interactions can result in positive or negative feedback, in balance, escalation, compromise, or mutual transformation. Conflict may be borne out of asymmetry or, on the contrary, out of symmetry or convergence, between the passions and values of two competitors, as in the remark attributed to Charles V: “I see eye to eye with my brother Francis of France: we both want Venice” or in René Girard’s mimetic theory of desire.2

In this paper, as in my earlier work, I am inspired by such philosophical or strategic scenarios as Hobbes’s state of nature, with its fight between “vainglory” and fear, Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave (where he who is willing to risk his life wins in the short run, yet ultimately is superseded by he who accepts subjection to save his life but ultimately wins through his work and his skill), or Clausewitz’s escalation based on the duel between passions, as well as between arms and between wills.

My focus is the interpretation of the encounter between liberal or bourgeois powers inspired by “possessive individualism” and groups or cultures inspired by more traditional, warlike, or “manly” passions, based on pride or honour, or on religious fanaticism and sacrifice. For the United States, I look first at the revolt of the “counter-culture” against the cold war establishment and the Vietnam War, then at the revolt of the populist and fundamentalist “counter-counter-culture” against the perceived decline of America’s power and that of traditional morality, as well as against taxes, and finally to the symmetric movement directed from the left against Wall Street and social inequality. These two opposite but equally angry movements have international parallels in European right-wing populism and in the revolt of young Arabs against unemployment and against the corrupt and autocratic character of their regimes.

The spread of passionate movements is usually attributed to a combination of empathy, emulation, adversary reaction and manipulation. Hence, I draw at least passing attention to the manipulation of passions in two instances: on the one hand, I discuss the appeal to “preventive genocide” (“they want to kill us, we have to kill them first”) by Milosevic in Serbia and the “Thousand Hills” radio in Rwanda, and – on the other hand – the manipulation by wealthy elites of popular resentment against growing inequalities by redirecting it towards foreigners, immigrants, the unemployed and the rootless technocrats or intellectuals, rather than against the wealthy or the economic system.

The modern world is not only the prosaic world of industry and technology, but also the world of wealth and competition. The bourgeois is the descendant of the slave, but his domination is threatened from two opposing sides: on the one hand, there is an aesthetic or romantic revolt against banal uniformity, and nostalgia for individual deeds and warrior virtues, a revolt and nostalgia which led to fascism. On the other hand, there is a revolt against money-based inequality and pity for the oppressed masses that produced communism. That is the theme of François Furet’s book *The Passing of an Illusion*. The passion for absolute domination through violence, and the equally violent passion for absolute equality, as well as the revenge of the dominated were to be the themes of the twentieth century. They appeared to have been defeated by the triumph of liberal democracy, the rule of law and the market, economic interdependence and political pluralism.

After the immense digression of two world wars and two totalitarian revolutions, it seemed to some that we were witnessing the triumph of the grand design of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which consisted of substituting interests for passions or, in the words of David Hume, replacing hot or violent passions with cold or calm ones. Albert Hirschman, who recounts this enterprise, has used Montesquieu’s words as the epigraph to his book: “It is fortunate for men to be in a situation where although their passions push them to being wicked they have an interest in not being so”. This is the situation foreseen by Nietzsche in his text on “the last man”. Another way to describe it would be, in platonic terms, as the disappearance of the *thumos*, the choleric component of the soul that, as an intermediary between reason and the instincts, is also the component of courage and honour or what today would be called the passions that forge identity through opposition to other individuals or other groups.

If, as René Girard has it, all societies have been founded on sacrifice or scapegoats, sacrifice can be seen to have been superseded in the modern economy. But in *Le sacrifice et l’envie* Jean-Pierre Dupuy warned us that: “It is not certain it will be possible to hold together the refusal of sacrifice and the rejection of envy. Leaving the sacrificial world brings the unleashing of competition. It is the spread of modern passions which Stendhal speaks of: “envy, jealousy and impotent hatred”. However

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it is precisely these passions that can revive the *thumos* and the search for scapegoats, and indeed sacrifice itself (acts both suicidal and murderous).

It is the supreme paradox that a society borne from fear of violent death and from an attempt to replace passion by rational, self-interested calculation can lead to its opposite: warlike and suicidal violence. Sometimes this can seem like a simple return to natural instincts long suppressed by modern civilization. But the latter no longer has the innocence or the natural brutality of pre-modern man for whom hunting and war, cruelty and heroism were the essence of virility. Modern passions are by nature reactive, both to other passions and to themselves. I have often spoken of the dialectic between barbarian and bourgeois of which the latest manifestation is asymmetrical warfare between, on the one hand, an advanced society seeking to replace risks to the individual with technology, and – on the other hand – individuals or groups who seek to terrorise or destroy civilian populations and even annihilate all civilization, including themselves. But even in their opposition the bourgeois and the barbarian are intimately bound together.

If modernity has been a huge undertaking of turning barbaric into bourgeois, it can also produce the opposite trend of barbarization of the bourgeois as a reaction to the reactions produced by “embourgeoisement”.

These reactions can lead simply to envy, but just as easily they can lead to despair or blind revenge as an expression of resentment. Passions are reversed or turned on themselves; the fear of fear can lead to adventure or unrestrained cruelty, the hatred of hatred can lead to hatred of the hateful, pity for the victims can lead to cruelty towards their executioners, love of humanity can lead to inhumanity towards its enemies (the wording of a petition to the Convention quoted by Hannah Arendt comes to mind: “For pity’s sake, for the love of humanity, be inhuman”8), nihilism can lead to a Nietzschean “nihilistic revolt against nihilism”, and – in Ernest Gellner’s9 expression – disenchantment can lead to “disenchantment with disenchantment” and then to fanaticism.

The manipulation of fear leading to inexpiable hatred is fully illustrated in what could be called “preventive genocide” or “reciprocal fear of massacre”. Think, for example, of the slogan “We must kill them before they kill us” as preached and practised in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The relevance of certain aspects of this cannot be excluded from conflicts that are nearer to us and our theme, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which fear and horror at the attacks among Israelis, the feeling of powerless humiliation among Palestinians, and the thirst for vengeance on both sides daily feed the escalation to extremes. The dialectics of terrorism and counter-terrorism on a world-scale, beginning with the September 11th attacks and

President Bush’s “global war on terror” have led to a catastrophic version of “the
dialectics of the barbarian and the bourgeois” (two terms mentioned earlier, which –
as their very dialectic shows – are definitely not to be identified with the opposition
between East and West or between North and South).

9/11 AND THE PASSIONS

Let us take, as our starting point, two big events of the past twenty years, the end
of the cold war and 9/11. (We shall touch upon a third, the economic crisis, in the
second part of the chapter.) The resulting situation is relatively new and extremely
destabilizing from the point of view of both subjective and objective security.

During the cold war the term used in strategic planning and Western military
schools was “threat”. In a bipolar world, this was highly defined and focused: it
meant the threat from the USSR.

After the end of the cold war, the concept of threat was replaced with the concept
of risk, which is more vague and indefinite. Risks can have a variety of origins and
characters. The concept was not focused on a given enemy. Risk could mean a total
catastrophe, but it was not an expression of hostile intent.

Today the concept of threat has reappeared but with all the ambiguity and elusive
multiple nature of risk. Enemies wish us harm, but we know neither whence they
come nor what their motives are. In this respect, the entire episode in which the Aum
sect released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway is even more symbolic and disturbing
than the September 11th attacks.

Today, are we seeing the return of the big fears, heralded by the events in Tokyo
and New York/Washington, DC?

Traditional fears appear and disappear in combination with other emotions
against a background of underlying fragility caused by the loss of landmarks.
Implicit risks, accepted daily, can suddenly merge and change into an absolute,
panic-provoking threat. Beset by natural disasters, self-destructive technical failure,
seemingly unpredictable and uncontrolled economic shocks and criminal acts,
the very nature of our society is marked by hesitation. One can, broadly speaking,
take the view that we have moved from the primacy of risks perceived as natural or
resulting from divine punishment to that of risks created by man through wars and
technology. However, climate change and the return of the great epidemics create
ambiguity, and – therefore – some paradoxical consequences.

On the one hand, there are risks that other cultures have lived with unconsciously or
accepted as inevitable but which cause problems today, such as dietary or ecological

10 Cf. Powell, Christopher, Barbaric Civilization. A Critical Sociology of Genocide, Montreal:
risks. On the other hand, there is the risk of global catastrophe, the inevitability of which certain people affirm as proven and many confusedly accept, but which is widely suppressed psychologically. Additionally, there is the re-emergence of moral or religious motivation. Certain people actively want a disaster and strive to hasten it; others would attribute it to evil which must be fought or exorcised. Thus, fear allies itself with another passion which is just as violent and just as blind: hatred.

CONTEMPT AND DEFIANCE, HUMILIATION AND RESENTMENT

At issue in this modern version of the struggle between master and slave is a confrontation between two sides within a framework of hostility that can quickly turn into hatred. On the one hand, there is an ethos of calculating rationality based on enlightened self-interest and in the last analysis of the search for survival, the acquisition and holding of material goods and the fear of suffering and death. On the other hand, there is an ethos of pride, honour or glory based on the martial virtues of the warrior, on the acceptance of, even the search for, the death suffered or inflicted on others, and sometimes on oneself, in a fever of self-mutilation and self-destruction.

This ethos may simply be the expression of a traditional warrior culture, or it may be tinged with an aesthetic romanticism which seeks grandiose gestures or a nihilistic expression of hatred, not just towards others but also towards oneself and the world.

In both cases, it opposes modernity with violence and scorn, seeing in it only materialism, corruption and decay. The “Mad Mullah of Somaliland” who opposed the British at the beginning of the twentieth century told them: “I will win because you love peace and I love war.” Bin Laden exclaimed: “We have thousands upon thousands of young people who love death as much as young Americans love life”. And when Henry Kissinger told Hafiz El Assad that one day he would have to negotiate with the Israelis, like Saddat, Assad replied: “Have no illusions at stake in the final war will be suffering not territory. The Israelis have become bourgeois like you. They no longer know how to suffer and die. As for us, we know it. Victory will go to those who can suffer and die the longest” (personal communication). These declarations inspired by warrior or religious traditions were echoed in the “Long live death!” slogans of the Italian and Spanish fascists or the Nazis’ contempt for America (and earlier of German intellectuals for the Britain of 1914) on the basis of an opposition between “a nation of heroes” and “a nation of merchants”.

These challenges have been faced down and these prophecies have been refuted throughout the twentieth century. To be sure, this is largely the result of a modern

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technology that has challenged Machiavelli’s principle that warrior virtues are more important than riches. But it is also because liberal bourgeois societies with their backs to the wall are capable of finding a spirit of resistance and combat which draws on pre-capitalist cultural resources, be they aristocratic or, as in the United States, derived from the conquest of the West, or from southern and fundamentalist America, but also and for the most part from the reawakening of the *thumos*, or honour, shown by a reflex of dignity or wounded pride, and in an indignant desire to resist, to seek vengeance and to strike back.

The second *Intifada* derived hope from the Israeli retreat from Lebanon, which was seen as an acknowledgement of weakness, Hamas from the retreat from Gaza, Bin Laden from the U.S. retreat from Somalia and earlier from Vietnam. We cannot rule out the long-term confirmation of these hopes, but – in the meantime – it is certain that they always underestimate the possibility of the defensive mobilisation of individualistic liberal societies.

The tragic element in this dialectic stems from the fact that it does not stop there. This defensive mobilisation of the liberal bourgeoisie can fall into two opposing traps that, in a sense, converge.

The first is the barbarization of the bourgeoisie under the impact of fear, anger and the feeling of betrayal. Certain aspects of the reaction to the barbarity of suicide attacks against civilian populations develop in this direction. The revival of feelings of national solidarity, among a formerly individualistic people, although healthy in itself, can lead to the acceptance of practices or attitudes that are anything but healthy, such as the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo and in Iraq or the practice of “rendition” (i.e., the secret transfer of prisoners to countries that specialize in torture), which is surprising in a country that once appeared excessively legalistic. The same goes for the practices of the Israeli army in the occupied territories, including the destruction of houses, reprisals against the civilian population or simply humiliation inflicted on the latter.

In the United States, an entire ideological campaign has promoted these attitudes. It declared that “leadership demands a pagan ethics”\(^{13}\) and that modernity changes nothing in this respect, while pointing to “the savage wars of peace”\(^{14}\) and quoting the then-fashionable President Theodore Roosevelt, the incarnation of martial values who said “unless we keep the barbarian virtues, gaining the civilized ones will be of little avail”.\(^{15}\) Certainly, these utterances invoke virtues and ethos rather than passions. One can even find legal and philosophical justifications for the idea


that rules and restrictions regarding destruction in war only apply to states that apply them in return and whose legitimacy is recognised, whereas when confronted with barbarians – that is to say with pirates or bandits or with savages (such as the colonised people of yesterday’s and today’s fanatics and terrorists) everything is permitted. But what Freud called “the return of the repressed” very often shows in these kinds of practices: an instinct of aggression is supposed to be unleashed even more among civilized people once the taboos are removed, precisely because it had been repressed or sublimated.

Even when liberal societies resist this temptation or the intoxication of vengeful passion they come to be more exposed to falling into the second trap, which is closer to their nature but also the symmetrical image of their enemies’ mistake: it consists of believing they can make the enemy capitulate by basically appealing to his fear of suffering or his hopes of prosperity.

Of course the search for peace can dispense neither with punitive force nor with material appeal. But if it is based solely on a psychology of utilitarian calculation, a behaviourist or Pavlovian approach, it runs the risk of resulting in a different, mechanical, impersonal barbarity. At the time of the Algerian war, Raymond Aron replied to those who thought a French military victory would show the Algerians it was in their interest to forego independence: “To believe that men will sacrifice their passions to their interests is to deny the experience of our century”. At the time of the Vietnam War, Thomas Schelling had suggested seeing the bombing of that country as a form of “compellence”, a way of influencing the enemy’s decisions through his calculations of costs and benefits, punishment and reward.

Two other American authors, Karl Deutsch and Kenneth Boulding, replied that this neo-Benthamian psychology ignored the non-utilitarian reactions to force, the way in which the latter can strengthen resistance instead of weakening it.

As Boulding writes: “The basic weakness in applying economic style analysis to social symptoms which are essentially not economic is precisely that it ignores aspects of human behaviour which are not economic but ‘heroic’ or more exactly identity-creating. In the mathematics of personal identity negative pay-offs frequently reinforce the existing commitment”.

It may be that this mistake has been made – on the one hand – by the perpetrators of the attacks on America and on Israel in the belief that they could make bourgeois

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adversaries yield; on the other hand, the mistake may have been made by the latter in the belief that they could deprive the terrorists of their support solely by inflicting punishments while ignoring the humiliations and desire for revenge that these would provoke.

Thus, perhaps we come to the essence of the matter as seen by the well-known columnist Tom Friedman, who once said: “The single most unappreciated force in world affairs is humiliation”. In *Bloody Revenge, Emotions, Nationalism and War*, Thomas J. Scheff identifies pride and shame as the master passions and designates unaccepted shame as the basic source of resentment and hatred.²⁰

Political scientist Roger D. Petersen has studied ethnic violence in Eastern Europe and identified its source in three passions: fear, hatred and resentment. He focuses on resentment as being the central element.²¹ Perhaps the most interesting convergence is to be found between the French novelist and essayist George Bernanos and the Swiss historian Philippe Burrin, regarding the context of Hitler and Nazism. In *Humiliated Children*²² the former saw in the humiliation and resentment of Hitler vis-à-vis the Jews the example of this “anger of imbeciles which fills the world”, whereas sixty years later in *Resentment and Apocalypse* Burrin found the key to Nazi anti-Semitism in a declaration made by Hitler in 1939: “In my life I have often been a prophet and most of the time people have made fun of me. When I was struggling for power it was mostly the Jews who laughed at the prophecy that I would become Head of the State and of the entire people and among other things successfully implement solutions to the Jewish problem. I think the resounding laughter of those days has since remained stuck in the Jews’ throats”.²³

While not confusing forms, degrees and expressions of resentment, how can one but find its traces in the fact that from Asia to Africa, not to mention South America and throughout the entire southern part of the planet, the attacks of September 11th provoked a certain satisfaction that it was all powerful America’s turn to be hit (whatever the disapproval of the method and compassion for the victims’ fate)?

The frustration of exclusion derived from the ever-present sight of inaccessible power and wealth is making itself felt everywhere, be it in *Schadenfreude*, resentment or satisfaction when the powerful “get what they deserve”. September 11th and its aftermath must therefore be seen in a double perspective. On the one side, there is a religious and warlike totalitarianism successor to the ideological totalitarianism of the past and fighting the same adversaries: moral corruption, pluralism, relativism

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and, more generally, democracy and modernity. On the other side, there is a reaction against the inequality and anarchy created by modernity, and – depending on the interpretation – feeding on envy and resentment or on revolt against injustice.

In both cases, Muslims (and especially Arabs) are on the front line. In one respect, what Hegel called “the worship of the One” disgust at changes in common morality, particularly the status of women, and the denial of the distinction between the spiritual and temporal are more intense than in other monotheist religions. Muslims (and especially the Arabs) are consumed with humiliation and resentment at the contrast between their present decline and the greatness of their cultural, political and religious past. This resentment is inflamed by the very existence of Israel and even more by the occupation of Palestinian territory, which is seen as a political and religious scandal. Thus, terrorism attracts followers to the extent that it is presented both as a weapon against the infidels, which will result in a counter-globalisation (that of the Islamic *Umma*), and as a way of defending territory against foreign occupation.

However, the revolutions of February 2011 in Tunisia and Egypt show that Arab passions cannot be reduced to the duality of fanaticism and sensuality or avidity signalled by Hegel. They show not only that what Tocqueville called the “democratic passions” (the universal demand for equality and “the sublime taste of liberty”) exist in the Arab world, but also that the search for dignity can adopt other directions than violent rage against external scapegoats. Moreover, the mixture of courage and restraint shown by the crowds in Cairo’s Liberation Square (which, admittedly, does not represent the whole of the Arab world, let alone Egypt), the absence of slogans expressing religious fanaticism, the influence of diasporas and, through them, of links with young militants of the same generation but of other cultural areas, shows that the effects of globalization cannot be reduced to uprootedness, envy and hatred. More generally, attributing to each culture its specific passions, ultimately based on religion and tradition, is a dangerous illusion, even though, obviously, some passions are stronger in some cultures than in others.

It may be, in any case, that the clash of the passions will increasingly take place not between civilizations but within civilizations and nations themselves. The example of Iran goes in the same direction. The various movements of “indignados” in Spain in 2011 spreading into Europe and the American “Occupy Wall Street” movement, have in no small measure been inspired by the Arab spring. The effects of world crises on the dialectics of passions within the West and particularly within the unique but crucial example of the United States demand our attention.

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THE PASSIONS IN THREE AMERICAN CRISIS

Almost from the beginning, the United States has been divided along psychological and sociological lines, which have often coincided with regions: the “Bible belt”, or “Middle America” or the South, the West and the center against the Eastern or (more recently “bi-coastal”). The latter traditionally embodies what Anatol Lieven calls “the American creed” or “the thesis”\textsuperscript{25}: optimistic, forward looking, individualistic and universalistic. The former is what he calls the “antithesis”\textsuperscript{26}: more traditionalist, more community-oriented, more religious, more prone to Great Fears and resentment, valuing “toughness, manliness and whiteness in defense of race, family and nation”, as Michael Kazin characterizes the Jacksonian spirit. It pits the healthy, manly producers against the guilt-ridden intellectuals and parasites, living on welfare at or flocking in from abroad and endangering America’s identity.\textsuperscript{27} As Lieven remarks, they are, nowadays, nostalgic of a more simple and healthy rural or small-town America and distrustful of this very modernity and globalization, which was shaped by America more than by any other nation.

In terms of passions, one side normally exudes optimism about the future and confidence in America’s mission for the good of mankind. When these hopes are disappointed, they can be replaced by guilt. The other looks at the past with nostalgia and at its environment, national or global, with distrust, fear and sometimes hatred. Kevin Philips, author of the “Southern Strategy” for the Republican Party, formulates the guiding question as “knowing who hates whom the most”.\textsuperscript{28}

Of course, this duality – if taken literally – is misleading. The two attitudes react to each other and, by this very process, exercise a mutual influence. External events and domestic manipulations can give a significant advantage to one or the other. The effects of war, such as the wars of Vietnam or Iraq, the effects of terrorist attacks, like those of 9/11, or the effects of economic crises tend sometimes to move and sometimes to blur the dividing lines. In particular, anger seems to be surprisingly volatile. The German philosopher Slojterdick\textsuperscript{29} has theorised this volatility with the metaphor of “banks of anger” that collect and invest anger in a productive enterprise (his two major examples being the Church and the Communist Party). Today, however, Kazin sees a world full of “liquid anger” with no bank fulfilling the function of channelling and investing anger and making it fructify.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., chapters 3 and 4, pp. 89–122.
\textsuperscript{28} Quoted by Kazin, p. 250.
In the United States, the populist movements are “anger banks” of sorts. But sometimes they channel brute, indiscriminate anger (“The party of ‘no’”, of “Hell, no” and of “I can’t stand it anymore!”), sometimes they target Wall Street (as the Populist Party did in the 1890s and recently as the Occupy Wall Street movement), and sometimes, more often, they target the government, its bureaucracy, its taxes and its bailouts. Often these movements are inspired by nostalgia for a partly mythical past and are in search of scapegoats for its disappearance. These scapegoats are often both national and international. From the right, for instance, they link Washington with dark foreign conspiracy. Conversely, from the left or from the isolationist faction of the right-wing movement, they blame America’s ills on its foreign involvements and unnecessary wars, and to foreign trade and on the flight of capital and jobs abroad.

For our subject, three observations seem relevant. First, popular and populist anger seem less directed at foreign countries than at groups or phenomena present or imagined within the United States, and as seen as carrying a danger: from outside minorities, immigrants, suspected communists (at the time of McCarthyism), terrorists today or (when viewed from the left) bankers and bigots. Second, successive waves of anger are often a reaction against preceding waves coming from different sectors. This occurs between racial as well as ideological groups.

Third, anger is inextricably mixed with other passions, such as moral indignation, envy and – of course – fear, greed or humiliation, or with reactions to them.

Historically, what Americans call “the culture wars” are in great part passionate reactions both to global trends and to a shared situation but also to the reactions of other, ascending or descending groups and to their general attitudes.

The changes in America’s position in the world (defeat in Vietnam, humiliation by Iran in the hostage crisis of 1979) and the fundamental transformations in American society (desegregation, war against poverty, opening to immigration, student revolt, feminism, changes in attitudes to sexuality, the emergence of the “moral majority” and the religious right) have produced or revived a polarization and a dismay leading to an increase in violence, including in the assassination of public figures. The “Reagan Revolution” was a reaction to these phenomena and has restored American self-confidence but it has led, at least for an important part of the population, to a mixture of hubris and greed. Additionally, the progress of globalization brings optimism to some and resentment to others.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the progress of an American-led globalization, which left the United States as an uncontested superpower, inspired a continuation of American optimism verging on hubris. These two events also were reflected in economic deregulation at home, in spite of the moderation of the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations; whereas, under the latter, polarization based on moral indignation increased further.
The shock of 9/11 produced a complex psychological situation made of a combined feeling of vulnerability, outraged innocence, fear and yet also power, leading both to a need for revenge and to a sense that only complete dominance could produce complete security. Of course the war in Iraq, the economic crisis that started in 2008, the election of Barack Obama, and the realization of the rise of China produced a new picture of hope and disappointment, of pessimism and polarization, of resentment and fear of the future.

The complexity of the cleavages and debates, their dialectical and, sometimes, paradoxical character, their way of transcending the boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs, and the central role played by the passions, are nicely illustrated by two eloquent and polemical books: *One Nation, Two Cultures*, by Gertrude Himmelfarb and *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism*, by Andrew Bacevich.

Gertrude Himmelfarb, a cultural historian belonging to the founding family of neoconservatism, opposes what she calls “the dominant culture”, represented by Clinton, with the “caring virtues”, like humanity or benevolence, a virtue that goes well with dissoluteness, because it relies on passion and sentiment rather than on rules like those of marriage.

The paradox is that the attempted return to the “old morality” while rehabilitating the warlike or manly virtues, and, in theory at least, the traditional moral code in sexual matters, certainly did not rely, whether under Ronald Reagan or under George W. Bush, on austerity, restraint or the curbing of appetite. On the contrary, and in opposition to the puritanical origins of capitalism according to Max Weber, which are supposed to be based on delayed satisfaction, they were periods of profligacy, of pursuing immediate satisfaction and of consumption versus saving or long-term investment.

Bacevich develops a biting critique of the dominance of appetite and the refusal of sacrifice in America: “As individuals, Americans never cease to expect more. As members of a community, especially a national community, they choose to contribute less… Soldiers fight, Americans consume” as there are “[t]oo many wars, too few warriors”. He denounces “a limited liability version of patriotism”.

The contribution of Bacevich lies in linking the domestic and economic dimension with that of foreign and military policy. In both, he discerns the same “national exuberance”, the same refusal of limits and of sacrifice, which leads to the accumulation of debt and of optimistic and adventurist gambles on the future based on the assumption that the moment of truth can be postponed indefinitely.

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thanks to the dynamics of capitalism and of American exceptionalism. He calls both areas to a return to moderation, to solvency, and to a careful balancing of aspirations and costs.

Obviously, the financial crisis and its economic and social consequences have amply justified his views. Americans discover they have been living above their means both domestically and in their foreign pursuits. Economists rediscover the role of “animal spirits”\(^3\) emphasized by Keynes, of the passions encouraged by capitalism. The Bernie Madoff case appears as a monstrous caricature of a general tendency. The convergence in attitudes towards wealth and towards political, particularly international, power seems also, in a way, to confirm the famous statement of Adam Smith, in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* about “the desire to be attended to, and taken notice of” which is the great object of worldly toil and brustle.\(^3\)

The shock of 2008 has produced, however, a partial reversal. The consciousness of the magnitude of accumulated debt has given a sense of urgency to a general recognition that it cannot go on indefinitely. But this recognition leads to very divergent reactions and recommendations. Most of those who, like Vice-President Cheney, declared at the time of the Iraq war that “Reagan has shown that deficits don’t count” are for drastic cuts in government expenditures (especially for the poor), while maintaining tax cuts (particularly for the rich) and the defense budget. Those who want to maintain or increase welfare and services and to reduce inequalities want to continue spending to stimulate the economy and offer no credible plan for resorbing the debt. On foreign policy, the appetite for military adventures and nation-building missions has strongly diminished but, along with objective constraints against disengagement, economic interests and passionate attachments in parts of the political spectrum to the notion of American exceptionalism and leadership prevent too great a break with the past.

The most striking phenomenon, from the point of view of the passions, is the one we already alluded to: anger has for quite some time been directed much more against the government and immigrants than against the banks and the system which produced the crisis, more against the bailouts by the government than against the financial practices that provoked them, and the huge bonuses still going to their authors and against the growing inequalities of American society.

This corresponds in part to long-standing elements of American culture: a traditional distrust of government\(^3\)\(^4\), a greater hostility to taxes, and a lesser jealousy of the poor towards the rich, than in other countries.


But it is also favoured by the manipulation of the popular passions through a permanent campaign financed by billionaires and waged by passionate radio and television stars (such as Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck) or by religious fundamentalists.

The Tea-Party phenomenon is made even more interesting by the appearance of a quasi-symmetric movement to the left: Occupy Wall Street. Like the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street is based on anxiety about the evolution of American society, and on anger against a powerful institution that is designated as the source of this situation: government in one case, the banks, or – more broadly – greedy and unregulated capitalism in the other.

Both movements share the characteristic of not being structured behind a charismatic leader, a coherent practical program or a comprehensive ideology. However, by its style and the age and social origins that predominate in its ranks, Occupy Wall Street is consciously reminiscent and perhaps nostalgic of the counter-culture of the sixties, which – as we mentioned – was one of the main targets of the “counter-counter culture” of which the Tea Party is a more recent manifestation. The cultural wars continue more than even to occupy the American scene.

The dialectic between the two movements is not, however, without its complications and its paradoxes. The Tea Party is much more numerous, better financed, better represented in the media and, above all, more influential politically at the point of a having captured one of the two major parties or at least imposed its veto power on its temptations of pragmatic accommodation with the Obama administration. Besides government in general and President Obama in particular, it can direct its anger against the traditional scapegoats that have been strongly revived everywhere by globalization, such as the foreigners, whether as immigrants or as unfair competitors.

The Occupy Wall Street movement, although populist in composition and blaming international financial capitalism, is in principle more internationalist and intellectual. Its diagnoses of America’s ills – “overconsumption, overextension, over-optimism”, drift into plutocracy and increasing inequality – are more realistic than that of “socialism” or obedience to a world conspiracy against American brandished by the Tea Party. The Tea Party, however, is more in tune with some American traditions, such as hostility to “big government” and to wealth redistribution. It is true, however, that beyond certain limits, like its refusal to tax the rich, it is beginning to run against a majority of the American people.

Occupy Wall Street, on the other hand, risks isolating itself from the 99 per cent it claims to represent. It is symptomatic that the movement finds little support among

the black population, although the latter is particularly hit by unemployment or by the threats against welfare. But the black population tends to consider the activities of Occupy Wall Street both as coming from newcomers to the deprivation and the feeling of inequality, which members of the black population have always experienced, and as liable to worsen their situation by provoking a conservative reaction.  

Even the broader constituency of the so-called silent majority, while sympathetic to Occupy Wall Street’s stand against the bailout of the banks and, generally, to the opposition of “Main Street versus Wall Street”, are nonetheless distrustful of, or irritated by, the style of the movement as it appears as a threat to law and order and to the normal life of people who are too busy to “occupy” or to “demonstrate. “Normal” people may sympathise with populist movements but are turned off by noisy young people blocking the traffic and harming business.

FROM CONTAGIOUS ENTHUSIASM TO GROWING ISOLATION

A similar reaction appears in the countries whose movements have contributed to inspiring Occupy Wall Street: the Indignados occupying the Puerta del Sol in Madrid, the Egyptians (among whom white collar, jobless, educated, young people were a driving force) occupying the Tahrir Square, the French students occupying the Sorbonne in 1968, or the young revolutionaries all over Europe during the “People’s Spring” of 1848. In all these “dignity revolutions”, the great achievement after decades of passivity, humiliation and fear, is the courage with which fear suddenly disappears and the formerly submissive subjects become citizens who face the likelihood of being shot or even welcome death by their suicide. Among the majority, however, the fear of chaos – either in the form of a bloody struggle of all against all or in that of the paralysis of economic activity – replaces the fear of the tyrant and of repression. Stopping the disorder and returning to normalcy becomes the dominant slogan and opens the door of a new authoritarianism which in some countries may be based on religious passions or on trust in the military. In others countries, this occurs in relation to a social and cultural conservatism fearing the unknown and rejecting new influence and experiments.

THE PASSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

What has all this to do with international relations? Very much as we live in a revolutionary time when technology and globalization make the acceleration of change and the interpenetration of societies inevitable. As Niall Ferguson has put it:

Computing power has grown exponentially. So has the human network. But the brain of *Homo sapiens* remained pretty much the same organ that evolved in the heads of African hunter-gatherers 200,000 years ago. And that brain has a tendency to swing in its mood from greed to fear and from love to hate.

The reality may be that by joining us all together and deluging us with data, the Netlords have ushered in a new age of volatility, in which our primeval emotions are combined and amplified as never before.

We are Linkedin, but stressed out. And that “cloud” of downloadable data may yet turn out to be a thundercloud.\(^{38}\)

Inevitably, this thunder resonates across borders and produces reactions that may include a spectrum from volatility to paralysis according to the various cultures and political regimes.\(^{39}\) The study of the spread, interaction and transformation of passions through imitation, emulation, reaction and so forth accelerated by the technologies of communication is wide open for research.

Another important aspect is the weakness of institutions and the poverty of statesmanship. They are, in a sense, reduced or blocked at a time when their role would be the most crucial for managing the passions, by combining, screening, sublimating, balancing and transforming them into policies. In this sense, the distinctions between passions, interests and ideas may be analytically indispensable but their separation is disastrous.

From Plato’s statesman (who is supposed to master the act of combining manliness and moderation), to Madison’s institutions (which – in Federalist N°10 – are supposed both to make use of the passions and to combine them by channelling them against each other), dealing with the passions is a central, in some respects the central, task of government. A political leadership or elite that ignores the passions of the people\(^{40}\) or either follows the passions blindly or replaces them by its own passions is doomed to fail. The political leadership’s task is even more difficult at the international level, where constraining and protective institutions are shaky, and strong pressures come from different directions: enemies, rivals and allies, from its own constituents and from more or less anonymous forces (like the markets). The only solution is also the most difficult solution: the combination of passion and moderation. A moderate passion is no longer a passion, but a passion for moderation, or a policy inspired by passion but guided by moderation is the highest achievement of the political art.

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\(^{40}\) See, for example, the absence of an “indignants” movement in France, although the various European ones were inspired by a French book (*Indignez-vous!* by Stéphane Hessel), which sold a million copies but did not provoke a social movement in its own country. Cf Beja (Alice), *L’étrange apathie des indignés français*, *Esprit*, No. 38, December 2011, pp. 6–7.
INTRODUCTION

There remains within International Relations (IR) a general presumption towards mistrust which characterises interactions at the global level and which has been identified as a relevant factor in conflict prevention and transformation. How we conceptualise trust and mistrust in IR matters because this can make the difference between war and peace (Kydd, 2005: 3). More recently, trust has become the focus of a burgeoning field of research within and beyond IR (see Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Glaser, 2010; Hardin, 2002; Hollis, 1998; Kydd, 2005; Möllering, 2006; Wheeler, 2010). Once we begin to question how adversarial and mistrusting relationships might be transformed into more cooperative relationships, it is a relatively small step to suggest this requires conceptual tools for understanding empathy – an integral element to human relations – and the communicative encounters which form a central vehicle in international politics for the diplomatic management of conflict. Recognising the limitations of orthodox IR theories which have tended not to engage extensively with these concepts because emotions have largely been perceived to undermine rational decision-making in international politics, the aims of this chapter are threefold. First, the chapter brings together innovative and contemporary interdisciplinary research in the separate spheres of trust, empathy, and communicative ethics and makes an argument for their consideration in international politics and conflict analysis as explicitly relational and dynamic concepts. Second, in so doing, a series of questions are identified which contribute to an emergent interdisciplinary research agenda in IR that is focused on addressing issues of conflict transformation. Crucially, such an

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agenda includes: the role played by emotions in dynamic processes of trust, empathy, and dialogue; the status of emotions in negotiations and conflict transformation processes and the concomitant methodological question of how, as scholars, we might access and interpret them; the challenges posed by the need to engage with multiple actors and levels of analysis (e.g., does empathy occur between collectives as well as individuals, and how can we talk of emotions in relation to states?), and the theoretical and empirical conditions under which an adversarial relationship may transform into a more cooperative relationship. Third, by drawing on the illustrative character of the contested and unresolved negotiations between Iran and the West over Iran’s nuclear program, the need for a holistic approach to trust, empathy, and dialogue in conflict transformation becomes clear. Framed by the parties themselves as a dilemma of trust, this complex and protracted conflict serves to highlight some of the obstacles to exercising empathy and, at the same time, the need to engage in reflexive dialogue to build trust and transform adversarial relationships.

A RELATIONAL APPROACH?

Trust, like other concepts within the social sciences, has been placed within the framework of reason and rationality, raising questions concerning whether rationality is crucial to trust or whether it is in fact detrimental to trust within social life (Hollis, 1998). Rationalist approaches to trust emphasise the importance of interests and the pay-off structure which shape the interaction. As Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler have argued, once the ‘distribution of pay-offs from cooperation changes, for example as a result of the changed circumstances of one of the players, there will be an incentive to abandon cooperation’ (2010: 73). Given the risks attached to such a relationship in the international sphere, and the likelihood that it may break down, it is clear why actors would exercise caution regarding their own investment in it. On the other hand, recognition of the centrality of promises in establishing and maintaining a trusting relationship belongs to what has been called the binding approach (Ruzicka and Wheeler, 2010: 73). This rests ‘on the notion that actors will honour their promises’ even if they have opportunities to defect for selfish gains: ‘to trust is to expect that the other party or parties will do what is required to begin and maintain the relationship because they value both its existence and continuation’ (Ruzicka and Wheeler, 2010: 73; see also Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Hollis, 1998; Möllering, 2006).

While the rationalist approach clearly favours strategic calculation by actors (which may well be motivated by fear as well as self-interest), the binding approach invites reflection on the feelings which underpin judgements of value and obligation. Because cooperation in international politics is likely to rely on elements of both rational thinking and feelings, it becomes clear that trust possesses both a cognitive and an emotional dimension (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 232). It is not a purely cognitive activity, but it is based on a belief beyond empirical certainty and
the feelings one holds for another, that the other will not act in ways which will harm. Thus, for the purposes of the current argument, trust, as Jonathan Mercer has argued, is an emotional belief; how people feel influences their interpretation of another’s behaviour (Mercer, 2005: 95). An emotional belief is defined as ‘one where emotion constitutes and strengthens a belief and which makes possible a generalization about an actor that involves certainty beyond evidence’ (Mercer, 2010: 2). Yet such emotional beliefs are not objective and immutable (and neither is trust); even those conflicts that appear to be driven by beliefs about the other which are frozen in stone can undergo transformation, bringing with it the possibility of new practices that can transform such conflicts. There are (at least) two potential sources of transformation of emotional beliefs which shape and influence issues of conflict: (1) new evidence, and (2) empathy.

A decision taken by actors to trust – against the background of existential uncertainty integral to international politics – should not disguise the concerns over mistrust which arise at times. The question of trust in international politics unavoidably raises its shadowy alter ego, deception. Once deception is present or believed to be present in a relationship, ‘trust is usually disturbed and trustworthiness is reconsidered, too, when the act of deception is seen as a betrayal of the trustor’s positive expectations and willingness to be vulnerable’ (Möllering, 2008: 6). Trust and deception are, in other words, two sides of the same coin: the possibility of the one renders the other meaningful. Deception and empathy also construct a particular duality: on the one hand, empathy may be exercised to better exploit or deceive other actors; on the other hand, it may also increase understanding of the acts and intentions of other actors in ways which both reveal and remove the perceived necessity for deception on both sides, thus paving the way for possible confidence-building measures. Dialogue and deception similarly possess a close relationship because it is commonly through particular communicative practices that deception or trust is articulated and developed. Therefore, while trust/mistrust may be the problem which pervades U.S.-Iranian relations, for example, this is articulated, consolidated and perpetuated through various communicative practices (be they diplomatic exchanges, public rhetoric, film and media, direct negotiations, Security Council meetings, etc.). Communicative practices in international politics are intimately entwined with concepts of trust and empathy. The relational nature of these concepts draws strength from the recognition that they are all intersubjective – that is, they require interaction with others.

EMOTIONS AND EMPATHY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The importance of the affective elements of politics has long been recognised within philosophical traditions and has been broached by Western thinkers as
varied as Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Adam Smith, David Hume, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Martha Nussbaum. A common theme to these writings is the relationship between feelings and ethics or morality. Our ability to experience pain and pleasure, to imagine the pain and pleasure of others and the desire for others to share our experiences, prevents us from acting purely on the basis of self-interest and provides an incentive to perceive ourselves and evaluate our actions through the eyes of others (Frevert, 2011: 161; Lebow, 2005: 298). Despite a rich philosophical tradition, emotions and empathy have received little systematic enquiry in mainstream IR theories (Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008).

A convincing case for the paucity of traditional IR theories’ ability to engage with these issues given their insufficient individual ontologies premised on the assumption of an autonomous, calculating, egoistic individual has been made by Richard Ned Lebow (2005). Lebow’s critique of those theories which adopt a broadly rationalist approach to explain cooperation rests on the contention that emotions ‘are absolutely fundamental to creating any general propensity to cooperate with a given group of actors’ (2005: 284). In common with other critical traditions, Lebow argues that the notion of the autonomous individual is a ‘fiction of the Enlightenment’ (2005: 284). Moreover, behaviour cannot simply be explained by reference to external incentives. While actions may certainly be a response to incentives, what constitutes an incentive and the reasons why actors may consider it to be important cannot be separated out from their conceptions of identity and interests. The latter are formed intersubjectively, through collective experiences, affective ties, and relationships embedded in communities. As such, to explain the behaviour of actors, we must also examine their internal incentives and their social and emotional beliefs and attachments (2005: 284, 291). This touches on a critical question for scholars of trust and empathy in IR: How do we respond to the need to engage with multiple levels of analysis? At stake are not only the complex personal cognitive and affective processes of individuals, but those of individuals who also adopt roles as formal representatives of collectives such as international institutions, governments of states, and other political or cultural groups. IR is rightly charged with the practice of personifying the state (Lomas, 2005; Wendt, 2004). Nowhere is this more evident – and controversial – than when attempting to explore the emotions relevant to international politics.

While emotions such as fear and mistrust have been very much present in neorealist narratives of IR, they have generally been understood as a product of the perceived anarchy of the international system. Under anarchy, fear compels states to follow the logic of survival or perish. By contrast, scholars such as Neta Crawford have argued that conflict does not emerge from the structural pressures of the system, but from the way in which emotions such as fear or mistrust shape and influence the perceptions and identities of decision makers (2000: 131–136). In sum, emotions have
been recognised as core components in our constitution of identity and community; as physiological, biological or bodily sensations; as forms of knowledge; as affect or feelings, and as central to our ability to form evaluative judgements (Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008: 124; Hunt, 2007; Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 1988). Crawford writes that ‘feelings are internally experienced, but the meaning attached to those feelings, the behaviors associated with them, and the recognition of emotions in others are cognitively and culturally construed and constructed’ (2000: 125). If this is so, then they deserve greater attention than they frequently receive in international politics.

That this has not been so to a significant degree reflects methodological concerns arising from the dominance of positivist social science. The epistemological challenge issued by critical theory to positivism was reflected in a corresponding shift in IR theory from which emerged a range of critiques of positivism. Approaches to IR which adopted a neutral and objective understanding of reality were rejected and alternative epistemological positions quickly emerged. These articulated an awareness of the relationship between knowledge, power and interests, and undermined any claim to an ‘objective reality’, instead articulating an intersubjective and, at times, a radically subjective approach to knowledge and meaning. These critical approaches were primarily focused on the realist/neorealist orthodoxy which identified material power as an endemic feature of international politics and one that structured state interactions. While this ‘critical turn’ opened the methodological way for closer consideration of emotions and empathy, much of the relevant research has continued to be done in other disciplines and has struggled to fully penetrate the dominant IR focus on issues of security and conflict. There can be little question, however, that the critiques of positivism paved the way for the ‘linguistic turn’ which significantly influenced the role attributed to language and ideational factors in IR.

Emotion, as suggested by the dominance of rationalism, has long been subordinated to cognition by philosophers and IR scholars alike, serving only to explain irrationality or mistaken judgements. Justice, it was argued, must be free of passion because emotions distort our capacity for rational and ethical judgement (for critiques see Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008: 120; Hutchings, 2005; Morrell, 2010). Countering this tendency, the reciprocal relationship between cognition and emotion has been firmly established both in the natural sciences and the social sciences (see Crawford, 2000; Damasio, 1994; Decety and Ickes, 2009). Challenging the precepts of rationalist theories which have traditionally dominated IR, research in the social sciences has more recently argued that

emotion is necessary to rationality and intrinsic to choice. Emotion precedes choice (by ranking one’s preferences), emotion influences choice (because it directs
one’s attention and is the source of action), and emotion follows choice (which determines how one feels about one’s choice and influences one’s preferences) (Mercer, 2005: 94).

Contra the rationalist position that emotion is merely a product of cognition or a reaction to external stimuli, Mercer suggests that all decision making is shaped by emotional beliefs. Emotions are not simply produced by specific situations, but shape our reasoning, our framing of the situation, and our responses to it; ‘emotion and cognition co-produce beliefs’ (Mercer, 2010: 5).

If we accept the argument that emotion – like language – is a constitutive element of international politics, then we are able to re-examine the assumptions which underpin our interactions with others in situations of conflict. The social and intersubjective ontology underpinning critical theories (broadly understood here to include critical constructivism, Habermasian critical theory, and hermeneutics) shifts our focus away from maximizing utility and rational self-interest towards the constitutive role of language, desires, and beliefs. If political conflicts are underpinned by emotional dimensions then an inability to understand others’ feelings is likely to be a dynamic which contributes towards perpetuating mistrust and conflict.

Making a decision to trust is not simply based on a rational assessment of the evidence – actors may decide to trust others against the odds for reasons that can only be explained by accessing the emotions which underpin this decision. Conversely, actors may also find it hard to trust despite the presence of relevant material evidence because of the strength of the conviction with which particular emotional beliefs are held (Mercer, 2010: 9). Research in psychology has demonstrated that there is a correlation between moral convictions and strong emotions associated with particular policy preferences (Skitka and Wisneski, 2011). Trust and empathy may be predispositions, but they are also decisions, emotional beliefs, and responses which may shift over time and are embedded in cultural, historical, and interpersonal narratives and relationships.

Given the supposition that emotions and concomitant beliefs are not static but dynamic processes, it is incumbent on us to explore where the potential for transformation lies. There are at least two potential sources of change: (1) new evidence, and (2) empathy. The effect of new evidence on beliefs draws on the rationalist position that actors will update their beliefs and interests as a result of new information (Grobe, 2010; Kydd, 2005; Mercer, 2010). However, if evidence is processed through the interpretive lens of particular theories, beliefs, or normative expectations, then the outcome is likely to be somewhat different than that posited by rationalists. Moreover, it is difficult to explain different conclusions based on the same evidence if the role that emotions play in framing our interpretations is not
considered. Mercer illustrates this by indicating the different American and Israeli intelligence estimates conducted in 2006 as to when Iran might acquire nuclear weapons. The Israelis believed it could take Iran two years, while the Americans expected it to take five to ten years. Both groups undertook the analysis on the basis of the same evidence and knowledge and in close consultation with each other: ‘Different conclusions based on the same evidence are irrational only if one believes in a naïve accommodation of beliefs to evidence … The Israelis and the Americans felt the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran differently and these different feelings were part of their assessments’ (Mercer, 2010: 19).

Being able to understand the role that emotional beliefs may play in the construction of trust, mistrust, vulnerability, insecurity, or threat relies on being able to exercise empathy. The necessity for the recognition of empathy emerges in various strands of political theory and International Relations including, deliberative democracy and communicative action (Crawford, 2010; Dews, 1992; Morrell, 2010), conflict resolution (Broome, 1993; Halpern and Weinstein, 2004; Rothman, 1992), psychological approaches to foreign policy analysis (Jervis, 1970, 1976; Jervis, Lebow and Stein, 1985; White, 1991), and political judgement (Arendt, 1965, 2006; Solomon, 1988). While trust, empathy, and dialogue have received increasing interdisciplinary attention as individual concepts, they should not be examined in isolation. Instead, they should be conceived of both theoretically and empirically as relational and dynamic concepts. Support for such an argument is implicit in Lebow’s assertion that

the world’s greatest philosophical and religious traditions emphasize the role of emotions, not just of reason, in bringing about the fundamental disposition to cooperate. Affection builds empathy, which allows us to perceive ourselves through the eyes of others. Empathy in turn encourages us to see others as our ontological equals and to recognize the self-actualizing benefits of close relationships with others. From Socrates to Gadamer, philosophers have also argued that dialogue has the potential to make us recognize the parochial and limited nature of our understandings of justice (Lebow, 2005: 42).

A multitude of meanings have been ascribed to empathy, not all of which clearly map onto each other. The most common distinction is that drawn between cognitive and affective empathy (Rothman, 1992: 61–62). While not easily disentangled, the latter, often conflated with sympathy, usually refers to shared feeling with another, such as pain or suffering (Decety and Ickes, 2009; Morrell, 2010). Cognitive empathy, in contrast, tends to refer to the cognitive projection of oneself into the shoes of another, while maintaining a clear differentiation between self and other.

Cognitive empathy places emphasis on the actor’s ability to understand the perspective and emotions of the other, without necessarily having to share those
Trust, Empathy, and Dialogue

feelings (see White, 1991: 292). This raises the pertinent issue of ‘moral neutrality’ (Hollan, 2012: 71). Unlike sympathy, which requires an element of concern or care for the other, empathy does not necessarily imply altruistic or compassionate action; empathy may be used to hurt or humiliate another actor, reinforcing reasons for mistrust. Similarly, it requires an ability to tolerate the emotional and moral ambivalence to which exercising empathy may give rise (Halpern and Weinstein, 2004). While this separation characterises much of the literature, maintaining a strong division between cognitive and affective empathy fails to fully integrate the role of emotions and to acknowledge the constitutive force of cognition and emotion. Thus, cognitive empathy is not a process devoid of emotions despite its representation at times as a rational and intellectual process within a tradition that has long separated reason and emotion. Emotions are relevant to both cognitive and affective empathy. Crucially, what the distinction serves to highlight is the indeterminacy of empathy and the role that emotions can play in shaping motives and intentions.

Missing from many accounts of empathy is a sense of the temporal dimension of empathy. In other words, while empathy frequently focuses directly on the encounter, this misses a broader social, biological, and political context for the prior possibility of empathy, as well as the changing dynamics of empathy before, during, and after communicative encounters. A consideration of ‘time’ and its treatment across negotiating processes in international politics has important implications. Most obviously, negotiations take time and are part of an iterative process which is affected by the cognitive and emotional interpretation of what has gone before. The time-bounded nature common to negotiations also has implications for the potential for trust and empathy to emerge. A temporal dimension to empathy reflects the idea that ‘human beings think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices according to narrative structures’ (Sarbin, 1986, cited in Hammack and Pilecki, 2012: 76). Placing the interconnected concepts of trust, empathy, and dialogue within a framework of historical narratives also serves to acknowledge that the cognitive and emotional components of these concepts also have a narrative form: our relationships to objects, people, and beliefs are developed over time (see Nussbaum, 2001: 2–3).

In addition to the absence of an explicit temporal dimension is the lack of a clear set of processes through which empathy may occur which integrate both affective and cognitive mechanisms. Acknowledging the need for a model of empathy which embraces its complexity and does not offer a reductionist account, Mark H. Davis has argued for a multidimensional approach. Instead of defining empathy ‘solely as affective responses or cognitive reactions, the multidimensional approach recognizes that affect and cognition are intertwined in empathy’ (Morrell, 2010: 55). The resulting model of empathy seeks to articulate a conception of empathy that speaks across the various disciplines in which it plays a role and embraces a range of
components ascribed to empathy. What emerges out of Davis’s model is awareness of empathy as a process rather than an emotion in and of itself. There is, Michael Morrell argues, ‘no “empathy” that we feel; instead, empathy is a process through which others’ emotional states or situations have an affect upon us’ (2010: 62). Recognising empathy as a process pays attention to the antecedents, process, and outcomes of empathy through which transformation of relationships can emerge (Morrell, 2010: 55–62; see also Cameron, 2012a, 2011). These characteristics are picked up and developed further by Lynne Cameron’s empathy model (Figure 16.1) in ways which contribute to a dynamic and relational understanding of trust, empathy and dialogue.

Cameron’s model recognises that empathy ‘appears to have been studied both as something that occurs in talk and as something that emerges from talk’, thus acknowledging the close relationship between empathy and communicative practices. She rightly suggests that ‘an appropriate descriptive model will be dynamic, i.e. will characterize empathy through multiple processes operating at, and interacting across, different levels and timescales’ (2011: 2).

Furthermore, Cameron not only pays attention to those mechanisms which enable or facilitate empathy, but also to those which may serve to block empathy (2012b). This addresses a key concern for scholars of IR whereby a central focus on the causes of war require a sensitivity to those contextual factors which enable and prevent, perpetuate, end, or transform conflict. Emotional beliefs form one potential block to exercising empathy. Addressing the issue of multiple levels of analysis, emotional beliefs embrace a range of related factors which may be analytically

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**Figure 16.1.** Cameron, ‘Multi-level dynamic model of empathy’ (2012).
distinguished, such as specific socio-cultural factors including individual and collective identity, traumatic memories (Bell, 2006; Fattah and Pierke, 2009) and historical narratives (Hammack and Pilecki, 2012; Monroe, 2002). Other blocks to empathy encompass personal predispositions or an individual capacity to exercise empathy both in particular contexts and over a period of time, as well as the kind of communicative practices adopted when engaging in dialogue. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, careful empirical work on particular cases is required to establish contextual factors which act to block empathy and to differentiate between cases where empathy and dialogue can work to build trust and where it may be too risky or costly for actors to make themselves vulnerable.

COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS: CLOSING THE CIRCLE

From a normative perspective, dialogue invites an equality of trust and respect. Such qualities – to which we may add empathy – require more fostering and preparation in contexts of conflict and crisis than others. Protracted conflict casts the long shadow of past experience and memory for all parties which cannot be ignored if the qualities of trust and empathy are to be nurtured within dialogue. Similarly, proponents of dialogue and participants need to be aware of the inequalities which frequently structure dialogic encounters at the international level if they wish to contribute to a sustainable transformation of conflict. At such times, the need for ‘legitimate dialogue’ is more urgent than ever. What characterises such dialogue, and the role that argument, persuasion, and legitimacy play in international politics has been a subject of increasing concern among IR scholars (Bjola, 2009; Crawford, 2002, 2010; Head, 2012; Hurrelmann et al., 2007; Hutchings, 2005; Linklater, 1998, 2005; Risse, 2000); many of whom have turned to the work of Jürgen Habermas on communication.

Habermas’s concern with emancipation through communicative rationality equips us with a set of sophisticated conceptual tools with which to cast a critical and reflexive eye on the procedures, institutions, and interactions which sustain, shape, and constrain interactions in international politics. Communicative ethics offers both an ‘instrument of criticism’ of unjustifiable limitations of the rights and opportunities of discourse-partners and a normative guide ‘as a way of defining an ideal which can be approached through practice and organizational arrangements’ (Alexy, 1989: 194; Eckersley, 2004; Head, 2012). Practical political dialogue in international politics takes place under a variety of conditions and constraints. Interpreting Habermas’s model of discourse as a principle of legitimacy rather than a concrete institutional design secures a critical ability to identify different forms of constraints on practical discourse, such as exclusion or coercion, and subsequently offers access to a powerful account of legitimacy relevant to a focus on conflict transformation (Head, 2012).
While Habermas’s account is not sufficiently sensitive to the workings of trust and empathy, it is nonetheless appropriate to focus on discourse ethics to articulate an alternative conception of communicative practices for two reasons. First, although the charge has been levelled that Habermas’s conception of rational argument and reason falls foul of the dichotomy between reason and emotion, discourse ethics nonetheless ascribes an important role to empathy through the requirement of perspective-taking. Second, the significance of the critical leverage secured by his work in relation to decisions to use coercion or force in international politics ensures that we cannot simply dismiss discourse ethics despite its limitations (see Bjola, 2009; Eckersley, 2004; Head, 2012; Linklater 1998, 2005). It is appropriate, therefore, to establish both a critique of Habermas’s position regarding empathy in moral discourse and to offer an alternative conception of communicative ethics which places a stronger recognition of the relational nature of trust, dialogue, and empathy at its core. While the multidisciplinary literature on empathy assumes communication is necessary, it does not tend to theorise what such communication (or its distortion) might look like. With few exceptions, little attention is paid to the kinds of communicative practices through which empathy may be enabled or blocked (Burton, 1969; Cameron, 2010, 2012b; Crawford, 2010; Head, 2012).

The link between trust and communicative action draws on the validity claims integral to Habermas’s theory. These include the speaker’s sincerity, the factual accuracy of the claim, its comprehensibility, and the normative appropriateness of particular communicative interactions. Habermas argues that speakers implicitly make these claims whenever they engage in dialogue and that they can be justified if necessary. Illustrative of the relationship between trust and communication, Harald Müller has argued that ‘when there are doubts about sincerity, communicative action becomes impossible. From this point of view every breach of a promise, however strategically trivial, places in question the kind of action that has been chosen’ (Müller, 2001: 169). Thus, the capacity to interrogate communicative practices contributes to the kind of reflexivity which may facilitate transforming hostile relationships. Reflecting on the validity claims integral to communicative action poses a dilemma of interpretation as actors have to decide how to interpret the actions, intentions, and statements of others under the precondition of uncertainty. The perceived presence or absence of sincerity/honesty will impact the way in which actors interpret and respond to others. In a similar vein, so will an intention or decision to exercise empathy. This critical interrogation of communicative practices is an element rarely integrated with the concerns of security dilemma theorists in IR who focus on concepts of costly signalling and the (mis)perceptions attached to sending and receiving signals (Booth and Wheeler 2008; Glaser, 2010; Jervis, 1970, 1976; Kydd, 2005).

The second element of Habermas’s theory of communicative action which is of central concern is empathy. The form of empathy which has a central role
in Habermas’s discourse ethics is intended to support and enable the cognitive activity of ideal role-taking, thus building on the aforementioned distinction between cognition and emotion. Habermas ‘builds the moment of empathy into the procedure of coming to a reasoned agreement: each must put him- or herself into the place of everyone else in discussing whether a proposed norm is fair to all’ (Habermas, 1990: viii–ix; 1993: 174). Habermas acknowledges that

\[\text{empathy, … the capacity to transport oneself by means of feeling across cultural distance into alien and prima facie incomprehensible life conditions, patterns of reaction, and interpretive perspectives – is an emotional precondition for the ideal taking over of roles, which requires each person to adopt the standpoint of all the others (Habermas in Dews, 1992: 269).}\]

The imagining of the other’s reasons necessary for ideal role-taking, is not, as Crawford notes, the same as actually listening and understanding the feelings and views of others (2010: 31). It does not, she argues, pay sufficient attention to the non-cognitive reasons that people may have for holding or rejecting beliefs which are co-constituted by cognition and emotion (2010: 32). Feelings and desires can, for Habermas, achieve ‘“intersubjective transparency”, but they cannot reach the same level of intersubjective recognition of validity as descriptive or normative expressions’ (Morrell, 2010: 80), and so are subordinate to cognitive reasons in discourse ethics. In other words, emotions belong to our subjective experiences and cannot achieve universal validity on the basis of communicative rationality.

Recalling the earlier discussion on empathy, Habermas blurs somewhat the distinction between cognitive and affective empathy. By recognising that the cognitive requirements of perspective-taking call for a sense of concern for the other, he brings in the role of emotions. Habermas’s cognitive empathy occupies a rather more normative position than that of many in IR because it implies an intention not to harm the other that is missing in more rationalist accounts. Habermas also draws our attention to an important factor in thinking about the role of empathy for conflict transformation. Recognising that ‘one’s neighbor’ is frequently not close by raises questions regarding the capacity for empathy to be exercised across space and time. It is commonly acknowledged that empathy tends to be more accessible when the objects of our attention can be easily identified with in terms of language, culture, social norms, class, gender, nationality, or race. The obstacles imposed by spatial distance, time, and lack of familiarity or identification have widely been recognised as blocks to empathy (Cameron, 2012b; Frevert, 2011: 185–192).

While Habermas’s concept of justice implies that moral motivation is drawn from reason rather than from moral feelings, he nevertheless acknowledges the role of moral feelings in constituting moral phenomena as ‘feelings provide the basis for our perception of something as a moral issue’ (Dews, 1992: 251). However,
he maintains that emotions ‘cannot be the final reference point for judging the phenomena they bring to light’ (Habermas, 1993: 174). Habermas’s position remains insufficient to account for the degree to which emotions not only provide the basis for our perception of something as a moral issue, but also influence our judgement, constitute non-cognitive claims in arguments, and consequently shape our decisions.

Crawford has argued for additional validity claims to those established by Habermas of ‘empathy’, ‘perspective-taking’, and ‘emotional truthfulness’ which would ‘require actors to examine the role that their feelings play in their judgements. Fear and a drive for invulnerability, for example, may be the paramount motivation for behaviour’ (2010: 42). Moreover, acknowledging the emotional content of speech would broaden the kinds of speech which could be taken seriously in a deliberative context and would represent a shift away from the privileging of cognition or ‘rational’ speech. These additional validity claims complement the broader understanding of empathy encompassed by Cameron’s discourse dynamics of empathy. While Crawford articulates more stringent normative conditions or capacities for a communicative ethics, Cameron’s model allows this process of raising validity claims to be traced through actual dialogue taking place moment by moment. Although coming from different disciplinary backgrounds and adopting different orientations to analysing practice, they embody similar positions with regard to a commitment to draw together the theory and practice of empathic relations.

A concept of empathy which resonates with critical theoretical concerns should be understood as a complex social, political, and temporal process. Communicative practices which pay little regard for levels of inclusion, the presence of coercion, the recognition of different groups within society, or a plurality of perspectives, all derive from and result in various forms of social, political, or linguistic harm which impede the transformation of conflicted relationships towards cooperative relationships and block the building of trust.

THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM: CRYING OUT FOR TRUST, EMPATHY, AND DIALOGUE?

‘[T]he foundation of this matter is trust. We don’t trust Europe, and Europe doesn’t trust us. In the process of negotiating and working with Europe, we are seeking to build a foundation of trust’ (Mohammadi, citing Rowhani, 2005).

The framing of Iran’s nuclear program by one of Iran’s leading nuclear negotiators, Hassan Rowhani, as a dilemma of trust which pervades diplomatic and political interaction highlights the central argument that theorising conflict transformation in the international sphere requires a theoretical account of trust, dialogue, and empathy. This is echoed by Indonesia’s statement in the Security Council in March 2008, which draws attention to the use of coercion in contemporary communicative
practices and the need for greater reflexivity in order to build trust: ‘We need to pose the question whether imposing more sanctions is the most sensible course of action to instill confidence and trust’ (UN, S/PV.5848: 11).

Following the collapse of negotiations which took place between Iran and the EU3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) from 2003 to 2006, the effect of referring Iran to the Security Council in July 2006 has been to deepen the levels of mistrust between Iran and members of the Council and to reduce the likelihood of a cooperative solution to the nuclear problem. In addition to a range of bilateral and unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran by UN member states, the adoption of four Security Council resolutions (2006–2012) imposing sanctions against Iran represents a historically unprecedented application of the Council’s enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This coercive approach by the Council has had the effect of placing the burden on Iran to demonstrate its trustworthiness. On this reading, Iran can only achieve the Security Council’s trust in its peaceful nuclear intentions if it satisfies a series of conditions (including the indefinite suspension of enrichment activities) that are perceived by the Council as establishing its bona fides. Although the imposition of sanctions against Iran has been strongly supported by the Council, a close reading of the arguments offered by some Council members (for example, India, Turkey, Brazil, Qatar, and Indonesia) question the efficacy of a coercive approach in achieving Iran’s cooperation over the nuclear issue (S/PV.5984; S/PV.5807; S/PV.6335). The ambassadorial statements of these member states suggests that alternative approaches to sanctions for building trust between Iran and the Council are strongly needed to effectively address the challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The strong belief that Iran is inherently untrustworthy and intent on developing a nuclear weapons capability guides and shapes the response of the international community. This belief of untrustworthiness rests however, on states’ selection and interpretation of the evidence gathered through national intelligence and International Atomic Energy Agency inspections; on the belief based on past experience and interactions that the Iranian leadership cannot be trusted; on the dominant historical and emotional narratives in the United States regarding its long-standing relationship with Iran; on the appropriation and use of traumatic memory to frame this relationship, and on the feelings of foreign policy elites of vulnerability or fear of a nuclear-armed Iran. States remain inclined to distrust Iran; the language and rhetoric of deception runs through much of American political commentary despite the conclusion of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimates

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1 This formulation of the problem posed by the question of trust in relation to Iran was developed collaboratively by the author and Nicholas J. Wheeler and formed part of a joint research project on negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
in 2007 and 2011 which reported with ‘high confidence’ that Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003 (NIE, 2007, 2011). The highly anticipated IAEA report of November 2011 indicated that Iran had halted weaponisation activities in 2003 and that, while it is likely to be seeking nuclear latency, Iran does not have an active nuclear weapons program (IAEA, GOV/2011/65). Despite these findings, the IAEA report has repeatedly been used as evidence of new and incriminating evidence against Iran by those who believe that Iran is indeed intent on developing a nuclear weapon. Such beliefs in the face of credible empirical counter-evidence lend force to the notion of the influence of emotional beliefs on policy.

To return to the possibilities presented, respectively, by new evidence and empathy for the transformation of conflict, if the U.S. government feels that the Iranian leadership is untrustworthy, then it is likely to change its belief only if either strong new evidence comes to light that reduces the degree of uncertainty over Iran’s intentions (and even this may be disregarded if it challenges existing strong beliefs as already demonstrated), or if it re-reads the historical record, examines its own interactions with Iran through taking the perspective of the other and imagine how it might perceive matters if it were in Iran’s shoes. Such perspective-taking – one mechanism through which empathy can be exercised – may serve to cast in a different light both its own actions and those of Iran. In turn, this might – there is no guarantee – shift the predisposition not to trust Iran, potentially opening alternative paths of engagement and the possibility of developing a trusting relationship. The concrete actions that are necessary to realize alternatives to the coercive approach adopted by the Council depend on empathy and dialogue. Empathy enables conflict to be re-described in ways which transform actors’ understanding of their own and each others’ positions (Broome, 1993; Halpern and Weinstein, 2004; Rothman, 1992) and responds to the call issued by John Tirman for a ‘new process to cope specifically with the emotional content of a bad relationship’ (2009: 528). Seen in this light, the communicative practices adopted by the Council have failed to recognise the problem of the historically selective application of its own standards in Iran’s eyes (e.g., the reluctance to condemn Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran war, the Council’s silence on the Israeli nuclear weapons program, and the failure of the nuclear weapons states to act on the disarmament obligations contained within the Non-Proliferation Treaty), leading to distortion and misperceptions of the motives and statements of each side.

Focusing on communicative practices in the context of trust and empathy highlights several important issues. Considering the example of finding out that someone has lied casts the relationships between trust, empathy, and dialogue in an illustrative light. In Habermasian terms, the validity claim of sincerity is contested by this communicative act. Consider, however, the effects of a lie on the interpersonal relations between the liar and the one lied to. The emotions of the latter (anger,
betrayal, hurt) are less likely to incline them to trust the other person again in the near future, particularly if there is no gesture or evidence to indicate that person’s ongoing trustworthiness or repentance. The exercise of empathy by both parties might transform a potentially mistrusting relationship by recognising, on the one hand, that there might have been understandable reasons for the person to lie, and, on the other hand, the liar’s recognition that his/her own trustworthiness may have been questioned and to act accordingly. Without entering into their respective narratives in detail here, both Iranian and Western political elites feel that they have been deceived over a long period of time and this motivates at least some of their actions with regards to the nuclear issue (Mousavian, 2012). While empathy in no way determines change, it opens the possibilities for it, thus permitting both parties to act in ways which might mitigate the effects of the deception. Empathy offers us a chance to get inside the mind of both sides and to understand why it is that they interpret the situation as they do.

A preliminary examination of the communicative practices of states in relevant transcripts of Security Council meetings demonstrates that member states frequently position themselves in a number of ways which serve to construct notions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ in relation to belonging and legitimate behaviour within the ‘international community’. It is not unreasonable to suggest that this impacts the potential for building trust and empathy. Moreover, the P5 have demonstrated little willingness to consider Iran’s historical narrative, to engage in perspective taking, or to reflect upon perceptions of their own behaviour. For example, Iran’s representative in the Council stated that:

The people of Iran will never forget the inaction of the Security Council with regard to Saddam Hussein’s attack against Iran on 22 September 1980, the invasion that resulted in an eight-year-long war waged against Iran, with unspeakable suffering and losses for our nation. That act of aggression did not trouble the same permanent members of the Council who have sought the adoption of the resolution against Iran today, nor did they consider it a threat against international peace and security (S/PV.5848: 6).

Similarly, Iran declared:

In the early 1950s, the United Kingdom was arguing exactly the same way as today, saying that “nationalization of Iran’s oil industry is putting in danger the peace and security of the region and the world”. Just replace the phrase “oil nationalization” from accusations against Iran at that time with today’s phrase “nuclear activities” and the result will be quite workable statements for diplomats who are repeating history (S/PV.6335: 15).

In response, the UK representative declared that the Permanent Representative of Iran’s ‘distorted account of history – including personal attacks on my country – simply
demean him and seem designed as an excuse for Iran not to respond to international concerns about its nuclear programme’ (S/PV.6335: 17). Such language resonates with emotion and seeks to construct the other as ‘unreasonable’ and thus as acting in ways which leave little room for alternative paths of action other than increasing levels of coercion and mistrust (see S/PV.5848, 3 March 2008; S/PV.6335, 9 June 2010).

Communicative ethics draws attention to a set of procedural reflections for constructing future rounds of negotiations (Head, 2012). First, the legitimacy of preconditions set before parties sit down together at the negotiating table may be called into question. Pre-conditions have frequently characterised the negotiations between Iran and the West since 2003 when the EU3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) required Iran to suspend all enrichment activities. Suspension prior to negotiations has remained a key requirement and it is a requirement the Iranians have consistently rejected from 2005 onwards when they restarted enrichment activities after a two-year suspension during negotiations. Preconditions raise questions concerning procedural fairness as a characteristic of negotiations. Is it fair and legitimate to require a substantive commitment only from one side prior to sitting down to talk? For the Iranian negotiators and political elite, this conveys a failure to show mutual respect and to accord them the dignity of an equal negotiating partner. The Iranian refusal to continue suspension raised levels of mistrust regarding Iran’s future intentions for its nuclear program, while the insistence on suspension as a precondition raised Iranian levels of mistrust regarding the negotiating intentions of the West. Moreover, and crucially for a focus on emotions and empathy, the Iranian rejection of these preconditions can be explained not, as many in the West assume, because they necessarily intend to develop a nuclear weapon, but because they refuse to make themselves vulnerable by acceding to demands they perceive to be harmful to their sense of security, pride, and cultural and national identities.

Communicative ethics raises questions of coercion which encompass not just structural violence, but also the procedural parameters established for negotiations such as agenda-setting, control over time, place, and, of course, the use of the threat of force (Head, 2012). While preconditions represent a form of coercion, the Iranian nuclear program has also been the target of more conventional forms of coercion: the use of sanctions, cyberstrikes (Sanger, 2012), covert operations, and the threat of military force. Notwithstanding that the effectiveness of these tactics in terms of Iran’s capabilities remains the subject of much contemporary debate, less attention is paid to the impact they have had on the perceived legitimacy of the negotiations in Iranian eyes. A successful negotiating process needs to acknowledge and address these issues both on a procedural and emotional level.
It has been argued that the reflexive capacities of dialogue, empathy, and trust can act as transitional processes through which relationships and interaction may be transformed. Intentions, behaviour, reasons, and emotions are frequently – although not exclusively – expressed communicatively by actors within contexts of conflict. How such signals should be interpreted requires explicit consideration of the cognitive and emotional elements involved within these different forms of communication and, importantly, where their capacity to effect changes lies. Moreover, a reflective stance invites engagement with a number of perspectives and actors and bolsters the call for greater acknowledgement within negotiating processes of the contested historical and emotional narratives which shape conflicts. Jay Rothman has noted that the question of how to move from an adversarial approach to an integrative problem solving approach, ‘in terms of how such a transition is effected and how it is understood, is probably one of the least articulated and most important aspects of the entire enterprise of conflict resolution and creative problem solving’ (1992: 58). It is the means by which relationships may be transformed that Rothman is drawing our attention to and which deserve greater attention.

It has long been recognised in alternative dispute resolution that people ‘are not motivated by facts: they are motivated by their perceptions of the facts, their interpretations of the facts, their feelings about the facts’ (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005: 290); this resonates with the notion of ‘emotional beliefs’ as a significant factor shaping conflict in international politics. Recognising the role of emotions raises a correlate requirement for considering the nature and scope of trust, empathy, and dialogue as intervening factors in conflict and as potential vehicles for change and transformation. Notwithstanding the commonly heard claim that the international realm is qualitatively different from the domestic, bringing together interdisciplinary research on empathy offers additional tools for understanding these concepts within the context of international politics and opens hitherto underexplored avenues for investigation. The relational approach of trust, empathy, and dialogue is not limited to the international sphere, but feeds into political practices and relationships at all levels. Indeed, its ability to embrace multiple levels of analysis challenges the hierarchy of the domestic/international distinction. However, while conflicts occur at the level of international politics as in the case of Iran, then this remains a key site for transformation.

A brief exploration of the challenges posed by the Iranian nuclear negotiations has indicated pathways for exploring the connections between trust, empathy, and dialogue and raises questions which must be at the heart of further research. The challenges posed are considerable and include: integrating multiple levels of
analysis; the complexity of building trust and empathy between states affected by a range of domestic and external constraints; navigating multiple social identities; and the difficulties of identifying and attributing causal impact to emotions in multiple actors. Notwithstanding these challenges, arguing that trust, empathy, and dialogue should be considered as relational and dynamic concepts – both theoretically and empirically – ensures a nuanced and comprehensive approach to interrogating practice.

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The Role of Emotions in Foreign Policy Decision Making

Embarrassment from the Bay of Pigs

Assia Alexieva

The unsuccessful attempt on behalf of the United States to foment rebellion and overthrow the Castro regime through the training and secret landing of 1,400 exiles on Cuban soil caused considerable trouble for the Kennedy administration in its first months in office. Not only was the invasion crushed by Castro's militias, but also 1,189 invaders were taken prisoner, 4 American pilots were killed in battle, and U.S. complicity in the operation became apparent, thus producing uproar at the United Nations, both domestically and regionally. Feelings carried over from the Bay of Pigs affair are believed to have affected Kennedy and others in the subsequent Cuban missile crisis and in dealing with the situation in Berlin, Laos, and Vietnam.

This chapter presents an emotional interpretation of the Bay of Pigs episode, aimed at identifying the overarching emotion that reigned among the U.S. decision makers, determining its constituent elements, and delineating typical policy responses. In so doing, concepts, systems, and relationships have been borrowed from other social sciences that have studied emotions at the individual level, and have been transposed to the state level. The “affective mapping” method has been developed, portraying the Kennedy administration’s emotional state as a series of sequences composed of three elements – a current situation, momentary feelings, and policy – all linked in a relationship of causality, complementarity, or modality. The method is applied in three stages: (1) data construction, including textual analysis, sequencing, and grounded coding of mostly primary material; (2) data analysis, involving drawing snapshot emotional maps and zooming into some of their structures; and (3) hypothesis generation and testing, consisting of clustering, labeling and macro mapping.

1 The affective mapping method is based on the assumption that three loci of state emotions exist – the decision-makers, the broader elite (e.g., congressmen, columnists, informed public), and the mass public – and that any of these three groups of actors is capable of feeling on behalf of the state. While this chapter presents the analysis of the decision-makers only, similar analysis has been conducted and affective maps drawn for the U.S. elite too.
Drawing from the qualitative database constructed in stage 1, this chapter presents the three snapshot maps that have been drawn on the feelings, related contextual circumstances, and subsequent policy responses of the American decision-makers in the three phases in which the Bay of Pigs episode has been divided: (1) the immediate phase covers the first week following the failed invasion; (2) the soon after phase encompasses the next 2–4 weeks; and (3) the medium/long-term phase captures relevant repercussions six months to a year later.

A hypothesis is then generated, arguing that the American decision-makers experienced embarrassment as a result of the Bay of Pigs. It is tested by means of identifying clusters of feelings representative of four elements considered characteristic of embarrassment: (1) the occurrence of an incident, (2) apprehension of social judgment, (3) image discrepancy, and (4) recuperation. A macro affective map is ultimately produced, revealing the building blocks of embarrassment in international relations and the major policy trends that this emotion induces.

**IMMEDIATE PHASE (APRIL 19–25, 1961)**

As illustrated in Figure 10.1, shock was the first reaction of John F. Kennedy and his advisors to the outright failure of the operation, their mistaken judgment, and Castro’s crushing defeat of the exiles. As the President’s Special Advisor Arthur Schlesinger recalls, “everyone was in a state of denial or shock” in the first hours following the tragic developments.³ The President’s advisors were “absolutely numb,”³ while the President was “quite shattered” and “suffering an acute shock.”⁴ As demonstrated in Figure 10.1, the decision-makers’ astonishment is the direct result of their

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unambiguous view of the ill-starred operation as a *failure, a mistake, and a defeat*. According to Bowles, the President’s shock came from the fact that, after a flawless career as senator and presidential candidate, his judgment had been mistaken for the first time. Arthur Schlesinger relates his own shock to the realization of “how dismal things were,” whereas Walt Rostow’s bewilderment arose from his disbelief at the unreasonable nature of the operation.

The avoidance of aggression is an interesting policy outcome of experiencing shock. It is partially related to the accompanying fear of damaged reputation that some decision-makers experienced as a result of projecting the negative consequences of a forceful action by a nation of 180 million upon an island of 6 million, and in violation of all possible treaty obligations. Both Bowles and Schlesinger pleaded for a policy of restraint that would “reassure the democratic world about the prudence of Washington” and avoid sympathy for Castro “in his David and Goliath struggle.”

The differentiation of reputation from prestige should be stressed here, with reputation referring to the country’s norms image (i.e., attempts not to appear “rigid and warlike”) and prestige standing for its power image (i.e., “not to appear weak or irresolute”).

Apart from these reputational considerations, it is believed that this policy behavior is not so much avoidance of aggression as it is avoidance of another wrong move and another failure which might disprove the claim that the Bay of Pigs has been an aberration. In this regard, two additional reactions are worth noting: (1) the widespread belief among members of the administration that the inflicted damage is repairable, and (2) the existence of an identifiable culprit on whom the blame for any miscalculation and incompetence can be attributed. In referring to the perceived loss of U.S. prestige as a result of the Cuban fiasco, Arthur Schlesinger remembers the President as saying: “I have been close enough to disaster to realize that these things which seem world-shaking at one moment you can barely remember the next.” He also recalls him predicting that the administration “will be kicked in the can for the next couple of weeks,” but that it will not “affect the main business.”

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5 FRUS, Doc 158.
8 Bowles quoted in FRUS, Doc 166, Notes on the 478th Meeting of the National Security Council, April 22, 1961; similar statements also were made in FRUS, Doc 158; Schlesinger, Arthur. *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (London: André Deutsch Ltd., 1965), 260.
10 Bowles quoted in FRUS, Doc 166.
John F. Kennedy also seems clear as to the cause of the failure: the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which he characterized as “the soft spots in his administration.”

In other words, whereas the U.S. decision-makers undeniably report finding themselves in a terrible situation, they also consider the hindrances arising from the situation as entirely surmountable. Figure 10.2 illuminates this point by adding the feelings of hope and optimism to the emotional structure, thus underlining the widespread perception of the failed attempt as a rare happening, a one-time event that will never repeat itself. This conviction is reinforced by the President’s frequent allusion to the lessons learned from “this sobering episode.” The lessons, together with the administration’s perceived capacity to detect the causes of failure and to fix any deficiencies, have provoked feelings of hope and optimism about things turning out different next time around. “We got a big kick in the leg – and we deserved it,” said President Kennedy to his Special Assistant Arthur Schlesinger, “But maybe we’ll learn something from it.” His reasoning reveals a conviction that failure can happen to anyone; it only makes one wiser and contributes to eventual triumph.

Regardless of these optimistic notes on behalf of the President, the general feeling of defeat should not be understated. After anxiety about the future and shock from the recent events, feeling beaten down is the next most pronounced feeling among the U.S. decision-makers, as evidenced by their frequent references to being “knocked off one’s feet,” having gotten “a big kick in the leg,” having one’s “pride and confidence deeply wounded,” and having experienced “the worst day” of one’s life. In describing the atmosphere at the White House in the wake of the Cuban disaster, Arthur Schlesinger further recalls “a general sense of gloom”; Chester Bowles tells of a cabinet meeting as grim as any meeting he can remember in his

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14 Kennedy quoted in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 263. This general belief that the Bay of Pigs incident is not representative of overall U.S. performance transpires also in the speech of Adlai Stevenson, who noted that “the fortresses of tyranny may not fall at the first blow,” thus implying that it is only a matter of time and effort to have the Castro regime fall (Statement of April 20. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV May 8 (Washington, DC: United State Government Printing Office, 1961), 681–682.


16 Kennedy quoted in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 263. In an off-the-record press conference he further admits that “a failure hurts,” and portends many setbacks, but also expresses hope for many successes to come. The President then concludes: “All we can attempt to do is try, … and if we fail, then we are going to try again.”

17 FRUS, Doc 163, Memorandum from the Presidents’ Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy, April 21, 1961.

18 Kennedy quoted in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 263.

19 Bowles quoted in FRUS, Doc 166.

20 Allen Dulles quoted in Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 204.

experience in government; and Gen. Taylor reminisces about “a command post that had been overrun by the enemy” and an administration that is “learning the sting of defeat.”

Similar to feeling shocked, feeling beaten down is invoked by a perceived failure or mistake, as noted in Figure 10.2. In terms of policy, however, it does not necessarily preclude a belligerent move at a later stage. The immediate behavior typical of this feeling is to take a moment to reflect, learn, and recuperate (coded as Learn from one’s mistakes and Wait, cool down). As the Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs advised the President in a memorandum of April 21, “when you are in a fight and knocked off your feet, the most dangerous thing to do is to come out swinging wildly.” He and the Under Secretary of State Bowles provided similar advice on a couple of other occasions, and particularly that “now is the time to dance around until our heads clear. This is a time to pause and think.”

Such reasoning contrasts sharply with the policy behavior described in Figure 10.3, which is based on an entirely different mix of feelings: feeling threatened, determined, and afraid of losing prestige. Although President Kennedy noted that “a nation of Cuba’s size is less a threat to [U.S.] survival,” its potential role as a Soviet offensive air or missile base and a base for infiltration and subversion in the rest of Latin America has led some decision-makers to conclude that Cuba represents a considerable threat to national and regional security. These perceived threats have created a feeling of impending danger in Washington and have prompted a

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22 FRUS, Doc 158.
24 FRUS, Doc 163.
25 Rostow quoted in Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 289; FRUS, Doc 166.
26 Kennedy in Address Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 304–306.
27 FRUS, Doc 163; FRUS, Doc 172, Memorandum from the Presidents’ Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, April 24, 1961.
28 FRUS, Doc 171, Circular Telegram from the Department of State to All Posts in Latin America, April 23, 1961; Kennedy, “Address Before”; FRUS, Doc 163.
feeling of determination to “show one’s will . . . regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril.”

In terms of policy response, feeling threatened seems to prompt enthusiasm to work with others and organize a collective action, whereas feeling determined and afraid of losing prestige tends to generate a willingness to show resolve and resort to more aggressive policy, if necessary. Shortly after the tragic events at the Bay of Pigs, Secretary of Labor Goldberg hinted at the likelihood of such a forceful move, remarking that “if a great power plays its cards or gets into a game, it should go all the way.”

Driven by the mixture of these feelings, Robert Kennedy showed himself unwilling “just to sit and take it.” The Attorney General and some other members of the administration were concerned about the potential loss of U.S. prestige as a result of the fiasco. He was apprehensive of the United States coming out of the crisis “with her tail between her legs,” and fretted about the possibility of being “judged paper tigers in Moscow.” Whereas quite a few decision-makers observed the need to do something about the situation sooner rather than later, Robert Kennedy was

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31 Robert F. Kennedy in Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 289.
32 FRUS, Doc 157, Memorandum from the Attorney General (Kennedy) to President Kennedy, April 19, 1961.
33 Robert Kennedy in Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 289.
34 President Kennedy, Off-The-Record Press Conference, April 25, 1961 in Benson, Thomas W. Writing JFK: Presidential Rhetoric and the Press in the Bay of Pigs Crisis (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 85–99; FRUS, Doc 159, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer), April 20, 1961.
by far the most impatient actor, continuously stressing the need to act immediately and do “something forceful and determined.” The two undesirable but possible policy options he brought to the table included a military blockade of Cuba and the sending of U.S. troops, although no other policy actor matched the Attorney General’s zeal for action. Aware of the security threats posed by a Communist Cuba, both Secretary of Defense McNamara and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Rostow considered a blockade and an intervention possible but strictly conditional on an aggressive act on behalf of Castro (e.g., an attack on Guantanamo).

Last but not least comes the emotional structure centered around feeling anxious, frustrated, and ineffective, illustrated in Figure 10.4. Because all these feelings are related to the Kennedy administration’s perceived incapacity to achieve its objectives, this blend of feelings has led to calls for policy reorientation and the adoption of new methods aimed at tackling indirect aggression. It should be noted that anxiety is the most pronounced feeling among American decision-makers in the immediate phase of the Bay of Pigs debacle. Moreover, it is caused by a wide variety of factors, ranging from perceptions about the adversary (e.g., malevolent, playing dirty, stronger than expected) to appraisal of the strategic conditions for action (e.g., time pressure, no pretext) to assessment of the implications of failure (e.g., a dangerous situation, threat to national/regional security). For example, President Kennedy expressed intense concern about the insidious tactics used by the Soviet Union.

35 FRUS, Doc 157; see also FRUS Doc 166.
36 FRUS, Doc 157.
37 FRUS 163; FRUS 172.
(seen as the mastermind behind Communist strides to world domination) in picking off vulnerable areas through subversion and infiltration and exploiting the social structure of poorer societies in order to seize control.  

The perceived constraints to taking action, such as lack of a legal basis for intervention, time pressure related to the expected shipments of Soviet arms and aircraft to Cuba, and the increasingly entrenched position of Castro’s regime, have all been additional reasons for anxiety.  

Finally, anxiety coming from the looming threat of the defeat at the Bay of Pigs gradually gave way to anxiety about the longer term threats to U.S. and hemispheric security posed by a Communist Cuba. Khrushchev’s potential move in Berlin in the event of a U.S. intervention in Cuba has further alarmed U.S. decision-makers.  

Lastly, the U.S. setback in Cuba is seen by some decision-makers in the context of a series of setbacks experienced by the Kennedy administration in its first months in office, thus breeding feelings of frustration and ineffectiveness. As Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Rostow noted in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, “in two of our four areas where we inherited Communist enclaves of power . . . we have not done terribly well.” He further recalls in his oral history interview that throughout 1961 things seemed to be “sliding against” the administration: Congo was “a mess,” Indonesia seemed “ominous,” and difficult decisions were awaiting Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, and Berlin. These challenges to U.S. foreign policy not only produced frustration among the U.S. decision-makers, but also added to the administration’s fear of appearing weak and being “up against a game [it couldn’t] handle.”

Snapshot Map 10.1 presents a complete account of the perceptions, feelings, and actions discussed by the Kennedy administration in the first days following the unsuccessful invasion.

SOON AFTER PHASE (APRIL 26–MAY 15, 1961)

As evident from Snapshot Map 10.2, anxiety continues to dominate the decision-makers’ emotional spectrum in the first month after the unsuccessful operation at the Bay of Pigs. The initial shock, frustration, and feeling of having been beaten down have given way to feelings related to one’s safety, self-confidence, and sense of importance. Even though fear of losing prestige is still evident, it has gradually turned into a feeling of diminished admiration by others, mostly as a result

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40 FRUS, Doc 163; FRUS, Doc 157; Kennedy in Benson, Off-The-Record Conference, Writing JFK, 85–99.
41 Kennedy quoted in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 260.
42 FRUS, Doc 172.
43 Rostow, Oral History Interview, 49–51.
44 FRUS, Doc 172.
of a realization that prestige has already been lost to a great degree. As compared to the previous phase, the Kennedy administration demonstrates a clearer account of the detrimental consequences of its action in terms of image (looking imperialistic, hypocritical, stupid, or weak), reputation (loss of confidence/prestige), safety (strengthened adversary and deteriorated international security), and performance in the struggle against international Communism (a point for the enemy). Regardless of these downturns, the feelings of hope and optimism have persisted in the cabinet’s outlook for the future, and the regime’s overthrow has become the government’s primary objective regarding Cuba.

No change is observable in the way the government’s action and its implications are described. Regarding policy, calls to learn from one’s mistake have been replaced by appeals not to allow another mistake. Similarly, suggestions for an immediate action (unilateral, if necessary) have been substituted by proposals for collective action as a leading policy line. Finally, a few concrete policy instruments have taken shape, including development assistance, subversion (sabotage, guerrilla activities and in/exfiltration), and propaganda warfare. Military intervention has remained an undesirable but possible policy option.

Many of the factors that would normally trigger feelings of impending peril (a dangerous situation and a threat to regional security) have prompted a less intense feeling of anxiety. This downplaying of the threat posed by a Communist Cuba is mostly attributed to the cabinet’s awareness of Castro’s limited capacity to inflict direct damage on the United States. In a memorandum to the National Security Advisor, Richard Goodwin noted that Cuba did not represent a direct military menace in the Caribbean and that any military moves by Castro could be met immediately by U.S. forces.\footnote{FRUS, Doc 179, Memorandum from the President's Assistant Special Counsel to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Apr 26, 1961.}

From the point of view of the Kennedy administration, the bigger problem was not national but regional security, stemming from Castro’s capacity “to export revolution” and the growing Communist influence in the Americas. Similarly, Kennedy’s advisors saw the Soviet Union rather than Cuba as the nation’s major adversary, describing it as “an adversary of great power, of considerable and growing wealth, and remarkable propaganda skills,”\footnote{“The United States and Revolution,” Department of State Bulletin, 795–800.} which sought to “consolidate its territory” by riding the crest of the revolution and intimidating others into becoming the “pawns of an imperial power.”\footnote{“Urgent National Needs,” Special Message of the President to the Congress (May 25) in Department of State Bulletin, Jun 12, 1961.} Not surprisingly, the Kennedy administration felt anxious in the face of such an ambitious, rising power with a tendency to play dirty (see Figure 10.5).

As illustrated in Figure 10.5, feeling anxious and threatened go together with the usual feelings of determination and fear of losing prestige, which were already present
in the first days of the crisis. Whereas it was clear that the exiles’ defeat had gravely damaged U.S. prestige, Kennedy’s advisors were concerned about the possibility of a further drain of confidence in American leadership. “The world is now waiting to see what the United States will do,” cautioned Theodore Achilles. On the one hand, it was reasoned that a policy of restraint might be interpreted as evidence of weakness, thus tempting Khrushchev into another blow against American prestige in Laos. On the other hand, it was considered that a policy of resolve through the application of military force might have a similar effect if the administration embarked on such a course, and then, through the pressure of world opinion, was forced to abandon its action.

Moving to the feeling of determination, the cabinet’s post-Bay of Pigs Cuban policy seemed directed toward one and only goal: “weaken Castro,” “hurt Castro,” “eliminate the Castro regime in the immediate future.” In a special message to the U.S. Congress, the President expressed his resolve “not to leave an open road to despotism,” and declared that freedom would “survive and succeed” in 1961. On another occasion, John F. Kennedy admitted that he expected many setbacks.

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48 FRUS, Doc 182, Paper Prepared for the NSC by the Director of the Department of State Operations Center (Achilles), Apr 27.
50 FRUS, Doc 178, Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Apr 26, 1961.
51 Rusk in FRUS, Doc 194, Notes of the 483rd Meeting of the NSC, May 5, 1961; Doc 182; Johnson in FRUS, Doc 206.
52 President Kennedy in “Urgent National Needs,” Department of State Bulletin.
as well as successes in this “hard and difficult era of history,” but also articulated his firmness in meeting the U.S. responsibilities. As noted in Figure 10.5, expected difficulties is an element that feeds into the feeling of determination. It is also a factor that breeds hope, as revealed by the President’s reference to Francis Bacon in his closing remarks: “There is hope enough and to spare, not only to make a bold man try, but also to make a sober-minded and wise man believe.”

While Kennedy was more cautious in his vision for the future, the majority of his advisors were much bolder in conveying their optimism. Many of the memoranda that reached the President concluded that “the picture was not so dark,” that the repercussions for U.S. policy were “unlikely to be very prolonged or profound,” and that the fund of goodwill that the administration had built before the invasion was “by no means entirely destroyed.” As demonstrated in Figure 10.6, the widespread belief in the surmountability of any difficulties had persisted. Any loss of confidence was deemed recoverable, bureaucratic glitches repairable, and policy mistakes “forgivable as an aberration.”

In terms of behavior, two interrelated policy lines appeared as a result of feeling anxious and optimistic: wait, cool down and don’t allow another mistake. The former refers to calls from all sides of the administration to “go easy,” “not be in too much hurry,” “draw a deep breath” and take one’s time in undertaking all sorts of assessments, intelligence estimates, and studies before “an irrevocable choice” is made. The rationale behind such cautious policy behavior was to prove to the world

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53 Address in Chicago at a Dinner of the Democratic Party of Cook County, Public Papers of the Presidents, Doc 155, 339–342.
54 Ibid.
55 FRUS, Doc 202.
56 “Consequences for the United States of.”
57 FRUS, Doc 196, Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy, May 3.
58 Ibid.
59 Bowles in FRUS, Doc 206.
60 Secretary Rusk’s News Conference of May 4, Department of State Bulletin, 756–763.
61 FRUS, Doc 182; see also Doc 179 and Doc 184, Notes on the 479th Meeting of the NSC, Apr 27, 1961.
that Cuba was an aberration, an accident that spoke neither of the administration’s foreign policy direction nor of the nation’s capacity to fight Communism. Several administration officials admonished the President that his administration could not afford “any more mistakes,” “weakness, irresponsibility or failure.” Upon his return from a trip to Europe, Arthur Schlesinger issued a similar warning: “One more mistake like this, and you will really be through.” The government had to avoid another “ill-considered, poorly timed action” that could disrupt the Organization of American States (OAS), turn Latin America against the United States, weaken its position elsewhere, and even trigger a world war.

Several policy instruments came out of the decision-makers’ combined feeling of anxious, determined, and threatened: development assistance, subversion, propaganda, and regime change elsewhere (see Figure 10.5). Strengthening of the Alliance for Progress Program was the most proclaimed policy move as a way of preventing the further spread of Communism in Latin America. As the Dominican Republic and Haiti were considered the two countries most vulnerable to a Castro takeover, means of precipitating the fall of Trujillo and Duvalier were sketched out. Regarding Cuba, Castro’s regime was to be weakened through clandestine activities, among others, sabotage operations against selected industrial and communications targets, operations in support of guerrilla activities, in/exfiltration of personnel, and operations directed at defection of Castro officials. These were to be backed up by psychological and propaganda warfare aimed at destroying the popular image of Castro and refuting the notion that U.S. policy drove the Cuban leader into the arms of the Soviet Union.

A naval and air blockade and military intervention were the two policy options that were discarded by the majority of the decision-makers. Both the civil and army personnel were against the use of military means. Secretary of State Rusk reasoned that a blockade would be interpreted as an act of war, thus rejecting the option as “wholly impracticable.” Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze estimated that a blockade would not yield immediate results and would only exacerbate world opinion in the meantime. According to the JCS, a blockade only had to be instituted as complementary to a military invasion. The latter was recognized as “the only sure

62 FRUS, Doc 191, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) and the Direction of the Operations Center (Achilles), May 1, 1961; Achilles in FRUS, Doc 202.
63 FRUS, Doc 196.
64 FRUS, Doc 182.
65 FRUS, Doc 202, Doc 182, Doc 179, and President Kennedy in Doc 204.
67 FRUS, Doc 223; Doc 28, Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Political Warfare Subcommittee of the Cuban Task Force, May 8, 1961; Doc 202; Doc 182.
68 Rusk in FRUS, Doc 204.
69 Nitze in Ibid.
70 FRUS, Doc 178.
Emotions in Foreign Policy Decision Making

way of overthrowing Castro,” but was temporarily bracketed as contingent on Cuba becoming a direct military threat or committing aggression against a Latin American country. In a paper for the NSC, the Inter-Agency Task Force on Cuba reckoned that the costs of intervention would outweigh the advantages. Significant loss of life and civilian casualties might be expected, and the U.S. position of leadership in the Free World would be endangered.

Similar reputational considerations weighed heavily in the policy calculus. The United States was to avoid going against a small country like Cuba and appear like “a bully pushing . . . Castro around.” U.S. ambassadors were advised to beware of any “reckless statements” that may create the impression of the leader of the Free World being “a wobbly, uncertain, and vindictive power.” The government also had to draw the line on becoming involved in the affairs of another country. In other words, the U.S. policy of restraint was driven to a great extent by concern for preserving the country’s image as a non-imperialist, non-aggressive, anti-colonial power that observed treaties and respected the moral principles on which the international system was established. An internationalization of policy was therefore promoted, laying the ground for U.S. strategy toward Cuba at the United Nations, NATO, and among Latin American allies. While some covert activity was acceptable, the focus of U.S. policy had to be on isolating Castro diplomatically, strengthening the OAS, and leading propaganda warfare. Figure 10.7 presents this line of reasoning based on fear of damaged reputation.

As mentioned earlier, the Kennedy administration was conscious of the detrimental consequences that the unsuccessful invasion attempt had on U.S. prestige. Although optimistic about its recoverability, a feeling of diminished

71 FRUS, Doc 223; Doc 202.
73 FRUS, Doc 202.
74 FRUS, Doc 206.
75 FRUS, Doc 184.
76 President Kennedy in FRUS, Doc 204.
77 Ibid.; FRUS, Doc 206.
esteem crept through the ranks of the decision makers (marked in Figure 10.8 as *feeling less admired*). The CIA figured that the Cuban opposition’s confidence in the U.S. government had been shaken, as was the confidence of American allies in the country’s wisdom and ability to help them. Following a series of meetings with his European counterparts, the President’s Special Assistant reached a similar conclusion: U.S. friends had lost confidence in the administration’s “intelligence and responsibility.” In a memorandum to the President, the Special Assistant cited a few of the commentaries that he had heard during his trip to Europe, all reflecting an overall feeling of “disillusionment.”

As evident from the emotional structure presented here, two additional feelings were produced from the decision-makers’ awareness of having failed and having made a mistake. The initial *shock* that had overwhelmed the administration persisted into the so-called soon after phase. The *feeling of ineffectiveness* is also not new, and confirms the perception of a series of setbacks as a triggering source. In the current phase, it is also provoked by a perception of having unnecessarily strengthened one’s adversary as a result of one’s own actions. According to the JCS, the abortive invasion “had the effect of strengthening the control held by the Castro government, instilling confidence and loyalty in the militia.” The CIA reached a similar conclusion, noting that the Cuban leader was “stronger than ever.”

Similar to the behavior surrounding *lessons learned* described in the previous phase, U.S. decision-makers continued pushing forward a series of bureaucratic

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*Figure 10.8. The emotional structure of feeling less admired, shocked and ineffective.*

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78 FRUS, Doc 223; “Consequences for the United States of.”
79 FRUS, Doc 196.
80 Ibid.
82 FRUS, Doc 178.
83 “Consequences for the United State of.”
changes and policy evaluation. *Shunning intervention elsewhere* was an unexpected policy outcome of the failed operation in Cuba. A preference for negotiations in Laos and increased military assistance to South Vietnam took shape instead. In *A Thousand Days*, Arthur Schlesinger remembers that “chastened by the Bay of Pigs” the JCS declined to guarantee the success of a military operation in Laos short of the use of nuclear weapons.  

84 The Secretary of State also expressed a predilection for settling the Laos question “without a major escalation of the fighting.”  

85 John F. Kennedy’s final decision was to leave the adversary with “an honorable alternative to fighting,” opening the way to a negotiated settlement. In a conversation with Schlesinger, he exclaimed: “If it hadn’t been for Cuba, we might be about to intervene in Laos.”  

86 Therefore, failure had at least a short-term effect on propensity for aggression.

**MEDIUM TO LONG-TERM PHASE (JUNE 1961–1962)**

As Snapshot Map 10.3 reveals, a combination of anxiety and determination continued to dominate the decision-makers’ affective blend throughout 1961. The former stemmed mostly from the perception of Castro as continuously strengthening his position; the latter from a succession of foreign policy setbacks (Cuba, Laos, and the space race) and a desire to set the record straight. Contrary to the previous phase, where anxiety was the leading feeling, determination turned into the most common feeling in the long-term phase. Feeling threatened had become secondary and mostly related to the perceived threat that an ambitious dictator such as Castro posed to Latin America. In this phase, Kennedy’s advisors seemed to have realized that the United States had not lost that much prestige after all, as the feeling of being less admired had disappeared. Nevertheless, their concern for the U.S. good name had risen, as demonstrated by their heightened fear of a damaged reputation.

The related policy behavior was to lie low and avoid appearing warlike, while quietly working along two major policy tracks. The “overt track” was designed to punish Castro by isolating him from the hemispheric community; it involved mainly diplomatic policy instruments, such as intense lobbying among the OAS members and increased development assistance for Latin America. Nevertheless, it was the “covert track” that was at the heart of the administration’s Cuban policy. It was directed at harassing Castro’s regime through a variety of clandestine activities (e.g., subversion, propaganda, and paramilitary activities) and informal methods.


FOE
- Ambitious dictator
- Playing dirty; Not that important/strong; Malevolent; Powerful

ACT
- Failure
- Mistake
- Defeat

CONDITIONS
- Strengthening position of adversary
- Favorable developments; Success
- Time pressure
- Political opposition
- Weakening position of adversary

FEELINGS
- Determined
- Anxious
- Afraid of damaged reputation
- Optimistic
- Threatened
- Shocked
- Hopeful
- Relieved
- Frustrated
- Dissatisfied

CONSEQUENCES
- Lessons learned
- Looking weak
- Strengthened adversary
- Loss of prestige
- Looking stupid; Deteriorated international security

IMPLICATIONS
- A series of setbacks
- Threat to regional security
- Expected difficulties
- Threat to reputation
- A messy situation
- Unfortunate mix of circumstances; insufficiently prepared; A dangerous situation; A setback; Inactivity; Threat of strategic influence

IMPLICATIONS
- A series of setbacks
- Threat to regional security
- Expected difficulties
- Threat to reputation
- A messy situation
- Unfortunate mix of circumstances; insufficiently prepared; A dangerous situation; A setback; Inactivity; Threat of strategic influence

REACTION TO NEGATIVE INPUT
- Summarizable
- Diffusing responsibility
- Identifiable culprit
- Good may come out of failure; Complaining of unfair treatment

JUSTIFICATION FOR ACTION
- No alternative

POLICY CHARACTER & OBJECTIVES
- Topple regime
- Learn from one’s mistakes
- Wait & see, Do nothing
- Do something
- Preserve image
- Act now
- Don’t allow another mistake

POLICY MEANS
- Subversion
- Propaganda
- Economic pressure
- Development assistance
- Multilateral solution (non-UN)
- Opposition support
- Bureaucratic reorganization
- Military assistance
- Build international support
- Adopt new methods; Negotiations; Threaten; International political pressure

POSSIBLE / CONDITIONAL POLICY MEANS
- Intervention elsewhere
- Embargo

UNDESIRABLE / UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED POLICY MEANS
- Subversion; Blockade; Multilateral solution (non-UN)

for economic pressure (e.g., depriving Cuba of markets, discouraging businesses to work with Castro, and so on).

The feelings of optimism and hope persisted, and even were augmented, as a result of a series of policy steps that were considered reasonably successful (the Laos ceasefire, Kennedy’s first foreign trip to Canada, and the stand-off against the Soviets in Berlin). The prevalent belief that Castro could still be overthrown further added to the administration’s optimism. There were frequent references to the past shock from the Cuban fiasco but mostly in relation to designing policies to absorb it. Generally, intervention in Cuba was off the table, although intervention elsewhere remained a policy option throughout the reviewed period.

Zooming into the relationships connecting some of these feelings and their antecedents and consequences, Figure 10.9 presents the most salient emotional structure in the medium- to long-term phase. The “April failure” had clearly not been forgotten, breeding anxiety among the Washington decision-makers. Even years after the invasion, members of the Kennedy administration continued to refer to the Bay of Pigs as “a total and utter disaster,” “a fiasco,” and “a total debacle.” The major source of the decision-makers’ anxiety was by far their perception of Castro as continuously improving his position. In July 1961, a Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board estimated that the Cuban ground forces were “better equipped than those of any other Latin American country,” owing to extensive Soviet bloc military assistance. Reports also indicated that Castro continued to enjoy “considerable popular support” in the country, and would only increase his

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Figure 10.9. The emotional structure of feeling threatened, anxious and determined.

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87 FRUS, Doc 230, Letter from the Chairman of the Cuba Study Group (Taylor) to President Kennedy, June 13.


power in the near future.\textsuperscript{90} One of the most alarming developments was reported by the Chief of Operations Helms to the newly appointed CIA Director McCone in early 1962. According to his memorandum, progress in Cuba toward a police and Communist state was more rapid than that made by any country in Eastern Europe in an equivalent period of time.\textsuperscript{91} The “rapidity of advance” sparked anxiety as well as \textit{determination} to “attack the Cuban problem.”\textsuperscript{92} In a conversation with his brother, President Kennedy was cited as saying that “the final chapter on Cuba ha[d] not been written.” This same memorandum conveyed the Attorney General’s explicit instructions in this regard: “it’s got to be done and will be done”; no time, money, effort, or manpower was to be spared.\textsuperscript{93}

As indicated in Figure 10.9, this determination to “turn the tide” was partially the result of the series of setbacks that the administration had suffered in its first months in office. As Walt Rostow reasoned quite a few years later, Kennedy knew that “Laos compounded on Cuba and Berlin compounded on Laos.”\textsuperscript{94} In a letter to the President that accompanied the Cuba Study Group Report on the Bay of Pigs, General Taylor expressed the Group’s impression that the United States was “losing today on many fronts.”\textsuperscript{95} In his oral history interview, Chester Bowles put forward a more personal motivation behind the President’s “desire to be tough and resolute.”\textsuperscript{96} According to the former Under Secretary of State, Kennedy wanted to demonstrate to Khrushchev after their rough encounter in Vienna in June 1961 that “he wasn’t just a young, weak, wobbly man” and “that he could be tough too.”\textsuperscript{97}

As noted in Figure 10.9, determination also came in response to expected difficulties in the “long struggle” against Communism.\textsuperscript{98} On the one hand, the military considered the taking of Cuba doable, although “more and more difficult.”\textsuperscript{99} On the other hand, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Rostow warned that the administration was heading into “crucial months of crisis” in which “two defensive battles” had to be won: Berlin would have to be held against the Russians, and the Communists would have to be turned back in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{100} The

\textsuperscript{90} Lansdale in FRUS, Doc 279, Editorial Note, Early Nov, 1961; Doc 253, Admiral Burke in Memorandum for the Record, Jul 26, 1961.
\textsuperscript{91} Memorandum for CIA Director (McCone), Jan 19, 1962, in Blight and Kornbluh, \textit{Politics of Illusion}, 246–248.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Rostow, Oral History Interview, 56.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} Bowles, Chester B., Oral History Interview, JFK#1, February 2, 1965, JFKL, 52.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{99} FRUS, Doc 253.
dyadic relationship between anxiety and determination is manifest in both Admiral Burke’s and Rostow’s words.

In terms of policy behavior, determination tends to be followed by a desire to show resolve. In his account of the Kennedy years, Chester Bowles linked the President’s determination to his willingness to prove that the United States “couldn’t get pushed around.” Although probably influenced by his boss’ views, James Thomson, Bowles’ assistant, also believed that the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the subsequent “traumatic” meeting in Vienna “created an atmosphere in which President Kennedy undoubtedly felt under special pressure to show his nation’s mettle.” They also both connected the Bay of Pigs to the subsequent U.S. involvement in Vietnam. According to Bowles, Kennedy’s decision to send 16,000 military advisors there was a “reaction to the humiliation of the Bay of Pigs.” Thomson similarly claimed that Vietnam was chosen as the place to play tough because “the Vietnamese, unlike the people of Lao, were willing to fight”. As mentioned earlier, Rostow was pointing to the same policy option in a memorandum to the President, arguing that Vietnam could be used as a way of demonstrating that “wars of national liberation could and would be defeated.” This method is represented in Figure 10.9 as intervention elsewhere.

The most pronounced behavioral consequence linked to determination was indisputably the administration’s zeal to overthrow Castro. In a memorandum to McCone summarizing Helm’s meeting with Robert Kennedy, the CIA Chief of Operations reported that “a solution to the Cuban problem” was to carry “top priority.” The available documentation on the government’s Cuban policy demonstrates that Castro’s overthrow remained high on the agenda at least from Taylor’s report in June 1961 until the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The Study Group chaired by General Taylor concluded that “no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor” was possible. In his program review, General Lansdale also reiterated the government’s goal “to help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.” According to Garry Wills, the clandestine

101 Bowles, Oral History Interview, 52.
102 CRS Interview with James C. Thomson in Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, footnote, 64.
103 Bowles, Oral History Interview, 52.
104 Thomson in Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, footnote, 64.
106 Memorandum from the Attorney General (Kennedy) to CIA Director (McCone) in Blight and Kornbluh, Politics of Illusion, 247.
107 FRUS, Doc 234, Memorandum No.4 from the Cuba Study Group to President Kennedy, June 13, 1961.
programs against Castro, including assassination attempts – involving poisonous cigars, pills, needles, and so on – were only discontinued after Kennedy’s death, when Lyndon Johnson came into office.\textsuperscript{109}

In the months following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Robert Kennedy became the driving force behind secret committees, such as the Special Group for Counter-Insurgency and the Special Group Augmented. The former was set up to oppose Communist-inspired regimes and develop guerrilla warfare skills within the Special Forces;\textsuperscript{110} the latter exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose – the program meant to overthrow the Castro regime without overt U.S. military commitment.\textsuperscript{111} This program came to represent the essence of the U.S. Cuban policy in the next year and a half. Specifically, the Attorney General suggested “to stir things up on the island with espionage, sabotage, general disorder, run and operated by Cubans themselves.”\textsuperscript{112} Small, covert operations were at the heart of Mongoose, making use of psychological warfare (e.g., work stoppages, slow-downs, and leaflet dropping), building internal resistance (agent training, infiltration/exfiltration, and supplying ammunition, food, and clothing to existing guerrilla elements), and mostly carrying out sabotage operations, such as burning cane fields, blowing railroad bridges, blowing up factories and oil storage tanks, and other acts.\textsuperscript{113} The Attorney General ordered that all possible actions were attempted as long as they were deemed conducive to creating dissensions within Cuba and discrediting the Castro regime.\textsuperscript{114} As Richard Helms, CIA Chief of Operations, explained in a memo to the Agency’s newly appointed director McConne, the idea was to “keep Castro so busy with internal problems” that he would have “no time for meddling abroad.”\textsuperscript{115}

Even before the launching of Operation Mongoose in November 1961, the President’s Special Assistant Counsel had already presented the concept of “commando operations” in a series of memoranda to the President. Goodwin argued that such operations were “the only effective way to handle an all-out attack on the Cuban problem,”\textsuperscript{116} thus recommending the stepping up of paramilitary

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 257.
\textsuperscript{111} Harvey in Blight and Kornbluh, Politics of Illusion, 251–252.
\textsuperscript{112} FRUS, Doc 279, Editorial Note, Handwritten Notes by the Attorney General, Nov 7, 1961.
\textsuperscript{114} FRUS, Doc 275, Memorandum for the Record, November 22, 1961.
\textsuperscript{115} Memorandum from the Chief of Operations (Helms) to the CIA Director (McConne) in Blight and Kornbluh, Politics of Illusion, 246–248.
\textsuperscript{116} FRUS, Doc 269, Memorandum from the President’s Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy, November 1, 1961.
activities involving revolutionary groups, the destruction of targets important to the Cuban economy, and the conduct of psychological warfare. The “beauty” of such operations was that the United States could not lose: “if the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at least we will emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda, and a far clearer idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect us.”

The policy steps described here derive from the feeling of determination described earlier, and are denoted in Figure 10.9 as subversion. Its complementary linkage to propaganda and military assistance to guerrillas stands for the auxiliary function that these methods had in the administration’s subversion plans. The policy means related to anxiety are much less clear, although the policy thrust is relatively unambiguous. In the first place, the administration was to do something about the situation. At a meeting with General Lansdale, Robert Kennedy urged for “immediate dynamic action” in Cuba. CIA Director McCone supported the Attorney General’s stance, but emphasized that the “action should not be reckless.” This type of reasoning constituted the second major policy trend within the administration: to strive not to allow another mistake. In a memorandum discussing policy regarding Berlin, Arthur Schlesinger expressed “the collective concern” about the possibility of repeating the same planning and policy framing mistakes as in April. In recalling the post-Bay of Pigs months, Richard Helms also spoke of the administration’s attempts to stay away from trouble. In his words, “nobody had any stomach anymore for any invasions or any military fiascos.” According to Elie Abel, a news correspondent who wrote a book on the missile crisis, people close to the Kennedys described the President’s attitude in a similar fashion: “There will be no more disasters, I’ve got to be very careful about what I do.”

Lastly, a quick note should be made with regard to feeling threatened. As mentioned earlier, this feeling was much less pronounced in the medium- to long-term phase

117 FRUS, Doc 258, Memorandum from the President’s Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy, September 1, 1961; Doc 256, Memorandum from Goodwin to the President, August 22, 1961.
118 FRUS, Doc 269.
119 FRUS, Doc 275, Memorandum for the Record, November 22, 1961.
120 Ibid.
121 The memo discussed the so-called Acheson paper in particular, warning against the excessive concentration on military and operational problems and the inadequate consideration of political issues and negotiations as an alternative. According to Schlesinger, the President was often faced with policy options framed in hard policy/soft policy terms (e.g., “Are you chicken or not?” and “put-up-or-shut-up” types of options). He reiterated that such fear need not constrain free discussion of Berlin (Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 349–351).
123 Abel, Oral History Interview, 4.
as the government estimated that Castro did not realistically pose a direct national security threat. However, the regional security aspect of his regime was frequently stressed, as indicated in Figure 10.9. For instance, Taylor’s report noted that Castro’s “continued presence within the hemispheric community” constituted “a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics.” Similar concerns were expressed by the President in a conversation with Senator Kubitschek of Brazil, the U.S. representative to the OAS Morrison, and the Ad Hoc Committee of the United States Intelligence Board. The latter saw Castro’s regime in the context of a larger Sino-Soviet plan to establish Cuba as “a secure base of operations,” and thus “weaken, and eventually destroy” U.S. influence throughout the world.

While such concern for the country’s strategic influence was present to a certain extent, it was mostly fear for the country’s reputation that preoccupied the U.S. decision-makers in the medium to long term. As the President shared with his Argentinean and Brazilian counterparts, it was “important not to leave the impression of the United States, great imperialist power from the North, attacking poor, brave Cuba.” To this end, he suggested isolating Cuba and increasing its economic problems as much as possible, while avoiding any direct controversy.

Therefore, the U.S. government undertook a three-pronged strategy of isolating Castro diplomatically, publicly ignoring him, while secretly dedicating significant time and effort toward his eventual removal from power. In a memorandum to the CIA Director, Richard Helms called this approach “better to lay low.” Special Counsel Goodwin offered the President similar advice in proposing a “quiet public posture.” The policy objective was to preserve the U.S. image, which genuinely tipped the policy preference to covert means which “avoid any appearance of U.S. Government control or ultimate responsibility.” Any direct action was undesirable as it might “easily be regarded as a positive threat to the independence, sovereignty and fight to self-determination of nations in the Hemisphere.” As indicated in

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125 FRUS, Doc 234.
127 FRUS, Doc 245.
128 FRUS, Doc 264, Memorandum of Conversation between President Kennedy and President Frondizi, September 26, 1961.
129 Ibid.; FRUS, Doc 263.
130 FRUS, Doc 250, 256, 258, 263, 264, 275.
131 Memorandum for the CIA Director (McGone) in Blight and Kornbluh, Politics of Illusion, 246–248.
132 FRUS, Doc 258 and 256.
133 FRUS, Doc 273.
134 FRUS, Doc 263.
Figure 10.10, economic pressure had to be stepped up, although an embargo was undesirable as it would imply “declaring war on the Cuban people.”  

Feeling optimism and hope has been an interesting feature that appeared in the first days of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and never disappeared from the U.S. decision-makers’ emotional structures. As apparent from Figure 10.11, the unsuccessful rebel invasion continued to be associated with loss of prestige which, in turn, continued to be looked upon as “serious but repairable.”  

However, a new source of optimism was uncovered, stemming from positive appraisal of the administration’s subsequent foreign policy steps (coded as favorable developments). According to Walt Rostow, “the first favorable break” that gave Kennedy “a breather” was the ceasefire in Laos, achieved even “without having actually to put troops in.”  

A second recovery came via the President’s successful Canadian trip, “a first exercise in going abroad.”  

Berlin came later, which showed that the Russians were taking the U.S. military buildup seriously. Finally, the President had begun “to pull Latin America around into facing the problem of indirect aggression.” In return for hemispheric

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135 The President’s News Conference as of Nov 8, 1961, Doc 455 in Public Papers of the Presidents, 704; see also FRUS, Doc 256 and Doc 240, Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy, June 28, 1961.


137 Rostow, Oral History Interview, 56 and 126–128.

138 Ibid., 126–128.

139 Ibid.
cooperation, and as an instrument of preventing the further spread of Communism, the administration pushed forward with the Alliance for Progress program, denoted on Figure 10.11 as development assistance.\textsuperscript{140}

Both Sorensen and Rostow thought that the President felt relieved by the fact that the Bay of Pigs failure eliminated the military option in Laos (marked as intervention elsewhere – wrong). In a conversation with Ted Sorensen, John Kennedy was remembered as saying: “Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did. Otherwise we’d be in Laos by now – and that would be a hundred times worse.”\textsuperscript{141} In his oral history interview, Walt Rostow also expressed an opinion that the fiasco prevented Kennedy from doing what “he passionately didn’t want to do,” to put troops “in an area half way round the world.”\textsuperscript{142}

\textit{Hypothesis Generation, Clustering, and Macro Mapping}

This analysis points to an emotional syndrome whose exact label has remained unclear so far. To deal with this taxonomic difficulty, knowledge is tapped from other social sciences, which have extensively studied emotions at the individual level. The review of relevant literature hints at embarrassment as the emotion that comes most closely to the symptoms observed in the Bay of Pigs. Specifically, psychologists and sociologists have defined embarrassment as an unintended transgression of social standards that represents a threat to one’s public image.\textsuperscript{143} It does not undermine an individual’s general identity but rather involves loss of situational self-esteem. Common triggers include faux pas, accidents, and mistakes; whereas fear of being seen as lacking certain collectively valued attributes is a common accompanying feeling. Four steps to feeling embarrassed have been identified: (1) a disruption of social interaction; (2) apprehension of social evaluation; (3) inconsistency with self-image; and (4) temporary loss of self-esteem.\textsuperscript{144} The last step is relatively short-lived as embarrassment in principle involves a situation that can be put right. Three main reactions are possible: (1) trying to conceal; (2) trying to excuse; and (3) trying to repress the event.\textsuperscript{145}


\textsuperscript{141} President Kennedy to Sorensen in Gibbons, \textit{The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War}, 26.

\textsuperscript{142} Rostow, Oral History Interview, 126–128.


Based on this description and the empirical analysis conducted so far, it is assumed that embarrassment would comprise of at least four clusters of emotional sequences, which should be observable in the three affective maps: (1) an incident cluster that includes feelings that convey the “disruption” part of the definition; (2) an apprehension cluster related to threat to one’s public image; (3) a discrepancy cluster reflecting the “inconsistency” and “loss of self-esteem” aspects; and (4) a recuperation cluster leading to at least one of the three possible reactions to embarrassment. A feeling of optimism would accompany them all, standing for the “something that can be put right” part of the definition.

To verify the validity of these suppositions, the homologies between the different clusters of feelings and the analogies to such clusters at the individual level are used to label the emotion observed. In so doing, the antecedents and consequences of the feelings identified in the snapshot maps are compared as a way of establishing common links. Those feelings that show a partial overlap and are relevant to the cluster theme are named core feelings. Core feelings constitute the building blocks of a cluster. Feelings which possess at least one common antecedent or consequence with a core feeling but are likely to make part of other clusters, or result in a variety of policies when blended with other feelings, are termed peripheral feelings. Peripheral feelings are not constitutive of a cluster but add some important nuances. A feeling may be a core feeling in one cluster and a peripheral feeling in another. Feelings that persist throughout an emotional episode are labeled permanent feelings.

Macro Map 10.1 visualizes the result of this clustering exercise in which feelings from the three affective maps have been grouped by means of identifying common antecedents and consequences, matching their relevance to the key characteristics of embarrassment and delineating a policy trend.

As a result, it has been established that embarrassment in international relations comprises four clusters of feelings. The incident cluster is made up of feeling shocked, bewildered, embarrassed, and beaten down (with feeling anxious, disappointed, and frustrated functioning as peripheral feelings). It constitutes the emotional representation of a sudden, unexpected event caused by a mistake or an accident that disrupts an actor’s social interactions. The failed Cuban invasion was such an event of inadvertent nature, which was perceived as an aberration.

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146 The differentiation made between prestige and reputation should be reiterated here. For better clarity, issues related to power and standing have been regarded as prestige-related, whereas those pertaining to legal and moral norms as reputation-related. For instance, concern that allies would consider the United States untrustworthy in keeping its security promises would be coded as a “threat to prestige,” whereas concern that the U.S. image at the United Nations would suffer as a result of having been caught lying would be considered “a threat to reputation.” Decision-makers and the elite care for both prestige and reputation, but when in a difficult situation, they tend to put more weight on one than the other. Because loss in both of these intangible assets can provoke inconsistency with one’s public image and loss of self-esteem, it is believed that they can both induce embarrassment.
or an inept act. The second cluster is centered on feelings related to a looming hazard (feeling threatened and anxious) or to the anticipated judgments of others (fear of losing prestige, fear of damaged reputation). Concern for one’s safety and/or public image is the central theme of this so-called apprehension cluster. Feeling determined, scornful, and worried have been found to be associated with its core feelings. The discrepancy cluster comes third, and is where the expected negative social evaluation has turned into perception of reality. Fear of losing prestige and fear of damaged reputation are replaced by feeling less admired and discredited, and the feelings related to safety are superseded by feelings related to performance (disappointment, embarrassment). Feeling dissatisfied, ineffective, indignant, and guilty have been found to be complementary feelings. This cluster both expresses a proven inconsistency between beliefs and facts about an actor’s self-image and
indicates negative appraisal and a related loss of self-esteem. Finally, the recuperation cluster is indispensable for identifying whether or not embarrassment is at work. Because the latter is supposed to cause only a temporary loss of self-esteem, feelings indicative of recovery of self-confidence should be observable, such as determination, strength, satisfaction, hope and optimism. The last two have been discovered to take part in all four clusters, hence their label as permanent feelings. Hope and optimism are further considered key to spotting embarrassment as they stand for a belief that any damage to one’s public image is only temporary and that the triggering event does not reveal any major flaw.

The three behavioral features that social scientists have determined – trying to conceal, excuse, or repress – have been confirmed by the empirical analysis of embarrassment at the state level. In the short term, a series of attempts to conceal an embarrassing event have been detected: masking a failure through a rhetorical emphasis on learning (e.g., the Bay of Pigs failure was largely presented as a lesson learned); and lying low while showing continuous resolve (e.g., ignoring Castro while showing determination in Berlin). Another concealing technique discovered is a tendency to orient policy toward avoiding another mistake, which has been embodied in Kennedy’s decision not to intervene in Laos. It has further been ascertained that policy behavior leans toward excusing an embarrassing event in the medium to long term (i.e., blaming it on situational factors, such as conditions beyond one’s control). In the long term, policy is indicative of an attempt to repress. For example, the initiation of Operation Mongoose constituted an attempt to redress the committed mistake and achieve success through covert means, whereas the U.S. increased involvement in Vietnam was partially aimed at proving one’s strength and capacity in other areas. Overall, embarrassment tends to provoke a policy of restraint in the short term which, depending on the prevailing feelings related to one’s image (i.e., fear of losing prestige vs. fear of damaged reputation) may transform into a policy of resolve in the medium term. Policy is almost certain to take such a direction in the long term.

In other words, not only are the constitutive elements of embarrassment identifiable in the Bay of Pigs case, but so are the typical behavioral patterns that characterize the emotion. The incident reminds of a situation in which a person claiming to be the best juggler in town suddenly makes a wrong move and lets a ball fall on the ground. Unsure of whether someone has noticed, he quickly picks it up and goes on as if nothing has happened. Upon realizing that everyone in town has actually witnessed the faux pas, a desire to show off and restore one’s image as the best juggler emerges, coupled with a terrorizing feeling of uncertainty whether he will manage to do the trick successfully this time, or will only convince the public that he is a regular juggler after all. This is an example of embarrassment at the personal level.
In the Bay of Pigs episode, the United States looks like this juggler who realizes that he has suddenly found himself in the spotlight of public attention. Despite the immediate temptation to strike Cuba, a sobering thought of cautiousness sneaks into the American reasoning. At this stage, the Kennedy administration seems haunted by fears of committing another mistake or suffering another defeat. Another failure would unquestionably convince allies, adversaries, and the rest of the world that the United States is not as potent and capable as it claims, and that it does not deserve its current leadership status. The variations along the apprehension and discrepancy variables indicate that those decision-makers who supported a more aggressive policy path were the ones who felt embarrassed of the United States not meeting prestige-related expectations (i.e., power-based factors). The other group of actors preached for rooting U.S. foreign policy into methods based on principles and favored a non-belligerent policy line. They equally felt embarrassed but because the United States did not meet certain reputation-related expectations (i.e., moral standards, respect for international norms).

The proposed policies have ultimately converged on a firm but publicly non-belligerent policy response aimed at showing determination while avoiding any hasty acts. Covert aggression, or subversion, has become central to the Kennedy administration’s Cuban policy as a way of showing resolve to the domestic constituency while preserving the country’s image as a non-imperialist, law-abiding nation. Overt aggression has been avoided, although deemed acceptable as a way of showing success elsewhere. This policy mixture is an attempt to contain the damage done to one’s image by presenting the event as an aberration as opposed to a fundamental flaw in U.S. capacity. The serious contingency planning that has been ordered can be viewed as intended to prevent another failure, in case it comes to the undesirable but possible option of military intervention. The longer-term assertive behavior is conducive to a more belligerent policy stance aimed at making up for past mistakes and regaining any losses.

CONCLUSION: THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF EMOTIONAL ANALYSIS

While the Bay of Pigs case study has primarily been used as a tool to define embarrassment in foreign policy decision-making and to test the affective mapping method, it has also revealed the benefits of examining historical events through an emotional lens. The value of such an approach is not in explaining or retelling what happened in a particular foreign policy episode but in providing a better sense of the rationale behind the policies that have been undertaken but which seem contradictory at first glance. For example, the archival material indicated that the Kennedy administration undertook a two-pronged policy of lying low and showing resolve after the Bay of Pigs failure, which may initially seem conflicting but is
Emotions in Foreign Policy Decision Making

absolutely coherent once fear of damaged reputation and fear of losing prestige are inserted into the decision-making logic. The two policy tracks constituted an attempt to reconcile the two feelings in a single policy action. Similarly, it may seem puzzling that the Kennedy administration put off any plans to intervene in Laos but increased its military involvement in Vietnam later. The rationale for choosing a public policy of ignoring Castro and a covert policy of harassing him may also seem unclear.

Examining the post-Bay of Pigs U.S. policy from the point of view of embarrassment answers these questions and straightens out the contradictions. Specifically, an actor who is embarrassed finds himself standing in the spotlight of public attention with a stained image and growing doubts about his superiority. Such an actor will avoid steps that can lead to another mistake, but also will try to prove his excellence whenever he feels ready for such a prestige-restoring act in the future.

The empirical analysis unveiled the United States as such an embarrassed actor who unexpectedly found himself in the center of world attention once the U.S. role in the Cuban invasion came to light. As the sole contestant to Soviet power and the security provider for a large network of allies and clients, the United States was particularly sensitive to issues related to global leadership (i.e., meeting others’ expectations, maintaining credibility in its determination to fight Communism, and maintaining confidence in its capacity). This susceptibility had allegedly made the United States a more emotionally predisposed actor on the world scene. Throughout the cold war, U.S. decision-makers had zealously tried to preserve the country’s image of a norm-abiding, non-imperialist, anti-colonial power. The exposure of U.S. involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion not only revealed a serious violation of internationally established norms (e.g., principle of sovereignty, non-interference, and so on), but it also pointed to major inconsistencies in the U.S. projected image of invincibility.

As a result, some of the decision-makers felt embarrassed as the event cast a shadow on U.S. reputation for high moral standards and respect for international norms. They favored a non-belligerent policy line toward Castro, and demanded rooting U.S. foreign policy in methods based on principles, such as development assistance. The others also felt embarrassed but for prestige-related reasons as the military fiasco had raised doubts about U.S. preparedness and invincibility among allies and foes. This group of actors leaned toward a more aggressive policy line but was haunted by fear of another defeat that would turn their doubts into beliefs. Therefore, embarrassment can ultimately explain the firm but publicly non-belligerent policy response which took shape, centered on covert action against Castro as a way of showing resolve to the domestic constituency and an overt non-aggression designed to maintain the country’s international image. Embarrassment can further explain Kennedy’s decision to bracket intervention in Cuba or Laos to avoid another failure which would convince allies and adversaries alike that the United States was not as
potent and capable as it claimed to be. It also gives an explanation of the subsequent refocusing on Vietnam that was flagged in post-Bay of Pigs memoranda as a possible theater in which the United States could show success and reassert its prestige. In this sense, an analytical model based on emotions can explain policy shifts that have marked turning points in interstate relations as well as shed new light on key episodes of twentieth-century diplomatic history.

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Conclusion

A Few Suggestions for a Future Research Program on Emotions and Passions in International Politics

Jean-Marc Coicaud

Mainstream scholarship in international relations has a lot of qualities. The fact that it overlooks emotions and passions, however, represents a major weakness. Against this background I would like to outline four suggestions toward integrating emotions and passions in the study of international relations: mainstreaming emotions and passions in international relations; developing a more systematic and systemic analysis of emotions and passions in international relations; promoting institutional change in the ways international relations are taught and studied; and encouraging the inclusion of emotions and passions in international political theory.

Mainstreaming Emotions and Passions in International Relations

At the most general level, ensuring that emotions and passions become part of the research and teaching curricula of international relations would certainly be helpful. For this to happen, three prerequisites would need to be met.

First, it would be necessary to make a thorough appraisal of the limitations of mainstream scholarship in international relations concerning psychology in general, and emotions and passions in particular, including their hidden assumptions and contradictions in this regard. Second, the added value produced by studying emotions and passions in international politics would certainly benefit from a compelling model of study which could be applied to various cases. Third, in order for these developments to be reflected in the production and transmission of knowledge in international affairs, there would be a need for an institutional change.

1 On this, see also in this volume Richard Ned Lebow, “Foreword.”
2 Ibid.
3 The various chapters dealing with case studies in Part II of this volume show the value of bringing together theory and concrete cases.
to make the field of study better equipped for present and future demands, especially from the intellectual, professional and policy standpoints.

**A MORE SYSTEMATIC AND SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS IN IR**

A model of study able to factor in emotions and passions and show the resulting additional value requires a more sophisticated understanding of the social character of international life than the one endorsed by traditional international relations scholarship. The bottom line is that self-interest and attempts to prevail over others are certainly part of international politics, but they are too narrow to claim to represent the whole.  

4 There is more than this to international relations. Although international life by no means displays the high level of socialization that can be found in smaller groups, it is not a socially bare land. This is all the more the case considering that globalization, in its various forms, has resulted in societies being increasingly intertwined, a process that is bound to have social and emotional emotional impact.  

5 With this in mind, I suggest a three layered approach aimed at understanding emotions and passions in relation with other key characteristics of international affairs. The first layer would stress and explain that societies and their members are prone to interact internationally through a system not only of values and norms, but also of emotions and passions. The second layer would unpack inter- and intra-state relations. The third layer would focus on the study of the nexus of time, memory, emotions and passions on the international stage. Let us look at these approaches in greater detail.

First layer: Examining international relations as part of an emotional system may constitute a step toward a socially comprehensive and, consequently, more satisfactory conception and analysis of international politics.  

6 This could take place in four steps. First, one would have to show how the emotions and passions that are elicited by international actors’ are defined by values, norms, laws, power distribution and organization that, when connected in a system, define standards of behavior, thinking and feeling. Second, this could lead to show how emotions, passions and their corresponding actions, including collective and individual actions, and public and private actions, are related to a dominant

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4 As Albert O. Hirschman puts it: “(F)or the only certain and predictable feature of human affairs is … the futility to reduce human action to a single motive – such as interest,” in *Rival Views on Market Society and Other Recent Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 53.

5 On this question, refer in particular to James M. Jasper, and Jocelyn Pixley in this volume.

6 Peter N. Stearns alludes to this in Chapter 2 in this volume, in the context of the question of change and emotions.
international culture. Third, demonstration could be made that this dominant
culture is usually associated with the culture of the hegemonic power(s) of the
period. Fourth, there is need to show how all this is liable to evolve, introducing
in the process changes in a given system or even a change of system/paradigm in
international relations.  

Second layer: A systematic examination of inter- and intra-state relations, which
would involve three levels of analysis, could be useful.

First, at the level of interstate relations, a review of the emotions and passions
elicited in the interactions between state-actors could serve as a starting point for
developing a typology of the various emotional and passionate regimes that exist on
the international scene. This could have two advantages. To begin with, it could
show that the feelings that states seek to elicit in their members through the values

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7 It would not be a new approach to examine how the different pieces (emotions, passions, values,
norms, laws, power distribution and organization) work and fit together in a social system that has also
a paradigmatic value (i.e., generates standards). Take for example the European thinkers at the roots
of Western modern democratic politics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To be sure, as
part of their battle against the old order, these thinkers put a premium on agency, be it the individual
in the national context or the state in the international context. But even the most committed thinkers
did not endorse a fully atomic, self-sustained and contained, and all-powerful conception of agency.
They did not assume that actors function and should function, nationally and internationally (in
specific ways at each level) in a “social no-man’s land.” While putting agency front and center, they
argued that this functioning takes place in a social system. They envisioned an enabling process,
designed to set, regulate and monitor empowerment, going both ways. On the one hand, agency was
meant for actors (individuals from the national point of view, and states from the international point of
view) to be able to contribute to the identification and implementation of the right; that is – optimal,
overall social system and its subsystems, and their institutions, including economic, civil, legal and
political institutions. On the other hand, the right social system and the institutions were intended
to make it feasible for agency (individual and state) to be realized as much as possible, including
in its role toward the optimization of the social system and the institutions in the service of agency.
Hence, nationally and internationally, their approach of agency and social reality in their diverse
aspects was done in an encompassing and holistic fashion. Refer in particular to Immanuel Kant,
To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, translated
by Ted Humphrey, 1985); and the remarks by Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at
the Collège de France, 1978–1979, Lecture 3. Hence, also, their dual concerns for anthropological
and social considerations. In particular, issues regarding individual agency – such as what it is to be
a human being, what it should be all about, and how a human being should relate to oneself, others
and the world – were echoed by and dovetailed with questions focusing on the right social system and
institutions. In contrast with this approach, over time and especially in the American social sciences,
this understanding and analysis of agency as socially embedded was more or less disregarded. In
international relations, the lower degree of integration compared to the national level facilitated this
orientation. The notions of (national) interest and of the state as a more or less stand-alone actor came
to illustrate and, in fact, assist the spread of a somewhat de-socialized, if not de-socializing conception
and analysis of international politics.

8 Richard Ned Lebow offers a typology of emotions and passions in A Cultural Theory of International
Relations, but – as we mentioned in a previous chapter – notwithstanding the formidable character of
his theory, what seems to be his universal use of Greek categories is problematic.
and meanings mobilized to promote a sense of collective identity contribute to motivate behavior. These feelings are certainly of a richer and wider variety than those to which mainstream scholarship tends to reduce international politics, namely the pursuit of interests and the quest for security. They evolve over time. They differ according to the forms of political regimes (for example, modern or not, Western or not, democratic or not), to the nature of the relationship (friends, allies or enemies, of similar power or not and so on) and the timing of the relationship (peace or war). 9

Second, at the intra-state level, one could seek to develop a typology of emotions and passions. 10 This could be done by defining the emotional regimes of specific societies with their overall organization and subcomponents, including social groups and their members. 11 The aim would be to shed light on how specific emotional (public and private) regimes correspond to particular (public and private) regimes of rights, and, ultimately, to various types of societies with their own social, economic and political regimes. 12

Third, one could bring together inter- and intra-state relations and analyze them in a dynamic manner. Studying the interactions between international and national regimes of emotions and passions could help, for example, to assess the importance of their mutual influence 13 and how this influence accounts for their evolution. Such inquiries could again be pursued at three levels. One could examine how

9 On this issue, see the Peter N. Stearns’s remarks in this volume.
10 Several authors refer to such a typology in their contribution to this volume and call for developing it further.
11 Pierre Bourdieu’s work, such as Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, translated by Richard Nice, 1987) and The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Fields of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, translated by Lauretta C. Clough, 1998), despite its often sociologically one-sided and deterministic orientation, offers insights on which to build. The work of Norbert Elias is also very useful in this regard.
13 Alexander Wendt gives an example of how significant it can be: “Collective self-esteem refers to a group’s need to feel good about itself, for respect or status. Self-esteem is a basic human need of individuals, and one of the things that individuals seek in group membership. As expressions of this desire groups acquire the need as well. Like other national interests it can be expressed in different ways. A key factor is whether collective self-images are positive or negative, which will depend in part on relationships to significant Others, since it is by taking the perspective of the Other that the Self sees itself. Negative self-images tend to emerge from perceived disregard or humiliation by other states, and as such may occur frequently in highly competitive international environments (the Germans after World War I? The Russians today?). Since groups cannot long tolerate such images if they are to meet the self-esteem needs of their members, they will compensate by self-assertion and/or devaluation and aggression toward the Other. Positive self-images, in contrast, tend to emerge from mutual respect and cooperation.” See Social Theory of International Polities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 236–237.
domestic elements enter into the fabric of the relationships that a country has with the “other,” inside and outside its borders. This could be done by analyzing how the emotions and passions associated with the individual and collective sense of self (and their matching values, rights, laws and so on) existing in a country domestically contribute to shape the interactions with, in the words of Alexander Wendt, “significant Others,” internally and in the context of its foreign policy. Another approach could be to focus on countries that are central to the international distribution of power and study their impact on the world scene. An example of case study could be how Western regimes of rights – national sovereignty, economic and individual rights – together with the emotional regimes related to them transformed the international landscape, including its emotional dimensions. This could lead to exploring how countries at the receiving end of events in history are affected and how they respond in emotional and other ways to this state of affairs.

Third layer: The last layer concerns the nexus of time, memory, emotions and passions. Taking seriously the social setting of international politics and the role played by emotions and passions play would benefit from introducing an important aspect of international relations: time and, consequently, memory as there is no time awareness without the constitution and perspective of temporality (past, present and future) that memory makes possible. In this regard, while quite a bit of attention

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14 In this volume, the reflections of Pierre de Senarclens on nationalism, and on nationalism and psychoanalysis, are useful.
15 Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 236.
16 The politics and policies of naturalization are part of this story. For instance, countries of immigration, and the possibility of naturalization they can entail (for example, in Europe and the United States), are likely to have a different vision of the “other” (and of themselves) than countries in which immigration is marginalized, and naturalization not a routine option. Such differences in the national culture of these countries are expressions of different visions of the world, and it is probable that they have some impact on their foreign policies. At a time when the international distribution of power is somewhat shifting beyond the West toward Asia (China in particular), this type of issues is worth studying as it could have interesting consequences on the future of international relations and world order.
17 Consult, for example, Norbert Elias, *The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York: Columbia University Press, translated from the German by Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell, 1996), for example Part III.
18 The international repercussions of revolutionary upheaval in France at the end of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century are an illustration of this situation. The emotions and passions at the core of the French Revolution, internally, became part of the international scene and contributed to redrawing it. See Mlada Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), and, more generally on these types of issues, see Philip Allott, *Eunomia: New Order for a New World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), for instance chapter 15.
has been given to this problem at the national level from the historical\textsuperscript{20} and, more broadly, philosophical\textsuperscript{21} and sociological\textsuperscript{22} perspectives, very little has been done at the international level. Yet, the dynamics at the core of the nexus is a key component of how actors (state-actors), based on the pressure of the international, see and interact with themselves, one another, and their environment. Thus, studying this nexus of time, meaning, emotions and passions would be a welcome addition to our understanding of international life.\textsuperscript{23}

This could be done in at least two ways. One way would be to start at the national level. Remembering or forgetting the past – which past and how – influences the present and future of identity, emotions, and passions (by either heightening or lessening them), and the actions and reactions of actors. This is especially relevant in the domestic “management” of relations with other nations. In particular, memorialization or denial of past crimes and humiliations endured by countries over decades, if not centuries, influence the way representatives of states and citizens feel, think and behave nationally and internationally.\textsuperscript{24} A complimentary approach would be to explore how power and the social, normative and emotional systems on which international politics is built are selective because the culture of the past, including the emotional culture of the past, emerges itself from a situation of hegemonic power and reflects the concerns of the hegemon accordingly.

ENCOURAGING THE EVOLUTION OF IR RESEARCH AND TEACHING INSTITUTIONS

Not surprisingly, these changes of approach would require major shifts in teaching and research practices. Five come to mind. First, we would need to cease being held captive by the domestic analogy and the beliefs that come with it (e.g., the idea of anarchy in the international sphere). At the international level, there is no absence of socialization. Socialization at the international level simply differs in nature and extent from the socialization that occurs at the national level. Second, agency, particularly state-agency, should be studied in holistic and systemic ways. Third, we


\textsuperscript{23} This would facilitate also the understanding of how trust and empathy, and dialogue and cooperation, occur. On this question, refer in this volume to, among others, Richard Ned Lebow and Naomi Head.

\textsuperscript{24} Peter Hays Gries addresses this issue for China in \textit{China’s New Nationalism. Pride, Politics and Diplomacy}. 
would need to consider that psychology, and – more specifically – psychoanalysis, can make important contributions to the study of international relations. Fourth, it would be important to factor in more historical and context-sensitive analyses of international life. Fifth, international relations as an academic field should be more interdisciplinary, in terms of both research and teaching. Failing this fifth point, it is unlikely that the other four shifts could ever take place.

EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY

These shifts would be of great benefit to the possibility of international political theory. Indeed, so far political theory has mostly been concerned with the national level. This can be seen in the fact that political philosophy has especially aimed at achieving justice internally, whether social, political, economic or cultural. International justice, let alone global justice, has been, at best, a secondary concern. This may have been good enough in the past. However, with globalization that has resulted in societies becoming increasingly interdependent and intertwined, this position is no longer sustainable. Fewer problems can now be tackled at a country level, and demands for addressing issues at the global level are rapidly increasing. Moreover, countries are less often self-contained owing to increasing hybridization of the national and international spheres. This state of affairs not only brings more emotions and passions, negative and positive, to the forefront of the discussion, but also enhances their importance and the need to understand them.

For it is not as if the growing role of emotions and passions resulting from globalization was pointing in one – exclusively positive – direction only. Globalization engenders both more integration and more disintegration. The ambiguous track record of previous waves of globalization in the course of history provides factual evidence of this. As a result, the world today is often torn between inclusive emotions and passions such as the ones related to empathy, solidarity, respect for others and peace, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, exclusionary emotions and passions such as those connected to discrimination and conflict. The oscillation between the two poles and all that rests between them is already unsettling. Nonetheless, as the horrors of the first half of the twentieth century show, the dangers arising from the possibility of exclusionary passions prevailing over inclusive passions are so grave that one should not underestimate the need to examine and understand the nature, role and evolution of emotions and passions in international relations. This examination and understanding of emotions and passions should take place in the context of the development of international political theory, or international moral and political philosophy.

25 See Pierre de Senarclens in this volume.
Indeed, overlooking the nature, role and evolution of emotions and passions in international relations would not simply be bad international political theory, or bad international moral and political philosophy; it could also lead to missing the chance to recognize what it takes for emotions and passions to contribute to the unyielding quest for peace. It could lead to an inability to nurture the emotions and passions of inclusiveness, and combat those exclusion.²⁶

²⁶ It is the very human and social need to nurture the emotions and passions of inclusiveness and combat exclusionary emotions and passions that has triggered the interest of the author in the question of emotions and passions.
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